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The premise of this dissertation sees western colonization in the last 500 years as the central 
factor in shaping modern reality today. In the regional context, it perceives of the Zionist project 
as a colonial enterprise in the Middle East, in addition to being a national liberation movement 
of European Jews. The theoretical premise of the research is based upon contemporary 
developments of postcolonial theory, especially among Latin-American social scientists, 
named by some, "the decolonial turn". The decolonial perspective is especially useful for 
conceptualizing social and political struggles of ethnic groups that have been oppressed by 
colonial power relations. The research uses the decolonial terminology to examine autonomous 
Mizrahi and Sephardic political organizations in Israel, in order to elicit decolonial aspects in 
their activity and discourse, and examine the conditions that limited their decolonial potential, 
as well as their activity at large.   
The research examines different political organizations of Sephardim and Mizrahim in Israel, 
from the establishment of the state of Israel until its territorial expansion in the Six Day War. 
The study is based on historical documents and newspapers of the different organizations, and 
focuses on the activity of the Council of the Sephardic Community of Jerusalem under the 
leadership of Eliahu Eliachar. 
The dissertation outlines a Mizrahi political field with a unique dynamic of its own, which at 
times diverged from the Ashkenazi political field in its interpretation of the social reality and 
in its reactions to Middle-Eastern political developments. The decolonial conceptualizations 
and tools were applied in the analysis of the discourse and practices of different political 
organizations within this field. The investigation focuses on the organizations' attempts to 
establish a collective identity for Sephardim and Mizrahim in Israel, and on their discourse and 
activity regarding the surrounding Arab countries, the Palestinian people and the Palestinian 
minority in Israel. The dissertation emphasizes seeds of decolonial thinking that emerged 
among certain activists and organizations in certain moments, and will also follow the 
multifaceted ways these organizations had been oppressed and marginalized.  
In the 1950s, the main independent political organization in this research is the Council of the 
Sephardic Community of Jerusalem, which attempted to represent the Sephardic and Mizrahi 
public in the parliament. The unique organizational culture of the Community Council will be 
examined, as well as the notions of honor that guided its politics. In these years the Sephardic 
border-thinking tilted towards western modernity, due to the animosity created between Israel 
and the Arab world. This sterilized any positive and reliable contents from the collective 
identity which this organization attempted to produce and represent.  
In the 1960s the Mizrahi political field diversified enormously, but the Zionist power structure 
vacated from meaning the organized Mizrahi action, recreating it as narrow "political ethnicity" 
focused on questions of representation. The restrictive political climate allowed for some 
activists' circles to develop discourse with decolonial characteristics, with the aim of 
influencing Mizrahi public discourse, rather than interceding directly in the Israeli political 
field. During this period, in the journal In the Battle, a vision of autochthonous eastern Zionism 
was developed, based on an aspiration for a Merger of Diasporas project as an "ecology of 
knowledges". This project urged for an Inner-Jewish dialogue that relied on the heritage of the 
Sephardic Golden Age as common to all Jews, and as the foundations from which to construct 
an intercultural Jewish state in Israel/Palestine.  
A separate examination is dedicated to the activity of the Iraqi cadre in the Israeli Communist 
Party until 1965. The rigid loyalty of the party to the USSR prevented the Iraqi cadre from 
advancing in the party, and from contributing to it their unique perspectives and skills, which 
were expressed during the Jewish-Arab split of the party.  
This dissertation aims to contribute to the development of the decolonial theoretical perspective 
in the context of the Middle East, and to the construction of a legacy of such thinking in Israel 
today.   
 תקציר
 האחרונות השנים מאות בחמש העולם שאר של המערבית הקולוניזציה את רואה זה מחקר של המוצא נקודת
 של כפרויקט תיהציונ התנועה את תופס המחקר, המקומי בהקשר. כיום המודרני העולם בעיצוב המרכזית כדינמיקה
 זה מחקר של התיאורטי בסיסה. אירופה יהודי של לאומית שחרור תנועת להיותה בנוסף, התיכון במזרח יזציהקולונ
 הנקראות, אמריקאים-לטינו חברה מדעני בקרב בעיקר קולוניאלית-פוסטה התיאוריה של עכשוויות התפתחויות הינו
 מאבקים להמשגת ההמתאימ מבט נקודת תורמת קולוניאלית-הדה הפרספקטיבה". קולוניאלי-הדה המפנה" לעיתים
-הדה בהמשגות ישתמש זה מחקר. קולוניאליים כוח מבני דרך שדוכאו אתניות קבוצות של ופוליטיים חברתיים
 קולוניאליים-דה היבטים לזקק מנת על, בישראל וספרדיים מזרחים עצמאיים פוליטיים ארגונים לחקר קולוניאליות
 ארגונים של קולוניאלי-הדה הפוטנציאל את שהגבילו התנאים ייבחנו כן כמו. והפיצו פיתחו שהם ובשיח בפעילותם
 המחקר. הימים ששת במלחמת הטריטוריאלית הרחבתה ועד המדינה מהקמת שונים ארגונים בוחן המחקר. אלו
 בירושלים הספרדית העדה ועד של בפעילותו ומתמקד, ארגונים אותם של ופרסומים היסטוריים מסמכים על מתבסס
 . אלישר אליהו של הנהגתו תחת
 האשכנזי הפוליטי מהשדה רגח שלעיתים, עצמו משל מסוימת דינמיקה בעל מזרחי פוליטי שדה תמתאר זו עבודה
-הדה םהתיאורטיי הכלים. התיכון במזרח פוליטיות להתפתחויות ובתגובותיו החברתית המציאות של בפרשנויותיו
 לבסס הארגונים של בדרכים מתמקד המחקר. השונים הארגונים של והפרקטיקות השיח בניתוח שולבו קולוניאליים
 לעם, הערבי לעולם ביחס שלהם ובמעשים ובשיח, בישראל המזרח דותע ובני ספרדים ציבור של קולקטיבית זהות
 
 
 חשיבה של צמיחה אפשרו אשר התנאים את מדגיש המחקר, זה ניתוח בתוך. בישראל הפלסטיני ולמיעוט הפלסטיני
 ארגונים דוכאו שדרכן המרובות הדרכים נבחנות כן כמו; מסוימים פוליטיים ופעילים ארגונים בקרב קולוניאלית-דה
 . אלו
 לבחירות התמודד אשר, בירושלים הספרדים עדת ועד הוא במחקר העיקרי העצמאי הארגון, החמישים בשנות במהלך
 ועד מוסד של הייחודית הארגונית התרבות את נבחן. המזרח עדות ובני הספרדים ציבור של נציגו בתור לכנסת
 את שאפיינה הגבול-מחשבת כיצד נראה, אלו יםבשנ. הנחה שהוא הפוליטיקה את שאפיינו הכבוד מונחי ואת העדה
 והמדינות ישראל בין השנוצר העוינות בשל אירופאיות-מודרניות תפיסות לכיוון נטתה הוותיקה הספרדית ההנהגה
   .ולייצר לייצג העדה ועד ניסה אותה הקולקטיבית הזהות לתוך ואמין חיובי תוכן יציקת מנעו אלו. הערביות
 ההתארגנות כוח את ממשמעות לרוקן הצליח הכוח מבנה אך, המזרחי הפוליטי השדה ביותר ןהתגוו השישים שנותב
 מעגלי עודד זה פנימי פוליטי אקלים . ייצוג של בשאלות וממוקדת מצומצמת" פוליטית עדתיות"כ ולייצרו המזרחי
 על ישירות ולא המזרחי הציבורי השיח על להשפיע במטרה, יםקולוניאלי-דה גוונים בעל שיח לפתח שונים פעילים
 על המבוססת, תיכונית-מזרח ילידית ציונות של חזון תחהתפ" במערכה" בירחון, זה בזמן. הישראלי הפוליטי השדה
, הספרדי הזהב תור ממורשת כוחו את שאב זה חזון". ידעים של אקולוגיה"כ גלויות מיזוג של לפרויקט שאיפה
 מדינה של לכינונה לתרום שיוכל, יהודי-פנים דיאלוג לפתח מנת לע נחוץה יהודי-כלל היסטורי כנרטיב נחשבש
 . פלסטין/בישראל תרבותית-רב יהודית
 בשנות לפיצולה עד הישראלית הקומוניסטית במפלגה העיראקים חוג של פעילותו את בנפרד בוחן המחקר כן כמו
 להתקדם הן העיראקי הקאדר של ביכולתו פגם הסובייטית לאידיאולוגיה י"מק של מתפשרת הבלתי הנאמנות. 1965
 . במפלגה ערבי-היהודי פיצולה בזמן ביטוי לידי באו אשר, הייחודיים ממאפייניו לתרום והן במפלגה
 חשיבה של מורשת ולפיתוח תיכוני המזרח הקשרל קולוניאלית-הדה הפרספקטיבה קירובל לתרום מבקש זה מחקר
 . כיום בישראל כזו פוליטית
 
 : ארגונים
 הספרדית המפלגה, אפריקה צפון יוצאי ליכוד, הלאומי האיחוד, מזרחים ליכוד תנועת, בירושלים הספרדית העדה ועד





ترى فرضية هذه األطروحة أن االستعمار الغربي في الـخمسمائة سنة الماضية هو العامل المركزي في تشكيل الواقع 
اق اإلقليمي، ترى المشروع الصهيوني كمشروع استعماري في الشرق األوسط، باإلضافة إلى كونه الحديث اليوم. في السي
حركة تحرير وطنية لليهود األوروبيين. تستند الفرضية النظرية للبحث إلى التطورات المعاصرة لنظرية ما بعد االستعمار، 
 
 
ها البعض "تحول التفكك االستعماري". إن منظور تفكك وخاصة بين علماء االجتماع في أمريكا الالتينية، والتي أطلق علي
االستعمار مفيد بشكل خاص لتصور النضاالت االجتماعية والسياسية للمجموعات العرقية التي تعرضت للقمع بسبب عالقات 
والسفاردية القوة االستعمارية. يستخدم البحث مصطلحات نظرية تفكك االستعمار لفحص المنظمات السياسية لليهود الشرقيين 
المستقلة في إسرائيل، من أجل استخالص الجوانب االستعمارية في نشاطهم وخطابهم، ودراسة الظروف التي حدت من 
 .إمكاناتهم االستعمارية، وكذلك نشاطهم بشكل عام
حتى توسعها  يدرس البحث المنظمات السياسية المختلفة للسيفارديم واليهود الشرقيين في إسرائيل، من قيام دولة إسرائيل
اإلقليمي في حرب األيام الستة. تعتمد الدراسة على الوثائق والصحف التاريخية للمنظمات المختلفة، وتركز على نشاط 
 .مجلس جماعة السفارديم في القدس بقيادة إلياهوإليشار
ا بديناميكية فريدة خاصة به، والتي اختلفت في بعض األ حيان عن المجال السياسي تحدد األطروحة مجاالا سياسياا مزراحيا
األشكنازي في تفسيره للواقع االجتماعي وردود أفعاله على التطورات السياسية في الشرق األوسط. تم تطبيق المفاهيم 
واألدوات الخاصة بنظرية تفكك اإلستعمار في تحليل خطاب وممارسات المنظمات السياسية المختلفة في هذا المجال. يركز 
المنظمات إلرساء هوية جماعية لليهود السيفارديم والشرقيين في إسرائيل، وعلى خطابهم ونشاطهم  البحث على محاوالت
فيما يتعلق بالدول العربية المحيطة، والشعب الفلسطيني واألقلية الفلسطينية في إسرائيل. تؤكد األطروحة على بذور تفكير 
في لحظات معينة، وستتبع أيضاا الطرق المتعددة األوجه  التفكك االستعماري التي ظهرت بين بعض الناشطين والمنظمات
 .التي تعرضت فيها هذه المنظمات للقمع والتهميش
نجحت  الصهيونية القوى بُنية لكن كبير، بشكل( الِمزراحي) الشرقيين لليهود السياسي المجال تنّوع الستينيات، في
 هذا. "كطائفية سياسية" ضيّقة منحصرة في قضايا التمثيلمن إفراغ قوة التنظيم المزراحي من المعنى وصّورته 
 التأثير بهدف لإلستعمار مناهض طابع ذو خطاب لتطوير مختلفة نشطاء دوائر دفع المقيّد الداخلي السياسي المناخ
 في الفترة، هذه خالل. اإلسرائيلي السياسي الحقل في مباشرة التوسط من بدالا  المزراحي، العام الخطاب على
طموح إلنشاء مشروع "دمج  على بناءا  المستقلة، الشرقية للصهيونية رؤية تطوير تم ، In the Battle مجلة
 تاريخي سرد يُعتبر الذي للسفارديم، الذهبي العصر تراث من قّوتها الرؤية هذه الشتات كبيئة معرفية". استمّدت
 متعددة يهودية دولةالمساهمة بتأسيس  يمكنه الذي اليهودي الداخلي الحوار على وحثّت اليهود، لجميع مشترك
 .فلسطين/  إسرائيل في الثقافات
. 1965كذلك سنخصص بحث منفصل لنشاط الكادر العراقي في الحزب الشيوعي اإلسرائيلي حتى تفكيكه سنة 
الحزب ومن والء الحزب الشديد التحاد الجمهوريات االشتراكية السوفياتية منع الكادر العراقي من التقدم في 
 العربي للحزب.-المساهمة فيه برؤيتهم الفريدة التي انعكست في اإلنقسام اليهودي
تهدف هذه الرسالة إلى المساهمة في تطوير المنظور النظري للتفكك االستعماري في السياق الشرق أوسطي، 
 .وفي بناء إرث فكري سياسي في إسرائيل اليوم
 
Laburpena 
Ikerketa honen premisak mundu osoko mendebaldeko kolonizazioa azken 500 urteetan jotzen 
du errealitate moderno garaikidea moldatzeko faktore nagusia. Tokiko testuinguruan, proiektu 
sionista Ekialde Hurbileko proiektu kolonial gisa hautematen du, baita Europako juduen 
askapen nazionalerako mugimendua ere. Ikerketaren premisa teorikoa teoria postkolonialetan 
garaikide garaikideetan oinarritzen da, batez ere Latinoamerikako zientzialari sozialen artean, 
 
 
batzuek izendatuta, "txanda deskolonial". Kolonialismoaren ikuspegia bereziki erabilgarria da 
botere harreman kolonialen bidez zapaldu dituzten talde etnikoen borroka sozialak eta 
politikoak kontzeptualizatzeko. Ikerketak deskolonial terminologia erabiltzen du Israelgo 
Mizrahi eta sefardiako erakunde politiko autonomoak aztertzeko, alderdi deskolonialak beren 
jardueran eta diskurtsoan azaltzeko eta beren potentzial dekoloniala mugatzen zuten baldintzak 
aztertzeko, baita beren jarduera orokorrean ere. 
Ikerketak sefardim eta mizrahim erakunde politiko desberdinak aztertzen ditu Israelen, Israel 
estatua ezarri zenetik sei eguneko gerran lurralde hedapenera arte. Ikerketa hainbat 
erakundetako dokumentu historiko eta periodikoetan oinarrituta dago, eta Eliahu Eliachar-en 
zuzendaritzapean, Jerusalemgo Erkidegoko Sefardiako Kontseiluaren jardueraren inguruan 
oinarritzen da. 
Tesian Israelen Mizrahi eremu politikoa dago, dinamika propioa izan zuena. Batzuetan 
Ashkenazi arlo politikotik desbideratu zen errealitate sozialaren interpretazioan eta Ekialde 
Hurbileko gertakari politikoen erreakzioetan. Tresna deskolonialak arlo horretako erakunde 
politikoen diskurtsoaren eta praktiken azterketan aplikatu ziren. Ikerketak erakundeetan 
saiakerak egin ditu Israelen sefardia eta Mizrahi identitate kolektiboa ezartzeko, baita inguruko 
arabiar herrialdeekin, Palestinako herriarekin eta Palestinako gutxiengoarekin ere. Tesian 
zenbait aktibista eta erakunderen artean zenbait momentutan sortu zen pentsamendu 
deskolonialaren haziak azpimarratzen dira, eta erakunde horiek zapaldu eta baztertu zituzten 
modu anitzak jarraitzen ditu. 
50eko hamarkadan, ikerketa honetako erakunde politiko independente nagusia Jerusalemgo 
Erkidegoko Batzorde Sephardikoa da, parlamentuan sefardiak eta mizrahi jendaurrean 
ordezkatzen saiatu zuena. Kontseiluaren  kultura antolamendu bakarra eta ohorezko nozioak 
gidatu zuen politika aztertu zen. Urte horietan, sefardiar mugako pentsamenduak  
mendebaldeko modernitatearen aldera jo zuen, Israel eta mundu arabiarraren artean sortutako 
animismoaren ondorioz. Honek, erakunde honen identitate kolektiboaren eduki positiboa sortu 
eta ordezkatzeko saiakeraren eduki positibo eta fidagarri oro esterilizatu zuen. 
1960ko hamarkadan, mizrahiren esparru politikoa izugarri dibertsifikatu zen, baina botere 
egitura sionistak, mizrahi ekintza antolatua, zentzu gabe utzi zuen, errepresentazio gaietan 
oinarritutako "etnizitate politikoa" bezala  utziz . Giro politiko murriztatzaileak, aktibisten talde 
batzuei, Israelgo esparru politikoan zuzenean parte hartu beharrean., mizrahien diskurtso 
publikoan eragiteko aukera eman zien. Garai horretan, In the Battle aldizkarian, ekialdeko 
sionismo autoktono baten ikuspegia landu zen, "Diasporaren Fusioa" proiektuarn oinarrituriko 
"ezagutzaren ekologia" gisa hartuta. Proiektu honek judu guztientzako ohikoa zen urrezko aro 
sefardarraren ondarean oinarritutako juduen barne-elkarrizketa eskatzen zuen eta 
Israel/Palestinan kulturarteko estatu judua eraikitzeko oinarriak gisa. 
Israelgo Alderdi Komunistan 1965. urte arte  izandako irakiarren jarduera  bereizita berrikusi 
da. Alderdiaren  SESB (Sobietar Errepublika Sozialisten Batasuna ) ekiko leialtasun zurrunak 
alderdiaren  aurrera egitea galarazi zuen, beraien ikuspegi eta gaitasun paregabeak lagatuz, 
alderdiaren judu-arabiar dibisioan adierazi zirenak. 
Tesi honek, Ekialde Hurbileko testuinguruan ikuspegi teoriko deskolonialen garapenean eta 
gaur egun Israelen horrelako pentsaera ondarea eraikitzen lagundu nahi du. 
Resumen  
La premisa de esta investigación considera la colonización occidental del resto del mundo en 
los últimos 500 años como el factor central en la configuración de la realidad moderna 
contemporánea. En el contexto local, percibe el proyecto sionista como un proyecto colonial 
en el Oriente Medio, además de ser un movimiento de liberación nacional de judíos europeos. 
La premisa teórica de la investigación se basa en los desarrollos contemporáneos de la teoría 
poscolonial, especialmente entre los científicos sociales latinoamericanos, nombrados por 
algunos, "el giro decolonial". La perspectiva decolonial es especialmente útil para 
conceptualizar las luchas sociales y políticas de los grupos étnicos que han sido oprimidos por 
las relaciones de poder coloniales. La investigación utiliza la terminología decolonial para 
examinar las organizaciones políticas autónomas mizrahi y sefardíes en Israel, a fin de exponer 
aspectos descoloniales en su actividad y discurso, y examinar las condiciones que limitaron su 
potencial decolonial, así como su actividad en general. 
La investigación examina diferentes organizaciones políticas de sefardíes y mizrahim en Israel, 
desde el establecimiento del estado de Israel hasta su expansión territorial en la Guerra de los 
Seis Días. El estudio se basa en documentos históricos y periódicos de las diferentes 
organizaciones, y se centra en la actividad del Concilio de la Comunidad Sefardí de Jerusalén, 
bajo el liderazgo de Eliahu Eliachar. 
La tesís traza un campo político mizrahi en Israel, que tuvo una dinámica propia, que a veces 
divergió del campo político ashkenazi en su interpretación de la realidad social y en sus 
reacciones a los acontecimientos políticos del Oriente Medio. Las herramientas decoloniales se 
aplicaron en el análisis del discurso y las prácticas de diferentes organizaciones políticas dentro 
de este campo. La investigación se centra en los intentos de las organizaciones de establecer 
una identidad colectiva sefardí y mizrahi en Israel, y en sus discursos y actividad con respecto 
a los países árabes circundantes, el pueblo palestino y la minoría palestina en Israel. La tesís 
enfatiza las semillas del pensamiento decolonial que surgió entre ciertos activistas y 
organizaciones en ciertos momentos, y también sigue las formas multifacéticas en que estas 
organizaciones han sido oprimidas y marginadas. 
 
 
En la década de los 1950, la principal organización política independiente en esta investigación 
es el Concilio de la Comunidad Sefardí de Jerusalén, que intentó representar al público sefardí 
y mizrahi en el parlamento. Se examina la cultura organizativa única del Concilio, así como las 
nociones de honor que guiaron su política. En estos años, el pensamiento fronterizo sefardí se 
inclinó hacia el lado de la modernidad occidental, debido a la animosidad creada entre Israel y 
el mundo árabe. Esto esterilizó cualquier contenido positivo y confiable de la identidad 
colectiva que esta organización intentó producir y representar. 
En la década de 1960, el campo político de Mizrahi se diversificó enormemente, pero la 
estructura de poder sionista dejó vacante de significado la acción organizada mizrahi, 
recreándola como una reducida "etnicidad política" centrada en cuestiones de representación. 
El clima político restrictivo permitió que algunos círculos de activistas desarrollaran un 
discurso con características decoloniales, con el objetivo de influir en el discurso público de 
mizrahies, en lugar de intervenir directamente en el campo político israelí. Durante este período, 
en la revista In the Battle, se desarrolló una visión de un sionismo autóctono oriental, basado 
en la aspiración de un proyecto de "Fusión de las Diásporas" como una "ecología de los 
saberes". Este proyecto instó a un diálogo judío interior que se basara en la herencia de la Edad 
de Oro sefardí como común a todos los judíos, y como las bases para construir un estado judío 
intercultural en Israel / Palestina. 
La actividad de los iraquíes en el Partido Comunista Israelí hasta 1965 esta revisada por 
separado. La rígida lealtad del partido a la URSS impidió que los iraquíes avanzaran en el 
partido y contribuyeran a él con sus perspectivas y habilidades únicas, los cuales se expresaron 
durante la división judío-árabe del partido. 
Esta tesis tiene como objetivo contribuir al desarrollo de la perspectiva teórica decolonial en el 







The chapter that lays ahead is divided into four segments, each disclosing other facets of the 
academic and political concerns that have directed the formulation of this dissertation. The first 
part will explain the personal process that brought this investigation into being, and conclude 
by presenting the questions of investigation. Afterwards, there will be a presentation to the 
definitions of Mizrahi and Sephardic Jewries, followed by a review of the different themes 
related to them within contemporary Israeli politics. Next, I will explore the role of 
Israel/Palestine in global politics today and attend to the implications of writing the historical 
account of this research in this context. Finally, I will explain the title of the dissertation, will 
present shortly its main findings and conclude by depicting the structure of the paper.  
 
Much of the historical research about middle-eastern Jewries, named here Mizrahim and 
Sephardim, and about their political activity in Israel, has been written in English in Anglo-
Saxon universities. Notwithstanding, the relation between my university and my topic of 
research has raised eyebrows around me throughout all the years of research. I find it useful, 
then, to first and fore mostly explain how this research developed into being, and explain the 
way my Bilbao-Jerusalem axis of movement in the past years has designed the very tools and 
questions of inquiry.   
The point of departure upon this adventure was a seminary class held by Ramon Grosfoguel for 
graduate students in the Social Science and Communication Department of the UPV/EHU. In 
this series of lectures, Grosfoguel gave words, terms and a theoretical framework for what I 
had been trying to explain as my main interest of research during the whole period of my 
Master's degree: with key words such as global power relations and political solidarity, 
centering geographically in Palestine/Israel. Following these classes, I decided to be the one to 
bring "the decolonial turn" that Grosfoguel presented to us to my native context, thus hoping, 
of course, to redeem the lost Israeli left from its poor communicative abilities with Palestinian 
Arabs, helping to bridge the tragic abyss between these populations in their common struggle 
to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine. My initial research proposal included an ethnographic 
study of movements of Israeli radical left, a grand majority of which are of upper-middle class 
European Jews, and their solidarity with Palestinian Arab national struggles in the West Bank. 
I spent a year in the Basque Country preparing for this research, mainly by attaining a good 
level of spoken Palestinian Arabic. When I arrived to perform the field-work in Palestine/Israel, 
however, I found the field of research replete of people documenting the activities, journalists 
and others, who at times outnumbered both Palestinian and Israeli activists. The kind of political 
action I aimed to examine had been way past its peak, about 10-15 years ago. I also discovered 
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that as a field of research, this solidarity activity has been utterly exhausted by American and 
European graduate students who have examined exactly the same reduced circles and activities 
I was so eager to examine. The exhaustion of this research field by MA and doctorate 
dissertations is a reflection of the central and symbolic place of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
in western global-capitalist politics, and of the search of those western leftists after a way to 
contribute to struggle against the injustices these politics produce. It also reflects their 
identification with the solidarity of those western Israelis with the Palestinian struggle, that is, 
the social similarity of these leftists. I diverged the research to writing the historical genealogy 
of Ashkenazi solidarity with Palestinians, observing Mizrahim's place in it as well. After a year, 
I could clearly see the abyssal gap present nowadays and in the past between the European 
Israelis and the Palestinians, the colonizers and the colonized, and saw clearly the many 
mechanisms that reproduce the abyssal inequality.  This dissertation would have been dedicated 
to the analysis and recording of these mechanisms, had I not stumbled upon the writings of the 
Sephardic notable Eliahu Eliachar. Eliachar enchanted me with the depth of his emotional 
overtone, intoned to touch the hearts and transform and souls of Jewish folk. I discovered other 
native intellectuals of Sephardic and Mizrahi origins and saw how their pre-1948 discourse, 
their particular way to oppose the Zionist leadership and the kind of inter-cultural horizons they 
imagined for their homeland, reverberated much of the discourse of the Latin-American 
theorists I had been studying. Finally, I found the empirical phenomenon that could most benefit 
from the translation of the decolonial perspectives into the Middle East.  
Many of the writers who have contributed to developing "the decolonial turn" are third-world 
intellectuals producing knowledge from western universities. This geo-cultural position is 
understood to have an advantage in the development of a thorough critique within western 
academy, one that goes beyond inner-modern critiques of modernity, as postmodernism and 
Marxism (Grosfoguel 2012). This is because this position enables expressing epistemological 
critique, using the tools and patterns of western university, which allow it, in fact, to be legible 
by it. Writing from the borderlines of western modernity may allow the expression of voices 
and epistemologies that had been silenced by western science, negated the stature of being 
considered knowledge and truth. The anti-colonial writer Frantz Fanon discussed quite broadly 
the phenomenon of "native intellectuals", referring to the layers in the colonized society that 
during the period of decolonization had begun a dialogue with the bourgeoisie of the colonialist 
country (Fanon 1965:43). The native intellectuals do not belong to the colonizing layer, but 
also not entirely to the colonized society. Much of this research will indeed focus on the 
discourse and practices of such Mizrahi and Sephardic native intellectuals, who aligned their 
intellectual critique with organized groups who had aspirations to gain power in the political 
field. It is of no surprise that a contemporary version of native intellectuals, as the ones writing 
out "the decolonial turn", can be found to correspond appropriately with the subject of study of 
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research, and that they resonate each other's analysis of reality, political conceptualizations and 
socio-cultural political critique. It is not a coincidence either that the geographical point of 
departure of the colonization processes both groups of native intellectuals rebel against are 
located in the Iberian Peninsula, where this dissertation is from. 
  
This dissertation relies upon the conceptualization of western colonization of the rest of the 
world, since 1492, as the central factor in shaping modern realities today: colonial oppression 
and modern emancipation are understood to be co-constitutive. According to this narrative, in 
1492 the ideological apparatus that purged the Spanish kingdom crossed the Atlantic, and 
modern racial hierarchies started to get formulated in a globally encompassing manner. This 
progressively led to the formulation and justification of a whole apparatus of global domination 
of the west everywhere else. 1492 then can be viewed as the beginning of Orientalism in the 
Occident (Shohat 2017). In the local geo-political context of this research, this inquiry departs 
from the conceptualization of the Zionist project as a colonial enterprise: created by and for 
European Jews, supported by western powers and based upon Orientalist conceptions that 
presume the superiority of western modernity. Zionist ideology also contained a certain 
aspiration to re-invent a Hebrew native identity that is anchored in the east (Eyal 2005), and 
nurtured a myth of an eastern autochthonous Jew (mainly by appropriating the nativity of 
Palestinian Arabs) (Raz-Krakotzkin 2005). However, with the establishment of the state of 
Israel through war with its surrounding countries, most of the ambiguity regarding the nature 
of the Jewish nation disappeared. The state was establishment as a western country, distinct 
from its middle-eastern environment, and mostly preoccupied about better fortifying its 
armored walls (see in Eyal 2005). These walls separated the western from the eastern, and 
excluded the indigenous non-Jewish population in the land. Throughout this research we will 
see the conditions that allowed these walls to expand to include Jews indigenous to the region, 
i.e. Mizrahi and Sephardic Jews. The research aims to perform an analytical historical 
investigation of autonomous political discourse and practices of Sephardim and Mizrahim in 
Israel. If the mere existence of Jews in Israel/Palestine as a nation has relied on colonization 
and re-colonization, the questions of research are:   
 
1- Did Sephardic and Mizrahi groups and individuals opposing coloniality develop within 
the Zionist settler-colonial society? If so, how did they come into being?  
2- To what degree did they succeed in challenging and opposing Zionist-colonial 
frameworks, or creating alternatives to them? Why did they fail to create a viable 
alternative to Zionism?  
3- Why did they fail to construct an independent political camp?  
4- Under what circumstances has this opposition strengthened at certain moments, and 
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what made it weaken at others? 
Towards the end of the introduction some of the answers to these questions will be reviewed 
briefly. Following, an explanation as to who are Mizrahim, Sephardim and Ashkenazim will be 
proposed, reviewing how these identities got consolidated historically. Then the important 
themes this ethnic division represent in contemporary Israeli society will get highlighted, 
especially those relevant to the Israeli political sphere.    
he Crescent and under the Crossnder tu  Jewish Diaspora
The simple way to explain the category of Mizrahi (in Hebrew: eastern) and Sephardic Jewries 
would be to recur to history and heritage. These are Jews whose origins, for several generations, 
had been from Muslim countries -in Western Asia and North Africa- or from the Balkans. As 
an ethnic division in the Jewish world, Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews can be seen as another 
Jewish stream than Ashkenazi Jews, whose origins, for several generations, has been from 
eastern and central Europe. Otherwise understood, it is a division between Jewish heritages that 
had developed under either Christian-European or Muslim-Arab centennial rule, two sides of 
Judaism as culture and as religion, that have constructed different mental patterns and 
conceptions of Self (Pedaya 2015, Cohen 2005). However, as the study of ethnicity consistently 
shows, such definitions are rarely as neat or encompassing as could be desired by researchers 
and readers alike. Sephardim have actually lived under both Christian and Muslim rule, and 
there were also Ashkenazi communities living in Muslim territories, for instance in Egypt since 
early 19th century.  Nonetheless, it has been suggested that the term "Jews of Muslim countries", 
or some acronym of it, is the most accurate way to refer to Mizrahi Jewry (Pedaya 2015, Ben 
Dor 1999). However, this title or the suggested acronyms never caught, and both in the academy 
and in popular discourse it is common, in different contexts, to apply either the terms Sephardim 
or Mizrahim to refer to the entire population of non-Ashkenazi Jews. 
Sefarad is the Hebrew name of Roman Hispania, Muslim Al-Andalus and contemporary Spain. 
Though Jews inhabited the Iberian Peninsula since the 3rd century (Weksler 2005), their last 
seven centuries in it charged their historiography in a way that the term Sephardic was coined, 
and later got analyzed broadly across various spatial, temporal and subjective contexts (e.g. 
Halevi-Wise 2012, Evri 2013). The myth of harmonic convivencia of the three monotheistic 
religions in Al-Andalus has made Sephardic history a useful metaphor for a variety of artists, 
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and a source of inspiration for academics concerned with peace and war, identity politics and 
international reconfigurations, from the 18th century to nowadays (Halevi-Wise 2012, Benbassa 
& Rodrigue 2000, Aizenberg 2005). For world Jewry, Sephardism provokes the imagery of the 
Jewish Spanish Golden Age, a period of remarkable intellectual, artistic and religious creation. 
The Medieval Sephardic aesthetic and knowledge productions was intertwined in 
extraordinarily profound manners with the language, content, forms and genres of the Arab 
cultural bloom of the time and place, built upon rationalist and humanist Muslim, Persian and 
Greek foundations (Tubi 2011, Bineart 1992, Yosef 1991, Asis 1991).     
After the 1492 expulsion from the new united kingdom on the Iberian Peninsula, some 
Sephardic Jews got dispersed in different European countries, but most of them ended up under 
Muslim rule. They took prominence within different Jewish communities all over the 
Mediterranean Sea (David 2005, Bunis 2005). In the northern parts of the Mediterranean 
Ottoman Empire, the native Jewish communities got assimilated into Sephardic culture and 
language. With the invention of print, the Sephardic prayer book (Siddur) spread across other 
Jewries in the Muslim world (Pedaya 2015), and "Sephardic" became an adjective to particular 
liturgics, customs and rabbinical authority (Zohar 2001). Other customs and also languages 
varied within Jewries in different parts of the Muslim world. Therefore, all Jews under Muslim 
rule could in different moments or contexts be considered as belonging to a Sephardic Halachic 
and prayer tradition (Raz-Krakotzkin 1994, Pikar 2003). Since early modernity, then, it can be 
claimed two branches of Judaism were getting marked, Ashkenazi and Sephardic.  
Some researchers ask to contest this historical perception, claiming that relations and influences 
always existed between all Jewish communities, and that there was no self-perception of 
autonomous branches of Judaism in early modernity (Frenkel 2015, Zohar 2001). 
Notwithstanding, there are other researchers who toiled to define the substantial differences 
between Sephardic/Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jewries (e.g. Elazar 1986, Zohar 2005, Schorsch 
2012). According to these last, the differences are not only marked in liturgy, styles of 
rabbinical education and some customs, but most importantly in the different structure of 
opportunities created for minorities under Islam versus Christianity. While Islam accepted the 
rights of other monotheistic religions to live under its rule under a special protected status, for 
Christianity Jews remained historically responsible for murdering its godi, and persecutions and 
humiliations of the Jewish minority population were much more widespread and recurring. 
Consequently, European Jewry developed quite introverted and closed communities. In 
contrast, Jewries under Islamic rule were involved in their societies in quotidian ways and could 
even share with their societies customs and beliefs. In late modernity, significant Jewish 
movements grew in Europe, marking unequivocal differences with Jews under Muslim rule. 
                                                             
i I Thank Ramon Grosfoguel for pointing out to me this additional point.  
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The secularizing effects of Enlightenment on Ashkenazi Jewish society created a reactionary 
response among some religious streams, which developed radically introverted ultra-
orthodoxy. In contrast, in Muslim countries modernization did not develop as a struggle 
between secularity and religion in a way that threatened religious authorities. The respectable 
stature of rabbis was generally maintained (Zohar 2001) and reactionary conservative 
orthodoxy was rare (Leon 2010). Also, in Europe alone, as consequence of the recurring 
persecutions, and by inspirations of European colonialism and "spring of nations", Jewish 
modern/colonial nationalism grew and got consolidated in the form of the Zionist movement.   
 
 
In the state of Israel: Mizrahim 
The state of Israel was established by the Zionist movement, which perceived itself as a national 
liberation movement, asking for the auto-emancipation of European Jews. During most of the 
20th century, the hegemonic current in the Zionist movement was the Labor movement, which 
was secular and socialist, and represented an ambition to modernize both the Jewish people and 
the Holy Land. This allowed the Zionist movement to assume a self-image of a socialist national 
movement, while putting into effect a settler-colonial project. The establishment of the state of 
Israel through war and violence between the Zionist colony and the surrounding Arab countries, 
forced the immigration of Jews living in Arab countries to the nascent Jewish state. This 
occurred despite the initial aspirations of the Zionist movement, which had little to do with 
these Jewries.  
Non-Ashkenazi Jews that resided in Palestine/Eretz-Israeli before the Zionist immigrations, 
were considered Sephardic in the social system of the Jewish colony (Tsur 2007a, Bezalel 
2007). After the establishment of the state, the weight of immigrants from Arab countries grew 
in Israeli society, and gradually the tag of Sephardic gave way to the tag Mizrahi (Tsur 2007). 
In this process, the European Sephardic communities, e.g. Bulgarian or Italian Jews, dropped 
out from this category (Tsur 2000). The Sephardic natives and the Mizrahi immigrants got 
marginalized and were discriminated against within the Zionist-colonial state mechanisms, 
which were designed with a purpose of adapting these Jewries to the modern European patterns 
of the state (Sternhell 1995, Levy 1998, Hever et.al. 2002). These mechanisms silenced 
Sephardic and Mizrahi cultures, heritage and history, considering those at best as obsolete 
                                                             
i Though the administrative unit of Palestine did not formally exist from the 12th century and until the British 
mandate started in 1920, this name will be used here, since there are records identifying the land or parts of it 
with this name beforehand as well (e.g. the newspaper Palestine since 1911) (Porat 1976). The Jewish name that 
was often used to describe the same land was Eretz-Israel (Land of Israel). When addressing the land in question 
prior to 1920, "Eretz-Israel" might be used when applied to a Jewish perspective, and "Palestine"- when applied to 
a Palestinian perspective, or for emphasizing colonial actions. However, the double name will be most commonly 
used. 
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folklore. In those first years of the state, an ethno-class structure was formed that is prevalent 
until today, which placed Mizrahi Jews in its disadvantaged layer. Their way to get included in 
the Jewish national collective, as designed by the Zionist movement, had the price of socio-
economic, cultural and spiritual subjugation. In the political sphere, all Israeli political parties 
in the period of study, with the exception of the communist party, were a continuation of parties 
already active within the Zionist movement. Following Chetrit (2004), I will refer to them 
throughout this research as Zionist parties of Ashkenazi hegemony. All Jewish parties in Israel 
in this period, including the communist party, were established, led and controlled by 
Ashkenazim. As Shohat (1988) claimed, the locus of struggle in the Israeli political sphere was, 
and remains, focused on sharing power among various Ashkenazi groups, expressing various 
Jewish-European identity dilemmas, and has had very little space for Sephardic and Mizrahi 
aspirations.  
The process of a partially forced immigration of middle-eastern Jewry into the Zionist colonial 
state has been described as a violent tear, a disastrous fracture, indeed a catastrophe bestowed 
upon these Jewriesi, devised by a structural complicity that was established between Zionist 
and Arab national governments (Behar 2007, Shohat 1999, Ben Dor 2004, Snir 2006). At least 
in those initial years, this left these Jewries without an appropriate place under the sun. 
Following Shohat (2017), throughout the dissertation this process will be sometimes referred 
to as the Rupture. The Rupture that occurred in 1948 upon the establishment of the state of 
Israel propagated new identity barriers in the Middle East, reorganized cultural identities and 
affiliations, and by the way destroyed the collective self-confidence of a Judeo-Muslim 
civilization (Snir 2006) with millennial pride (Shohat 1988). In the state of Israel Mizrahim 
became degraded to poverty and crime, and were tagged negatively in a way that made many 
reject their non-European culture of origins. These cultures were considered illegitimate in the 
state of Israel: inferior and similar to those of the enemy. There was a subtle process of coercion, 
where Mizrahim were made to feel ashamed of their skin color, mother languages, music 
preferences, pronunciation, traditions and customs, within what may be considered a cultural 
massacre of immense proportion of a rooted eastern civilization (Shohat 1988). In the period of 
study, Mizrahi cultures continued to develop in Israel only "underground", limited to Mizrahi 
geographical enclaves (Tsur 2000). 
  
Until the 1980s Mizrahi Jews were estimated to consist of about 50% of the Jewish population 
in Israel (Mizrachi & Herzog 2012), at present day the number is unknown, since the Statistical 
Bureau does not collect data about grandparents' countries of origins (Cohen et.al. 2013). 
Speaking of ethnic divisions between Jews in Israel has always been taboo, transgressing under 
                                                             
i Meir Buzaglo about Moroccan Jewry, in Qedar (14.5.15). 
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the national ethos that perceives the state as the country of all the Jews. Therefore, despite the 
fact that some statistics and research reflect an ethno-class reality in Israeli society, much of the 
socio-economic political discourse about Mizrahi, Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews is limited to 
particular political groups, circles of activists and to the academy. In recent years there has been 
an explosion of discourse about Mizrahim in the media, as an important component to be 
considered in the Israeli political sphere. Otherwise in popular discourse, references to the 
different Jewish ethnicities are described usually as cultural or religious differences, for 
instance in different traditional food or distinct burial arrangements, as well as other 
stereotypical characteristics (see in: Sagiv 2014). There are also different stereotypes attributed 
to specific countries of origins rather than to an Ashkenazi/Mizrahi divide. Mixed marriagesi, 
certain class mobilization (Cohen & Leon 2008), large waves of immigration from Russia and 
Ethiopia in the 1990s and the Statistical Bureau's policies, are all factors that aid to blur a 
contemporary existence of an Ashkenazi/Mizrahi divide. Different researchers pointed out that 
certain Mizrahi cultural patterns, and especially Mizrahi music, have acquired alternative 
symbolic capital, and some have become parts of Israeliness, also changing certain cultural 
patterns of Ashkenazim, at times developing a sense of connection between Arabic and Israeli 
western oriented culture (Snir 2006, Yaar 2007, Sagiv 2014, Sasson-Levy & Shoshana 2014). 
As Tsur (2000) mentioned, Israeli national culture has a positive relation to the exotic and 
primeval elements of Judeo-Arab culture. I would add that this is as long as these elements can 
be contained in Israeli Eurocentric culture. Popular perceptions exhibit an almost opposite 
picture than research, since many consider that the class breach between Ashkenazim and 
Mizrahim have already been overcome, while cultural differences still prevail (Sagiv 2014), as 
well as political ones. As Brubaker (2004) reminds us, ethnicity is not an actual thing in the 
world; rather it is a perspective on the world. As such, the term Mizrahi prevails today in public 
discourse over more than dozen other titles available to define this public, each concealing a 
different historical and political perspective (Shohat 2004).  The term Mizrahi alludes to the 
homogenization that Jews from Muslim countries went through in the state of Israel; an 
"Israelization" process (Bashkin 2017), that also has been named the "Zionist civilizing 
process" (Shaul 2016): achieved by oppression, humiliation, exploitation, marginalization and 
discrimination. These oppressive processes left a heritage of political protest, as well as a deep 
sensation of insult that has been inherited by the following generations (Leon 2009). This is 
true even among those that have already got integrated into Ashkenazi middle-class: 
geographically and in terms of education there are already many of those (Cohen & Leon 2008). 
Schwartz (2015) summarizes the usage of the category Mizrahim in Israel today as such:  
                                                             
i Nowadays, about 20% of native Israeli are ethnically mixed, born to Ashkenazi and Mizrahi parents, according to 
Sagiv (2014) and Mizrachi & Herzog (2012).   
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"Social boundaries between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim gradually grew permeable and non-salient but 
have been reformulated as cultural boundaries, based on ethnically marked classed habitus, behaviors, 
and cultural preferences…Many Mizrahim [have been admitted] into Israel’s mainly Ashkenazi 
hegemonic group, while retaining the stereotypical identification of Mizrahiness with lowbrow tastes 
and uncivil behavior… In Israel, historical discriminatory policies in education, employment, and 
housing led to enduring underrepresentation of Mizrahim among the upper-middle class and cultural 
elites, although high intraethnic variance exists… Class, culture, and ethnic categories (which overlap 
only partially) are used alternately and strategically…" 
 
The fact that the Mizrahi category was developed by almost exclusively negative experiences 
from the 1950s and 1960s (Tsur 2000) makes it a rare source of self-identification. Though the 
term Mizrahi permeated public discourse, as a source of self-identification it remains a privilege 
of upper-middle class intellectual Mizrahim: those who are not threatened by the connotations 
of this term to mark them as inferior (Shiran 2005, Gutman 2008, Mizrachi et.al. 2013, Sagiv 
2014). This is in fact the social layer that coined this term, in order to define their own political 
identity in the 1990s (Shohat 1999). As any other historical attempt to define the ethnic divide 
in Israel, the term Mizrahi causes feisty public debates and common refutations of the very 
divide itself, since "we are all Israelis" (Michael 1984, Adut 2006, Raz-Krakotzkin 2005, Sagiv 
2014, Mizrachi et.al. 2013). Many scholars have claimed that studying Mizrahi identity can 
only be done per country of origin, and not as a collective identity (Ben Sasson 1979, Ben Dor 
1999, Dahan-Kalev 2006, Michael 2005, Levy 2005, Shoshana 2013). The term Ashkenazi, 
however, does not arouse heated debates in the same manner, it is not refuted as an adjective 
for all Jews of European origins, and can often be an object of self-identification, since this 
ethnic marker does not imply humiliation and suffering. For more religious or traditional 
publics, the term Mizrahi often translates into the adjective Sephardic (Sagiv 2014). The term 
Sephardic is a more popular source of self-identification; it does not raise antagonism as the 
title Mizrahi does. That is because of its objective basis on the Sephardic religious heritage, 
anchored in written materials that are related to a high heritage, one of rabbinical grandeur and 
intellectual splendor. Another reason for the smooth usage of the term might be related to the 
modern/colonial structure of Israeli society: Sephardic, eventually, is also European 
(Kimmerling 2004, Shohat 1999, 2004, Sagiv 2014).  
 
 
Mizrahi Judaism and This Bridge Called my Backi 
Despite the difficulty to grasp and prove the existence of a Mizrahi or Sephardic social group, 
there are some sociological particularities of this sector of the population that are common 
                                                             
iThis Bridge Called my Back is the title of an anthology of feminist writings edited by Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe 
Moraga. It was published in 1983 by Kitchen Table-Women of Color Press, and in 2015 was re-published by State 
University of New York Press.  
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knowledge, and also attract researchers' attention. Next, the characteristics necessary to 
understand the place of Mizrahim in the Israeli political sphere will be briefly review, and in 
following chapters some of these will get explored more profoundly.  
Firstly, the fact Mizrahi Judaism developed under Muslim rule had shaped its particular 
relationship to religious authorities and faith, downplaying both abstract laws and rabbinical 
hierarchy (Shohat 1988), in a way that simply cannot be addressed by the hopelessly modern 
European dichotomy of religious versus secular. An epistemological prosthetic was therefore 
invented: the category of "traditionalist" [masorti] (Shenhav 2006). This term describes an 
interactively easygoing and conservative religiosity (Leon 2011), sympathizing with but not 
necessarily committed to rabbinical authority (Yadgar 2010). Today, around 25% percent of 
Jewish Israelis identify themselves as "traditionalists", a category that was added by the Israeli 
Central Statistical Bureau to the scale that previously only asked participants to identify as 
secular, religious or ultra-orthodox. According to Yadgar (2010), the grand majority of the 
traditionalists are Mizrahi/Sephardic, and the majority of Mizrahim/Sephardim are 
traditionalisti.  Being traditionalist means conserving a basic loyalty to Jewish laws and 
customs, because of the way that they have been passed down through the generations, and not 
out of belief that this is god's will. Therefore, this kind of commitment allows for a personal 
selective attitude towards the Jewish religious laws (Leon 2009: 34). This pattern of Judaism 
construct a conventional view of Mizrahi and Sephardic Jewries as balanced, easygoing, 
tolerant, moderate, nobly simple and respectable, anti-fanatic, placated, versatile and adaptive 
(Michael 1984, Evri 2013, Elazar 1986). In addition, the heritage of belonging to Arab cultural 
linguistic realities (Raz-Krakotzkin 1994) had shaped also a certain tradition of openness to it 
(Tubi 2011). Despite the aggressive de-Arabization processes Mizrahi Jews have endured in 
the state of Israel (Alcalay 1993), Mizrahi and Sephardic Jews are carriers of a heritage of 
common cultural and spiritual values with Arabs and Muslims. This is the reason their locus of 
enunciation is sometimes understood to carry a potential to deconstruct the Israeli modern 
dichotomies of secular/religious, as well as those of Jew/Arab.  It is this perception of Mizrahi 
and Sephardic Judaism that attracts leftist political activists and intellectuals to view them as 
"a natural bridge for peace" (Shohat 2017a), and attempt to empower (and therefore define) a 
collective Mizrahi identity. The need for a theoretical conceptualization of a Mizrahi position 
in the colonial reality of Israel stems precisely from the lack of its practical expression in the 
Israeli political field. 
                                                             
i In 2016, 45% of Jewish population defined their lifestyle as secular, 25% as traditional, 16% as religious and very 
religious and 14% ultra-orthodox. Among Arabs, who conformed 20% of Israel's population, 11% defined their 
lifestyle as secular, 57% as traditional and 31% as religious and very religious. Central Bureau of Statistics (2018, 
June). Report #10.  
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Mizrahim in the Israeli Political Field  
The general stereotype of Mizrahim in Israeli society is of "Arab haters", and loyal to the right 
wing party Likud, which has been ruling Israel since early 2000s. There is a popular consensus, 
substantiated by some academic research, that Mizrahim were crucial in the governmental 
"turnover" in 1977 from the leftist Labor movement to right wing Likud. According to Rimon-
Or, it was in the 1977 campaign that verbal violence against Arabs came to the front of public 
stage, especially by Mizrahi publics. It is a popular conception that Mizrahim are prone to anti-
Arab and nationalist positions, as a way to purge themselves from the Arab component of their 
identity. Between the 1940s and 1960s identity borders between Arabs and Jews were getting 
consolidated in different countries in the Middle East, and the need to establish them in Israel 
by ideological affiliation was sharpened. Nowadays, researchers still claim that the Arab-hating 
stereotype is based on Mizrahim who have internalized Ashkenazi oppression and absorbed the 
Zionist logic, which excluded Mizrahim that did not westernize properly:  "Arab hatred almost 
always disguises self-hate" (Shohat 1999, also see: Rimon-Or 2002, Peres 1976, 1984, Chetrit 
1999). Tsur (2000) pointed out that grudge towards Arabs has often been designed by individual 
Mizrahim's experiences in their countries of origin:   
"More than fifty years ago Baghdad got fixed in my consciousness...just as I left it...we have been 
completely disconnected. I have not thought of it nor did I miss it. Even if it was revealed in my 
hallucinations, once in a while, it aroused in my heart a bitter feeling of disappointment and rage. Maybe 
it is because it degraded my identity, negated my existence, denounced my citizenship and made me 
escape for my dear life... Iraq...was and remained an incubator of terror against its citizens and 
neighbors."i  
Israeli sociologists suggested other explanations to Mizrahim's tendency towards the right 
wing, usually examining from different angles the way it consists of a counter-reaction to Labor 
political parties of Ashkenazi hegemony, which until 1977 ruled the country, creating and 
enforcing the institutional, economic and discursive exclusion of Mizrahim (Swirsky 1988, 
Peled & Shaffir 2005, Horowitz & Lissak 1990, Chetrit 2000, Dahan-Kalev 2006, Filk 2010, 
Leon & Cohen 2011). As Shohat (1988) pointed out, the difference between Likud and Labor 
politics towards Arabs is one of discourse only, and the more important difference is the firsts' 
populist appeal to Mizrahim as part of the nationalist Jewish collective, versus the elitist 
Eurocentric condescension typical of Labor Zionism. Mizrachi (2011) pointed out that the 
reaction-based explanations of Mizrahi right wing tendencies ignore an independent Mizrahi 
"world of signification", in which solidarity and feelings of national belonging prevail over 
liberal values of social justice and universal equality (also see: Kimmerling 2004). Eventually, 
the Mizrahi answer to the colonial inferiority imposed on them in the state of Israel has been 
Jewish nationalism: As Tsur pointed out, Mizrahim identified the Jewish state with themselves 
                                                             
i Patel (2003): 356.  
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and with god's grace, more than with the Ashkenazi ruling elites. Still, the in-accomplishment 
of the promise for national equality was a source of great disappointment and deep frustration 
(Tsur 2000). That is where the power of colonial relations plays an important role. Shaul 
explored the seeming contradiction between the oppression Mizrahim experienced by the state 
of Israel and their tendency to nationalist patriotism. She found that the Mizrahim's narratives 
about the oppression in the early years of the state was often shadowed by the narrative of their 
own accomplishments and agency to succeed despite the difficulties. Part of these 
accomplishments was the ability to live up to the state's expectations of them, to become 
productive and loyal citizens (Shaul 2016).  
Notwithstanding, the Mizrahi frustration and disappointment from the Ashkenazi hegemony in 
the state, of both right and left wing streams, has found a stable political expression with the 
rise of Shas in 1984. Shas is the only Mizrahi autonomous organization that has ever succeeded 
to position itself as a political party with a stable electorate. Its success has often been explained 
in research by emphasizing different shades of Mizrahim's commitment to Inner-Jewish 
solidarity and to the ethno-national ethos of citizenship, over universal values.  Shas is an ultra-
orthodox party, born to struggle over the blunt discrimination against Sephardim in Ashkenazi 
ultra-orthodox educational institutions and society. Shas relies on a network of social-aid 
institutions which, along with other tools, are designed to convert its public into ultra-
orthodoxy. Shas' cultural construction of the conversion to religion [hazara be-tshuva] consider 
it to be the appropriate answer to the catastrophe bestowed in Israel on Sephardic Jewries 
(Chetrit 2004). This way, Shas' target audience is of a broad spectrum of Mizrahim, who 
consider this enterprise as part of a tendency of religious renewal and transformation (Leon 
2009). Peled (2002) explained Shas' popularity among non-ultra-orthodox publics in its ability 
to challenge Israeliness on basis of Judaism and not over class or ethnic matters, thereby 
relinquishing any implicit base of solidarity between Mizrahim and Palestinian Arabs (Raz-
Krakotzkin 2005). In a similar way, Chetrit (2004) suggested that Shas embodies Mizrahi 
collectiveness by its success to define a comprehensive alternative to the Jewish Zionist-
Ashkenazi nationalism. What is clear from empirical reality is that Shas is the last most 
successful Mizrahi/Sephardic autonomous political organization to represent this public's world 
views and supposed interests. 
It might be the rise of Shas that stimulated the consolidation of something that might be called 
a Mizrahi left in early 1990s. Dominated mainly by Iraqi intellectuals, Israeli social and political 
sphere has been seeing the rise of new discourses and organizations attempting to formulate a 
Mizrahi identity option, which ask to overcome intra-ethnic differences, and oppose European 
Zionism beyond the a traditional-religious context (Chetrit 2004). This "New Mizrahi 
discourse", as defined by Chetrit, carries a socio-cultural critique of Israeli society and politics, 
meeting Shas' Jewish-religious critique back-to-back in the attempt to re-define Israeliness. 
23
This discourse includes another new component, of internal examination of the place and forms 
of religiosity in the Mizrahi social action (Chetrit 2004). Within the attempt to define a Mizrahi 
left, it is crucial to point out that the division between right and left is not less Eurocentric than 
the divide between religious and secular. Historically and contemporarily, radical left in Israel, 
for instance Israeli Marxist parties and activists, have usually struggled in solidarity against the 
oppression of Palestinian Arabs, while ignoring the oppression suffered by Mizrahim (Chetrit 
1999, Swirsky 1988). In its radical as well as its moderate variation of Labor-Zionism, the 
Israeli left has been dominated by Ashkenazim and has not tended to address the problems of 
Mizrahim. Mizrahi intellectuals' attempts to formulate an Israeli identity option in an 
emancipatory way, one that goes beyond Eurocentric constructions of secularity/religion, 
left/right and Arab/Jew, has not yet found a stable political organization through which to get 
expressed. It is this very lack that urges the need to draw the genealogy of Mizrahi attempts to 
do so. Bashkin (2017) claimed Mizrahi revival is currently taking place, expressed, among 
others, in the fact that almost every day an article, essay or a piece of art that deal with the 
ethnic differences between Jews in Israel gets published. Indeed, the Mizrahi struggle for 
equality has probably never enjoyed such broadband legitimacy, and the Israeli political sphere 
certainly includes Mizrahim today in much more diverse manners and forms than in the period 
of study of this research. This broad inclusion is a product of processes that began after 1977, 
and is also indebted to the activity of the mentioned Mizrahi intellectual elite.    
 
In summary, Zionism was based on a Jewish desire to assimilate into the west, and its process 
of colonization required transforming colonized Jews, and embodied their assimilation into the 
position of the colonizer (Raz-Krakotzkin 2005). The result of this was the erasure of a Mizrahi 
identity as potential carrier of positive content and connotation. Any intellectual attempt to 
define a Mizrahi public is inevitably perplexing (Ben Dor 1999, Dahan 2007, Adut 2006), 
another symptom of the crisis of this public itself (Shohat 2004). Perhaps the only factor that is 
not contested is the religious differences between Sephardim and Ashkenazim, and indeed this 
difference molded the sole historical opportunity to mobilize politically Mizrahi/Sephardic 
identity and interests. Any secular attempt, by sociologists, intellectuals or social activists, to 
speak about socio-economic and cultural oppression along ethnic lines, has resulted quite 
different from the story Israeli society tells about itself (Sagiv 2014). Nonetheless, leftist 
activists and researchers as myself are attracted to inquire into Mizrahi and Sephardic identity 
in a non-religious manner, because it is understood to embody an emancipatory alternative to 
the aggressively exclusive Israeli society and state. Next we will explore the meaning of such 
emancipatory alternatives, and suggest the importance of the study of history for the process of 
their contemporaneous elaboration.  
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 Coloniality and Decoloniality                                                                            in Palestine/Israel                                           
 
East and West 
When examining the Zionist movement as a colonial enterprise, it is important to note the 
similarities and differences between the two main groups who conform its victims. Palestinian 
Arabs, as the natives of the land who the settler-colonial project sought to replace, in certain 
senses, have endured its dynamics of annihilation and dispossession, from their property, lands 
and national political rights. By contrast, towards middle-eastern Jewries, the Zionist movement 
acted through dynamics of coercion and erasure, dispossessing them from their own identity, 
and indirectly also from their property and lands. There is no symmetry between these 
processes, but they both stem from the same historical process designed by the Eurocentric 
"ideal-ego" of Zionism: its insistence to perform as a prolongation of Europe, located in the 
Middle East, but not as part of it (Shohat 1988). When comparing the two colonial dynamics, 
the processes endured by Mizrahim may seem rather benign (Shohat 1988). Shohat (2017) 
suggested the Israeli racialization patterns are reminiscent of the Indian and the black of Euro-
American discourse: the indigenous people whose land was taken are compared to the 
Palestinians, and the Africans who were forced to migrate and were enslaved are compared to 
Mizrahi/Sephardic Jews. From a North American perspective, rather popular in social discourse 
and research about Israel/Palestine, this comparison can be quite enlightening. 
Notwithstanding, from another perspective, the historical processes of erasure and silencing of 
Mizrahi knowledge, heritage and identity may seem more similar to the processes endured by 
indigenous people under Spanish rule, while the processes deployed over Palestinian Arabs by 
Zionist colonization may be seen simply as one of the successes of the imperial-colonial 
enterprise the west has been imposing on the east since late modernity. This enterprise has 
entailed continuous military, economic and political interventions, guided by implicit racist 
notions of non-westerners as inferior and yet threatening Others, not fully human, whose lives 
are worth less because of their alienation and threatening animosity. Since the decolonization 
of the Middle East in mid-20th century, Israel has been a determining factor in much of western 
politics in the region. The situation in Palestine/Israel is one of the last remains of political 
colonization, which was replaced in the 21st century by other types of imperialism or coloniality 
(Quijano 2000).  That is why it is highly emblematic of the oppressive policies made possible 
by these power relations (Grosfoguel 2009). In many political spheres in the world, Israel 
functions as a symbol of what Hardt & Negri (2009) named Empire: the dispersed control 
apparatus that wields a massive power of destruction and oppression, registering around the 
globe in political, economic and cultural dimensions that penetrate to the depth of social 
realities. For this reason, it is of no surprise then that the Palestinian struggle has become one 
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of the symbols of the counter-movement (Collins 2011), which Santos (2007) called counter-
hegemonic globalization, a global movement of striving for emancipation from multiple types 
of oppression that are bound up in complex and multi-scale power relations. Palestine/Israel 
attract broad international media coverage, huge flows of aid funds and war technologies, 
involvement by Palestinian and Jewish Diasporas, US administrations, EU and Arab League 
diplomats, and massive international solidarity activists and projects. All these place Palestine 
and Israel in the heart of contemporary global politics.  
Since 2001, the east-west axis of global politics has deteriorated into deeper forms of violence, 
following the USA into what Collins (2011) described as an ongoing, pseudo-democratic, state-
sponsored violence. The Wall of Separation that has been built over the past twenty years 
between Israel and the Palestinian autonomic enclaves is a physical emblem of these dynamics. 
Palestine has become a laboratory for new forms of warfare and social control, offering new 
ways of colonization of humanity by techno-scientific methods that have global implications 
(Collins 2011, Zureik 2016), within global politics that have declared the east by the west as 
the enemy of the free world (Chetrit 2004). Arabs, Muslims and the Middle East are constructed 
as an Other civilization that is dangerous to the west: in political terms, as an inherently deposit 
space, in religious terms, as strictly fundamentalist (Santos 2006). Being in the heart of these 
global dynamics allows the Israeli occupation in Palestine to deepen its patterns of exploitation 
and annihilation towards Palestinians, erasing any glimpses of hopefulness from the historical 
memory of the diplomatic negotiations of the 1990s.  
The deepening animosity increases desperation, and this is reflected in a growing interest in 
research in the past few decades in "the could have-beens" of history (Shohat 2017), in all the 
roads not taken of Arab-Jewish relationships in this land. This line of inquiry has often 
investigated the discourse and practices of Mizrahi and Sephardic Jews, assuming that 
"examining Arab-Jewish relations through perspective of Sephardic and Oriental [Mizrahi] 
Jews sheds other light on complexities and nuances of conflict and on the Zionist perspective 
on it" (Jacobson & Naor 2016). 
 
 
Writing History of Resistance  
The North American sociologist Norman Denzin (2009) suggested viewing 9/11 as a defining 
moment in critical social investigation, as he called for this generation to change the language 
of critical social research to a language of possibilities. This language should attempt to exceed 
the role that social science has played in maintaining western hegemony in the universities and 
beyond. This is the point of departure for the decolonial theoretical perspective in social 
research. The decolonial perspectives do not reflect a paradigm or a theoretical framework per 
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say, and they are not integrated in this dissertation through entering into theoretical discussions 
with their formulators, nor by performing comparisons with empirical cases that other 
researchers using the same theoretical guidelines might have studied. Rather, the decolonial 
perspective conformed the guidelines of all the choices I made throughout this research, from 
the questions of research to the materials chosen to enter into dialogue with. The decolonial 
perspectives form part of an epistemological transition inside the academy in the past decades, 
reflected in a variety of studies and fields, that is much in debt to feminist debates and to a vast 
array of social and political movements in the west and in Latin America (Mignolo 2003, 
Martinez et.al. 2012). The aspiration to use investigation as a transformative emancipatory tool 
is the point of departure of all critical research (Burgos-Ortiz 2011, Kinchele & McLaren 2000). 
Using the particular critical angle of the decolonial spectacles has directed this research to look 
purposely in history after the discourses and practices that rise from the margins of Eurocentric 
modernity/coloniality, which are understood to perform as potentially viable alternatives to it.  
The Feminist scholar Gloria Anzaldúa spoke of the importance of knowing the struggles of the 
past, in order to construct a history of resistance, that can strengthen the different emancipatory 
struggles by highlighting what unites them: human suffering caused by unnecessary and 
humiliating human initiatives (Santos 2008). A history of resistance allows to unite different 
struggles, and transcend the ignorance that separates between people, creating prejudice and 
allowing subordination, disfiguring and whitening history (Anzaldúa 1987/2016: 145). The 
decolonial perspectives emerge from the way that modernity has consistently failed to fulfill its 
promises of solidarity, liberty and equality. These failures created a planet filled with modern 
problems that do not have modern solutions (Santos 2006). Santos claimed that by the 1990s it 
was clear that the solutions had to come from the margins of modernity. However, the only way 
to recognize these margins is by their opposition to modernity, that can mostly be seen post-
priori (Santos 2010), in human initiatives, rather than in abstract ideas of progress (Santos 2008: 
129-154). 
The Israeli historian Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin (1993), among others, returned to Walter 
Benjamin's Theses on the Philosophy of Historyi, where he described the history of progress 
and civilization as co-constitutive with the history of barbarity, one conforming the testimony 
of the other. Since history is written by the winners, it serves the interests of the rulers and the 
oppressors, and makes the memory of the oppressed irrelevant. Present reality is constructed 
by this oppression and its denial is part of this reality. That is why turning to the voices that 
have been oppressed is vital in order to construct emancipatory processes: the memory of suffer 
and pain has the potential to construct praxis for present day struggles (Raz-Krakotzkin 1993). 
                                                             
i Written in 1942, this essay is available in: https://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/CONCEPT2.html (last accessed on 
16.12.19).  
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Raz-Krakotzkin reviewed the relevance of this concept of history in our local context, noting 
how Jewish-Zionist historiography has not used Jewish suffer in order to construct a history of 
the oppressed, critical or subversive of European history. Rather, it is a typical national history, 
comprehensively Eurocentric. Raz-Krakotzkin (2005) asked to write Zionism from a Jewish 
perspective, "where criticism of Zionism can take a constructive form in redefining Jewish 
collectivity in Palestine". Mizrahi history is a privileged point of view from which to attempt 
to write Jewish history in a critical way, because it emphasizes the roots of the Jewish people 
in the east. Raz-Krakotzkin suggested that writing the history of Mizrahim allows Jewish 
historiography to emerge right from the borderlands between east and west, from an ambivalent 
place, which relies on the perspective of the colonized as well as the colonizer. This in-between 
place is also privileged for liberating the binary oppositions of east/west and 
colonizer/colonized (Raz-Krakotzkin 2005). Writing Jewish history from a critical perspective 
entails the aspiration to provincialize Europe and the Ashkenazim in the history of Zionism. In 
this sense, this research is an endeavor to fill some gaps of Jewish history in Israel/Palestine, 
by telling the story of some groups that have lost their power and therefore remained outside of 




Auto-Emancipation                                                                                        About this Research   
In 1882 the Polish-Russian Jewish intellectual Leon Pinsker wrote a pamphlet titled Auto-
emancipation! The pamphlet was translated into many languages and dispersed among 
European Jewish communities. Many historians mark this pamphlet as the inception of modern 
Jewish nationalism, that is, of the Zionist movement. The emotional overtone of the pamphlet 
in the moment of its publication, instigated, supported and inspired innovative actions among 
European Jewry.  
"In seeking to fuse with other peoples, they [the Jews] deliberately renounced to some extent their own 
nationality. Yet nowhere did they succeed in obtaining from their fellow-citizens recognition as natives 
of equal status…the greatest impediment in the path of the Jews to an independent national existence is 
that they do not feel its need. Not only that, but they go so far as to deny its authenticity. …. this desire 
[for national independence] must be awakened and maintained in time if they do not wish to be 
subjected forever to disgraceful existence…The Jews are aliens who can have no representatives, 
because they have no country.... Like the Negroes, like women, and unlike all free peoples, they must be 
emancipated… The legal emancipation of the Jews is the culminating achievement of our century. But 
legal emancipation is not social emancipation, and with the proclamation of the former the Jews are 
still far from being emancipated from their exceptional social position…. The emancipation of the Jews 
is required as a postulate of logic, of law, and of enlightened national interest, but it can never be a 
spontaneous expression of human feeling. Far from owing its origin to spontaneous feeling…it has never 
yet taken root so deeply that further discussion of it becomes unnecessary… 'You are foolish, because 
you stand there non-plussed and expect of human nature something which it has never produced - 
humanity. You are also contemptible, because you have no real self-estimation and no national self-
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respect'…The proper, the only solution, is in the creation of a Jewish nationality, of a people living upon 
its own soil, the auto-emancipation of the Jews; their return to the ranks of the nations by the 
acquisition of a Jewish homeland. We must not persuade ourselves that humanity and enlightenment 
alone can cure the malady of our people. The lack of national self-respect and self-confidence of political 
initiative and of unity, are the enemies of our national renaissance."i  
In the end of the 19th century in Europe, the need for the self-liberation of Jews became evident 
to many European Jews, a need designed by the social and political conditions of their 
environment, which was divided into nation states, many of which allowed formal legal status 
for Jews, but still discriminated against them. As the quote explicates, a Jewish nation state was 
perceived as necessary in order to allow Jews to fully and equally participate in the family of 
(European) nations. In Israel of the 1950s and 1960s, the conditions ripened for Sephardic and 
Mizrahi Jews to claim the same kind of self-liberation. Although there were such Sephardic 
claims in earlier periods as well, these two decades are of particular interest. The realization of 
the Jewish-European national ambition included Mizrahim and Sephardim in a formal legal 
way, but discriminated against them in many other ways, and in a much more brute manner 
than ever beforehand or afterwards. The autonomous Mizrahi and Sephardic organizations of 
this period were formed in a way that was much inspired by the European Zionist endeavors of 
self-liberation, under a notion that it was now "their turn" to get their auto-emancipation, after 
the Ashkenazim had fulfilled theirs. These autonomous frameworks aimed to include Mizrahim 
and Sephardim as equal participants in the Zionist enterprise, none of them asked to dismantle 
its basis. The autonomous framework was understood to be the way to re-establish the same 
self-respect and self-confidence Pinsker wrote about among Mizrahim and Sephardim, after the 
degradation of their humanity within the newly established state. Throughout the research, we 
will see how some Sephardic and Mizrahi political activists grasped this period to be the 
appropriate time for their communities to adhere to some form of unity, in order to gain political 
power, and take a significant role in designing the face of the modern Jewish nation. Those who 
propagated for autonomous Mizrahi and Sephardic organizations understood that the real 
emancipation of Mizrahi and Sephardic Jewries in Israel required something much beyond an 
equal legal status, and that this somewhat-obscure something could only be achieved by the 
unison and empowerment of these publics. For this reason, many of the autonomous 
organizations used the quote of the Jewish sage Hillel the Elder, which Pinsker incorporated in 
the title page of his essay, "If I am not for myself, who will be for me? And if not now, when?" 
 
The research will suggest a historical review and analysis of the political discourse and practices 
of autonomous Sephardic and Mizrahi political organizations in Israel. This is the site where I 
                                                             
i Emphases mine. From: Pinsker, Leon (1882). Auto-emancipation! An appeal to his people. Retrieved from: 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/quot-auto-emancipation-quot-leon-pinsker (last accessed on 15.12.19).  
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understand the potential alterity of Mizrahi discourse to reside, most easily distinguished from 
the modern Zionist one. The analysis suggested will rely on the meanings and forms of 
decolonial knowledge production, and its goal is to make visible Sephardic and Mizrahi 
intellectual construction of oppositional theory, while observing practical projects that had the 
potential of setting alternatives to the Zionist colonial frameworks, and noting their limitations. 
The decolonial perspective directed me to highlight practices and discourses that mark 
emancipatory horizon and contribute to the nurturing of universal liberation, peace, equality 
and justice in my homeland. I focused on the construction of collective Sephardic and Mizrahi 
identity and on references made in relation to Palestinian Arabs and Arabs in general. To my 
understanding, these are the sites where the potential alternative of Mizrahi-led politics lies, 
versus the dead-end politics that Ashkenazi modern coloniality has led Israel to. The analysis 
presented in this research will attempt to keep a careful balance between two main arguments: 
one claiming that as part of the national group of the colonizers, the activity of Mizrahi 
autonomous political organization only amounted to struggles over privileges within the 
colonial system, and therefore only reproduced colonial power-relations, and had no 
alternatives to suggest to modern/colonial Zionism. On the other end, there is the argument that 
claims that any Mizrahi autonomous political organization, by its very existence, formed part 
of a history of decolonial Mizrahi resistance, because the mere ambitions to have natives of the 
region in positions of power potentially disrupts the Eurocentric nature of the state. The tension 
between these arguments had led me to inquire about the extent to which the Mizrahi 
autonomous political activity was able to create viable alternative to Zionism, in any practical 
or discursive way. The alternatives that were found are not exempt of incoherencies, inner-
contradictions, and present limited horizons of emancipation, as stemming from the activists' 
simultaneous position as colonizers and colonized. 
 
The research will draw an independent Mizrahi political sphere, that while functioning as a sub-
sphere of the Israeli political sphere, had dynamics of its own, and was influenced by 
international, regional, national and local politics in ways that at times deferred from the general 
Israeli one. The Mizrahi political sphere included activists from all ideological tendencies, 
independent activists, autonomous groups and also activists that belonged to political parties of 
Ashkenazi hegemony. These reacted to each other and often constructed their actions and 
discourse as response to others in this sub-sphere. Notwithstanding, an independent Mizrahi 
political camp was not established within the Mizrahi political sphere, mainly due to the highly 
restrictive structure of political opportunities in the period of study. The research will detail the 
ways in which colonial power relations prevented the autonomous organizations from 
accumulating political power and discredited the legitimacy of the very autonomy of these 
organizations. The research will unfold the colonial Zionist structure of power and the ways in 
30
which it penetrated the autonomous organizations and dismantled their attempts at constructing 
a Mizrahi-Sephardic political camp.  
Notwithstanding, the research will show that Sephardic and Mizrahi groups and individuals 
opposing coloniality did develop within the Zionist settler-colonial society. These were mainly 
intellectual activists, who shared a sense of nativity, of coming from the Middle East and being 
of the region. They succeeded in challenging and opposing Zionist-colonial frameworks 
inasmuch as they developed discourse which rejected racist views of western superiority, and 
to the extent to which they asked, even hesitantly, to embrace certain aspects of the east, and 
integrate it into Israeli society and culture. At times of warfare, as the first half of the 1950s, 
this kind of political discourse was silenced entirely. In the 1960s, the structure of political 
opportunities for autonomous Mizrahi action was closed even further, in a way which allowed 
for traces of decolonial discourses to emerge, simply because their formulators could not 
nurture political aspirations per se. The closed structure of political opportunities allowed for 
safe spaces for intellectual exploration to open up without getting their epistemic base 
illegitimated by the colonial ruling elites. Changes in the internal regimes of the surrounding 
Arab countries were another important factor in strengthening the decolonial hints in the 
political discourse of the native intellectual activists. We will see how hints of decolonial 
discourse emerged within the revolutionary atmosphere of the 1960s in the Middle East, often 
in a way that reverberated the influence of this atmosphere in the west, and taking its legitimacy 
from western intellectuals. From these borderlines of western modernity, in the 1960s some 
Mizrahi and Sephardic intellectual activists formulated a theory of autochthons Zionism, which 
relied on the trope of Sefarad for constructing decolonial horizons for Palestine/Israel. The 
heritage of Sefarad was used as a metaphor for a reproducible space and time that can allow 
eastern and western civilizations to fertilize each other, merge into new forms of creativity, 
develop Jewish spirituality in its highest forms for both Ashkenazim and Sephardim, and 
include Arabs within the modern Jewish state without diluting or jeopardizing Judaism as a 
religion and as source of identity. The main character in this research is the figure who was 
most active in attempting to put this autochthonous Zionist theory into practice. Eliahu Eliachar 
was called by Chetrit (2004), the precursor of radicalism of the Mizrahi struggle for equality. 
Jacobson & Naor (2016) marked his activity and discourse as the most prominent example of 
the potential alternative roads that were not taken by Zionism, and Dikla Rivlin-Katz's 
dissertation about his original contribution is to be published shortlyi.  
 
                                                             
i The doctoral dissertation "From the Ottoman to Israeli Space: the national consciousness and spatial identity of 
Eliyahu Eliachar", by Dikla Rivlin-Katz, has been written in parallel to this research project. Rivlin-Katz used archival 
and published sources to identify the influence of three factors on Sephardic local identity: spatial perceptions and 
connections that developed between different middle-eastern Jewish communities, Sephardic urban traditions of 
Jewish and non-Jewish relations and pre-modern perceptions of nationality.  
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None of the groups or activists in this research had ideas similar to those of the Jewish Israeli 
Anti-Zionist left, which asks the state of Israel to shed its Jewish identity in order to become an 
inclusive democracy that can foster plurality. In general, the comparison between the discourses 
presented here to any kind of  leftist ideology should be made with much precaution, and should 
be mainly used in order to engage in dialogue with Eurocentric leftist movementsi. The tag of 
"left" carries the risk of appropriating the decolonial critique in inappropriate manners, which 
replicate colonial power relations from the left, under leftist forms of coloniality (Grosfoguel 
2012). The Mizrahi and Sephardic organizations had a national discourse, which asked to root 
the nation within the Middle East and change its Eurocentric characteristics, but as a Jewish 
nation. In this sense, the goal of every autonomous Sephardic and Mizrahi political action in 
this period was to gain equal privileges in the Jewish state. Notwithstanding, the aspiration to 
write Jewish history in Israel/Palestine from a critical perspective has directed me to examine 
closely the phenomenon of autonomous Mizrahi and Sephardic political organizations in the 
1950s and 1960s. The close examination revealed some historical traces of Mizrahi and 
Sephardic decolonial, rebellious construction of knowledge, which this study emphasizes in 
order to contribute to a genealogy of a Mizrahi history of resistance. The assumption here is 
that there is a need for contemporary Israeli social movements and political activists to have 
more knowledge about this past. This exploration is therefore understood as contributing to 
decolonizing efforts in Palestine/Israel. This research project is an extremely limited expression 
of the search for ways for Israel to open up to the east, allowing it to envision an intertwined 
future with Palestine in a non-destructive fashion, and suggest a possibility of a transformation 
of the local relationship between east and west.  
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
The research presented here is divided into two introductory chapters and four historical 
chapters. Chapter 2 explores the theoretical framework of the research, and includes a literature 
review of previous relevant studies. Chapter 3 explicates the methodological framework, 
reviewing the process and limitations of research, its terminologies and periodization.  
Chapter 4 conforms the historical background of the research, explaining the relevant historical 
developments prior to 1948, which is the point of departure of this research.  
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the autonomous political activity of Mizrahim and Sephardim in the 
1950s and the 1960s, respectively. Each chapter is divided into three parts. The first part is a 
historical introduction to the decade, depicting the relevant international, regional and local 
political events influencing the period. This part outlines the structure of political opportunities 
                                                             
i See for instance Shiko Behar's lecture about "The Mizrahi left from 1896 and until today" to the Israeli Communist 
Party, which took place in Hagada Hasmalit, Tel Aviv, on January 15th, 2017.  
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that the autonomous Mizrahi organizations faced and the political field from which they grew. 
The second part will review the activity and discourse of the autonomous organizations. The 
third and final part will constitute of a discussion, analyzing the empirical data of the 
organizations' activity with sociological, decolonial and anti-colonial theoretical debates.  
Chapter 7 constitutes of a review, based on many secondary sources, of the Iraqi cadre in the 
Israeli Communist Party, over almost the entire period of research. This chapter will be divided 
into two: a historical review of this circle's activity and discourse, followed by a theoretical 
discussion on the matter.   
Last but not least is the concluding chapter, which will summarize the empirical data and 
theoretical debates reviewed throughout the historical chapters, and highlight the contribution 























This chapter outlines a theoretical framework for the decolonial historical study of Mizrahi and 
Sephardic autonomous political organizations. It is divided into five sections that are organized 
in two parts. The first part is a theoretical exploration, and the second part grounds the 
theorization in the local context, and contains a review of the relevant literature that has 
prepared the ground for this inquiry. The first part commences with a short introduction to the 
contemporary decolonial theoretical perspective, followed by examination of some of its 
sources of inspiration and genealogy. Afterwards, some of the basic and most relevant 
decolonial terms and conceptualizations will be elicited. The next section will review ways of 
theorizing political activity. The development of Social Movement Theory will be explored, 
mainly in order to justify its irrelevance for this research. The first part will conclude by eliciting 
what decolonial perspectives may mean to the study of collective action.  
The second part begins with a brief review of decolonial thinking in the Middle East, and then 
in scholarly productions of Jews. This will lead to the discussion about the question of framing 
Zionism as a form of colonialism. We will attend to the settler-colonial paradigm that reigns 
this line of research, and later address the question of the modern/colonial scales created among 
Jews along Jewish history. After that, we will attend to the literature review. Firstly, we will 
examine the different ways in which Mizrahim and Sephardim in Israel have been studied, 
which is in fact an examination of the development of Israeli critical sociology. We will 
describe its relation with critical historiography, and its engagement with Anglophone 
postcolonial theories. Then there will be a review of what I interpret to be decolonial theoretical 
endeavors to conceptualize Mizrahiness in Israel, which this research attempts to contributes 
to. Lastly, there will be a literature review of previous studies of Mizrahi and Sephardic political 
activity, marking the lacks I found in research, which called the need for this very investigation. 
The final section will define some theoretical tools required for approaching this empirical 












PART I: GLOBAL DESIGNS 
 
 
1. DECOLONIAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
In the past two decades or so, a group of scholars mostly of Latin American origins, have had 
a series of intellectual exchanges, in the form of seminars, articles, conferences etc., from which 
a more or less coherent system of concepts was developed and categories and theoretical 
focuses were constructed. Some of those have been incorporated into the academic language in 
Latin America (Restrepo & Rojas 2010). Some called this line of thought, "the 
modernity/coloniality research program" (Escobar 2007), others named it "the decolonial turn" 
(Restrepo & Rojas 2010, Castro-Gómez & Grosfoguel 2007). In order to appeal to the repeating 
claim that it is not a "single theoretical school, but rather… a family of diverse position that 
share a view" (Maldonado-Torres 2011), this theoretical proposal will be referred to as 
decolonial perspectives or thinking.  
Decolonial perspectives have roots and have been contemplated from and between different 
disciplines, including philosophy, political-economy, literary critique, sociology, anthropology 
and international relations. Their theoretical predecessors are just as varied: debates of Latin 
American critical thought such as dependency theory, philosophy of liberation and 
Participatory Action Research; postcolonialism, Marxism, black and Chicano feminism, 
cultural and communication studies, African and Muslim philosophy, post-development 
studies, world system theory and postmodernism among others (Escobar 2007, Restrepo & 
Rojas 2010, Florez 2010). Following, we will elaborate on those theoretical lines that 
correspond with and precede contemporary decolonial thinking, and are thought to be of most 




Genealogy and Predecessors   
 
Postcolonial Theory 
In the 1950s and 1960s, in the height of the struggle between two empires to extend their 
influence over the entire world, anti-colonial writings were developed by westernized 
intellectuals in what got nominated then as the "third world". These intellectual activists were 
involved in different ways in the "third world's" wars and processes of decolonization. They 
were concerned with questions of cultural imperialism (e.g. Cabral 1973/1994), and wrote 




subjects (Restrepo & Rojas 2010). These writings pointed out the moral and spiritual 
bankruptcy of European civilization, and explicated the existential and psychological 
consequences, for both colonizer and colonized, of the oppressive colonial violence, and of the 
dehumanization that justified and based the colonial rule (e.g. Cesaire 1972, Fanon 1965, 
Memmi 1965, Du-Bois 1903/1968). These writings accompanied the Bundung conference in 
1955 of African and Asian states, various national liberation struggles, and the ideologies of 
Negritude, Pan-Africanism, Pan-Asianism and Pan-Arabism (Shohat 2006, Aydin 2007, 
Kaiwar 2014).  
Ahmad (1992) claimed that it was Edward Said's book Orientalism, published in 1978, that 
brought the dichotomist analysis of colonizers versus colonized into terms that Anglophone 
academy could endorse. By drawing on a variety of historical texts and Foucauldian post-
structuralism, among other approaches, Said widened the epistemological inquiry of colonial 
power relations. He drew attention to questions of knowledge production of colonial authorities, 
and showed how it portrayed the Orient in colonial texts as a simultaneously inferior and 
threatening Other. Orientalism inaugurated a new era of academic research of colonial 
discourse (Williams & Chrisman 1994, Ahmad 1992). Indian and British-Indian scholars 
carried on this line of research, influenced by the historian Ranajit Guha, who established the 
Subaltern Studies Group in early 1980s. This group was inspired by the writings of the Italian 
scholar Antonio Gramci, and was dedicated to the analysis of historical texts about rural history 
and farmers' revolts, in order to create a counter-hegemonic Indian historiography. Their 
intention was to rescue the subaltern's perspective from historical moments of insurrection and 
autonomy, in order to contrast the nationalist history focused on the elites (Ludden, 2002, 
Chatterjee 2010). This was until the Indian feminist scholar Gayatri Spivak (1988) published a 
critique that pointed out the inability of such researchers, methods and sources to rescue any 
form of whole subaltern experience. Then the group shifted to analyzing literary texts, and 
changed its main inquiry to questions of colonial representations of subalterns. This 
poststructuralist shift gained the group recognition in North American universities, within the 
field of knowledge known as Postcolonial Studies (Chatterjee 2010, Kaiwar 2014).  
Postcolonial theory developed as a theoretical niche in Anglophone universities, drawing on 
postmodern and post-structural theories, and centrally anchored in literary critique. The "post" 
here may stand for few things, but significantly it is post the anti-colonial era, and therefore it 
rejects the binaries of "third world" militancy and its maintenance of essentialist colonial terms 
(Williams & Chrisman 1994, Shohat 1992, Shohat & Stam 1994).  Mainstream postcolonial 
theory tends to challenge the western-modern truth discourse by its own theoretical tools of 
anti-essentialist post-structuralism (Shohat & Stam 1994), asking to dismantle its entourage of 
binaries, as self/Other, center/periphery, metropolis/colony (McClintock 1994, Spanos 2009). 




historical location and production of knowledge, criticizing domination and favoring the 
subaltern point of view (Mignolo 2000: 94). Not unlike the postmodernist perspective, this line 
of study opposes the view of modernity as a lineal process of progress, through which 
modernity was conceived in Europe and then spread to rest of the world, which must now 
advance in order to "catch up". Rather, many postcolonial writers emphasize multiple 
modernities in various places, insisting that colonialism is not a "mistake" of enlightened 
modernity, but a plain part of it for most of humanity. The political decolonial value of this 
academic inquiry lies then in undermining and obfuscating the colonial power relations, rather 
than in suggesting theories of struggle (Shenhav 2004). Homi K. Bhabha is a good example of 
this approach. This scholar wrote in philosophical terms about the unstable, ambiguous, 
ambivalent and always bi-directional and contradictory power relations that exist between 
colonized and the colonizer (Bhabha 1994). Through this kind of critique, postcolonial theory 
got to revolve much around terms of fragmented identity, hybridity, syncretism, mimicry and 
liminality: most usually referring to the lived experience of the colonized, and perceiving 
European identity as a coherent whole (Kaiwar 2014, Ahmad 1992). Some claimed this type of 
postmodern analyses is the only one providing accessibility to postcolonial theory in 
metropolitan universities, as it is essentially reassuring and safe for the colonizers (Mishra & 
Hodge 1994), part of a theoretical discourse controlled and formulated by the white academy 
itself (hooks 1994). Kaiwar (2014) claimed the Geist of postcolonial studies, as well as its 
impasse, is precisely this motion between cultural essentialism and the postmodern celebration 
of "fragments". Shohat & Stam (1994) locate this impasse in the relation between academy and 
political movements: while theory deconstructs totalizing myths, activism nourishes them. 
Intellectuals that are activists and academics, dismiss theoretically essentialist identities, while 
in practice they premise political actions on their basis. Ways out of this impasse have been 
pointed out, for instance by the term "strategic essentialism" attributed to Spivak (1988). 
"Strategic essentialism" addresses the need of nations and minorities to imagine a communal 
past striped of colonial domination, in order to forge collective resistance (Shohat 1992). hooks 
(1994) suggested this was a necessary phase, which allows for a later phase, of criticism of 
essentialism, to emphasize the authority of the experience of the oppressed.  Therefore, the 
essentialist phase allows for the diversity of experiences of different social classes of oppressed 
ethnicities to get accounted for. It allows for hybridity and syncretism to be studies critically 
(Shohat 1992), examining their diverse modalities and the circumstances of their creation 
(Santos 2010).  
The blurred lines between theory and practice become more evident when dealing with 
multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is an Anglophone paradigm for policy making, which has 
been criticized for basing the representation of the political, social and cultural fields in terms 




(Shohat & Stam 1994, Brubaker et.al. 2004). According to Mishra & Hodge (1994), this policy 
key-word translates into practice the theoretical formations of theories of hybridity, in its 
uncritical adulation of pluralism. Although it may seem as contradictory to the 
hybridity/syncretism paradigm, both paradigms share the tendency of celebrating plurality in a 
way that ignores the violence that has shaped it. This makes them easy to integrate into policy 
and discourse that maintains contemporary colonial and imperial power relations within 
capitalist globalization (Kaiwar 2014). They do not, however, lend themselves easily to 
geopolitical critique or to transformative struggles (Shohat 1992, Fraser 1993). Postcolonial 
theory was criticized for having gained a prestigious and stable academic niche in price of de-
radicalizing the political movements on which it was based, and thereinafter carrying 
depoliticizing potential, for its refusal to theorize clearly domination and its opposition 
(McClintock 1994, Kaiwar 2014, Shohat 1992). The postcolonial inquiry of syncretic and fluid 
identities, just like the multicultural policy of endowing superficial representation to different 
ethnicities, both "run the risk of sanctifying the 'mission accomplished' of colonial violence" 
(Shohat 1992).  Anti-colonial writings have been criticized by postcolonial theorists for 
reproducing colonial logics, leaving them intact and also reversing them. Therefore, much of 
mainstream postcolonial knowledge production deals with dismantling the meanings of 
colonial power relations by revealing their inner contradictions. This tendency was criticized 
by politically committed intellectuals for undermining the very stance against colonial relations. 
This is a political debate, but also a theoretical one, about the limits and potential of academic 
production to challenge western modernity by its own tools (Charkarbarty 1992, Spivak 1988).  
 
 
Race and Ethnicity Studies 
A parallel and sometimes congruent line of theoretical inquiry with postcolonial theory 
developed in Anglophone universities, in order to conceptualize racial and ethnic identities, 
experiences and dynamics in metropolitan societies. This body of knowledge examines both 
institutional and subjective everyday constructions of race, racism, ethnicity and nationalism.  
For instance, Balibar & Wallerstein (1991) showed the intrinsic relation between racism and 
nationalism as a cycle of historical reciprocity, and noted the roots of this relation in 1492 in 
Spain and Latin America. Race and Ethnicity Studies focus on race as a social construction, 
and follow historical and contemporary racialization processes (e.g. Omi & Winant 1986, 
Banton 1970). To encompass the all-temporal dimensions of racialization, Bonilla-Silva (1997) 
suggested emphasizing the structural nature of race, as an organizing principle of social life 
within racial social systems. However, such structuralist approaches are easily refuted and 




equal opportunities, is the dominant cognitive framework in the west, and it is the foundation 
of the naturalization of the racial system. Abstract liberalism produces white colorblindness 
that is recruited for preserving racial hierarchies (Segrest 2001, Rasmussen 2001), within a 
racialized social system that maintains "racism without racists" (Bonilla-Silva 2006). In order 
to resolve the discrepancy between sociological analysis and actors' own interpretation of social 
life, some researchers focused on everyday practices and discourses that create and maintain 
ethnic boundaries (Wimmer 2008, 2009, Lamont & Molnar 2002). Empirical research within 
this perspective dealt with everyday interactions or with institutional, political and historical 
practices of power (Brubaker et.al. 2004). Some authors raised questions related to the elusive 
nature of ethnic identities, usually among social minorities. These asked to dismantle the 
understanding of ethnicity as related to ontological "groups", and pointed out cognitive 
processes behind the creation of ethnic terminology. Banton (2011) suggested using categories, 
Brubaker (2004) suggested viewing ethnicity as an epistemology, a perspective on the world. 
The empirical study within this cognitive approach inquires how, when, and why do people 
interpret social experience in racial, ethnic, or national terms (Brubaker et.al. 2004). Feminists 
of color integrated these debates more profoundly with class, gender and other oppressions, by 
suggesting intersectional analysis of experiences, representations and identities (Crenshaw 
1991). If relating to this line of this research separately from its feminist branches, however, it 
can be noted that it lacks epistemological commitment to social transformation, and therefore 
is liberated from critiques of its failure to undermine colonial or racial power relations. Race 
and Ethnicity Studies and postcolonial theory form part of the point of departure of the 
decolonial perspectives, but it has had different trajectories, emphases and questionings 
(Restrepo & Rojas 2010). 
 
 
Latin American Critical Thought 
According to Bialakowsky & Gentilli (2012), one of the fundaments of Latin American critical 
thought is dependency theory, that showed how "international and internal structure… leads 
[Latin American countries] to underdevelopment, or more precisely, to a dependent structure 
that deepens and aggravates the fundamental problems of their people" (Dos Santos 1970). 
This paradigm, along with African underdevelopment theory, raised criticism about 
multinational corporations, capitalist countries and global multilateral organizations, 
examining how they generate wealth for the "first world" and poverty for the "third world" 
(Shohat & Stam 1994). From this base further critique developed in post-development theory 
(Escobar 1995). The narrative about the modern world system that Wallerstein (2004) 




These initiated the establishment of institutions, power relations and ways of thinking that 
ended up legitimating a Eurocentric domination over the world (Restrepo & Rojas 2010). 
Through these lenses, capitalism can cease to be seen as born in Europe and later expanding to 
the rest of the world, as part of a linear exponential narrative of the history of modernity. Rather, 
modernity is understood as a result of a specific interactions which have involved the entire 
world from their very inception, in form of global accumulation of capital and an unequal 
international division of labor (Florez 2010, Restrepo & Rojas 2010, Grosfoguel 2011).  
Latin American social movements conform part of the non-academic genealogy of decolonial 
thinking (Mignolo 2007). Decolonization, after all, is not an abstract theory, but has been the 
axis of struggle of indigenous peoples everywhere, including in the Americas, ever since the 
first conquistas (Walsh 2008, Maldonado-Torres 2011, Resrtepo 2007). In the 1980s, when the 
USA supported the installment of dictatorships in Latin America, the philosophy of liberation 
was developed from the theology of liberation, and got to form a constitutive part and 
fundamental pillar of Latin American critical praxisi. The philosophy of liberation recognizes 
an epistemic and political privilege of the oppressed, and defines the struggle to liberation as 
much against the oppressor as it is against the fear of the oppressed from liberation, which is 
the result of dominating structures: liberation, then, is of both (Dussel 2003). This philosophy 
can be seen as a project of cultural liberation (Dussel 2005), which requires self-reflexivity in 
order to avoid inverting relations of domination (Restrepo & Rojas 2010).  
Since early 2000s, indigenous movements have been gaining more public and academic 
visibility in Latin America, as leftist and center-left governments were established in many 
countries, and Ecuador and Bolivia formulated new constitutions, which incorporate indigenous 
values and terminology. From the Zapatistas' theoretical revolution (Mignolo 2000: 149) to 
other movements from "the base and periphery of society" (Fals-Borda 1992) all around the 
region, innovative projects rise, as well as self-reflexive manners to express them throughout 
state, regional and global networks. These serve as a source of inspiration to activists 
worldwideii (Hoetmer 2009), and became an important referent for academics studying 
collective action (Martinez et.al. 2012). These movements and organizations stand against 
militaristic, authoritarian and monopolistic statehood, foreign intervention, and social and 
economic development in its current configuration, as conducted by the rich countries and 
through local oligarchies. These social movements do not only organize protest, but also 
practice alternative ways to organize, develop, educate, do democracy and treat the 
                                                             
i For example, it is considered related to Popular Education, a pedagogical attitude and set of institutions attributed 
to Paulo Freire, as directed to lower classes and based on dialogue and exchange between the educator and 
students.   
ii The Brazilian based Via Campesina has its networks in Palestine, and the Zapatistas' struggle has also had 
certain resonance in Israel and Palestine. For example, see: Faris Giacaman, "The Sadness of Post-Militance: 
Some Reflections on Brown University’s 'New Directions in Palestine Studies' Conference", 6.4.14. Retrieved 




environment. This way, they achieve breaking sectarianism and unite different leftist fractions 
(Fals-Borda 1992), based on specific paradigms as feminism, Marxism and anti-racism 
(Chinchilla 1992). In fact, the respect to differences and recognition of diversity is the key point 
of departure of many movements, practicing "identity-politics" combined with a substantial 
tolerance to other identities (Hoetmer 2009). The inner space of the movements becomes an 
arena of struggle between different actors over the construction of alternative institutions, 
practices, concepts, imageries, and political projects of education, means of communication and 
economic organization (Alvarez 2009). These projects are seen as having a deep potential to 
develop alternatives to today's modern problems, since the movements do not emerge primarily 
from the urban educated middle-class, but rely on a synthesis of modern emancipatory values 
with indigenous cosmologies and rural liberation struggles. The political culture constructed 
through these movements are of particular interest for the academic world, because of new 
theoretical, conceptual and analytical frameworks that are emerging and being used, not only 
about but also from the movements, and often through innovative forms of exchange between 
the academy and movements (Walsh 2001, Martinez et.al. 2012). By emphasizing and 
elaborating on notions like horizontality, emancipation, interculturalism and autonomy, 
contextual and specific knowledge is produced, interpreted and re-interpreted to the benefit of 
weaker populations (Walsh 2001).  
It is within this context, and out of this atmosphere of exchange of theory and action, that 
contemporary academic decolonial perspective has developed. It is part of intellectual 
endeavors that have existed since the very inception of modern forms of colonization 
(Maldonado-Torres 2011), and yet a result of specific exchanges of the last decades. These 
exchanges take place after decades of remapping of the political and cultural possibilities 
available for resistance, when "substantives such as revolution and liberation transmuted into 
adjectival opposition- counter hegemonic, subversive and adversarial". The macro-narrative 
of revolution of the middle of the 20th century has shifted into decentered multiplicity of 
localized struggles (Shohat & Stam 1994: 338-342). Intellectual debates in Latin America, 
Africa and the Arab world have been replacing reactive identity affirmation in humanistic, 
moral and political critique of cultural colonization. Essentialist debates about identity and 
ideology shift to critical thinking about democracy and agency (Kassab 2009). Feminist 
writings, especially of color, substantiated the relation between such debates and academic 
theoretical production. The decolonial perspective developed from this kind of relationship. By 
drawing on Latin American economic critique of imperialist capitalism and on Anglophone 
structural and cultural critiques of colonialist subjugation (Castro-Goméz & Grosfoguel 2007), 
it dismantles the theoretical, economy versus culture dilemmai (e.g. Fraser 1993, 1998). 
                                                             




Decolonial Questionings and Concepts 
 
Modernity  
The major challenge in conceptualizing modernity from a decolonial perspective are its inherent 
contradictions and ambivalence, centrally, the way it had set the conditions of oppression as 
well as the horizons for liberation (Quijano 2000). Modernity bears liberating concepts like 
development, democracy and human rights, but these have been used also to reproduce and 
severe patterns of domination. These concepts then are as indispensable as they are 
inappropriate in order to imagine emancipatory horizons (Santos 2011). A key image of 
decolonial thinking regarding modernity is seeing it as co-constitutive with coloniality as its 
"dark side", another side of the same coin, which does not deny the existence of the lit side 
(Quijano 2000, Luther 1964).  
Some decolonial efforts have been dedicated to rewriting the history of modernity, relying on 
systemic analyses of world history. These narratives ask to refute the narrative of the isolated 
development of modernity in Europe, by showing how colonialism has historically shaped 
modern philosophy, politics and culture (e.g. Shohat & Stam 1994), and by stressing horizontal 
and vertical links between communities and histories that lay in a conflictual network (Shohat 
2002). The fact these historical narratives can be contested, as any other, is not as relevant to 
their inquiry, as their oppositional stance to the Eurocentric narrative: this way of relating to 
history is aimed at giving a point of reference and a positive macro-narrative for the victims of 
modernity (Dussel 2007). The Eurocentric narrative of modernity, of a rational emancipation 
process conceived in Europe for the rest of the world, is seen as a myth, a local history whose 
real power, beyond its technological advancements, is the unprecedented ability to impose its 
cultural, political, economic and ontological particularities as a model for the entire planet, 
consisting as the center of global designs of other local histories (Mignolo 2000). This ability 
was achieved through domination, violence, often military, and exploitation (Dussel 2005). 
This violence must be present in any analysis of modernity, in order to refute the Eurocentric 
myth of modernity, which obscures the irrationality and violence through which modernity is 
constituted, and justifies European domination over all its Others (Restrepo & Rojas 2010).  
The way Eurocentric modernity has monopoly over academic theory and canon has motivated 
different writers to defy this limit, among them Dussel when he developed Transmodernity: a 
project of south-south theoretical and political exchanges (Mignolo, 2000: 201-214, Dussel 
2005), which he vigorously exemplified in his career and writings (e.g. Dussel 2008). The first 
phase in the project of Transmodernity is gaining appreciation and recognition for the 
autochthonous culture that has been denied legitimacy, and was inferiorized and silenced by 




possibilities of that same culture. This should be carried out by critics that come from its 
borders, with bicultural and bilingual backgrounds. Afterwards, there is a process of resistance, 
maturity, and accumulation of strength, in order to advance dialogue that criticizes modernity 
from the plurality of its periphery: a pluriversal inter-cultural critical dialogue composed out of 
many universalities (Islamic, Taoist, European, Latin American etc.) (Dussel 2005). The 
challenge here is reinventing emancipation without a totalizing theory, but within oppositional 
postmodernism. Oppositional postmodernism shares the Eurocentric, "celebratoty", 
postmodern critique about essentialism, universalism and meta-narratives, as well as its 
emphasis on heterogeneity and plurality. However, oppositional postmodernity centers on 
collective projects (Santos 2010), and aims to learn from the south, which is understood as a 
metaphor of human suffering caused by capitalism/colonialism in a variety of places. It is a 




The term coloniality represents an advancement from postcolonial theory, because it helps 
distinguish between historical political-administrative colonialism and colonial structures of 
power that are still in vigor nowadays, under new economic and inter-subjective relations 
(Quijano 1995). Quijano wrote about the coloniality of power: "a global hegemonic model of 
power in place since the Conquest that articulates race and labor, space and peoples, 
according to the needs of capital and to the benefit of white European peoples" (Quijano 2000). 
This term integrates multiple hierarchies, or heterarchies: of class, age and gender, sexual, 
spiritual, linguistic, geographical, epistemological, aesthetic, pedagogical, ecological and 
spatial hierarchies that in an interrelated manner compose the coloniality of power, but have 
race and racism as an organizing principle (Grosfoguel 2011). Capitalism is understood this 
way as historical structural processes that construct a global ethnic-racial hierarchy and division 
of labor. Superstructure and structure go together, as do culture or economy. The coloniality of 
power is a matrix of power, with an institutional structure (like nation states) and both spatial 
and epistemological implications (Mignolo 2000: 17). It is related to the naturalization of 
Eurocentrism as a global common sense, which divides the world into west and the rest, 
implicitly and constantly flattering Europe in the way of defining of nations versus tribes, 
religion and culture versus superstitions and folklore, arts versus artifacts, demonstrations 
versus riots and defense versus terrorism (Shohat & Stam 1994). From the coloniality of power 
derives the coloniality of being, which relates to the lived experience of those who have been 
dehumanized, and also of those who have been generated as superior, or as a model of 




norm to rational-instrumental thinking (Walsh 2008, Maldonado-Torres 2007). The coloniality 
of knowledge also derives from these mechanisms, and forms part of the coloniality of power. 
The coloniality of knowledge refers to the different mechanisms of inferiorization of knowledge 
and their implications. This term asks to emphasize autonomous theoretical productions of 
knowledge that do not draw their validity from scientific standards (Santos 2007). It is useful 
to address knowledge that has been silenced, ignored, excluded, and omitted throughout 
capitalistic hegemonic globalization (Grosfoguel 2011), disqualified as non-conceptual, 
insufficiently elaborated, naïve, inferior; below required erudition or scientific standards 
(Foucault 2003). It draws attention to knowledge that is deemed particular, intuitive, understood 
as beliefs and opinions: knowledge that is not considered knowledge, but subjective 
understanding. The coloniality of knowledge is most evident in the various development recipes 
subscribed by the west to "cure" the "illnesses" of formerly colonized societies (Escobar 1992).  
Coloniality, therefore, can be seen analytically through these three dimensions: political (of 
power), epistemological (of knowledge) and ontological (of being) (Restrepo & Rojas 2010). 
In any such analytical axis, the meaning of coloniality remains, as a reminder of the violence 
inherent in modernity. This violence has been conceptualized as epistemic violence by Spivaki, 
as epistemicide by Grosfoguel, and as genocidal logics of conquest of the ego-conquiro by 
Dussel. The violence inherent in coloniality is essential to include within intellectual endeavors 
to democratize and reconstruct modernity (Quijano 1995). The inventory of tracesii that colonial 
violence has left on its victims, the existential realities of pain, anger and resentment it has 
shaped (Shohat & Stam 1994), are compacted within the term, the colonial wound. The colonial 
wound is closely related to the colonial difference: the irreducible epistemic difference between 
cultures, often obscured as simple "cultural differences" when the colonial wound is not being 
attended to. The colonial difference is a product of the coloniality of power, of being and of 
knowledge (Maldonado-Torres 2007). It is confirmed by the recognition of groups of people 
by their lacks or excesses in relation to the classifier (Mignolo 2003). These classifications and 
the pain they have produced created a particular locus of enunciation, a geo-political and body-
political location from which subjects speak (Grosfoguel 2011). The colonial difference is an 
epistemic site, which consists of the vital experiences of those who have been inferiorized 
(Restrepo & Rojas 2010). This does not refer to a social, "objective" location on the oppressed 
side, but to an epistemic location of opposition of those excluded from the creation of the 
modern/colonial world system, who may mark alternatives to hegemonic forms of knowledge 
(Mignolo 2000, Castro-Gómez & Grosfoguel 2007). For these alternative knowledges to 
realize, translations and exchange of knowledge are deemed indispensable, especially between 
                                                             
i This term of Foucault was used by Spivak (1988) to describe the production of the colonial subject as Other, whose 
knowledge is made subaltern, perceived as naïve, underdeveloped and not ready for the task of self-government.   




various subaltern knowledges. Thinking through the colonial difference means thinking 
through non-Eurocentric epistemologies, and that is where alternative categories and politics 




The question of alternatives raises the question of the possibility of exteriority and alterity to 
modernity. Since the entire world is infiltrated by western modernity, exteriority to modernity 
cannot be understood as ontological or absolute, but as the position of marginality in its 
structures of power (Restrepo & Rojas 2010). The exteriority to modernity is reflected in a 
historical location on the margins of the modern world system, which therefore allows access 
to non-modern knowledges, which have been deemed inferior by Eurocentric rationality. This 
kind of thinking is opaque from the western point of view and the scales it has created, and has 
the right not to be known entirely, nor to be pretended or desired to (Maldonado-Torres 2011). 
The Mind in modern epistemology has been appropriated and universalized by the very concept 
of Reason. Notwithstanding, thinking remains universal and local at the same time, responding 
to local and material needs. Alternative epistemologies might be seen as replacing the 
hegemonic imagination that has the head as the center of the body (Mignolo 2000: 81). This 
leads to an aspiration to change not only the content of production of knowledge, as perhaps 
anthropologists have been doing all along, but to transform the very terms of the conversation, 
challenge the very way universities and schools give preference to western-scientific thought. 
From here rises the need of the decolonial writers to establish new categories and concepts 
(Mignolo 2000). 
Like the postcolonial theoreticians, many writers quoted above are "third world" intellectuals 
producing knowledge in colonial languages and often from western universities. This geo-
cultural position is understood as privileged in order to develop an Other epistemology, that 
goes beyond inner-modern critiques of modernity, like postmodernism and Marxism, which 
have been inspired by the social and economic conditions of the center of the modern world 
system. The Moroccan scholar Abdulkbir Khatibi wrote about the 'double criticism' that can 
develop from this position, a critique of one's own culture along with critique of modernity 
from its margins (Mignolo 2000). The feminist scholar Gloria Anzaldúa (1987/2016) dedicated 
much writing to describing these geo-cultural borderlands, as epistemological spaces where 
different cultural frames of reference clash and collide. People who live the borderlands have 
the potential of opening more inclusive perspectives, and grow tolerance to contradictions and 
ambiguity. From the borderlines border-thinking may develop, as an epistemology that 




the colonial difference and the pain and anger entailed in it. Border-thinking utilizes 
dichotomies, but not in order to organize the world by them (Mignolo 2000), but in order to 
visualize projects that transcend them, that subsume and redefine concepts of citizenship, 
democracy, human rights, humanity and economic relations (Grosfoguel 2008).  
As Salbodsky (2014) mentioned, the notion of border-thinking that is attributed to "third-world" 
intellectuals corresponds with Homi K. Bhabha's notion of a "third space", as these intellectuals' 
place of enunciation. According to Bhabha (1994: 36-39), the third space holds the mutual 
effects of all cultures, and the hybridity of any historical identity. For Bhabha, the concept of a 
third space of enunciation carries the potential to transform the meanings of western colonial 
heritance into liberatory significations, by disposing of restrictive notions of culture which 
people use to construct visions of political change. This is a good point of comparison of the 
postmodern stream of postcolonial theory with the decolonial proposal. In contrast to Bhabha's 
ideas of what constitutes of liberation, a decolonial perspective might claim that essentialist 
notions of culture might be restrictive in some senses, but they are crucial for the strategic 
struggles for liberation of the oppressed, just as crucial as critique of Eurocentric power 
structures (Shohat & Stam 1994). Border-thinking is not about combatting dichotomous 
arguments for the sake of theoretically dismantling western hegemonic constructions, but it 
uses these dichotomies in order to explore alternative knowledge negated by western discourses 
(Slabodsky 2014), and create cultural maps out of diverse knowledges (Naylor 2006). Thinking 
through the colonial difference can mean thinking through non-Eurocentric epistemologies, 
which makes possible the construction of alternative categories and politicsi. 
Mignolo (2000) viewed border-thinking, coloniality and Transmodernity as complementary 
terms. The three define the limits of inner-modern critique of modernity, whose claims for 
universality establish leftist forms of coloniality (Grosfoguel 2012), as long as they do not 
engage in a critical dialogue with critiques arising from the colonial difference (Escobar 2007). 
This critical dialogue can lead to what Shohat & Stam (1994) called, polycentric 
multiculturalism, a parallel term to De Sousa Santos' ecology of knowledges. The ecology of 
knowledges is the practical expression of border epistemologies in inter-cultural struggles. Its 
point of departure is the principles of differentiation and relationality, in order to construct equal 
though diverse epistemologies in the world. The ecology of knowledges is a practical term, a 
way to bridge between different categories that groups of different backgrounds bring into a 
collective action. It means to identify common concerns, and inherent lacks in different 
knowledges, and therefore search for complementary focuses or recognize contradictions. The 
ecology of knowledge does not search for harmony, but for a self-aware reflexive dialogue 
within and between cultures (Santos 2007). The idea is of reciprocal relativization of diverse 
                                                             




cultures, which when placed in play, each could come to perceive the limitations of their social 
and cultural perspectives. It is a matter of seeing other perspectives, see how your own is seen, 
recognize and acknowledge it, take it under account, and come prepared to get transformed by 
this exchange (Shohat & Stam 1994).  The ecology of knowledges can permit choosing a 
strategy for collective action based on the knowledges most suited to pursue a certain goal, 
rather than privileging certain knowledge for its position in the power relations between the 
groups. This shifts the focus on collective action into a theory of inter-cultural translation. 
Within his endeavors to build such a theory, De Sousa Santos points out that 
incommensurability or reciprocal unintelligibility, as long as they do not impede 
communication, can lead to unsuspected forms of complementarity, that "identify common 






2. THEORIZING POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
 
Academic (Eurocentric) sociological research recognizes a series of theories as Social 
Movement Theory (hereinafter SMT), which has been the basis for much research in the west 
about specific kinds of self-organized collective political action. The SMT framing might 
define "social movements" as "a result of collective action, carried out by the sum of formal 
and informal interactions that are established through a plurality of individuals, collectives 
and organized groups that share to some extent a feeling of belonging or collective identity, 
and the structures of interaction they establish with other political and social agents with which 
they enter into conflict, through appropriation, participation or transformation of the power 
relations or the social goals that need to be reached; all this through the mobilization of certain 
sectors of society" (Tejerina 2010: 19). McAdam, Tarro & Tilly (2001) noted that SMT has 
worked best for analyzing a single unified actor in democratic states, in a particular contentious 
moment. It does not work well for analyzing dynamic and interactive sequences of contention, 
and provides weak guidelines for explaining actions, actors, identities, trajectories or outcomes. 
That is, it does not fit all kinds of collective action, and is not precisely made for developing a 
historical view of those. Moreover, most SMT literature implicitly or explicitly focuses on 
different aspects of the effectiveness of the mobilization, even when incorporating more 
cultural, constructivist and symbolic questions (e.g. Smith et.al. 1997, Benford & Snow 2000, 
Morris & Mueller 1992). Therefore, this theory does not usually provide proper tools for 




view that search to conceptualize the effectiveness of the movements' practices and discourses, 
the organizations in this research would be irrelevant, since they never gained power position, 
became popular, nor achieved their goals. However, and since collective political action is a 
natural site for decolonial inquiry, SMT in its entirety cannot get discard. For the study of the 
political organizations of this research, some dialogue will be created between SMT concepts 
and framings and decolonial concepts and framings, following other researchers such as 
Escobar (2004), Florez (2007) and Aguilar (2015). Following, there is a short introduction to 
the historical development of SMT, highlighting some concepts and questionings that will be 
used throughout this research. Afterwards, some concepts for framing collective action from a 
decolonial perspective will be suggested, as elaborated also from dialogues established between 
the decolonial perspectives and SMT, and, perhaps more importantly, between academics and 
social movements. The final part of this chapter will address specifically the terms that will be 




Social Movement Theory 
According to Ibarra (2000), the study of social movements in North America during the 1950s 
and 1960s, under the reign of functional-structuralism sociological research, generally saw 
social movements as a reaction to a structural break or tension, not approachable through norms 
of social control. Social movements were seen as a basically irrational mass-collective 
construction, in whose analysis psycho-social elements were prominent. This view was 
contested by more instrumentalist thought in the 1970s and 1980s, when social movements was 
defined rather as rational and reflexive collective behavior. Resource Mobilization Theory was 
fomulated in order to address the ways movements mobilize human, organizational, material 
and other kinds of resources in order to realize rational strategies, arguably seeking to predict 
by this inquiry the cycle of life of collective action. Incorporating the state into the analysis 
developed the theory of Political Structure of Opportunities, which focused on the way 
movements model and adjust their resources and strategies of mobilization and discourse 
according to their particular political context. The rise of human rights, pacifist, ecological, gay 
and solidarity movements, as well as continuation of feminist and indigenous ones, inspired 
another line of research in the 1980s, named New Social Movements. It can be noted that the 
adjective "new" may actually adhere more to the theory rather to than the movements 
themselves. Within this line of research, the mentioned movements were perceived by contrast 
to Labor movements, organizing mainly in turn of issues of identity rather than of work and 




acknowledgment for the singularity of their identity and attempt to define rights that derive 
from it. This type of movements drew theorists' attention to the discursive construction of 
collective action and identity, and to the production of ideas and meanings. Movements were 
seen hence as an alternative collective cultural-political everyday behavior, producers of 
"politics of signification" (Benford & Snow 2000). Ibarra affirms that by the end of the 1980s, 
two main schools of thought were consolidated, instrumentalists who focus on the question of 
how movements organize, versus culturalists whose question was why they get organized. The 
importance of both points of view was recognized and towards the 1990s an analytical model 
was consolidated, which recognized the importance of the different points of view and wished 
to encompass as many variables as possible in order to examine movements, mainly through 
five guidelines: strategic framing processes, activists' identities, mobilization structures, 
resource mobilization, structure of political opportunities, and repertoire of contention 
(McCarthy 1997). Ibarra (2000) notes that in practice, the different focuses were not easy to 
integrate into one research, and this led to mostly partial analysis of specific movements in the 
paved path of SMT in its variants (Eyerman & Jamison 1991).  
During the 1990s new challenges faced societies all around the world. These years saw the 
further consolidation of global neoliberal capitalism by multilateral institutions like the IMF 
and the World Bank. According to Hoetmer (2009), the reforms and laws that were established 
in this decade transferred the state's economic power to transnational companies and financial 
institutions, while keeping the state responsible for managing the population. Democracy was 
hence separated from the market, and global, economic-based citizenship was created. Global 
economy and global organization of violence also became interrelated this way (Escobar 2004). 
Some authors think that these processes changed profoundly the social practices of movements 
(Florez 2007, Martinez et.al. 2012, Hoetmer 2009, 2009a, Bringel & Cairo 2010). These authors 
noted that organizations are increasingly developing horizontal and solidarity-based 
organizational structures, performing with their practices a more integral criticism of relations 
of power and domination in society. Some claimed these movements act as laboratories in the 
alternative construction of social practices and relationships (Martinez et.al. 2012). Some 
authors suggested this shift might require new theories and epistemologies of collective action 
(Bringel & Echart 2010), which go beyond questions of institutions, identities, frames or cycles 
(Toal 2010).  
 
Until now, the historical development of SMT has been described as closely related to changing 
political contexts and the contemporaneous activity of social movements in the west. However, 
the strength of any theory lies in its potential to be relevant beyond its particular moment of 
production and the particular context in which it is anchored. SMT has been largely developed 




unsurprisingly, has kept the Eurocentric view of modernity depicted in the previous sectioni. 
Florez claimed that SMT have suppressed, in both a theoretical and epistemological sense, the 
potential of peripheral struggles to criticize modernity. It is not that that researchers from the 
global periphery did not participate in the production of this theory. The problem is that the 
concepts and terms of debate remained intact, despite of their participation (Florez 2007). In 
order to allow a decolonial view over the organized political activity of this research, it is 
necessary to expand the horizons and terminology that can be used to address it. This can be 
done by entering into dialogue with the Eurocentric terms, but much more importantly, with 
contemporary movements themselves.  
 
 
Decolonial Perspectives in the Study of Collective Action  
Melucci (1995) claimed social movements address the cultural foundations of society, because 
they challenge dominant models through the production of alternative cultural models, creating 
new representations, new ways to imagine, define and understand reality. Eyerman & Jamison 
(1991) agreed on this point, but thought the movements were not only challenging existing 
models, but also constructing new perspectives and ideas, that are in fact innovative knowledge. 
Activism itself can be seen as a form of theorizing, a practical testing of ideas (Shohat 2002), 
what Eyerman & Jamison (1991) called "cognitive praxis". The production of knowledge that 
occurs through organized collective action expands symbolic universes, constructs new 
concepts of human dignity, and this way contributes to socio-historical projects of change 
(Santos 2010). Therefore, when studying collective action from a decolonial perspective we 
could try to apply De Sousa Santos' notion of "hermeneutics of emergence". That means, 
"making more visible and credible the diverse forms of organizations, movements and communities that 
resist capitalist hegemony, and recognize economic alternatives that are founded in non-capitalistic 
logics (equality, solidarity, protection of nature) …even if they’re simultaneous with capitalist logics and 
contradictory…when they address the complexity of problems that are being confronted"ii.  
Using the hermeneutics of emergence in the study of collective action, would direct research to 
study the way in which collective political action enacts practices of social, economic and 
cultural-political difference, which can be thought of as alternatives to modernity (Escobar 
2004). This shifts the attention of research to the way collective actions and political actors re-
                                                             
i For example, New Social Movements were generally perceived as responding to modern globalization, challenging 
and complicating the enlightened modernity narrative. Indigenous Latin American movements, who often struggle 
for material basic needs, were frequently not included in this theoretical structure, because they were seen as 
movements that arise from traditional societies, which struggle for achieving European modernity itself and 
therefore not (yet) in a position to be criticizing it (Escobar 1992, Florez 2010). This way, Social Movement Theory 
has often preserved colonial hierarchical dichotomies of center/periphery and modern/traditional (Florez 2007). 




conceptualize and re-establish diverse, egalitarian relations, logics, practices and ways to live, 
behave and think (Walsh 2008). Decolonial study of collective actions may shift our attention 
to the way local, state and global power relations are interrelated. For instance, viewing the 
ways in which movements expand, or change profoundly the frameworks that gives meaning 
to reality (e.g. the nation state), or the ways in which movements destabilize the hierarchies 
produced by modernity (e.g. between west and east) (Florez 2007). 
 
Auto-emancipation 
Using the hermeneutics of emergence to study collective action perhaps inevitably directs 
researchers to coin terms and theorize concepts as they rise from dialogues between academics 
and social movements or political organizations. For instance, some studies asked about the 
possibilities and tendencies that strengthen notions like emancipation, autonomy and 
interculturalism in the movements' practices.  
The notion of autonomy directs research to emphasize movements as forms of self-organization 
(Escobar 2008). Autonomy points to the ability to live according to rules that are collectively 
defined for and by the people that are affected by them. The autonomy of a political 
organization gives it the capacity and disposition to take responsibility over its own entire 
system of institutions, practices and discoursesi. Self-governed politics are achieved through 
multiple agreements, and imply negotiation and management of differences. The autonomy of 
a political movement is threatened by opportunities to become too institutionalized, and thus 
lose its subversive edge, by entering a game where the powerful sustains the power. This is in 
contrast to another danger, of conserving autonomy to the point of remaining marginal and 
losing any potential to influence society (Adamovsky 2009, Chetrit 2004).  
The notion of emancipation is attributed to any action that asks to denaturalize oppression, 
conceiving it not only unjust but also an unnecessary and reversible product of human actions 
(Santos 2008). Martinez et.al. (2012) defined an emancipatory process as transformation of 
personal and collective practices and relations of discrimination, which subordinate people in 
everyday life, in sexist, racial, classist, linguistic and other manners. Emancipation is then a 
never ending process that strives to structural change in the relations of power.  
Another such terms which movements and academics can exchange is interculturalism, which 
puts more direct emphasis on the question of diversity. As developed by the Ecuadorian 
indigenous movement and elaborated by Catherine Walsh, interculturalism does not refers to a 
principal of communication between cultures, but to a political, social, epistemological and 
historical project for respect to the diversity of different ethnic, social and economic groups. 
                                                             




Rather than working towards inclusion, interculturalism aims to change the monoculture 
hegemonic character of the state's institutions, structures and relations. The ambition is to 
transform both hegemonic and subaltern cultures, through relations and negotiations where 
each particularity can contribute from its different world view and understanding (Walsh 2007, 
2008).  
Interculturalism can be seen as the goal of actions that are based on the ecology of knowledges. 
However, for this ecology to occur there is need of intercultural translations. The exercise of 
translation aims to identify and potentiate what is common in the diversity of the counter-
hegemonic drive (Santos 2008). It requires trans-cultural dialogues which relay on mutual 
interpretation of cultural topos. This collective, interactive and inter-subjective process of 
production of knowledge may incubate self-reflexive consciousness about the incompleteness 
of every culture. However, in the study of collective action, it is important to recognize the 
tensions, disagreements and power relations at play. These mark the limits of the solidarity, 
loyalty and friendships collective actions can generate (Santos 2006, 2007, 2010).  
If we review struggles for basic needs, such as health, employment, food, education and land, 
through the lenses of emancipation, interculturalism and autonomy, we might often find that 
they do not necessarily imply adopting western models of modernity, democracy and 
development. In fact, taking a decolonial perspective about such struggles would explicitly 
demystify this misconception by addressing the colonial wound. Nonetheless, it must find a 
fine balance between the colonial wound and excessive victimization, which removes the 
agency of the oppressed from the course of history (Florez 2010). The victimizing discourse 
runs the risk of maintaining a Eurocentric view, by focusing on the west as responsible for all 
the evil in the world (Shohat & Stam 1994). A way to attend to the careful balance required, 
might ask to trace the genealogy of the certain collective actions to pre-Enlightenment 
revolutions and uprisings. Recognizing the transformative value of past mobilizations or 
organizational cultures in the trajectory of local histories, may help elicit more clearly an 
autochthonous narrative of emancipation, which does not depend on interpretations of 
liberalism or Marxism, and can open research to more diverse themes (Florez 2010). In order 
to distinguish between this way of giving importance to local traditions and what Grosfoguel 
(2010) called, "third world fundamentalism", we can use the concepts of emancipation and 
interculturalism. These make the distinction between movements that employ self-
aggrandization that is in fact turned against others (Memmi 1965), and the kind that has a need 
to co-exist with the diversity of others. 
 
In sum, taking a decolonial perspective over collective action, in social movements and political 
organizations, shifts the attention away from the empirical focus on repertoire of protest, and 




meaning. Rather, it makes the underlining question of research, the very motivation to 
investigate, to see what decolonial lessons the collective action examined can entail, by 
searching for hints of behaviors, relations, practices and discourses that can overcome colonial 
power relations in a local setting. Using decolonial spectacles shifts the focus of research to 
questions about the way movements enact concepts of emancipation and autonomy, portray 
their geo-historical trajectory and location, challenge multi-scaled power relations, and perform 
translation between cultures and struggles. This is the point of departure of this research, which 
views political organization as potential agents of cultural, political and social change, and thus 
aims to concentrate on the possibilities of decolonial transformation they can propose, while 































PART II: LOCAL HISTORIES 
 
1. DECOLONIAL PERSPECTIVES IN PALESTINE/ISRAEL 
 
The articulation of decoloniality explored in the previous part has been developed largely in 
Latin America, and in light of political projects there, which combine Marxism or socialism 
with indigenous cosmologies. The internationally remarkable projects of this kind are the 
autonomy created by the Zapatistas in Mexico, the institutions developed by the Movimento 
dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra in Brazil, and Bolivian and Ecuadorian constitutions 
acknowledging indigenous notions of nature. Since parallel political projects are hardly as 
visible in our area of concerni, we must review then at large some geopolitical differences 
between these intellectual developments and the ones allowed by the historical trajectories and 
contemporary positions of the Middle East, as encompassing Western Asia and North Africa. 
Since these geographical regions experienced other processes with western 
modernity/coloniality, decolonial voices have also taken different shapes and sounds.  
 
 
Decolonial Perspectives in the Middle East 
Critical thought about modernity/coloniality in the Middle East has developed in light of the 
centuries in which the Islamic empire was a leading civilizational force, competing and 
exchanging with other Asian civilizations. The imperial succession from east to west in the 15th 
century (Santos 2006) did not entail the loss of eastern knowledge: it was written and it 
remained intact, and was not destroyed by western coloniality as in Africa and the Americas.  
For this reason, it is the geographic region that maintains nowadays epistemological and 
political rivalry with the west. Therefore, unlike the stigmatization of primitive and inferior 
south, the east received the honor of being the Other to the west (Quijano 2000). Whereas the 
south was perceived by the western empire as part of nature, to be controlled by civilization, 
the east-west axis entails much more conflict. Because the east has been delimitated as a 
threatening civilization by western epistemology, it has to be controlled because it is feared 
(Santos 2006). The closer geographically it is to the west, the more acute is the threat, and the 
bigger is the need for control.  
Throughout the centuries of first modernity, as Europe was gaining power and richness through 
genocide-epistemicide and enslavement, the Ottoman Empire was in constant contact with 
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Europe entities, within diverse systems of encounters, exchanges, cooperation and conflicts. 
According to Aydin (2007), in these years the Ottomans selectively adopted some modern 
European ideas, techniques and methods and dismissed others. A qualitative shift occurred after 
the industrial revolution and the rise of nationalism. In Asian second-modernity, Europe 
became conceived as a civilizational unit worthy of emulation, a constant reference for ideas 
and reforms for Asian politicians and intellectuals. The white "civilizing mission" was at first 
reclaimed in order to get included equally in a universal civilizational order. The falsity of 
emancipation entailed in European modernity was soon unveiled, and Pan-Islamic and Pan-
Asian ideologies grew, opposing the "civilizing mission", and trying to accumulate moral, 
political, cultural and economic power. These were anti-western ideologies, that nonetheless 
demanded to fulfill the narrative of Enlightenment and to universalize modernity, make it their 
own, in order to participate equally in a new civilizational order (Worringer 2007, Hopwood 
2000), viewing western modernity as inevitably universal (Aydin 2007). 
According to Aydin (2004), from the beginning of the century and until today, much of the 
progressive and humanist content of Islamist critiques has not entered a mutually critical 
dialogue with other emancipatory struggles, but rather rebounded into political justification of 
nativist agendas. These agendas have often translated politically to rivalry and quests for power 
that could avenge Europe's humiliation of the Arab-Islamic civilization (Kassab 2009). This is 
the base for Islamic fundamentalism, which wishes to reverse Eurocentric fundamentalism: 
instead of European, it wishes to put Islamic cosmology and epistemology as superior and as 
the only source of truth (Grosfoguel 2010). To differentiate from strategic essentialism and 
other affirmative identity and self-valorization ideologies, Grosfoguel (2006) defined "third 
world fundamentalism" as this epistemological reversal, which tends to lead to political 
authoritarianism and discard most advantages entailed in western modernity. According to 
Kassab (2009), comparing to anti-colonial debates in Latin America and Africa, it seems 
fundamentalism has expanded more in the Arab Muslim world thanks to its relative physical 
and cultural integrity in terms of religion and written cultural heritage. Here, themes of 
genocide-epistemicide and slavery do not play part, whereas in Latin America and Africa the 
quest for empowerment does not rely on past superiority that could replace the western one. 
Still, in all regions decolonial debates arise, searching for intellectual independence, 
emphasizing the provincial particularity of western scholarship, and attempting to adapt 
Marxist economic critique to local realties, combined with humanistic, moral and political 
critique (Kassab 2009). The operative decolonial terms in Western Asia and North Africa have 
more to do with religion (e.g. Abu Zayd 2010), whereas in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 




focus on some Jewish decolonial thinking of the past century, leaving apart the growing body 
of knowledge about Muslim decolonial thinkingi.  
 
With the dawn of first modernity and the conquest of black and indigenous subjects, Christian 
religious discrimination against Jews in Europe developed its forms and meanings into 
dehumanizing and racial notions. This shaped centuries of Jewish experience in Europe as 
racialized subjects. These notions developed into modern European anti-Semitism (Gordon 
et.al. 2009), which culminated in the Nazi Final Solution, which reflected into Europe the 
genocidal logics of modernity/coloniality. The rise of Hitler has been viewed this way as a 
result of inserting dehumanizing colonial-racial notions from the colonies into the existing 
religious discrimination patterns in Europe (Cesaire 1972, Arendt 1973). According to 
Slabodsky (2014), the need to assuage this inner European violence led to the final approval of 
the Jewish-European settler-colonial project in Palestine and to the establishment of the state 
of Israel. If Zionism had had the aspiration to re-invent the Jewish people as a European nation 
(as will be discussed in continuance), in many senses it seems it succeeded even beyond its own 
expectation. Military and financial alliances made between European and American Jewish and 
non-Jewish elites, in Israel and abroad (Gordon et.al. 2009), join other political and social 
processes that have made the Jews "become white" (Brodkin 2004). After 1945 and 1948 a 
commonplace conception of Jews got spread as a new part of western hegemony (Gresh, 2011, 
Memmi 1976, Slabodsky 2014). Contemporary Israeli collective consciousness remains 
attached to the past experience of dehumanization of Jews in Europe, which help it to repudiate 
consciousness of its new position of power. This is driven by political needs, and derives from 
the ability to capitalize on the victims' consciousness (see Chaumont 2000). Israel's ability to 
present itself as vulnerable is exactly its source of strength as a spearhead of western 
imperialism in the Middle East. The fears of the west allow it to construct the east as a space to 
be controlled, along the way allowing its exploitation by war and commerce (Sanots 2006). 
Zionism uses the history of suffer and victimhood to justify its actions, while adopting a 
narrative and consciousness of "history of victors". This fully European and typically national 
narrative lacks any traces of universal lessons that might have been learned from the history of 
victimhood (Raz-Krakotzkin 1993). In the 1960s, anti-colonial writers still recognized the Jews 
as part of the racialized subjects of color made inferior by the West (Dussel 1969, Fanon 1967). 
Today, Anti-Jewish anti-Semitism in the west has been marginalized, as the Jews no longer 
consist of its main threat or scapegoat. This position was smoothly replaced by Arabs and 
Muslim (Said 1978, Gresh 2011), and Jews became central advocators of anti-Muslims/Arab 
                                                             
i Contemporary Muslim decolonial thinking is exemplified for instance in the relatively new journal "Re-orient". 




anti-Semitism (Gordon et.al. 2009). Moreover, Jews are not anymore passive receivers of anti-
Jewish Anti-Semitic hate, but active agents in social arguments, discourses and tensions around 
it (Wieviorka 2008, Gresh 2011, Gordon et.al. 2009). It is a radical inversion of the position of 
Jews in the last decades, from victims of European racism to complicit in contemporary 
imperialism, in a new articulation of a supposedly historical and western Judeo-Christian 
civilization (Slabodsky 2014, Gresh 2011).   
Despite the fact Anglophone postcolonial theory is the more usual framework for 
conceptualizing Jewish and Israeli anti-colonial stances, Slabodsky (2014) claimed Francphone 
and Hispanophone anti-colonial theory has had more historical interrelation with Jewish 
decolonial counter-narratives. From this assumption, Salbodsky departed into a review of 
decolonial Jewish writings throughout the 20th century, contrasting it with the decolonial 
debates presented above. First, he analyzed Marxist theoretical developments as arising from 
Jews' positions within Europe, holding access to its society's theoretical tools but understanding 
its inherent systemic contradictions, inscribed within the bodies of theoreticians like Marx, 
Luxemburg, Horkheimer and Marcuse. He conceptualized Jewish border-thinking within the 
writings of Walter Benjamin and Immanuel Levinas, who combined Jewish sources with 
modern-western philosophy to create their social critique. Lastly, he showed the limits of 
Levinas and Albert Memmi to engage fully with the inner-cultural dialogue of the second phase 
of Dussel's Transmodernity project. Their Inner-Jewish critique was limited by their inability 
to recognize the renewed positionality of Judaism as part of western civilization. Their 
endeavors to conceptualize Zionism as an emancipatory decolonial project remained limited to 
Inner-Jewish debates with anti-Zionists, and lacked dialogue with other critics of southern 
epistemologies of resistance (Slabodsky 2014).  Slabodsky's conclusions pointed out that 
understanding Zionism as a form of colonialism is pivotal in order to conceive and construct 
any decolonial alternatives to it.   
 
 
Zionism as Colonialism 
Zionist ideology mostly conceived the land of Israel/Palestine as an empty land, "a land without 
a people".  According to Said (1992), this entailed a natural right for Europeans to own the land, 
because of their ability to bring progress to the depraved natives: their control and subordination 
was not only considered possible but also justifiedi (Said 1992). These conceptions of 
superiority, and the real power balance on which they are based, have been designing the 
relationship between Palestinian Arabs and Jews since the beginning of Zionist immigration 
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and until today (Zureik 2016). Zionist politics have mainly ignored the concrete and particular 
existence of Palestinian Arabs, viewing their politics of resistance as an irrationally violent and 
inexplicable disruption to the Jewish national narrative (Raz-Krakotzkin 1993).  
Since the inception of Zionism immigration to Palestine/Israel and until today, Palestinian Arab 
discourse has based its objection to the Zionist immigration and to the practices of the state of 
Israel on basis of resistance to global imperialism and European colonialism (Said 1992, Zureik 
2016). In the 1960s the conceptualization of Zionism as colonialism entered the political 
discourse of some Israeli political groups as well, and after 1967 this debate also infiltrated 
western academy (Rodinson 1973). Israeli academy also started to address this concept in the 
1980si (Kimmerling 1983, Shaffir 1989). Although many Israelis -in the academy and beyond- 
refute the colonial perspective on Zionism on moral grounds, claiming it undermines the 
legitimate existence of the state of Israel (Halamish 1999, Ram 1993), it  has recently been 
becoming a more legitimate approach in Israeli academy for analyzing Israeli/Palestinian 
historiographies and societiesii (Zureik 2016).   
The arguments that refute the paradigm of Zionism as form of colonialism rely on its political 
and economic particularities, as well as its self-conception and ideological discourses. On the 
first level, there is the claim that Zionism did not have a concrete mother-country initiating 
colonization and benefitting from it. Therefore, the Zionist colonial situation cannot be resolved 
by the ultimate solution that Memmi (1965) suggested to the colonizers' dilemmas–just as the 
solution popular Palestinian discourse propagates-  of the return of the colonizers to their 
mother country. Another argument relies on the motivations of Jews to immigrate to 
Palestine/Eretz-Israel, claiming it cannot be considered as colonialism since it was not in order 
to exploit cheap native labor and get hold of valuable resources (Memmi 1975, Aharonson 
1996). On the level of discourse and purpose, there is the claim that immigration, expansion of 
settlements, and the construction of an exclusively Jewish labor market in Eretz-Israel/Palestine 
were all about decolonizing Jews, meant eventually for their auto-emancipation (Memmi 1976, 
Eyal 2005, Boyarin 2002). In addition, there were different kinds of Jews that also shaped the 
Jewish collective in Palestine, as the Sephardim, who had non-colonial relations with 
Palestinian Arabs, and other basis of bond to the land (Cohen 2013, Eyal 2005). Eyal dedicated 
his research to the construction of knowledge about the east in Israel since the beginning of the 
Zionist settlement. His conclusion challenges the view of Zionism as a form of colonialism, 
claiming the Zionist encounter with the east was one of "an opened horizon and reincarnation 
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of identities", where contradictory views about the east were easily integrated and woven 
together, such as a will to mimic and merge into the east as well as a need to liberate it (Eyal 
2005: 23-26). Nonetheless, quite commonly the objection to the colonial paradigm relies on 
Jewish national sentiments, which make researchers ignore the historical power relations 
between Zionists and Palestinian Arabs, and present their common history only as "a conflict 
between two ethnic groups and their national movements, which demand for themselves a place 
under the sun on the same land" (Genosar & Bareli 1996). 
 
 
i. The Settler Colonial Paradigm  
 
Many of the empirical arguments that distinguish Zionism from European colonialism do it by 
comparing it to the widespread academic research about French and British colonial models 
(e.g. Aharonson 1996, Memmi 1975, Halamish 1999). However, more recent research frames 
Zionism as another form of colonialism, settler-colonialism. Settler-colonialism has a different 
principal logic than the exploitation of the natives and the land in order to generate wealth for 
the mother country. Rather, it expropriates the territory and asks to eliminate the natives in 
order to replace them (Wolfe 2006). Wolfe (2006) claimed that settler colonialism is best 
understood as a structure, rather than as an event: a structure that works upon logics of 
elimination. The structure transforms radically the territory in question, by the destruction of 
indigenous social fabrics, creating a mechanisms of privileges that fabricates and classifies 
identities on a hierarchal scale. Settler-colonialism as structure is not related to actors' actions, 
discourses or intentions, subjective self-perceptions or motivations. Rather, this structure is 
created by processes that are set in motion by alliances made between elites -foreign and local- 
and farmers who carry out the act of settlementi. The settler-colony is extinguished not when 
the colonizers depart, but when the indigenous ultimately remains permanently (Veracini 
2011). Under this paradigm, assimilation is one of a range of strategies of elimination (Wolfe 
2006).  
According to Shaffir (1989), from early 20th century and until 1967, Zionist settlement followed 
a "limited pure settlement colony" model, similar to the Australian or New Zealand colonial 
projects. This type of colonization is based on ethnic segregation and dispossessing local land 
and labor. The exploitation of the natives is a side effect of this structure and not its principal 
goal. The case of Eretz-Israel/Palestine before 1948 answers a "limited" model because a pure, 
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separate Jewish labor market was not achieved. Moreover, Zionist colonization could not 
expand over the entire territory, but merely purchase some strongholds (Shaffir 1989). 
Although the Zionist settlements were not an outpost of a particular empire, they benefited from 
western material capital that provided for the settlement project, and from western symbolic 
capital that legitimized it in eyes of the western nations (Said 1992). The main factor to limit 
Zionist settler-colonization at this stage was basing the motivation of settling the land on 
biblical-historical heritage: definitely a unique characteristic of this colonial movement (Shohat 
2006a, Zreik 2016). Many have compared the pre-1948 stage of Zionist colonization to 
Christian missionaries who settled the land earlier in the 19th century by similar types of western 
privileges (e.g. Pappe 1997). Zionist pre-statehood colonization was also compared to the 
crusaders, conceiving the spatial dimension of the land as biblical text, within a paradigm of 
"sacred geography" (Eliaz 2008). The Zionist destination was set upon not dissimilar 
ideological, religious and emotional grounds as previous Christian-European settlements in 
Eretz-Israel/Palestine, but the difference is that Zionism chose the land also for fulfilling 
national aspirations. The land itself had no particular economic or strategic advantages 
(Kimmerling 1999), and was not particularly convenient for territorial expansion: until 1917 it 
was part of the Ottoman Empire, and it was populated with farmers and not nomads as were 
territories of some other settler-colonies. This meant all its lands were bureaucratically 
regulated and owned. Therefore, lands had to be purchased in a slow rate (Shaffir 1989). 
According to Zreik (2016), since the territory of Palestine/Eretz-Israel was also part of the Arab 
world, as a culture and nation of the entire region, coherent resistance to colonization rose from 
its inception, which further limited its expansion. Zionist Jewish nationalism came as an answer 
to oppressive dehumanization, and asked for self-purification from negative colonialist 
Orientalist stereotypes. This liberation was to be achieved by returning to the homeland, Eretz-
Israel, where a Jewish kingdom stood a couple of millennia beforehand. However, my claim is 
that these Zionist particularities did not design an ultimately different structure of settlement 
other than a settler-colony, driven by logics of elimination of the native. Though some Zionist 
movements and discourses expressed the desire to become indigenous, their aspiration to 
imitate the natives was driven by an ultimate will to replace them (Kimmerling 1999, 2004, 
Raz-Krakotzkin 1993).  
In the end of World War I, right when colonialism was getting out of fashion, the Zionist 
colonial project got the opportunity to obtain its very own step-mother-country (Pappe 1997). 
In 1916 France and Great Britain divided the Middle East to nation states under their influence. 
The latter empire got Palestine and gave the Zionist colonization project its patronage, though 
under dynamic and unstable conditions. The British did not treat the Zionists neither as natives 
to be exploited nor as a competing colonial-imperial power to be confronted with. The two 




settlement project, even if not as widely as the Zionists had hoped (Pappe 1997, Zureik 2016). 
The major complication derived from the Palestinian resistance, that could now more solidly 
base its pillars of struggle against imperialist maneuvers of colonial powers (Rodinson 1973). 
It was around this time that the Zionist leadership stopped purposely to use direct colonial 
terminology to describe their settlement project (Massad 2007), and Hebrew substitutes with 
softer connotations got spread (Kuzar 2015). To the empire, the Zionist leadership presented 
its settlement project as an extension of Europe, bringing progress and prosperity to the Middle 
East (Massad 2007). They also emphasized the unique, peaceful and non-violent character this 
settlement project will have (Shapira 1992).  
It can be claimed that the pretension –though not self-presentation- of a peaceful character was 
discarded with the expulsions, massacres, confiscations and destruction of villages and homes 
that accompanied the 1948 war, that nearly erased Palestinian Arab presence from the newly 
founded Jewish state of Israel (Zureik 2016). By contrast, Shaffir (1989) claimed that the "pure 
settlement colony" model only radicalized after 1967, becoming a complete and not limited 
"pure settler colony". In 1967 Israel occupied, but did not annex, the West Bank and Gazai. 
Since then, Israeli settlement and control started to appear more like British and French 
colonialisms, in terms of economic exploitation of human and natural resources, expansion by 
orderly military power, and the maintenance of two parallel legal systems that discriminate 
between rulers and ruled. Ever since 1967, Israeli right and left have been defined as those 
siding with either the complete or the limited model. The complete model assumes that it is 
possible to eventually eliminate or hold under control the Palestinian population, whereas the 
limited model prefers to give up territories in favor of ethnic homogeneity (Shaffir 1989). The 
Israeli colonial system is shaped by and has shaped Israeli society to be a proud rampart of 
Europe against the Middle East, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism (Slabodsky 
2014). This is expressed in public opinion polls (Yaar 2007, Herman & Yaar-Yochtman 2010), 
in the state's geo-political, cultural and economic westward orientation, in the siege mentality 
it nurtures (Kimmerling 1999), and in the central political and economic support of North 
American Jewry and subsequently the USA itself.   
The clear advantage of the settler-colonial paradigm for analyzing Zionism and 
Israeli/Palestinian histories and societies, is the comparative perspective it imposes. It 
contextualizes this case within a global context, which, for better and worse, undermines the 
uniqueness and the singular particularity of the Palestinian/Israeli case (Halamish 1999, Sharon 
2012). Various authors pointed out that the importance of the settler-colonial paradigm is its 
ability to mark the steps that must be taken in order to construct a just and peaceful future for 
Israel/Palestine. The settler-colonial paradigm entails a moral recognition of the injustice 
                                                             




caused to Palestinians, and a political recognition of their right of self-determination (Ram 
1993). However, unsurprisingly, different authors have arrived to different conclusions as to 
which practical solution is derived by this recognition (e.g. Reuveny 2003, 2005, Rodinson 
1973, Piterberg 2010, Zreik 2016). Ram (1993) claimed that the distinctive uniqueness of the 
settler-colonial paradigm is that it takes the Israeli-Palestinian set of relations as a vantage point 
from which to examine Israeli society. Sharon (2012) claimed that the colonial dimension 
allows analyzing the differential relation of the national elites to various ethnic, religious and 
national groups within subjugated populations. However, and despite a growing popularity of 
the settler-colonial paradigm, Israeli sociologists still lack theoretical tools to analyze in an 
integrative way the multiple hierarchies that affect both Israeli and Palestinian societies (Erlich 
1993, Shenhav 2002, Amor 2002, Hever et.al. 2002a, Offir & Azoulay 2008, Gillis 2016). In 
continuance, we will explore how the prism of modernity/coloniality can help conceptualize 
the colonial situation in Palestine/Israel in ways that can orientate research towards such an 
integrated approach.   
 
 
ii. The Modern/Colonial Scale of Ashkenization 
 
According to the multidisciplinary scholar Haviva Pedaya (2015), Judaism as a religion and a 
culture, as well as Jewish identity and consciousness, for millennia has been centrally shaped 
by tensions and images of east versus west. The relational constructions of east and west, on a 
dynamic and relative scale, shaped the rise and fall of different spiritual and intellectual centers 
(Kfir 2014). Notwithstanding, what Ben Shalom (2010) called "the image of a wise forefather 
in the east" always persisted, as well as the spiritual centrality of Eretz-Israel, shared by Jewish 
communities everywhere. By the early Middle Ages different spiritual centers prospered, 
developing distinct Ashkenazi and Sephardic streams of knowledge production and liturgics 
(Bineart 1992). In late modernity, and with the development of colonial and national 
movements, the distinction between these streams changed its nature and got re-organized on a 
civilizational scale of "Europeanness" (Pedaya 2015). By the end of the 19th century, mutual 
prejudices between the communities, based on cultural and liturgical differences, got 
reformulated by colonial power relations (Tsur 1997). According to the constitutive narrative 
of the Israeli sociologist Aziza Khazzoom, the level of westernization became a central factor 
in setting the relationship between Jewish communities. Ashkenazi Jews who got acculturate 
and educated under the auspices of the Enlightment recycled European dichotomous 
conceptions of east and west into modern Jewish discourse. Internalizing anti-Semitic 
stereotypes about Jewish culture as degenerated and inferior, they "orientalized" other Jewish 




valid towards Eastern European Jews and in a very similar way towards Sephardic and Mizrahi 
communities as well. All these got stigmatized as culture-less, filthy and backwardly 
traditional. Many of these inferiorized communities internalized these conceptions and desired 
to westernize themselves (Khazzoom 2003). This stigmatization was part of the endeavor of 
Ashkenazi Jews to get integrated in western Europe, to become considered part of white 
civilization. Some elements of Sephardic Medieval heritage were appropriated into Ashkenazi 
Judaism as their own heritage and past, in order to prove Jews' compatibility with the 
emancipatory elements of modern Europe (Ben Sasson 1979). Notwithstanding, Judeo-
Sephardic civilization, just as Muslim civilization, was considered to have frozen in time in late 
modernity, declining into contemporaneous primitiveness and passiveness (Raz-Krakotzkin 
1998, Evri 2016). Since all Jews were nevertheless part of the same group of reference, 
missionary projects surged within and between Jewish communities in order to westernize the 
other communities and "uplift" eastern Jewries from their degeneration (Khazzoom 2003). Such 
projects were taken by German Jews in Eastern Europe, and by French and British Jews within 
Jews in Muslim countries. The missionary projects were spurred by Jewish national solidarity 
as well as French/British/German patriotism (see Tsur 2007). In the 20th century, Eastern 
European ultra-orthodox and religious streams also tried to gain hold within North African 
Jewries in order to save them spiritually, using a more direct discourse of salvation (Leon 2011).  
The European colonial regimes in North Africa improved dramatically the socio-economic 
situation of the Jews there. This process will be explained in the historical section. For now, it 
is sufficing to say that the foreign occupation over Muslim Arab countries in North Africa in 
many senses meant liberation for the Jews there (Pikar 2013). From a minority group under 
Muslim rule, Jews became that part of the colonized closer to the colonizer, much thanks to 
European Jewries' interventions and contacts. Colonial rule meant a newly acquired social 
mobility for North African Jewries, in different degrees in different countries, and of course 
with different repercussions for different social classes (Tsur 2010). Some North African Jews 
of influence and power could even obtain European citizenship. Tsur (2007) defined two other 
Jewish sectors that emerged in some countries, each containing a variety of social classes: the 
native and the westernized one. The westernized sector was composed by groups that got 
educated by the colonial regime, in order to intermediate the foreign rule to the local systems. 
These groups converted their local cultural orientation towards Europe, a process that was 
accomplished more fully much more commonly among Jews than among Muslims. The lasts' 
education contained more emphasis on modernization than on westernization (Tsur 2010).  The 
Jewish westernized elites adopted a complete French habitus, culture and language, and 
detached themselves from their Judeo-Arab environment. A nativist sector of the population 
also emerged, whose elites developed and became closer in touch with the local high-culture: 




created different trajectories to detach Jews from their Arab environment, whether by Hebrew 
national sentiments, not necessarily related to Zionism (Pikar 2013), or by getting westernized, 
Orientalizing Arab civilization at large, and increasingly getting identified as non-Arab 
(Khazzoom 2003). Jews in middle-eastern countriesi went through similar processes of 
westernization, but the colonial effects were much more loose and Jews could stir between a 
variety of ethnic and national identities (Levy 2011). Iraq was the only place where conditions 
allowed Jews in a quite widespread fashion to strongly identify with the Arab component of 
their modern identity (Tsur 2010).  
In Eretz-Israel/Palestine, since the beginning of the 19th century, as European imperialism 
foreshadowed the Ottoman Empire, Ashkenazi immigration increased, and by effect also grew 
in power. According to Tsur (1997), By the end of the century the traditional communal 
divisions in Jewish society became identified as unequal and essentialist cultural gaps, relying 
on colonial dichotomies of west and east, European Jews versus non-Europeans. There too, 
Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewries went through certain westernization processes through the 
intervention of their European brethren, but when the presence of Ashkenazi Zionists in the 
country got to be dominant, many of the westernizers adapted to the Zionist Ashkenazi culture 
(Tsur 2007, Ginio-Meyuhas 2014).  
 
The process of ashkenization should be distinguished from westernization. Ashkenization 
might be considered as the particular, local, Inner-Jewish content of westernization, but in the 
following I will claim that this perception is more accurate if westernization is considered as 
the functioning of the coloniality of power, of being and of knowledge. In this sense, 
ashkenization would refer to the process that allows colonized subjects to blend with the 
colonizing powers by transforming their patterns of behavior, thought, speech and appearance. 
In other words, it is a self-representation as part of the hegemonic group, which occurs through 
processes of mimicry and in order to benefit from the privileges of the dominant group. Some 
researchers claim this entails undermining colonial dichotomies (Sasson-Levy & Shoshana 
2014). Since Jews are also a religious group, ashkenization has religious, ultra-orthodox and 
secular versions. In the first two versions, as well as in other less obvious contexts that will be 
discussed immediately, ashkenization cannot be considered a version of westernization 
processes, in fact it collides with them and disturbs them. I would like to claim in the following 
that historically, ashkenization is best understood not as a local version of westernization, but 
as de-Arabization (Alcalay 1993): the uprooting of customs, patterns of thought, conceptions 
of self, and modes of being acquired by Jews in Arab countries. Ashkenization has had the 
                                                             





function of creating a basis for a Jewish national collective identity (Sasson-Levy & Shoshana 
2014), which devises the productive and obedient civil body necessary for colonizing Palestine 
(Sharon 2012).  
According to Tsur (1997), the Zionist movement was the only ethno-national movement to deal 
with an inner division between Europeans and non-Europeans. Zionist ideology was anchored 
in patriarchal/colonial dichotomies that had set orientalist conceptions about Jews in Europe as 
passive and backwards. It was a westernizing identity project that attempted to de-stigmatize 
Jewish identity as oriental (Khazzoom 2003). Since this attempt at decolonizing Jews was 
designed by European Jews, immersed in modern/colonial paradigms, and not by the Jews most 
oppressed by them, in practice and theory it only reproduced them. The Zionist project aspired 
for self-improvement and self-purification, for uplifting Jews' degraded and passive-feminine 
existence, re-inventing the Jewish people in the image of the White Man (Raz-Krakotzkin 1993, 
Shenhav 2006, Gluzman 2003). This project of westernization of Jews translated into a project 
of colonization in the east. Zionist immigration and settlement sought western support by 
claiming to bring civilization and progress into the wilderness of the orient (Boyarin 2004, Raz-
Krakotzkin 1998). At the same time, the Zionist project, as a national project, had principals of 
national unity and equality, and thus it denied the possibility of internal Jewish differences 
(Tsur 1997). Zionist debates about Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewries reproduced the German-
Christian debates about the Jews' emancipation, debating whether their degeneration should be 
attributed to nature or nurture, the last implying the need of their modernization and re-
education (Raz-Krakotzkin 1998, Sharon 2012). The Zionist society that was getting 
established in Palestine/Eretz-Isreal, by the hegemony of Jews of Eastern European origins, 
was constituted by unofficial norms of thought and behavior of Ashkenazi supremacy. These 
norms reflected real differences in economic power, average levels of life and class 
mobilization opportunities (Tsur 1997). The same norms of supremacy got established in the 
rabbinical and toranic spheres, where Mizrahi Jews were conceived as requiring perpetual 
salvation, that could be reached by integrating them into the Ashkenazi religious education 
system, as weakened and retracted subjects (Leon 2011, Amir 1984). Zionist leadership, 
intellectuals, public figures and messengers to Arab countries, exhibited simultaneous 
tendencies for integration and retraction towards Mizrahi and Sephardic Jewries (Tsur 1997), 
in a mixture of colonial mentality and national solidarity (Shenhav 2006). 
The immigration of Mizrahim to the state of Israel after 1948 put the Ashkenazi ruling elite into 
demographic anxiety, especially because of the effect this immigration could have over the 
political order (Tsur 1997). The westernized sectors of North African Jewry went through the 
same processes as other Mizrahi immigrants, a process Shaul called, "the Zionist civilizing 
process". This entailed Mizrahim's de-urbanization, proletarianization, re-education and re-




mobility (Schwartz 2014). The westernization processes that Jews had gone through under 
colonial regimes in Arab countries made them distinct from their Arab environment by their 
own view, becoming, inconveniently, simultaneously colonizers and colonized (Memmi 1965).  
However, this was not so in Zionist eyes. Westernized North African Jews in Israel were not 
considered to have gone through the proper form of westernization, and did not acquire the 
required cultural capital in order to integrate with the Israeli hegemonic elites (Tsur 2007, Shaul 
2016). It could be claimed that in the Zionist perception, they had gone through the kind of 
westernization process available to colonized Arabs, and not to colonizing Jews.  Since they 
were conceived as incapable of managing with or contributing to a modern industrialized 
society, Mizrahi immigrants were required to change their forms of life, work and production, 
education and learning, acquire new contents, change from the base their culture, or as Ballas 
(1965) put it, transform their very souls.  
In the fifth chapter we will see in detail how the Zionist civilizing process created economic 
privileges to the Ashkenazi public, forming an intrinsic connection between ethnicity and class 
in Israeli society (Schwartz 2014). Ashkenazi identity became an asset to be nurtured 
(Khazzoom 2003), a source of symbolic capital that enables access to further resources (Sasson-
Levy 2008). Many Sephardim and Mizrahim went through ashkenization processes in the first 
decades of the state of Israel. The North African immigrants Tsur (2007) described as the 
nativist elite, whose modernization processes went through Hebraic high culture, and more so 
Mizrahi immigrants pertaining to the Zionist movement or closer to it, as well as the 
westernized sectors within the native Sephardic population in Palestine/Eretz-Israel- all these 
were often incorporated into Zionist institutions of Ashkenazi dominance. This allowed them 
upward socio-economic mobility, but had the cost of shedding any Arab components of identity 
(Shaul 2016).  With the years, the socio-economic aspect of Ashkenaziness became rooted in 
Israeli society.  
Different researchers examined subjective conceptions of Ashkenaziness and Mizrahiness, 
mainly through in-depth interviews. Sasson-Levy (2008) found that Ashkenaziness today is 
conceived mainly as a power position, without much performative or other ethnic content. 
Upward social mobility of Mizrahim in Israel is conceived by itself a practice of ashkenization. 
This term is epistemologically violent, and arouses connotations of shame. Those considered 
to be ashkenized subjects are considered doubly inauthentic, not really belonging to any social 
group: ruptured from their roots and in certain discordance with their socio-economic situation 
(Schwartz 2014, Dahan-Kalev 2017, Cohen & Leon 2008). However, ashkenization cannot be 
considered purely a question of socio-economic mobility. It should be here mentioned that in 
general, the terminology of social-classes is not very outspread or developed in Israel, neither 
in popular discourse nor in academic analysis (Schwartz 2014, Adut 2006). I would claim that 




reality comprehensively. Ashkenization then carries also cultural expressions, which can be 
traced in performance related to language, tone and volume of speech (Schwartz 2015), emotion 
management practices and cultural consumption patterns, mainly related to music (Sasson-
Levy & Shoshana 2014). Perhaps ironically, for men it was found related with egalitarian 
gender practices, while for women it is related with the food they cook (Frenkel 2011)i.  
Researchers that disregarded colonial conceptualizations tended to interpret the behavioral 
codes and cultural consumption patterns that mark Ashkenazi identity as indications of 
Europeanism or of upper social class (Sasson-Levy 2014, Frenkel 2011, Sagiv 2014). I would 
like to suggest here that this is a somewhat tautological argument, and that decolonial concepts 
can contribute to defining the particularities of the ashkenization process. Ashkenazi identity is 
constituted by the colonizer's position in global and local power structures, and by the mental 
and behavioral patterns that stem from this position. As such, it is constituted by its dichotomy 
with the colonized. Some definitions of Ashkenaziness cannot be reduced to questions of social 
class or some general "European culture", but they basically signify everything that is 
distinctively different from stereotypical conceptions of Arab or middle-eastern behavioral 
codes and cultural preferences. Some of the aspects of Ashkenaziness that emerged in research 
can be understood by the classist paradigm, such as its identification with higher education, 
intelligence, politeness, condescendence and economic success. Other aspects can indeed be 
recognized as proceeding from Europe, for instance preference to European classical music, 
secularity and small families. However, some elements related to emotion management are only 
arguably reduced to elements of social class or Europeanism per se, such as emotional distance 
and tendencies to be introverted (Sasson-Levy 2008, 2014, Frenkel 2011, Sagiv 2014). In his 
ethnographic research, Schwartz (2015) found different elements in the definition of 
Mizrahiness that are on the seam line between class and ethnicity, part of the ethno-class 
structure of society. Such characteristics of Mizrahiness are, for instance, their "sonic habitus"ii, 
substandard language, parenting styles and contempt for environmentalism. Cultural 
preferences, especially of Arab or Mizrahi musiciii, is one of the most recurring fundamental 
characteristics conceived as signaling Mizrahiness. Sagiv (2014) found the centrality of other 
kinds of esthetic tastes, for instance in ceremonies and interior design of houses, where Mizrahi 
styles and preferences are similar to Arab esthetic tendencies. Sagiv (2014) pointed at another 
central element related with Mizrahiness in Israel: the feeling of insult and shame (Dahan 2007), 
a result of "the Mizrahization melting pot" (Tsur 2010) of the 1950s and 1960s, the 
proletarianization, homogenization and negative stigmatization Mizrahim endured by Zionist 
                                                             
i Frenkel investigated the conceptions of Mizrahiness and Ashkenaziness among mixed children, according to their 
views about their parents.  
ii Schwartz (2015) referred to "sonic habitus" as the sum of speech volume, music preferences, sonic sensibilities 
and attitudes toward public space and its sonic regulation. 




hegemony. Others also pointed out the negative stigma that marks the expression of the insult 
and shame as an act of moaning [hitbahyenut] (Pedaya 2005, Shoshana 2013). Pedaya (2005: 
82-111) showed how the negativity entailed in the moaning-insulted stereotype, has to do with 
the self-disciplining of a western-modern self and the rejection of the oriental self, within a kind 
of "emotional coloniality", if we willi. The basic foregrounding, then, of the ashkenization 
processes can be better explained as part of a modern/colonial power structure. Historically, 
ashkenization meant taking the indigenous middle-eastern out of middle-eastern Jews, 
whitening them, placing them within disembogues religious patterns and in a disembogues 
position of colonizers. Nowadays, ashkenization mainly signifies upward mobility, signaling 
that the ashkenized subjects succeeded in getting positioned as colonizers and privilege from 
their share of the occupation of Palestineii.  
 
In sum, the decolonization of European Jews was based on neo-colonialism, and the 
emancipation of Jews was functionally identical to colonization (Boyarin 2004). The west for 
the Zionist movement, was both a place to get liberated from and to get integrated into. The 
east was the space of backwardness and solace, but also the geographical origin, where Jews 
could reunify with history (Shohat 2006). That is, Zionism brought the Jews back to their 
historical roots in the east in order to westernize them and make them part of the west. As any 
colonial regime, Zionist colonial rule privileges a particular national identity that is viewed as 
part of a general western civilization, which is the dichotomous opposite of the native 
population. The patterns of hegemony in the state of Israel since its establishment and until 
today privilege an Ashkenazi-Zionist identity, which is best conceived as the opposite of 
indigenous middle-eastern identity. Within the colonial situation, Mizrahim's potential to 
simultaneously belong to both sides of the dichotomy has been intolerable for all parties 
involved: Ashkenazim and Mizrahim as well as Palestinian Arabs. All Jews were placed on a 
scale measuring Ashkenaziness, and the ones originating from Muslim countries either went 
through de-Arabization process, also referred to as ashkenization, or placed in the bottom of 
the scale through proletarianization processes. The scale of ashkenization is the particular local 
expression of the scales designed by modern/colonial global structures. This local scale served 
as unifying basis from which the entire Jewish population in Palestine/Israel could "orientalize" 
the Palestinian Arabs (Khazzoom 2003), and construct Israel as a European enclave in the midst 
of the Wild East. 
                                                             
i "Emotional coloniality" may still be explored much further, following Pedaya's philosophical- oriented endeavors, 
and along the lines that examine the Mizrahi relation to Jewish heritage, tradition and religiosity.   
ii For instance, Bashkin (2017: 199-220) wrote about the "Zionisation" process of Iraqi Arab-Jewish identity in Israel 
in the 1950s and 1960s, and mentioned that a central component in this process was their involvement in managing 
and manipulating the Palestinian-Arab population. Even though substantial upward mobilization opportunities 
only opened to Mizrahim after 1977 (Cohen & Leon 2008), conquering the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 shifted the 




Taking a Jewish decolonial perspective on the history of Israel/Palestine means searching for 
the silenced voices throughout it that had the purpose of melting the walls of the Zionist 
modern/colonial fortress, and to open up the relationship between the colonized and colonizer 
to mutual influences, despite the inner-contradictions and external limitations such approaches 
have encountered. The Mizrahi and Sephardic locus of enunciation, as indigenous to the Middle 
East and colonizers in Palestine/Israel, makes their political activity a particularly fertile ground 
to examine the possibility of historical Jewish decolonial endeavors in this land. That is despite 
the fact that in contemporary Israel, the Mizrahi locus of enunciation leads more often than not 
to an antagonistic and uncompromising political stance towards Palestinian Arabs, as discussed 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Study of Mizrahim and Sephardim in Israel  
Although no academic branch of Mizrahi Studies has even been announced, despite Ella 
Shohat's (1999) proposal, the study of the ethnic divide of Israeli society forms one of the main 
pillars of Israeli sociology (Adut 2006). Quite a few comprehensive reviews have examined the 
study of Mizrahim in Israeli social sciencei. Here we will not repeat these reviews but will point 
out some of the main characteristics of previous research that is relevant for the current study.  
Israeli sociology was developed in the 1950s and 1960s hand in hand with government policies 
of immigrant absorption. It was strongly embedded within the Modernization paradigm, and 
departed from an assumption of dichotomy between traditional Jews preceding of Muslim 
countries and modern Jews preceding of European countries (e.g. Eisenstadt 1967). In late 
1970s young Ashkenazi researchers began criticizing their predecessors, and published 
research mainly from a materialist and often Marxist perspective about the circumstances and 
power relations that led to the creation of the ethno-class structure of Israeli societyii. Since the 
1990s more Mizrahim participated in the critical production of knowledge, drawing the 
emphasis towards questions of cultural subjugation, incorporating postcolonial language and 
concepts. Ella Shohat (1988) carved this theoretical route in her essay "Sephardim in Israel: 
Zionism from the. Standpoint of its Jewish Victims", which delineated the structural oppression 
of Mizrahim, traced its historical origins in Israel and proposed a symptomatic analysis of the 
                                                             
i Deshen (1979), Smooha (1984), Deshen & Shokeid (1984), Hever et.al (2002a), Tsur (2007a), Dahan-Kalev (2006).  
ii The pioneering collective project in this regard was the independently issued "Notebooks of Research and 
Critique" (mahbarot le-mehkar u-le-bikoret) published by Deborah Bernstein, Henri Rosenfeld and Shlomo Swirsky, 




discourse that perpetuates it. In this essay Shohat laid the foundations for comparing the 
structural oppression that Mizrahim and Palestinians endured by the Zionist colonial enterprise. 
Cohen & Leon (2008) summarized the variety of critical sociological approaches by "the 
conclusion that Israeli society since the 1950s and until nowadays is characterized by 
dichotomous ethnic-classist power relations that are based on severe orientalist oppression 
that is successfully reproduced between generations". They drew five central arenas in which 
Israeli critical sociology examines the historical design of Ashkenazi-Mizrahi relations: 
economical, examining the processes of proletarianization the immigrants endured (e.g. 
Swirsky & Bernstein 1993), educational, observing the educational system's part in this process 
(e.g. Alexander et.al. 2013), geographical, studying the policies that designed the physical 
aspects of their social marginalization (e.g. Sharon 2012), the cultural, focusing on 
stigmatization of Mizrahi identities and material culture (e.g. Mizrachi & Herzog 2012, Gutman 
2008), and the political, emphasizing the patron-client relations dominated by Ashkenazi 
decision makers (e.g. Chetrit 2000, Deshen 1970). Cohen & Leon (2008) themselves criticized 
critical Israeli sociology, claiming it related to the differences between Mizrahim and 
Ashkenazim in a static and essentialist manner, disregarding the changes of the last forty years 
and to the growing Mizrahi middle-class since late 1970s.  Hashash (2017), on the other hand, 
criticized existing research for not paying enough attention to the theorization of Mizrahiness 
in terms that can be relevant to questions of the deepening poverty and marginalization of lower 
classes in Israel.  
In the study of Mizrahi history, an academic division of labor has been established, and also 
lamented, with sociologists on the one hand studying Mizrahim in the state of Israel, while 
historians on the other hand study Jewish societies in Arab countries (Behar 2007, Tsur 2010). 
Some studies have also overcome this rift and examined the continuum between the Arab and 
Israeli pasts (e.g. Tsur 2001, Ben Dor 2004, Perlson 2006, Behar 2007, Deshen & Shokeid 
1984, Shokeid & Deshen 1999, Shaul 2016). This division of labor means that few 
historiographic accounts can relate to contemporary circumstances of Mizrahim born in Israel, 
and that sociological analyses tends to excessive homogenization of the Mizrahi experience, 
neglecting basic differences in backgrounds that had set different trajectories for contemporary 
Mizrahi and Sephardic groups and individuals.  Israeli contemporary critical sociology and 
historiography share the tendency to attend to the trajectories and positions of Mizrahim within 
colonial power relations, whereas previous generations of investigators attempted to conceal 
the effects of global colonial heritage on Inner-Jewish relations (Tsur 2007).  
 
Though much contemporary production of knowledge about Mizrahim has been made by 
Mizrahi intellectuals and activists, on the seam-line between academy and politics (Herzog 




decolonization through resistance. Postcolonial theory was adopted in Israel mainly through 
Anglophone academy, in its least radical and politically subversive version, which emphasizes 
post-structuralist writers (see Kaiwar 2014).  Postcolonial concepts have been usually aimed in 
Israeli sociology to theoretically dismantle dichotomies of east and west, Ashkenazi and 
Mizrahi, and define a Mizrahi identity that is hybrid, ambivalent, fluid, hyphenated and evasive; 
foreign and familiar, Arab and Jew, conformist and subversive (Shoshana 2013). Shohat 
explained that postcolonial theory was introduced to the Hebrew reader in an intellectual and 
political vacuum, lacking previous academic engagement with anti-colonial debates. This led 
to quite a monotonous adaptation of postcolonialism, applying it solely for the study of 
Mizrahim and not of other colonized populationsi, and using the concepts of hybridity, mimicry 
and Third Space as catch-all terms in the exploration of very diverse themes (Shohat 2006). 
The pioneers and leaders of this local adaptation of postcolonial theory are the sociologist 
Yehouda Shenhav and the literature critique Hannan Heverii. Their approach was adopted by 
others who used this framework for historical exploration (e.g. Nurieli 2005) as well as for 
contemporary research (e.g. Gutman 2008, Rimon-Or 2002), especially one concerned with 
skin-color and performance of ethnicity (Hinsky 2002, Dahan-Kalev 2017, Sasson-Levy & 
Shoshana 2014). As other variations of post-structural theory, this approach was criticized for 
exercising "unworldly textuality" (Spanos 2009), being distant from people's everyday 
experiences and categories (Shoshana 2013, Sagiv 2014), irrelevant for the study of women 
(Hashash 2008), and obviating questions of class oppression in favor of engagement with 
cultural critique (Hashash 2017). Some researchers use terminology and concepts of Race and 
Ethnicity Studies in sociological analyses of Mizrahi identity and position within Israeli society. 
This approach led to research about subjective construction of ethno-class identities through 
everyday experiences, practices and discourses (Shoshana 2013, Sasson-Levy 2008, Mizrachi 
& Herzog 2012, Mizrachi et.al. 2013). Both these theoretical approaches have produced 
important empirical research, and have mainly dealt with theoretically conceptualizing different 
dimensions of ambivalence and contradictions inherent in the dynamic construction of ethnic 
identities.  
 
Leon (2004) noted that much of the theory produced in research about Mizrahim in fact does 
not deal with Mizrahim themselves but with attempts to fill the category of "Mizrahiness" with 
content. In my view, this line of work can be seen as part of a decolonial intellectual endeavor, 
however restricted it may be within the modern/colonial structure of western academy in which 
they have been developed. Two approaches stand out in this line of inquiry, that are inter-
                                                             
i As far as I know, postcolonial theory has not been used for studying the occupation of Palestine, and very scarcely 
in research about Palestinian citizens of Israel. 




connected but still distinguishable: on the one hand there are researchers who seek to define 
Mizrahi Judaism (e.g. Shokeid 1986, Elazar 1986, Buzaglo 2008, Pedaya 2015). On the other 
hand, those who attempt to "formulate a non-religious Mizrahi identity-option" (Leon 2004), 
which often leads to describing Mizrahiness in relation to Arabness (e.g. Snir 2006, Ben Dor 
2004, Shenhav 2006, Shohat 1999). Both approaches have been used for the historical study of 
Mizrahim, and have attempted to challenge the Zionist modern regime of identities, searching 
within Mizrahiness for alternative decolonial identities, attempting to define a Mizrahi 
ontological experience and Mizrahi epistemology (Pedaya 2015, Shohat 2004, Hever et.al. 
2002a). 
Ben Sasson (1979) claimed that the approach that studies Mizrahi Judaism can only be attended 
to through anecdotal study of rabbinical texts in Arab countries. Researchers like Zvi Zohar 
(2001) indeed proved the fruit of such an approach within the discipline of Jewish Studies. 
Within disciplines closer to the social sciences, there have also been interesting attempts to 
discuss such texts. Pedaya (2015) opened a debate between Jewish sources and western 
philosophy, and conceptualized Mizrahi epistemology as based on rationalism, mysticism and 
the trauma of the Sephardic expulsion. Buzaglo (2008) conceptualized loyalty to tradition as a 
way to construct values and beliefs that is common within Mizrahi Jews. On the one hand, this 
loyalty does not relate to Judaism as a strict religion or nationality; On the other hand, it does 
not require renouncing to Jewish identity altogether in order to produce universal values that 
allow multi-cultural dialogues. Yadgar (2005) dedicated his research to explaining the 
practices, values and worldviews that design the everyday lives of 'traditionalist' Jews. He 
showed how this category overlaps with that of Mizrahim and insisted this form of 
traditionalism is part of the modern Mizrahi existence. His inquiry highlighted the moderate 
and flexible nature of this Judaism, and its respectful and yet critical attitude towards rabbinical 
authorities. Hence, even though Sephardic ultra-orthodoxy also developed in the state of Israel, 
it is not as narrowly closed as the Ashkenazi one. Leon's (2009) research after its forms and 
development led him to define it as "soft ultra-orthodoxy" [harediut raka]. It is different from 
Ashkenazi ultra-orthodoxy in that it does not close itself from contact with non-ultra-orthodox 
society (Pikar 2003), but addresses and includes a wide range of communities, families, and 
synagogues (Leon 2011). The inquiry after Mizrahi forms of tradition entails a search after a 
balanced approach to the sharp religious vs. secular dichotomy that was created within the 
framework of state of Israeli.   
                                                             
i See Yadgar (2005) and Maimaran (2013) about the role of the education system in constructing and maintaining 




The second decolonial approach, that can be called "the Arab-Jew paradigm", relies on the past 
of Jews in Arab countries, and is usually refuted by historians, because there were rarely any 
textual expressions of such an Arab-Jewish identityi, certainly not one that crossed the entire 
Middle East. Rather, it was the decolonization processes, with the rise of nationalism in the 
Middle East, the uprooting and immigration of Mizrahi Jews, which has inspired the attempt to 
speak in name of all the Jews of Arab lands, the Arab Jews (Tsur 2010). This approach to the 
study of Mizrahiness has been proclaimed usually as an epistemological positioning, aimed at 
constructing a horizon of Asianization or Arabization of Israeli society, and challenge its role 
as a European enclave, in order to become part of Western Asia (Shohat 2004, Shiran 1984, 
Massad 2007, Levy 2011, Hever & Shenhav 2010, Mahleb 2007). The construction of an Arab-
Jewish identity option is most commonly reflected in Mizrahi literature and poetry, as well as 
in literary and cultural critique. Unsurprisingly, it is led especially by Iraqi-Israeli intellectuals, 
who indeed carry this heritage from their ancestors much more than other Mizrahimii. In these 
fields, as well as in social research, the sometimes implicit assumption within the Arab-Jew 
paradigm and epistemological positioning is that Mizrahiness has the potential to bridge 
between Arab and Jewish nationalisms, because of the way the last was designed by Ashkenazi 
elites (Alcalay 1993, Bashkin 2017). This term had also been used historically by Palestinian 
Arab national leaders in order to idealize Muslim-Jewish relations under Islamic rule before the 
beginning of Zionism (Jacobson & Naor 2016:141). As Jews, whose culture is Arab and have 
suffered from social exclusion, but are also subjects for inclusion in the Israeli national 
collective, Mizrahim have been analyzed as holding an intermediary position within Israeli 
Ethnocracy (Yiftachel 1998), between Ashkenazi Jews and Palestinian Arabs that are citizens 
of Israel. This Mizrahi location within the Israeli scale of orientalization or westernization can 
be seen as reflected in Israeli culture (Gutman 2005), socio-economic class stratification (Peled 
2002, Peled & Shaffir 2000, Smooha 1993), and in land and settlement policy (Yiftachel 1998).  
This positioning of Mizrahiness between Jews and Arabs and between Jewish religious and 
secular dispositions is the base of its decolonial potential, as a destabilizing factor of 
modern/colonial dichotomies. The search for alternatives to the multiple oppressive forms of 
Israeli politics is the base of not few books dedicated fully or partially to interviews with or 
monologues of Mizrahi political activists and intellectuals (Swirsky 1981, Michael 1984, 
Abutbul et.al. 2005, Lir 2007, Yona et.al. 2007). That is also an underlining motivation of many 
                                                             
i The clear exceptions can be found within Jewish-Arab intellectual and literary movements in Iraq and Egypt, or of 
Jews in these countries that joined Arab national movements and therefore advocated such an identity as a way 
to get included in the national collective (Bashkin 2012, Snir 2005, 2006).  
ii See for instance Snir (2005) and Bashkin (2017) about the demise of the Arab-Jewish identity among Iraqi Jews 




of the investigations that have studied the political activity of Mizrahim in Israel, including this 
research.  
 
The Study of Historical Mizrahi and Sephardic Political Activity  
Much of the research about Mizrahim in Israel in the early years of statehood explored the 
multiple oppressive practices of the state's institutions. Nonetheless, there was also quite a lot 
of research that examined different aspects of Mizrahi and Sephardic political agency. This line 
has often focused on rescuing and visualizing Mizrahi practices of counter-hegemonic 
resistances, whether by highlighting acts of everyday resistance, or viewing the productions of 
ambivalently subversive discourses, which challenge the hegemonic construction of reality 
without rebelling against them. The first years of the state of Israel in particular have provided 
for many such accounts, when the massive waves of Jewish immigration from Muslim countries 
arrived to the newborn state. The state exercised its most oppressive practices in order to 
manage and control the population, therefore generating different kinds of resistance. The 
compilation of articles Mizrahim in Israel: Critical Review, edited by Hever, Shenhav & 
Mutsafi-Heler, collected some of these subversive accounts in the early 1950s and afterwards. 
Adriana Camp told about the varieties of acts of defiance and everyday empowerment of 
Mizrahi individuals, in their refusal to the population dispersal policies the state designed for 
them. Shenhav and Mutsafi-Heler each tell about a Zionist organization made up by Mizrahi 
intelligentsia, the World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries (WOJAC, established in 
mid-1970s), and ''the Union of Aram-Naharaim Youngsters" (1946-1951), correspondingly. 
These researchers emphasized the subversive potential of the discourse and proposals of these 
organizations, which undermined and challenged Eurocentric Zionism and the national and 
geo-political identity it shaped for the state of Israel.  
Another reason the 1950s provide for relatively many accounts of subversive acts of Mizrahim 
is that the 1948 Rupture between Jews and Arabs was just in its process of institutionalization, 
and this left space for some ambivalence and flexibility around the borders. Nurieli (2005), for 
instance, wrote of a decade long struggle in the 1950s of the state to re-settle North African 
immigrants who settled on their own in a gated area that belonged to Palestinian Arabs before 
1948. Nurieli interpreted the state's anxious struggle over the space and its orientalist discourse 
about it as a reaction to these immigrants' success in undermining the Zionist dichotomies of 
Arabs/Jews, thereby threatening the stability of the national ethos. Derry-Weksler (2013) wrote 
about Dr. Israel Ben-Zeev, an Ashkenazi native that worked within the state's institutions, who 
failingly attempted to establish a communal Arabic-language library, composed by books found 
in 1948 in Palestinian Arabs refugees' homes. Derry-Weksler showed other fields in which Ben-




establishment, had different, emancipatory ideas about how the state's affairs should be 
administered thanks to their expert knowledge and lived experiences as natives. In this case, 
Ben-Zeev attempted to challenge the Hebrew University libraries' monopoly over the "absentee 
property", and manifested other logics than the scientific modern logics of classification and 
education. Derry-Weksler in some senses continued Eyal's (2005) study about knowledge 
production in Israel about the surrounding Arab world. Eyal's study about the state's security 
and intelligence mechanisms dedicated special attention to native Jews and immigrants of 
Muslim countries, and the ways in which their particular knowledge was channeled for Zionist 
security needs.  
These sociological works form part of a growing historical trend that engages with the 
scholarship and activity of native Mizrahi and Sephardic intellectuals in Eretz-Israel/Palestine 
before 1948. Social-historical accounts such as Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and 
Jews in early 20th century Palestine (Campos 2011) and Oriental Neighbors: Middle Eastern 
Jews and Arabs in Mandatory Palestine (Jacobson & Naor 2016), deal with the different ways 
in which Sephardic intellectuals handled the expansion of Zionism, and the rift it was carving 
between the native Jews and Arab in the landi. Through the study of Sephardiness, Evri (2013, 
2016) broadened the perspective about these intellectuals, and the way they marked alternative 
historical roads not taken by the Zionist enterprise in Palestine. The line of inquiry of Jewish-
Arab relations and Jewish-Arab identity, through the discourse and cultural production of 
Mizrahi intellectuals, has been further explored within the state of Israel by Efron (2005). Other 
researchers focused more specifically on Iraqi intellectuals, showing the continuity between 
their intellectual activity in Iraq and in Israel, because of the special way they were immersed 
in Arab high culture (Alcalay 1993, Snir 2005). The line of research examining Mizrahi and 
Sephardic intellectuals' writings and thinking may often overlap with the subjects of research 
presented in this work. However, this dissertation engages with intellectual activity only when 
it is related to autonomously organized collective action frameworks.  
 
Much research was performed over non-autonomous political activity of Mizrahim and 
Sephardim, particularly over their quite limited activity in Zionist organization in different 
Muslim countries, especially before 1948 (e.g. Saadon 1992, Sehayek 1997). This line of study 
is often motivated by the desire to exhibit Jewish national unity, and weave Mizrahi 
historiography into the hegemonic Zionist narrative. However, not much research was 
conducted about the particular place and dynamics of Mizrahim in the Zionist parties in 
Palestine before 1948 (Katz 2007: 9-10). Somewhat more research was conducted about 
                                                             
i The trend that focuses on the relation between Sephardim and Palestinian Arabs can be highlighted versus the 
line of historical research that focused on the relationship of Sephardim with the Zionist movement, e.g. Bezalel 




Mizrahim in Zionist parties after 1948, but still there is much to be explored. This line of 
research has characterized Ashkenazi-Mizrahi relations within the parties, especially in the 
1950s and 1960s and in the Labor movements' parties, as "patronizing partnership" (Leon & 
Cohen 2011) or as applying a "custodian strategy" (Meir-Glitzenstein 2004). Some research 
examined Mizrahi immigrants' relation to various parties and their voting patterns (Deshen 
1970, 1972, Lissak 1972, Chetrit 2001). Other investigations examined Mizrahi membership 
patterns in a particular party. Meir-Glitzenstein (2004) investigated the ruling party Mapai, and 
showed the base of estrangement and mistrust of the Ashkenazi leadership towards the Mizrahi 
representatives they had nominated. Mizrahim were nominated to representative positions in 
order to recruit Mizrahi voters, and lacked any base of power within the party, and were 
therefore dependent in the party mechanisms. Therefore, for all public and external purposes 
they kept obedient and cooperative with the leadership's decisions and discourse, even when 
that went against their communities' interests (Meir-Glitzenstein 2009). Tzur (1995) wrote 
about the ethnic department in Mapam, a Zionist-Marxist Labor party, and the condescending 
attitudes of its Ashkenazi leadership, which frustrated the attempts of its Mizrahi members to 
grow in the party and influence its decision making (also see Roby 2015). Meir-Glitzenstein 
(2000) wrote a somewhat similar account of Mizrahim's experience in non-Zionist communist 
Maki. Herzog (1986) mentioned how all the Labor parties delegitimized ethnic political 
organizations, stigmatizing them as separatists, although they used the segregation along ethnic 
lines whenever it served their interests, in special departments within the Zionist parties and 
institutions. The color-blind discourse which refutes any kind of difference between 
Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, was enforced most strictly within the Marxist parties of Mapam 
and Maki. A similar kind of color-blind attitude, but from a different point of departure, was 
traced by Leon & Cohen (2011), in their research about Mizrahim in right wing Herut. Unlike 
the former investigations mentioned, they followed the circumstances, struggles and the 
meritocratic discourse that allowed Mizrahim to gain power positions within Herut in the 
decade before it succeeded in defeating the ruling Labor party.  
 
Quite a lot of research has been dedicated to studying episodes of Mizrahi contention and 
mobilizations, and particularly the two large episodes of mobilizations of Mizrahi immigrants 
in state of social exclusion, in 1959 in and in 1971-1973 (Bernstein 1976, Dahan-Kalev 1991, 
Grinberg 2014, Lev & Shenhav 2010). Here, academic investigation adds to and is supported 
by much lay literature written by political activists or others involved agents. This line of 
research has been dedicated in great part to describing the events, and have often dealt more 
closely with the causes and effects of the mobilizations rather than analyzing their discourse or 
organizational dynamics. The reaction of other social and political groups has also been 




oppressive structures that caused the protest, their receptivity to the protestors' demands 
(Dahan-Kalev 1991, Weiss 2007) and their methods of oppression of the protest itself (Lev & 
Shenhav 2010, Roby 2015).  
Most research mentioned above has relied on theory and concepts drawn from North American 
political culture. Chetrit (2004) and Roby (2015) conceptualized the genealogy of Mizrahi 
protests by comparison to the African-American Civil Rights Movement. While Roby 
examined correspondences between Mizrahi discourse and the black one, Chetrit made a 
general mapping of all Mizrahi political mobilizations and organizations from 1948 to 2004, 
imprinting thus the notion of a general movement of a Mizrahi struggle, that despite not being 
led by a particular group or person, its development can be traced through time.  
Mizrahi and Sephardic political organizations do surface in Roby's and Chetrit's reviews but 
they are not the focus of their attention as much as the collection of rebellious acts and 
discourses. Very little research was dedicated to the study of autonomous political 
organizations. Shlomo Deshen (1970, 1972, 1976) dedicated some of his ethnographic research 
within Tunisian immigrant to the matter. Levy (1998) wrote about the inner-dynamics of the 
political organization of the native Sephardic elites around the establishment of the state, and 
about its relation with the Mizrahi immigrants (Levy 2000). Herzog (1986) laid an important 
basis for the inquiry of autonomous political organizations, examining the construction of 
"political ethnicity" by the 54 Mizrahi and Sephardic political parties and factions since 1920 
and until 1984.  
Chetrit's (2004) and Herzog's (1986) studies are the two main comprehensive investigations 
that laid the platform for this research, by reviewing the "skeletons of political-ethnic Mizrahi 
organizations" that the closet of Israeli political history is so full of (Leon 2004). Chetrit 
mapped Mizrahi political activity according to its radicalism versus cooperation with the 
establishment, with the question of Mizrahi politics potentially forming alternative to 
hegemonic Zionism as the central axis of analysis. Herzog mapped the different fractions 
mainly by their grade of dependence in other parties. Though not relying on their categorization 
uncritically, it could be said that for this research the organizations chosen are of Chetrit's 
category of radical and of Herzog's category of independent. Choosing a shorter periodization 
allows deepening the analysis over each organization's discourse and practices, rather than 
making general observations about the nature of Mizrahi organizations. The attempt to do just 
this has inevitably led both researchers to the important inquiry of the ways that hegemonic 
discourse and institutional practices designed the discursive contents and practical possibilities 
of Mizrahi organizations. In the period of study, the hegemonic discourse mainly expressed 
delegitimiziation to the existence of the "ethnic organizations", by journalists and politicians. 
The main institutional practices were the negotiations tactics of Zionist parties for co-opting 




to get organized as a Mizrahi, Sephardic or under a particular ethnicity such as Yemenite, as a 
way to gain better redistribution of economic and symbolic resources, always emphasizing the 
national interests and not asking for segregation (Herzog 1986, Chetrit 2004). If the underlining 
question of the study of the political activity of Mizrahim and Sephardim is the question of 
whether or not the organizations suggested alternatives to hegemonic Zionist discourse and 
practices, in the period at hand both these researchers have maintained that they did not. Chetrit 
(2004) claimed that certain foundations were placed in the 1960s for alternative Mizrahi 
models, activities and discourses, but only in the 1980s and 1990s they got developed to 
discourse against European Zionism, from two directions: the Jewish-Sephardic perspective 
and a more intellectual-secular perspective of "the new mizrahim".  
 
In sum, previous research that explored the question of Mizrahi organizations setting 
alternatives to Zionist hegemony, has often negated this possibility. The will of Mizrahi and 
Sephardic organizations to gain power positions within the Zionist political system, their use 
of its terminology, their refusal to speak of segregation: all these led to the conclusion that they 
did not offer any alternatives to the system (Chetrit 2004, Herzog 1986, Meir-Glitzenstein 2009, 
Tsur 2000).  Much research found these organizations to be more about narrow identity politics, 
i.e. calling for self-representation of a marginalized community (Shohat & Stam 1994), but not 
in a subversive form, and without suggesting alternatives. Since all modern identities are a 
construction of the coloniality of power in the modern/colonial world, identity politics does not 
constitute an epistemological alterity. It demands equality within the system rather than 
developing an anti-systemic struggle (Grosfoguel 2011). Identity politics asks for recognition 
in a way that may seem as merely symbolic remedy for injustice (Fraser 1998), when it does 
not engage in demands for transformative recognition, attempting to destabilize racial 
dichotomies and change the sense of self of the entire society. However, such transformative 
ambitions are usually far removed from the immediate interests and identities of the majority 
of racialized people (Fraser 1993).  
On the other hand, previous research of Mizrahi political activity inevitably had at least touched 
the question, explicitly or implicitly, of Mizrahi political activity conforming of potential 
alternative horizons to modern/colonial reality in Israel/Palestine. As discussed so far, this relies 
on Mizrahim's intermediate position within the Zionist modern/colonial identity regime. The 
Mizrahi site of enunciation creates a contradiction in the inner-logics of modern/colonial 
Zionism, which has the potential of generating such processes of rebellion. The two sides of 
the modern/colonial coin are often coherently co-constitutive and complementary in local 
histories. Mizrahi history exposes the contradictions between the two sides of the coin, getting 
included in the modern national project but in the price of silencing their knowledge and ways 




the height of this process, we will observe what counter-hegemonic stances Mizrahim could 
generated from their very position. The Mizrahi position exposes the contradictions of Zionist 
consciousness, because it exposes the colonial racial components of the formal Zionist national 
ethos of unity and equality between Jews (Raz-Krakotzkin 2005). Here I will claim that the 
subversive potential of Mizrahi political activity can be most easily observed using decolonial 
perspectives and concepts. The need for this theoretical exploration stems precisely from the 







A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE DECOLONIAL HISTORICAL 
STUDY OF MIZRAHI AND SEPHARDIC POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
A decolonial perspective over ethno-class inequalities in Israel inevitably views those as 
importantly intertwined with the mechanisms that allow and severe the occupation of Palestine. 
For various historic and contemporary reasons previously discussed, Israel de-facto sustains an 
ethnic voting pattern, where leftist parties' voters are mainly Ashkenazim, who compose the 
majority of anti-Zionist left as well, and many Mizrahim voting to the nationalist right (Herzog 
1986, Horowitz & Lissak 1990). That is why a decolonial discussion in Palestine/Israel from a 
Jewish-Israeli perspective, must address the multiple hierarchies that affect Israeli society and 
the way they effect the dynamics with Palestinian Arabs.  
Within Israeli sociology, the analysis of these multiple hierarchies is usually restricted to the 
state of Israel, and separate terms of analysis and empirical investigations are dedicated to the 
study of the military regime over the Occupied Palestinian Territories. That is despite the 
obvious continuity and importance of the scale of orientalization, beyond the official borders 
of the state of Israel, and despite the uncertain blurredness of the borders themselves (Offir & 
Azoulay 2008, Shenhav 2002, Gillis 2016). Within pubic political discourse as well the "ethnic 
problem" (of Mizrahim) and the "Arab problem" (of Palestinians) can rarely be addressed at 
conjointly (for instance as the "Zionist problem"), and discussion of one would often obscure 
the otheri.  
                                                             





The principal contribution of decolonial theorization to our geo-cultural context is offering an 
integrated approach to the multiple hierarchies influencing the entire territory of 
Palestine/Israel. The decolonial concepts and prism can frame these hierarchies in an 
encompassing way, and may use one framework to address the changing historical situation 
since the beginning of Zionism and until nowadays, allowing to include under one conceptual 
umbrella the ethnic hierarchies of Israeli citizens and Palestinian non-citizens as well.  
 
The Abyssal Line 
The law sociologist Bonaventura De Sousa Santos conceptualized the irreducibility of the 
colonial difference -in its epistemological and legal manifestations- by an abyssal line. The 
Other side of the line is a realm of unofficial though recognizable law, conceived as lawlessness. 
The knowledge produced there is considered beyond truth and falseness, categorized as beliefs, 
intuitive or subjective knowledge (Santos 2007). Grosfguel expanded this term with Fanonian-
Hegelian concepts, through which above the abyssal line there is what Fanon referred to as the 
Human, in the zone of being, which can represent the west. Under the line there is the 
subhuman, in the zone of non-being, which can represent the colonized, the rest of humanity. 
The term Human refers to forms of living, being, feeling, knowing, producing etc., which are 
considered the model of humanity, whereas the rest are inferiorized, hence, subhuman. In each 
zone there are conflicts and oppressions determined by class, gender, religion, sexuality, 
ethnicity or other factors. But there is a qualitative difference between being oppressed on each 
side of the line.  In the zone of being, reign the social logics of emancipation and regulation. 
Most conflicts get resolved in non-violent ways, with violence occurring exceptionally. 
Discourses of equality and liberty constitute the institutional and legal management of such 
conflicts; the oppressed in the zone of being have a right to fight for their civil and human 
rights. On the other side, in the zone of non-being, reign social logics of violence and 
dispossession. The oppressed in the zone of non-being are not subjects of rights. They are 
treated as non-human, and conflicts are solved by violence in an openly shameless manner 
(Grosfoguel 2012). In the modern/colonial world order, the elementary forms of oppressions of 
social class and gender are organized legally by racial categorization. The racist application of 
law and rights determines the amount of violence that can be exercised over the subaltern.   
 
 
                     HUMAN/ZONE OF BEING   
                              -OPPRESSED                                          EMANCIPATION/ REGULATION 
                     SUBHUMAN/ ZONE OF NON-BEING 




The zones of being and non-being are not concrete geographical places, but a position of power 
relations that occurs on different scales. These power relations are bound to racist-
dehumanizing ideas, and have a concrete manifestation in customary and legal discrimination 
in rights. On a global scale, the zones of being and non-being conform to the First/ Third World 
or center/periphery, whereas on a city scale the zone of non-being can be a ghetto, whose 
inhabitants are racially inferiorized and are expropriated from many rights (Appadurai 2013). 
These ghettos, on a larger scale, can also be referred to as internal colonization, an enclave of 
the zone of non-being in the zone of being (Grosfoguel 2012, Santos 2007). 
 The abyssal line metaphor is especially useful for addressing the contemporary situation in 
Palestine and Israel, where the wall of separation make the abyssal line tangible, and where 
Palestinians suffer multiple oppressions and violation of many rights i (Grosfoguel 2009, Santos 
2007). The place of Palestinians citizens of Israel can be conceptualized as that of internal 
colonization (Zureik 1979): the re-articulation of the colonial difference inside the nation state 
(Mignolo 2000), with a position of second-class citizenship (Grosfoguel 2012). This explains 
how despite inhabiting the privileged side of the wall of separation and having formal civil 
rights, Palestinians citizens of Israel still suffer occasionally, exceptionally, the violence and 
dispossession of the dehumanized of the zone of non-being. Thus, the October 2000 events, 
where 13 Palestinian citizens of Israel were killed in demonstrations, can occur, while they still 
have more representation in higher education institutions than Mizrahim. A contemporary 
illustration of the abyssal line in Israel/Palestine may be portrayed as following:  
 
                  Ashkenazi(ed) urban middle-class                                                  ZONE OF BEING 
                  Mizrahim and other oppressed groups (women, Ethiopians etc.) 
                 (Enclaves of non-being: Palestinian citizens of Israel, work-immigrants) 
ABYSSAL LINE 
                         Palestinian political and intellectual elite                   ZONE OF NON-BEING 
                         Farmers and other oppressed groups (LGTBs, Bedouins etc.) 
                      
The abyssal line is a graphic illustration of the colonialilty of power, and addresses the 
contemporary aspiration for an integrated analysis of the territory from the Mediterranean to 
the Jordan River. Nonetheless, a scheme of the abyssal line might also be suggested to illustrate 
the state of Israel in the period of research and regarding the population of research. Here, the 
abyssal line marks the limits of the military regime imposed on Israeli Palestinian Arabs until 
1966:   
                                                             
i Among the human rights that are systematically violated in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are freedom of 
speech, association, movement, press, property owing and religion. See Paz-Fox (2010) for an example of the legal 





                  Ashkenazi urban middle-class                                                   ZONE OF BEING 
                  Mizrahi old timers   
                  Mizrahi immigrants 
                 (Enclaves of non-being: Druze and collaborative Arab sectors) 
ABYSSAL LINE 
                         Israeli Palestinian Arab urban middle class           ZONE OF NON-BEING 
                         Israeli Palestinian Arab farmers and internal refugees  
 
The scheme presented here helps to conceptualize the "sandwich existence" (Mahleb 2007) of 
Mizrahim in Israel today and its continuity with the past, it relates their oppression to a wider 
context than Jewish Israeli society, and also illustrates the difference between the colonial 
oppression they have endured and the one suffered by Palestinians.  
The same scheme could be displayed on a different scale in order to address the international 
actors that are enrooted in the local dynamics. This way the binary oppositions of power 
relations between Israel/Palestine can be contextualized within the binary oppositions of 
UN/Arab League, USA/Middle East, West/Rest, and Occident/Orient. With the concept of 
coloniality of power as encompassing multiple intersectional hierarchies, of gender, sexuality, 
class, age etc., we can see that this model enables to make a relatively non-reductive mapping 
of the multiple power relation that take part in our geographical province. Still, remembering 
that it is an analytical framework, and therefore requires to fix categories in order to approach 
the complexity of social reality (Martinez et.al. 2012).  
A further note is required about binary oppositions. Social scientists do not tend to like them in 
general, for being too reductive and strict. Postmodernism constitutes the Eurocentric answer 
that was developed from this dislike (Maldonado-Torres 2011, Santos 2006). However, from a 
decolonial perspective, these dichotomies are required in order to conceptualize the struggle 
required against colonial structures of power. As De Sousa Santos (2006) explained, the role of 
the investigator in this inquiry in not to theoretically deconstruct dichotomies, but it is rather in 
exploring processes from below that construct subjectivities that rebel against their 
manifestations. This essentially reductive scheme can best be used in order to visualize different 
levels of socio-political and cultural struggles. One type of struggle is against internal 
colonization, others are against specific oppressions, but the struggle against the existence and 
reinforcement of the abyssal line itself is a different one altogether. It seems such a struggle 
would require collaboration from every step on this ladder of power relations and qualities of 
life. However, the first condition for creating post-abyssal thinking is to recognize the abyss: 
otherwise critical thinking will continue to produce it even when it asks to rebel against it, as 




CONCLUSION: THE OBJECT OF RESEARCH 
 
In this research the key category for speaking of political activity will be "organizations", 
because the empirical data is best arranged under this general definition. This category will 
apply to different kinds of movements, associations, interest groups and political parties, all 
considered as one empirical phenomenon: self-organized collective action, oriented for gaining 
power (Ibarra et.al. 2002). 
The field of autonomous political organizations was chosen for research because I understand 
it to be the site where the Mizrahi locus of enunciation can be most clearly recognized and get 
translated into action, in ways that are relevant for potential actions nowadays as well. This is 
the site where some content inevitably gets poured into the category of Mizrahiness, because it 
is through this kind of organizations that collective identity gets formulated. It is within the 
need for autonomy and the attempt to get people organized in the political field where a group 
or a leader is most urgently required to the task of defining who they actually are, who do they 
aspire to represent and for the sake of whom do they wish to act.  
Most Social Movement Theory about collective identity examine inner processes of 
construction of collective action, such as participants' motivations, the making of strategic 
choices and the cultural effects movements have on society (Polletta & Jasper 2001, Melucci 
1995). In this research we will examine collective identity in a different way. Firstly, as a 
historical inquiry through documents, the research will examine only collective action frames 
(Benford & Snow 2000), that is, the discursive representation of collective action (Melucci 
1995). Secondly, we will emphasize the products Mizrahi and Sephardic organizations 
attempted to create, rather than the inner processes of their construction. The product is the 
shared sense of "we" that corresponds with the sense of "collective agency", inviting audiences 
to take action (Snow 2001). This sense of "we" is what often stands behind identity politics 
(Fominaya 2010), and emerges in times of social and political straits or changes (Snow 2001), 
as in the period of study.  
As Shohat & Stam (1994) pointed out, identity politics is fraught with personal and political 
tensions about who speaks, when, how, and in whose name. Eventually, much of this study of 
Sephardic and Mizrahi organizations explored certain leaders' discourses and actions. The 
leaders constitute the speakers of the organization, its representatives. Between the leader and 
the organization there is a metonymic relationship: the leader is part of the group and functions 
as a sign that represents the group (Bourdieu 1985). This focus in the speakers, assumes that 
behind the speaker there are networks of affiliation, anchored in shared cultural repertoires, 
through which speakers and groups design each other (Algazi 2011). These networks might 
share past and current cultural materials and traditions, as well as structural arrangements, 




threads that weave collective identities (Snow 2001). We will follow the leaders' attempts to 
leverage their symbolic capital within these networks, in order to name a Sephardic and Mizrahi 
collective. This is part of their struggle over the legitimate public way to conceptualize the 
social world (Bourdieu 1985). The leader attempts to establish the collective "through intense 
coordination, contingent improvisation, tactical maneuvering, responses to signals from other 
participants, on the spot reinterpretations of what is possible, desirable, or efficacious, and 
strings of unexpected outcome inciting new improvisations" (McAdam et.al. 2001).  
Bourdieu (1985) wrote in detail about the inherent gap between the intellectuals that take the 
role of the professionals of representation, and the public which they presume to represent 
(Algazi 2011).  He described the process through which individuals with low symbolic capital 
dispossess themselves of power in favor of an organization, a juridical entity, in order for this 
entity to be conceivable as an active social force. The speaker of the group then, having gained 
the authority and power to speak for the group, in fact substitutes the group and becomes the 
group itself. This entails an inevitable process of alienation of the representative from the 
individuals who are supposed to form the collective (Bourdieu 1985). The political discourse 
speakers create is a euphemized and universalized expression of their habitus, their actual role 
and their conceived role in the social world (Bourdieu 1984). Speakers create strategical and 
perspectival truths as weapons, which will allow them to be victorious (Foucault 2003). In this 
research we will follow then the maneuvering and coordination of different speakers, centrally 
inquiring after their construction of a collective ethnic identity.  
 
 
Searching for decolonial perspectives within the autonomous political activity of Mizrahi and 
Sephardic organizations continues former researchers' inquiry after Mizrahim's political 
activity as potentially setting alternatives to hegemonic Zionist political patterns. It also joins 
the effort of Slabodsky (2014) to weave the decolonial conceptual framework into critical 
Jewish history. By applying the hermeneutics of emergence, we will search for springs of post-
abyssal thinking, proposals, logics or mindsets, that could still be relevant today as alternatives 
to colonial Zionism. That means, that within the autonomous Mizrahi and Sephardic political 
activity, primarily aimed for their own emancipation, we will search for rhetoric and action that 
is built upon intercultural perceptions of diversity and liberation. Their relation with and 
discourse about Palestinian Arabs naturally form a constitutive part of examining post-abyssal 
thinking. If Mizrahim are best analyzed as both colonizers and colonized (Raz-Krakotzkin 
2005), the question of their potential to set alternatives to colonial Zionism by going beyond 
modern abyssal thinking can be answered primarily by the resistance to play both roles.  
Post-abyssal thinking may mean different things in different historical contexts. This study has 




standards of liberation and counter-hegemonic critique. In the decades of the cold war, after the 
Ashkenazi Holocaust and before revealing the Israeli archives about the 1948 war, Inner-Jewish 
critique that is not Marxist would have to rely on completely other tools and knowledge than 
the ones available for anti-colonial activists today. It is of no coincidence that both Herzog 
(1986) and Chetrit (2004) note only in their contemporaneous Mizrahi organizations the 
beginning of new discourses that goes beyond shallow identity politics, producing more 
comprehensive, coherent and challenging critique than the historical organizations they had 
examined (also see: Shenhav 2007, Chetrit 1999). That is despite the fact that still no Mizrahi 
movement has been able to articulate continuity with the Palestinian liberation strugglei (Honig-
Parnass 2011, Bashir 2007, Dahan 2007). The fact that historical Mizrahi and Sephardic 
organizations worked in order to get incorporated in the state and not in order to dismantle it, 
as the fact that they appropriated Zionist terminology, does not by itself discard their entire 
discourse and political activity as reproducing colonial Zionist logics. Often movements and 
adversaries speak the same language, but from opposite perspectives (Melucci 1995). In anti-
colonial struggles, the colonized fights in the name of the values of the colonizer, uses his 
technique of thought and methods of combat, because that is the only action the colonizer 
understands (Memmi 1965). The fact that national anti-colonial struggles use the imperial 
language in their resistance makes them seem dependent on western mainstream discourse. 
However, this is not the force of reality, and this assumed dependency is not always there (Said 
1993). The collective action that collective identity instigates is largely based on production of 
knowledge. This production often relies on appropriation of knowledge that, at least partially, 
did not go through manipulation of the dominant mechanisms (Polletta & Jasper 2001). In order 
to change the colonial nature of the state, any political group would have had to first gain power 
within it by the resources it has and according to the political structure of opportunities it 
encountered. Within this dynamic, we will search for ways in which the Mizrahi site of 
enunciation allowed challenging the inner-logics of modern/colonial Zionism. If Mizrahiness 
is one of the only perspectives social analysis have found for decolonizing Palestine/Israel, it is 
worthwhile exploring within its historical political avatars, expressions -however limited and 
contradictory- for such decolonial horizons, especially ones that could still set viable 




                                                             
i The last public attempt to do so, to my knowledge, was an attempt of Mizrahi supporters of Arab parties in Israel 
to form a kind of lobby within the united list of these parties, imposed on the three different Arab lists in the 2015 
elections.  The initiative of mizrahit-meshutefet: Mizrahi-Palestinian partnership, has not been functioning since 





The following chapter will lay out the epistemic base and methodological framework that 
preceded this research. First I will explicate the shortcomings of my toolbox and the limitations 
they have imposed on this research, and specify its methodological challenges. Afterwards, I 
will explain the choices I made throughout the investigation: first, regarding the translation 
from Hebrew to English, then regarding the selection of the groups, mentioning also some 
relevant groups that were excluded from this research. Then I will revise the materials chosen 
for review and explain the procedure of research itself. Lastly, I will attend to the periodization.  
 
 
Limitations of research  
In the last decades an epistemological transition is occurring within academic research, 
requiring researchers to reflect over their locus of enunciation. This is in order to produce 
knowledge conscious of the writers' position in the power structures, while explicating for 
whom and for what the knowledge is being produced. Being sensitive to the geo-politics 
(Dussel 2005) and body-politics of knowledge produced (Grosfoguel 2011), clarifies the 
emotional preferences of the scholar (Mignolo 2000), and their commitment to a socio-
historical location (Dussel 2007). Therefore, the next section will be dedicated to explaining 
my locus of enunciation and its weaknesses, as well as the reach of my acquired tools and skills, 
and the limitations these have imposed on this dissertation.  
The greatest limitation of this research, the main tool missing from its toolbox, derives from 
the slow and gradual focalization in the subject of research, as explained in the introduction. In 
my process of preparation for the research I did not get properly trained in reading literary 
Arabic, which would be necessary in order to include materials in Arabic in the research. 
Therefore, it is based only on Hebrew, English and Spanish materials. French would have also 
been very necessary for the study of some very relevant North African activists and groups that 
were left out of this research.  
The greatest methodological challenge for this research was the writing an historical account 
from a sociologist perspective. The sociological tools are designed to generalize and take a 
broad view of a situation, in order to be able to formulate an argument about it, relating it to 
theoretical models developed from similar contexts. By contrast, the historian's subject is 
precisely the details of any studied phenomenon, revealing its uniqueness and its ever-changing 
nature. My attempts, then, to formulate theoretical arguments regarding the historical field 
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studied remain inherently incomplete, both for the theoretical discussion and for describing the 
historical reality. Historical documents inevitably reveal too little, and interviews disclose a too 
partial piece of reality, to make any kind of generalization about any historical phenomenon, 
with the complexity of relationships and conversations, the richness of scents and accents that 
it entails.  
Furthermore, the mere assumption on which the research is based, that there can be decolonial 
discourse and practices found within the political activity of Mizrahim in Israel, is possibly 
based on not little Ashkenazi-biased romanticism. As an Ashkenazi, the attempt to make 
generalizations about Mizrahim, especially when examining this category in relation to the 
category of Arabs, entails a risk of reproducing colonial categories, homogenizing the two 
populations in indebted ways, and over simplifying the differences between different Mizrahim 
themselves, as conforming an irreducible alterity from the Ashkenazi point of view. The 
somewhat romanticized aspiration of Raz-Krakotzkin (2005), to write Mizrahi history as 
critical Jewish history, as presented in the first chapter, guided not little of this research. 
However, I believe my ability to write Jewish history in a critical way was limited by the 
politogolical perspective, inherent in the focus on political organizations and their formulation 
of a political Mizrahi identity. As Leon (2004) claimed, this is simply not precisely the principal 
perspective through which Mizrahi Judaism is constructed: this is not the sphere where its 
alterity is most demonstrated, nor does it best reveal the potential alternatives it encompasses 
for Israeli society and its relation with the other natives of the land and the region. The political 
perspective has been imposed to a certain degree by disciplinary divisions, hence my modern 
European scientific tools by themselves set limits for approaching the social sphere studied 
from a deeper decolonial perspective. However, it is possible for a deeper perspective to be 
developed using sociological tools by a researcher that has a more profound background in 
Mizrahi Judaism itself. Such backgrounds might have directed research to focusing on 
questions on the seam line between politics and spiritual culture. The entire research is tilted 
by my Ashkenazi identity, and its inquiries would not have been the same if I were studying 
the same social phenomenon from the motivation of writing up my own heritage of resistance. 
Decolonial perspectives taken from the south are more effective for re-formulating struggles of 
concrete groups over their own identity, much more than the point of view of the privileged, 
even when asking to perform an act of solidarity with these struggles. A decolonial research 
springing from carriers of Mizrahi heritage themselves, would perhaps be more interested in 
internal connections and differences within the Mizrahi political sphere studied: between Jews 
from different countries and regions of origins, between different immigration waves or 
between different generations. It is possible that this kind of information is the one more 
required in order to draw a deeper genealogy of the Mizrahi struggle: to understand the sources 
of today's struggle, to know from what point in fact this generation is picking the struggle up, 
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and to become familiar with the alliances that were possible in the past and the conditions that 
allowed them. Notwithstanding, the greater limitation of studying the Mizrahi political sphere 
as an Ashkenazi is the absence of the colonial wound in my personal inventory of traces. As a 
woman, I know something about oppression, and patriarchal and colonial power relations are 
interconnected and function eventually in mighty similar manners. However, I have not 
experienced the depth of the particular Mizrahi oppression, I have not suffered its pain in neither 
direct nor indirect manners, I know it completely from outside and not from any borderland.  
The problem of not being a carrier of the colonial wound rises from the irreducible colonial 
difference it has created, which is expressed in a difference between the critical knowledge 
produced by those who participated in building the modern/colonial world, and those who have 
been left out of the discussion (Mignolo 2002). It is about the emotive motivation of research, 
and about the limited ability of bringing to the foreground an alternative epistemic base that has 
been oppressed and discredited into silence. It is these kind of attempts "to account theoretically 
for the 'structure of feeling', the deep current of rage against the Israeli establishment that 
united Sephardim, independent of their declared party affiliation" (Shohat 1988), which has 
allowed for Mizrahi history writing to be ground-breaking.   
By this, I do not mean to reduce academic writing to an essentialist product of the writer's 
identity. An epistemic position is not the same as social position; in fact, "the success of the 
modern/colonial world system consists in making subjects that are socially located in the 
oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think epistemically like the ones on the dominant 
positions" (Grosfoguel 2011). However, positioning oneself epistemologically as subaltern 
while enjoying the social privileges resulting from a dominating position is somewhat more 
complex a taski. Mignolo (2003) called this positioning "weak border-thinking", exemplified 
in history for instance by Carl Marx or San Bartolomeo de las Casas. Shohat & Stam (1994) 
also discussed the role privileged participants can take in multi-cultural coalitions, and a whole 
paradigm of Whiteness Studies has been structured around this discussion in North America 
(Rasmussen et.al. 2001). Anzaldúa suggested for progressive whites who study other cultures 
the possibility to become intellectual mestizas. While I cannot be emotional mestiza, and 
certainly not biological mestiza, she suggested a room for empathy between people of color 
and progressive, politically sensitive and aware whites. However, that requires for research to 
connect with action and activism, and define clearly its ideological and political function (in: 
Keating 2009). This is where the crucial need arises to take into academic account practical 
                                                             
iI believe the most comprehensive discussion in this question until today was written by Memmi (1970). Naturally, 
it is also a recurrent subject in Israeli activist-intellectual online magazines. For instance, Abergel (2019); Haluzin-
Dovrat, Lin. "Share and not Divide: what was forgotten in the discourse about privileges?" (lahlok ve-lo lehalek. Ma 
nishkakh be-siah ha-privilegyot?) 9.9.13. Retrieved from: http://haemori.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/dovrat/ (last 
accessed on 12.5.20); Tahar-Lev, Itamar, "The Left is (sometimes) the Longing to Europe" (ha-smol hu [lif'amim] 
ga'aguim le-eropa), 31.3.15. Retrieved from: shorturl.at/ivEJ9 (last accessed on 12.5.20).   
.  
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knowledges of movements, whether they be of workers, women, racialized subjects, gays or 
simply anti-system (Castro-Gómez & Grosfoguel 2007), by stepping down from the ivory 
tower and accompanying social movements, looking to delve in some aspects of their practices 
and bring comparable experiences from other emancipatory struggles (Santos 2011). While this 
aspiration for social research is somewhat limited within the discipline of history, within the 
social sciences there are some methodologies designed to face this challenge, as Participatory 
Action Research, Critical Ethnography and Critical Communicative Methodology. These 
methodologies are based on the ethics of scientific inquiry, while relinquishing hierarchies 
between the investigator and subjects of investigation (Cruz & Cornejo 2012), avoiding telling 
"one true story" about reality (Harding 1986) and seeing hierarchies as negotiable (Haraway 
1992). In these methodologies, subjects of research are positioned in a strong and collective 
position of producers of knowledge, i.e. as participants in the research. This way, scientific 
knowledge is recreated, and objectivity is redefined as based on inter-subjectivity between 
researchers and social actors involved in a research (Gomez et.al. 2011). In this context, the 
scientific norm of "individual knowledge seekers" (Harding 1986) is losing some of its 
relevance, and collective research is found more productive. Within the dialectics Santos (2006) 
referred to between emancipation and regulation, this can be seen then as the last greatest 
limitation of research, in its aspiration to contribute to emancipatory struggles in 
Israel/Palestine: the very binding to the framework of the solitary construction of knowledge 
that consists of the process of the PhD project, limits its ability to constitute a more deeply 
liberatory search for knowledge.  
 
 
Translating Hebrew terms and concepts  
The challenge of writing this research in English forced some difficult choices because of the 
need to translate concepts that in Hebrew are self-explicatory or form part of general Israeli 
culture. This challenge also turned to a blessing at times, allowing me to coin expressions that 
I understand to be more liberatory, more supportive to the writing of a Mizrahi history of 
resistance. Notwithstanding, the main guideline for my choices of translation was to facilitate 
reading for those who are not immersed in the Israeli social field, whether as researchers or not. 
I decided to translate the Hebrew plural form into English, in words that have been used like 
this prior to me, as the terms kibbutzim, Ashkenazim and Sephardim. From this base I also used 
the less commonly used plural, Mizrahim. I tried not to overload the writing with Hebrew terms, 
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for instance by referring to toranic academies instead of yeshivasi, and ultra-orthodox Jews 
instead of haredim. A word I found difficult to translate was the word 'askan, which I replaced 
sometimes with activist, notable or intellectual activist, depending on the context. Neither of 
these English terms convey the same negative connotation this word nowadays transmits in 
Hebrew, however it was not the only connotation I found for it in the period of research. I found 
the word 'askan, without any negative connotation, to be quite an appropriate term to capture 
the variety in trajectories and degrees of political engagement of Mizrahim in this period. 
Another challenge was the concept of 'adatiyut: By itself I found the translation to ethnicity to 
be quite precise, but it got complicated with its conjugations, as 'eda or 'adati. In later 1960s 
my main subjects of research used in English the adjective communal where I used ethnic. I 
decided not to largely adopt this term for the course of research because I found ethnic to be a 
more appropriately charged term to convey the power relations hiding under the construction 
of the term 'adati.   
The choice of the category of Mizrahim was the hardest to make. The category Sephardic was 
congruent with the self-definition of its subjects, but the term Mizrahi was only getting 
formulated at this time and had many other competitors for its name, first and fore-mostly the 
hegemonic term, bnei 'edot ha-mizrah. When I had to translate it directly I translated it to 
eastern ethnicities. In research in English, the most common translation of this category is 
oriental, but contemporary political sociology more commonly uses the term Mizrahi, and that 
seemed more appropriate for the political framing and purpose of this inquiry. Therefore, I 
decided to apply this anachronism within this socio-historical research. I usually referred to 
"Mizrahi and Sephardic" in order to encompass to the diversity of the field at hand. Sometimes, 
for purposes fluency in writing, I used Sephardim or Mizrahim as interchangeable terms to 
describe the entire population of Jews that lived under Muslim rule until World War I. However, 
most often I used the term Mizrahim to allude to post-1948 immigrants to Israel from Muslim 
countries, and Sephardim to those who immigrated from these countries beforehand, including 
several centuries ago. The word I was lacking to describe the objective empirical phenomenon 
I was investigating was some kind of word that could define natives of the region, people 
forming part of a Judeo-Muslim civilization (Snir 2006), autochthonous of the entire Muslim 
Middle East, including North Africa, versus the colonizers that arrived from Europe. Using the 
terms native or autochthonous is difficult because of the vast movement of people within the 
Middle East and the fluent exchange the region has had with Europe throughout the centuries. 
While colonial terminology helps shed certain beams of light over the local context, there is 
some inherent difficulty in using the native-colonizer binary oppositions within middle-eastern 
                                                             
i yeshiva is the Jewish higher-education institution as it has been developed in Europe, a space for men to practice 
the holy work of studying the canonical texts of Jewish tradition.   
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The selection of groups  
The groups, leaders and texts chosen for observation in this investigation are those found most 
appropriate, and also accessible within my limitations, to answer the research questions: most 
likely to exhibit decolonial traces in their discourses and in their practices. I certainly did not 
exhaust all the groups that could be considered Mizrahi and Sephardic autonomous political 
organizations active in the period of study. Moreover, some of the groups chosen might not be 
considered as entirely autonomous organizations, and other organizations are not strictly 
political.  
I excluded from this research the entire Yemenite political sphere: this sub-political sphere has 
an especially large array and variety of political organizations that had been active in 
Palestine/Eretz-Israel since 1920. I did not have sufficient time in order to explore its extensive 
historical trajectory, inner structure and internal dynamics, which could well deserve a separate 
research of its owni. The same can be said about the many local Mizrahi political organizations 
formed in towns of Israel's periphery since late 1950s.  
Many autonomous Mizrahi organizations in the period of study were immigrant associations 
revolving around the common culture of a certain country of origins, functioning primarily for 
the sake of facilitating immigration and absorption processes. Many of the leaders of these 
organizations got absorbed into Zionist political parties, but many organizations kept an 
autonomy that was quite strictly a-political: for this reason, none of these organizations was 
included in this research. Some very relevant groups were not studied due to my language 
limitations. The most relevant group neglected for this reason is the circle surrounding Felix 
Matalon. Felix Matalon was an Egyptian-born Marxist and Mizrahi activist, who spent the first 
half of the 1950s immersed in the Marxist-Zionist party Mapam. He edited a Labor-oriented 
Mizrahi journal called Hame'orer for few years, starting in 1956. In the early 1960s he moved 
to an impoverished Mizrahi neighborhood in the outskirts of Tel Aviv where he established the 
group "The Suhube", called after the group of the prophet Muhamad's followers. This group 
continued to publish a journal called Hed Hame'orer independently, leading an anti-colonial 
and popular line. Despite much relevance for this research, this group's activity was not attended 
to, both for lack of primary material, and because of Matalon's extensive publications in 
                                                             
i For some more information about the Yemenites organizations see for instance, Herzog (1986), Jacobson & 
Naor (2016:131).   
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Frenchi. The investigation includes the Iraqi cadre in the Israeli Communist Party (ICP), but 
without reviewing their most relevant material for this research, that was produced in Arabic. 
Therefore, the chapter about this circle is highly limited, and its ability to respond to the 
research questions should be considered as less than partial. There was also a Bulgarian cadre 
in the ICP, i.e. of Sephardic origins. The Iraqi cadre was chosen for observation because their 
middle-eastern roots, Arab culture and command of Arabic language made their perspective, 
discourse and activity potentially liberatory in deeper decolonial ways than the Eurocentric 
communist discourse of the time. In contrast, and as far as my knowledge goes, the Bulgarian 
cadre never tapped into their Sephardic heritage for formulating political discourse that was 
relevant to the local reality.  
The autonomous organizations forming part of this research are firstly all those who 
participated in parliamentary politics. Those which are not, were chosen each upon different 
bases. The Student Cell for Merger of the Diasporas (SCMD) was chosen as a social experiment 
in politics that was allowed within Israeli academic campuses. Not engaging with the public 
sphere outside the campus allowed it to experiment with practices and discourses that did not 
evolve in the 1960s in the Mizrahi political sphere. The Torah Loyalist Circle was incorporated 
for this research because of the way this Circle later evolved, to be today's primary political 
party to represent an autonomous Sephardic collective voice, ultra-orthodox Shas. If the Torah 
Loyalist Circle was reviewed due to its future, the activity of the Committee of the Sephardic 
Community of Jerusalem (CSCJ) was reviewed thanks to its past. In 1955 this body quit 
electoral parliamentary and municipal politics, but its activity continued to be of central interest 
to this research. In the 1960s Mizrahi and Sephardic intellectuals in Israel were influenced by 
anti-colonial discourse in the Middle East, and the CSCJ supplied an autonomous Sephardic 
intellectual stage to incorporate these spirits into the Israeli political sphere.  
 
 
Procedure of research 
Before investigating the groups and activists chosen for review, I first studied secondary 
materials regarding international and national occurrences of each historical period, and 
elaborated the historical background of each historical period. Then I attended to the study of 
particular groups. First, I searched in libraries' search engines for any secondary materials about 
the group. The next step consisted of reviewing their own publications if they had any, usually 
going through the entire publication and choosing to focus on certain articles according to their 
                                                             
iSee in: CZA S62/576; 430A/210/3 & 4. For more about his biography, see Matalon (2002). 
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titlei. The next step was searching in relevant archives for any primary materials produced by 
the groups themselves or by their leaders. Pamphlets, posters, political propaganda, and journals 
were analyzed as texts used to define and distribute political discourse, and were also reviewed 
as testimony of public activity and projects. I also examined meeting protocols, personal 
journals and letters, as testimonies for negotiations and reflections of the process of formulation 
of the public action and discourse, which sometimes also revealed the emotional worlds behind 
the choices of the actors. I also looked for interviews with Mizrahi activists, mainly of those 
with a trajectory of seeking autonomous organizations. Within the primary materials, I searched 
after mentions of Palestinian Arabs, refugees, the military regime, Arab countries and Israeli-
Arab politics. I also followed materials about the category Ashkenazim, analyses of the 
problems of Mizrahi immigration, testimonies of Mizrahim's protests and of developments of 
the autonomous political organizations. I observed the ways in which different organizations 
constructed the collective identity of their audience, their political heritage and regional politics. 
In some cases, I also examined the mainstream press' discussions about the groups and activists, 
often following in the general press threads of debates found in the groups' own publications. 
Some groups and activists, whom I found little primary material about, got searched in two 
newspapers' search engines: Maariv on JPRESS and in the Yedioth Aharonot archives. These 
are two of very few newspapers that did not have an official party affiliation at the time. When 
materials were still scarce I searched also in party's newspapers on JPRESS, namely Herut, 
Haboker, Al Hamishmar, Davar, and more rarely, Hatsofe.  
The case of The Student Cell for Merger of the Diasporas was different. I had the opportunity 
to go through Yosef Tubi's personal archives and to obtain in-depth interviews with him and 
with Tuvia Sulami. Being the youngest of the activists of the period studied, both gentlemen 
were still in the prime of their intellectual activity and the interviews with them have been very 
enlightening for me to better understand the first Mizrahi generation graduating from Israeli 
universities. I held shorter interviews, without recording, with academics and activists in 
different degrees of relation to the CSCJ circle. I interviewed Adina Bar-Shalom, Rabbi Ovadia 
Yosef's daughter, about his contacts with the CSCJ. She enlightened me about Mizrahi ultra-
orthodoxy, and the ways it served as a source of strength in her father's public work. The 
interviews at large helped me understand the emotional world that derived autonomous Mizrahi 
political activity, and supplied rich descriptions of the lived experience that shaped the 
perceptions and beliefs of the actors involved.  
The study of the Iraqi cadre in the ICP should be explained separately. Since I started the 
research, three very relevant books to their study were published, as well as a whole trove of 
                                                             
i Only by the very end of my investigation time, two very relevant publications were uploaded to the JPRESS 
website, the journal Bama'arakha of the Committee of the Sephardic Community of Jerusalem, and the 
communist Hebrew daily, Kol Ha'am was uploaded until 1965.   
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their documents in the National Library Archive. The ICP was a main part of the previous 
research program I had about the Ashkenazi left. This chapter, the shortest of them all, had been 
written in three layers and its writing accompanied all the years of research. This is the only 
group whose material I did not get close to exhaust, just because of its sheer quantity. After 
reviewing the secondary sources, I reviewed the booklets of the national Committees held every 
few years, searching after members' comments, any mention to culture, and reviewing some of 
the political discourse. I searched Kol Ha'am around key moments when I thought discourse 
about Arabs and about Mizrahim could be found. I did not, however, review Kol Ha'am during 
the Wadi Salib events, because I felt different authors have already exhausted this topic and did 
not find it necessary to add another point of view. After the change of focus of research to 
Mizrahi autonomous organizations, I searched materials of local ICP branches and provinces 
of the Jewish periphery and the Iraqi areas of concertation in the center. I chose to review the 
years that were more likely to speak about Mizrahi, Palestinian or other Arab issues. Regarding 
the 1965 split in the party, I only reviewed the Bnei-Brak branch, as the only one that was 
available to me of the ones likely to have a high Iraqi concentration. I also went through relevant 
correspondences, and got some letters translated for me from Arabic. Lastly, I was able to get 
an interview with Menashe Khalifa, who was the head of the Bnei-brak branch during the split: 
his central role in maintaining the branch alive after the split and his coherent ideology 
throughout the discussions preceding it, left an impression on me, and I was glad to get his and 




1948 was chosen as year zero of this research, even if it was not the inception of the Zionist 
colonization process nor perhaps the most important inflexion point in it, according to some 
analysis. This year was chosen also despite of the artificial way in which this choice detaches 
Mizrahim's trajectories in Israel from their pasts in Muslim countries, perpetuating this way, 
within academic research, the epistemological Rupture that history bestowed upon these Jews. 
In this sense, although the research writes history from a sociological perspective, it does not 
contribute to the attempts to overcome the division of labor of Israeli academy between 
historians and sociologists criticized in the previous chapter. As Offir (1999) claimed, choosing 
1948 as the zero hour for critical social research, helps to undermine the unquestionable 
acceptance of the state's law and its principles of policing, and generates a confrontation 
between those and the claims of its victims. The research departs from the 1948 Rupture, and 
in this way it asks to emphasize the dimensions of the earthquake that the establishment of the 
state of Israel through war with the entire Arab world signified for Jews in Muslim countries. 
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For those who commenced their immigration process in that year, the element of Rupture is 
quite evident. Throughout this research I will demonstrate how this was a moment of Rupture 
for the native Sephardic elites as well, and I would claim that even for those Mizrahim who 
immigrated later on, 1948 also had significant importance, indefinitely changing the political 
climate for Jews in most Muslim countries.  
1956 was an important year, because of the Sinai Campaign of Israel, France and Britain against 
Egypt, a milestone in middle-eastern colonial/imperial history, and in the historiography of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was also important in the Mizrahi political sphere, since lack of 
warfare is historically the first condition for Mizrahi rebellious discourse and action to arise, 
and wars have always put an end to Mizrahi protests in Israel (Herzog 2005, Shokeid & Deshen 
1999). However, the first period of research terminates in 1957, and the second period begins 
in 1958 and until 1967, dividing hence the periods of research almost perfectly into two 
decades. This choice derived from the empirical material, which reflected a shift in 1958 in the 
parts of the Mizrahi political sphere examined in this research.  
The choice to end in 1967 was imposed by lack of time, as the initial ambition of this research 
project was to cover the entire period that Israel was dominated by Labor Zionism and by the 
party Mapai, until the 1977 turnover in government to the right. As mentioned, this turnover is 
mainly attributed to Mizrahim's vote, mainly as a counter-vote against the Labor movement: an 
electoral pattern that certainly still influences Israeli politics. Even those who claim that Mizrahi 
vote was not the most crucial factor in the 1977 elections, see this year as a crucial turning point 
in Mizrahi political history: as Ben Dor (2004) claimed, it liberated them from 30 years of a 
particular Ashkenazi oppression, and changed radically the conditions of Mizrahi integration, 
especially in politics but also in Israeli-Ashkenazi society at large.  The early 1970s saw the 
most known Mizrahi political movement, The Black Panthers, which fabricated interesting 
relationships with the radical Marxist left, the communist party and Palestinian Fatah leaders. 
The research, however, concludes in 1967, even though it is arguable if it was a crucial inflexion 
point in the Mizrahi political sphere: it certainly was not as crucial as it was for the Zionist 
colonization enterprise, for the Palestinian national movement and for the collision between the 
two. However, ending the research in 1967 is also justifiable. The 1950s and 1960s are 
designated by many researchers as distinct from the rest of Mizrahi history in Israel. In these 
two decades the discourse about modernization, in light of functionalist social theory was very 
influential, and the inequality between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim was especially brute and 
systematic (Shoshana 2013). The unequal distribution of economic and symbolic resources in 
this period designed the multiple fields from which Mizrahim in Israel are still, at least partially, 
excluded. Grinberg (2001) claimed that 1967 was a turning point also in the social and 
economic situation of Mizrahim in Israel, following the dramatic increase in Israel's economy, 
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with the incorporation of a large territory with its captive population, both as workers to exploit 
and as a market to sell to. After 1967, Bashkin (2017:223) claimed that Mizrahi population got 
more deeply divided along socio-economic lines, separating those who could benefit from this 
economic growth and those who remained in the cycle of poverty. The situation of those last 
probably worsened after 1967, having to compete in the labor market with poorer Palestinian 
Arab workers with no civil rights. 1967 is also important for anything related to Jewish-Arab 
grassroots initiatives, because it re-opened a new potential space of Jewish-Arab action (Efron 
2005), reuniting the territory once again for free movement of people, ideas and goods. 
Following, a review of the periods demarcated in this research is presented, explaining the 
choice of years more concretely and framing each period's most important events.   
 
Chapter 4: 1492-1881 
This chapter outlines the relevant developments in global, Jewish and middle-eastern history in 
the centuries that precede the research, required to understand the heritage and roots of the 
political dynamics revised in the research itself. It is divided into two parts. The first part starts 
in 1492 and attempts to define, in very broad brushstrokes, a decolonial interpretation of the 
history of world Jewry in the modern age. This part explores more deeply the development of 
two or three distinct Jewish sub-diasporas: Ashkenazi in Europe and Sephardic and Mizrahi 
mainly in the Middle East. 1492 was chosen for marking the beginning of what the philosopher 
Dussel (2005) called first modernity, when the modern hierarchical perception of race and 
ethnicity got conformed through changes in global politics. In the end of the first part, and the 
beginning of second modernity, this global perspective will be landed into the local reality, in 
order to understand the social, cultural and political trajectory of Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews 
in Eretz-Israel/Palestine, as well as to understand the background of their organized action prior 
to Zionism.  
The second part of this chapter begins in 1881, with the inception of the Zionist colonization 
enterprise, and ends with its culmination in the establishment of the state of Israel. In the end 
of World War I, the Ottoman Empire fell, and the Middle East got divided into new territorial 
units under French and British influences. Tsarist Russia was replaced by the communist 
regime, and Fascist and racist ideologies gained power in Europe. After World War II and the 
Jewish Holocaust annihilating most of European Jewry, The USA and the USSR were 
established as two global super powers, wrestling each other in the Cold War that would 
overshadow the entire period studied. During this period, both the Palestinian-Arab national 
movement and the Zionist movement, understood simultaneously as a Jewish-national 
movement and a colonization enterprise, were in the process of consolidation. In this part we 
will follow the Sephardic and Mizrahi autonomous political activity and organizations, within 
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the internal political dynamics of the Jewish settler-colony in Palestine, and the growing 
conflict between the Zionist and Palestinian-Arab national movements. We will see how some 
among the elites of the indigenous Jewish population, sustained a rival opposition to the Zionist 
movement's colonial practices, while holding an alternative notion of Zionism. Some 
development of the Palestinian Communist Party will also be attended to, as well as relevant 
occurrences in Europe and milestones in the processes of colonial modernization of Jewries in 
Arab countries.  
 
Chapter 5: 1948-1958  
In 1948 the state of Israel was established, through the event called the Catastrophe (Nakbah) 
by Palestinians, and the War of Independence by Israelis. In this war almost a million 
Palestinian Arab became refugees and were denied re-entering the country ever again. 150,000 
Palestinian Arabs remained within the boundaries of the state of Israel, received formal 
citizenship but were places under a military regime. Hundreds of thousands of Jews from 
Muslim countries immigrate to Israel, and were received under discriminatory conditions that 
would determine their socio-economic status in the working-class of the new state. The party 
ruling over the Zionist colonial/national enterprise, Mapai, enhanced and enrooted its apparatus 
of domination in the framework of the newborn state. In this period, we will follow the activity 
and discourse of one main organization, the Council of the Sephardic Community of Jerusalem 
(CSCJ), as the only body from among the indigenous elites to have sustained the autonomy 
from and rivalry with the Labor movement and other Zionist parties in this period.  
 
Chapter 6: 1958-1967 
This decade was exempt of great wars and movements of population that dramatically 
influenced the country. However, the Middle East went through inner turmoil. During this 
decade, regimes in Arab countries fell and changed, looking for different recipes for 
consolidating national independence through modernization and development, using egalitarian 
ideologies that challenged traditional status quos. As this periodization insinuates, it seems this 
regional climate had a greater influence on the Mizrahi political sphere than the direct 
occurrences of the Israeli conflict with its neighbors. In this decade, the research will focus on 
the activity and discourse of quite a few Mizrahi and Sephardic autonomous organizations, as 
this sub-sphere of Israeli politics bloomed in that decade. Many of the organizations examined 
in this inquiry were short lived political parties, there is one student organization from the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and an ultra-orthodox Sephardic organization. We will 
continue to follow the activity and discourse developed by the CSCJ in this decade as well, and 
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see how their discourse retook some of its pre-1948 features for challenging the colonial Zionist 
regime.  
 
Chapter 7: 1948-1965 The Iraqi cadre in the Israeli Communist Party  
A separate and shorter chapter is dedicated to reviewing the activity of Iraqi communist 
immigrants who joined the Israeli Communist Party. Despite not forming an official 
autonomous organization, the activity of this circle is included in this research because of its 
high relevance in regards to the research questions. Communism was a main anti-colonial 
ideology of the time and place, despite the inner-contradiction it displayed in its attempts to 
bring this Eurocentric form of emancipation to the Middle East. Because of the vast materials 
in Arabic language this cadre has produced, this chapter is a short and non-encompassing 
review of their activity and discourse and is largely based on secondary resources. Because of 
this limitation, and the distance -though not complete separation- of this circle from the Mizrahi 
political sphere, and in order to tell the Jewish point of view of the story of this circle in a 
continual manner, their chapter is separated from the rest of the research and covers a larger 
span of time: from the establishment of the state and until the split that occurred in the 
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 4921                                                                                                                        First Modernity        
 
When the Roman emperor Constantine converted to Christianity in the 4th century AD, the Jewish 
kingdom of Judea, that had its center in Jerusalem, had already ceased to be center of world Jewryi. 
Instead, the Jewish community in Babylon was gaining more importance, thanks to its grand learning 
center (Zohar 2005). In the 7th century, Islamic rule took over the area, leading a policy that tolerated 
the existence of Christian and Jewish minorities within the Caliphatesii. About a century after the 
establishment of Abbasian Caliphate in Baghdad in 750, the important Jewish toranic academies moved 
there, and received pupils and funds from all world Jewry. Until the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 
the 13th century, the importance and reach of the Halachic productions in Baghdad gradually formed 
what some historians see as a shared Judaic tradition, a single cultural orbit stretching from Spain to the 
Indian ocean. Baghdad became a center of reference for world Jewry. The Baghdadi academies formed 
strong local rabbinical leadership, who guided communities dispersed around the Muslim world with 
certain uniformity (Gerber 2003).  
According to Yosef (1991), the way Jewish high-culture got developed in the east under Muslim rule, 
gave legitimacy for Jews in the other end of the empire, in Al-Andalus, to open up and receive deep 
influences from Muslim culture. From the 10th to the 12th century in particular, Jewish courtiers adopted 
Arab cultural tastes and lifestyles, artists and poets took inspiration from their Muslim equivalents, 
leisure activities and modes of religion received influences from the Muslim environment (Gerber 
2003). Sephardic Jews were culturally involved and got influenced by their rulers also in the slowly 
expanding Christian areas of the Iberian Peninsula (Asis 1991). This period, known in Jewish 
historiography as The Golden Age, remains unique not only for the substantial cultural, Halachic and 
scientific developments Jews reached throughout it, but also for the depth to which Jewish high-culture 
was absorbed in its environment and contributed to it. According to Asis (1991), perhaps the most 
                                                             
i A mixture of the Biblical narrative with other archeological findings compose the main body of knowledge of Jewish history 
until this time. The kingdom of Judea, that had Jerusalem as its capital, probably existed since around the 8th century BC and 
until its conquest by Babylonians in the 6th century BC. Jews later returned to hold varying degrees of sovereignty in Jerusalem 
and its surroundings until the Roman conquests of the 1st century AD.  
ii As "people of the book" [ahel il-kittab] they were protected, under the dhimmi status. This status allowed for freedom of 
occupation and movement, as well as autonomy for all matters of faith, which were most public and community affairs. 
However, this status implied legal and juridical disqualifications, such as prohibition of certain rights or paying special taxes. 
These disqualifications, and the burden they implied for the everyday lives of Jews and Christians, varied along the centuries, 
as they were subjected to the interpretation of the different rulers (Gerber 2003, Laskier 1994).  
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distinct feature about this period, is the way Sephardic Jews were able to incorporate the Andalusian 
Muslim culture into part of their own heritage for generations to come. In 1391, the conquest of the 
Almohades of Al-Andalus brought an end to this period, as they established a reign of persecution and 
violence towards minorities, and expelled Jews from Cataluña and Mallorca. This was precedence for 
1492, when the kingdom of Castile united with the kingdom of Aragon.  
The decree for the expulsion of the Muslim and Jewish population from the Iberian Peninsula was 
issued on March 31st, 1492, nine months before Columbus' ships first embarked on the island thereafter 
named Hispaniola. Shohat & Stam (1994) quoted scholars that speculate that the wealth expropriated 
from the expulsed is what funded the overseas journeys. From their critical decolonial perspective, 
Shohat & Stam underscored the tight relation between the ethno-religious cleansing of the kingdom of 
Castile and the new formulas of colonialization and exploitation abroad, as two forms of state violence 
which tied together Christian religion and the white race. Shohat & Stam (1994) explained how feudal 
religiosity prepared the way for the racialized conquest that created new global hierarchies, a global 
system with one center and one principle trade route, which became dominant over a multiplicity of 
routes and centers. In Castile, old religious oppression was endowed with new racial meanings. From 
this perspective, 1492 symbolizes a new juridical and institutional abilities of governments, which 
constituted another thanatopolitics: another logic that allows the sovereign to kill, let die, or threat with 
death or expulsion (Agamben 1998).   
 
As for Jewish history, some have claimed that the expulsion was the propeller of Jewish modernity, 
instituting modern Jewish consciousness and reality (Pedaya 2015, Yosef 1991). The Jews that 
emigrated from the Iberian Peninsula throughout the following century were officially welcomed to 
settle in the Ottoman Empire, and many indeed complied. By the end of the 16th century almost half of 
world Jewry was residing in the Ottoman Empire (Gerber 2003). In places to which Sephardim arrived 
in large numbers to an existing Jewish community, as in the Balkans and Turkey, they became dominant 
in it; in other areas they intermingled with the native Jewries and were gradually absorbed into it, as in 
Tunisia, Syria and Palestine (Gerber 2003, Laskier 1994, Benbassa & Rodrigue 2000).  Sephardic Jews 
also emigrated to other areas: mainly to North-Western Africa or to different locations in Europe 
(Laskier 1994). The Sephardim in exile often maintained a separate community with parallel institutions 
to the native Jewries, but historians agree that they attained hegemonic stature everywhere they arrived, 
assuming spiritual and social leadership, forming an elite in both politics and in economy i (Gerber 2003, 
David 2005, Ben Sasson 1979, Laskier 1994). In North-Western Africa, despite attaining these 
leadership roles, Sephardic Jews were gradually absorbed in the local communities and started to use 
the local dialect (Benbassa 1992). In the Ottoman Empire, they conserved a cultural, intellectual and 
political interest in the Hispanic world, and nurtured feelings of proximity and nostalgia towards it (Asis 
                                                             
i Similar processes occurred within Muslim North African communities with the Muslim expulses (Benbassa 1992).  
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1991), in manners that Jews did not tend to conserve for their hosts societies. Benbassa & Rodrigue 
(2000) claimed that it was the stability of the Ottoman Empire that allowed for the development of a 
distinct Judeo-Hispanic cultural unit in it. This based an ethnic-religious identity of Hispanic customs 
and liturgy, with Judeo-Spanish as its common language (Asis 1991). The intellectual and rabbinical 
life of Ottoman Jewry flourished, holding newspapers, educational systems and libraries (David 2005). 
Ottoman Jewry was developed as what Benbassa and Rodrigue (2000) referred to as a "cultural area" 
of its own, which conserved a Judeo-Hispanic high culture. At the same time that this particular identity 
was formulated and nurtured, it can be claimed that the hegemonic stature of Sephardim in Jewish 
communities in Muslim countries contributed to the formulation of a larger Sephardic sub-diaspora in 
the Muslim world in early, pre-Enlightment modernity. The evidence and vehicle of this identity was 
the Sephardic Sidduri, which consolidated and dispersed Sephardic liturgy. This Siddur grew out of the 
modern/colonial reality the expulsion created: the territorial dispersal from Spain, the availability of 
techniques for printing in Hebrew the exiled Sephardim brought with them, and the tendency for textual 
canonization, that according to Pedaya (2015), were part of early modernity. The Siddur spread unified 
contents of Sephardic liturgy and customs throughout the Sephardic exiles, as well as to other Jewish 
communities under Islamic rule in today's Yemen and Iraq. This contributed to forming a distinction 
between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jewries as two perceivable sub-diasporas (Noy 2014, Yosef 1991), 
the first dominant within Christian Europe's Jewries and the latter dominant within Jewries under 
Islamic domain, from Morocco to Iraq (Cohen 2005). These two sub-diasporas had distinct liturgy, 
origins, and languages. Some Sephardim were also under Christian rule, and many Jews under Islamic 




Second Modernity and Emancipation                                                                                  1700-1830  
 
Dussel (2005) referred to late modernity as a second phase, where processes initiated in 1492 matured 
into their modern form. By late 16th century, Europe's power had increased in a way that allowed it to 
start seizing Christian territories off the Ottoman Empire. According to Shohat & Stam (1994), this was 
achieved through the use of forced labor from the Americas and Africa, massive injection of wealth 
from the Americas, the opening of new overseas markets and the establishment of new European trading 
routes. Enlightment was developed in Europe under the influence of the religious and philosophical 
turmoil that followed colonization and the image it created of the savage Other. Colonial exploitive 
economy matured into global capitalism, and Europe was being gradually transformed into a single 
                                                             
iSiddur is the book that assembles all the prayers Jews use for their everyday lives and for festive events, used in synagogues 
and in homes.   
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center of reference for the entire globe (Shohat & Stam 1994). Some authors have claimed that the 
presence of Sephardim in Europe had a constituting influence on the development of European 
modernity, which has not yet been studied properly (Ben Sasson 1979, Halevi-Wise 2012). Asis (1991), 
for instance, suggested Sephardim contributed to the impulsion of the European Renaissance movement 
by their central role in translating scientific and philosophical texts from Arabic to Romance languages 
in Christian parts of Spain, prior to the expulsion. Modern Europe, as a rising center of global reference, 
held reason and rationality at its epistemological root and as its ontological justification. However, this 
tendency was not attributed to previous developments in Islamic scientific and rational thinking, but 
rather served as basis to a "scientifically buttressed system of racial hierarchy" (Schorsch 2004). 
Mignolo (2000: 49-64) marked these processes as the first radical transformation of the Occident, which 
created new geo-political imageries of the world system. The development of Occident as Europe and 
the Americas, as its extension, simultaneously created the Orient as its ultimate Other.   
 
According to Schorsch (2004), by the 18th century Sephardic Jews in Europe firmly implanted 
themselves in the new Atlantic world system, and served as a model for other European Jews, who were 
incrementally distancing themselves from Jewish tradition and searching for integration in their home 
societies. Since the end of the 18th century, the process of Jewish Emancipation began in Europe, and 
Jews were given more civil rights across the continent. This slowly contributed to the dismantling of 
many Jewish communities and increased secularization among them. Schorsch (2012) investigated the 
processes of modernization of German Jews, and showed how central were Sephardic Jews to its 
development. The campaign for granting Jews equal rights in German society relied on the model of 
the prosperous Sephardic Jews of Amsterdam, London and Bordeaux. After gaining certain rights, a 
German-Jewish movement of Enlightment developed [haskala] and spread to Eastern Europe. Jews 
increasingly received secular education, and contributed to a scholarly and literary bloom in Hebrew, 
which until then in Europe was mainly used for liturgical and religious purposes.  Within this process, 
the Sephardic Golden Age served as a model and source of inspiration for constructing a Jewish 
religious posture that did not contradict cultural openness, philosophical thinking and appreciation of 
aesthetics. The Sephardic heritage of cultivating rational knowledge and using language as an esthetic 
tool gave German Jews a classical heritage to rely on, which could be formulated as common with 
German culture (Schorsch 2012). It served them as a useable past, a proof of their heritage being part 
of European culture (Evri 2013). Emancipated Jews in Europe found in Sephardic heritage a source of 
pride and an instrument of rebellion within Jewish tradition, one that did not jeopardize their Jewish 
identity. As Schorsch (2012) put it, "paradoxically, contact with Islam made Judaism part of the 
Western world".  
At the same time, Jews living under Muslim rule were already more integrated in their societies. Within 
the borders of the Ottoman Empire, Jewish communities, as other minorities, had a certain social and 
cultural autonomy that gave them religious, financial and educational liberties, which were conditioned 
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by certain civic discrimination that enforced the superiority of Islamic rule (Tzimhoni 1996). Despite 
holding a different faith, Jewish communities in Muslim countries shared the Arab religious culture, 
mythology and popular rituals (Leon 2009, Shokeid 1986). These basic socio-cultural differences 
between Jewish sub-diasporas shaped the distinct development of modernities for Jews under Islamic 
and under Christian rule, which would become ever more evident with the increase of power of Europe 




Western Imperialism in the Middle East                                                                              1830-1881 
 
Throughout the 19th century the Ottoman Empire was undergoing an uneasy process of modernization. 
This was propelled by a series of military defeats to European powers, which at the same time was 
accompanied by certain enthusiasm for the universal values, institutions and international norms 
entailed in the European idea a modern civilization. According to Aydin (2007), by the beginning of 
the 19th century these processes had consolidated Europe as a sole model for the Ottoman state and 
society. The empire began sending its notable youths to get educated in Europe, which cultivated 
different generations of reformers who wished to change, reorganize and modernize the empire's 
military and civic mechanisms (Campos 2011). The modernizing reforms in the Ottoman Empire 
increased civic equality in ways which strengthened communitarian ties of minority populations. It 
formalized different ethno-religious affiliations into secular positions, granting minorities an official 
name [millet], formal representation and official authorities of self- organization (Tzimhoni 1996, 
Bernai 1986). Since these processes supported the Jewish elites in the empire and strengthened their 
status, Jewish religious leaders developed an open and flexible reaction to European modernity. 
Modernity created more opportunities for the Jewish elites, allowing their incorporation to the Ottoman 
administrative system and enhancing their social, cultural and economic ties with the Arab Muslim 
elites (Lupo 2004, Glass & Kark 2007).  
According to Tsur (2010), the influence of these processes of Ottoman Jewry on Jews in Arab countries 
outside the empire's borders, as in Iraq, Yemen and Morocco, have not been studied enough. Sephardic 
Jews held a hegemonic stature among these Jewries, but these last were much more deeply a part of 
their Arab environment, in many aspects of material and popular culture, though not in the production 
of high-culture. Throughout the 19th century, the Arab retort to European Enlightment developed in the 
Nahda movement, which spread scholarly and literary texts in Arabic across the Arab speaking world. 
This movement, which crossed communal, ethnic and religious communities in the Middle East, was a 
central part in the processes that formulated modern Arab identities. Most Jewish communities in the 
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Middle East did not participate in this Arab cultural movement, as their language remained confined to 
particular Judeo-Arab dialects or to Judeo-Spanish (Levy 2011).  
The French colonial occupation of growing parts of North Africa, and the growing influence of colonial 
economy in the Middle East throughout this century, also brought dramatic changes to the lives of these 
Jewish diasporas: according to Leon (2009), in many ways these changes brought an end to 1400 years 
of Jewish-Muslim symbiosis. Perhaps the main factor influencing the entire sub-diaspora of middle-
eastern Jews since the second half of the 19th century, was the "meteoric spread" (Tsur 2010) of Alliance 
Israélite Universelle, a Jewish-French colonial school system that wished to spread modern secular 
education among middle-eastern Jews. According to Tsur (2010), Alliance had a decisive effect on 
middle-eastern Jewish identity and culture, acting as "the imperial mutation" of the classic western 
identity model. Through the increasing involvement of European Jews with middle-eastern Jews, the 
last became increasingly westernized, and converted their interest and involvement in the local culture 
with interest and involvement in European cultures. However, Tsur (2010) asks to distinguish these 
westernization processes and the modernization processes which Muslims in the same countries went 
through by acquiring western education. For the Jews, as modern economy and structures were 
developing under colonial auspices, the westernizing tendencies gave tools for social and economic 
mobility. The deep and wide expansion of the French identity option among North African Jews cut 
many ties between Jews and Muslims, since it gave the formers tools to enter the west (Roumani 2012). 
Jews started to distance themselves from Arab self-identification (Levy 2005, Tsur 2010), and became 
increasingly identified with the foreign rulers (Bezalel 2007). In North Africa, Jews gradually obtained 
a status of intermediators between the colonial regimes and the local population (Aydin 2007, Bar Yosef 
1959). When Balkan countries were gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire, Greek and other 
national identity options were opened to the Jews there as well. Throughout the 19th century, then, 
certain aspects of the Sephardic Jewish identification all across the Middle East was gradually getting 
replaced by competing identity options (Roumani 2012, Asis 1991, Benbassa 1992).  
This process of Jewish secular colonization had a parallel religious process that Lupo (2004a) referred 
to as "toranic colonization", propelled by the intervention of Eurocentric ultra-orthodox rabbis among 
North African Jews. In order to understand the particularities of this modern/colonial process we must 
again return to Europe. As mentioned earlier, the increasing spread of secular scholarship among Jews 
in Europe crumbled and weakened many Jewish communities, encouraging Jews to become integrated 
in their surrounding societies. This, in turn, stimulated a protective reaction among some religious 
communities, mainly in Eastern Europe, strengthening religious orthodox tendencies with the purpose 
of closing the community to external changes, including to Jews who assimilated into the majority 
society. Jewish ultra-orthodoxy was developed this way, designing a religious culture which holds the 
study of Torah as the highest value. Toranic academies [yeshivas] took the place of other traditional 
communal organizations, and the heads of the academies and rabbis gained a role of political and moral 
leadership, on top of the traditional religious one (Lupo 2004). Within Muslim countries, rabbis hardly 
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ever developed a similar reactionary response to the social and cultural changes modernity brought 
along, because these changes did not threaten as much the communities' religious faith, nor did they 
pose an immediate threat to the respectable posture of rabbis within their communitiesi.   
Lupo (2004) told the story of an ultra-orthodox toranic schooling network that started to function in 
Morocco half a century after the first Alliance school was established. This was part of a network of 
European toranic schools and academies which took up the mission of attracting and incorporating 
students from Morocco, in order to combat the secularizing effects of Alliance and teach the students 
Ashkenazi style ultra-orthodox Judaism. According to Lupo, the moral justification and cultural 
reasoning for this project were identical to the modern/colonial mission of Alliance: the aspiration to 
save middle-eastern Jewries from their degenerated state under Muslim rule, and try to assimilate them 
in the superior Ashkenazi Judaism, by westernizing their religious culture and toranic knowledge. Lupo 
(2006) claimed that this missionary approach would become the most substantial factor in the 
development and design of the Sephardic toranic world throughout the 20th century.  
 
 
Sephardic Jewry in Eretz-Israel/Palestine 
Throughout the 19th century, Palestine/Eretz-Israel was populated with mainly Arab Muslim population. 
There were many ethnic and religious minorities in the land, including different Muslim ethnicities, 
Shia communities, nine different types of Christian denominationsii, and a Jewish minority as well. 
Over 75% of the population was rural. Most of Christian and Jewish populations lived in the cities, 
along with Muslims as welliii.  
The greatest concentration of Jews was in Jerusalem (McCarthy 1990). Eretz-Israel was one of the few 
places where Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews lived side by side, but there were some important 
differences between these populations. First, Sephardim were generally Ottoman citizens while the 
Ashkenazim often were not. Ashkenazim, in general, were characterized by stricter religious devotion, 
its strictness expressed in a rather reactionary attitude towards modernity and change, as described 
above, while the Sephardim usually held pragmatic and tolerant attitudes towards the transformations 
of the time (Bezalel 2007, Meyuhas-Ginio 2013). The Sephardim were part of the general social, 
cultural and economic fabric of the society and many commanded Turkish and Arabic. The Sephardic 
public and the notables in particular were prone to join and cooperate with the French-Jewish initiative 
of the Alliance school to spread and develop modern European education. In Eretz-Israel, Alliance as 
                                                             
i A reactionary approach to modernity was developed among some middle-eastern rabbis in certain places. See Leon (2009): 
23-27 and Pikar (2003): 23-26, about such rabbis, the differences between them and the Ashkenazi approach, and about the 
different factors that can explain the general lack of religious reactionary response within middle-eastern Jewries.  
ii These included, according to the Ottoman Census, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian, Armenian Catholic, Roman 
Catholic, Protestants, Maronites, Syrians, Caledonians and Gypsies (McCarthy 1990).  
iii 87% of the population was Muslim, 9.3% Christians and 3.2% Jewish. The data is based on the 1879-1880 Ottoman census, 
in: McCarthy (1990).  
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well as other Sephardic education institutions combined traditional-religious and secular modern 
European tutelage (Bezalel 2007:81, Morag-Talmon 2000). In contrast, some researchers claim that the 
Ashkenazi communities were characterized by their relative isolation from their surroundings: they 
depended on funding from their home communities in Eastern Europe and learned later the local 
languages (Kaniel 1981, Mendel 2014). The borders between Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities 
were naturally also penetrable, and mutual influences, organizational partnerships, and individuals 
affiliated to other communities were also part of this reality (Aliav 1982, Gaon 1937/1982).  As in other 
places in the Ottoman Empire, since 1841 the Chief Sephardic Rabbi of Jerusalem had the official role 
of representing the Jewish community [millet] in the district of Jerusalemi. The Sephardic economic 
elites served as the administrative and organizational support for the different tasks this representation 
required, from taxation to education and welfare (Kark & Ben-Yaakov 1996). A main institution that 
organized the work of these elites was the Council of the Sephardic Community of Jerusalemii (CSCJ), 
that was established, according to its own tradition, as early as 1267. The head of this institution was 
the Chief Sephardic Rabbi of Jerusalem. Some of the Sephardic elites were incorporated in the Ottoman 
administrative bureaucratic system, and some carried out their affairs or their public's affairs in the 
framework of "notable politics". This entailed unprofessional occupation in administration and 
governance that relied on their social status and capital (Weber 1978: 291), that is, their contacts and 
intermediating skills with other elites in the land. The young generation of this elite attended the new 
western universities in Cairo and Beirut, and some of them got to form what Fanon (1965) called native 
intellectuals. The western-modern education combined with a traditional local upbringing would 
potentially develop among many of these elites the tools of border-thinking, allowing them to think 
from and criticize both western and non-western epistemologies, in a way that challenges the very 
dichotomy of viewing these forms of thought as two sides of a border (Mignolo 2000: 84-86).  
Since mid-19th century waves of Jewish immigration from different places, most notably from North 
Africa, undermined the authority of the CSCJ and formed their own organizations. These 
communitarian organizations, made by and for communities of certain cities or countries of origins, 
gained different degrees of autonomy; the Ashkenazi community even succeeded to informally 
represent itself to the empire's authorities (Kaniel 1981). The rest of middle-eastern Jewish communities 
maintained an economic and symbolic dependence in the Sephardic elites iii. As the Sephardim were 
usually of higher socio-economic status, the institutional dependence was accompanied by certain social 
                                                             
i The central representative of the Jewish millet in the Ottoman Empire was the Chief Rabbi of Kushta, Turkey, around whom 
two councils gathered, composed by the Sephardic elites of all provinces:  a spiritual council and a worldly one (Bernai 1986, 
Campos 2011).  
ii va'ad 'edat ha-sfraradim be-yerushalaim. The English translation relies on the organization's letterhead in the period of 
research, after 1948.  
iii These communities included the Ladino speaking Sephardim, the Maghrebis [ma'araviim], Aleppians [halebim], 
Babylonians, Persians, Bukharians, Yemenites, Georgians, Caucasians, Kurds and Orphals. These different ethnicities are 
distinguished by their Jewish dialect, Hebrew writing and pronunciation, patterns of religious ruling and a variety of customs. 




condescendence. The dependence and patronizing attitude were a continuance source of struggles, 
rivalries, and mutual accusations of neglect from the one side and lack of responsibility from the other 
(Morag-Talmon 1991, Aliav 1982, Sharabi 1984). The Sephardic elites held a hegemonic regional-
political role within the middle-eastern Jews in the land, but their prestige went also beyond the empire's 
borders (Bezalel 2007: 47-48). The Sephardic rabbinical elites had a spiritual-religious authority, related 
also to the sacred and central place of Jerusalem and Eretz-Israel in Judaism. This spiritual-religious 
status was implemented by sending messengers to middle-eastern Jewries to collect funds for the 












Auto-Emancipation: Zionism                                                                                                1881-1917                                                                                                                                
 
 
The important twists in our plot began in Eastern Europe, towards the end of the 19th century. A series 
of unfavorable laws and violent riots against Jews in Russia inspired a Russian Jew named Leon Pinsker 
to write in 1881 an essay titled "Auto-emancipation!", where he asked to incite European Jewry to 
realize their true emancipation, claiming civil equality could only be realized within the framework of 
a Jewish national movement, that should begin by organizing European Jewry and their immigration to 
Eretz-Israel (also known by the name of Zion). The essay got rapidly translated to many languages and 
dispersed within European Jewry: apparently, it reflected the spirits of the time. The land in question is 
recorded in the Old Testament and in other Jewish scripts as the land promised to the Jews by God, 
where a Jewish kingdom had once stood. In Jewish religious understanding, this land was mostly 
perceived as a mythical place, where the Jewish kingdom will revive upon the arrival of the messiah 
(Shapira 2012). European modernity impacted this traditional Jewish concept in two different ways. 
First, as Baer (2004) interpreted, the repeated persecutions of Jews in Europe became understood within 
the prism of a linear history. In line with the modern secular and national tendencies of the time, this 
rendered Jewish history in Europe as leading to progress in the form of a national revival in Zion. 
Second, European military superiority made it legally possible for Europeans to purchase lands in 
Palestine and settle them (Pappe 2006). These factors apparently helped recruit Jewish capital owners, 
as Baron Edmond Rothschild and Sir Moshe Montefiore, to support the Jewish settlement project in 
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Palestine by investing heavily in iti. Eastern European Jews started getting organized and immigrating 
to Eretz-Israel. In Europe, the Zionist movement was getting consolidated, founding institutions and 
recruiting some high positioned individuals, who vigorously sought after diplomatic ties and financial 
investors. Different Zionist political parties were formed, reflecting different ideological stances within 
the international Zionist congresses.  Most of the immigration in early 20th century was organized by 
parties that held socialist and Marxist nationalist ideologies, and presented themselves as the spearhead 
of the Hebrew Labor movement, which formed part of the Zionist movement. The Zionist parties were 
based in Europe, and in Eretz-Israel functioned as self-help organization, taking care of instrumental, 
economic and cultural needs of its members (Horowitz & Lissak 1979). By the beginning of the 20th 
century, the Zionist immigrants intended to establish an autonomous Jewish economy by advocating 
for Hebrew Labor only (Shapira 1977). 
During this period, there was also immigration to Eretz-Israel of Jews from Muslim countries. These 
immigrants were not derived by the same ideology, but the increasing Zionist immigration, as well as 
occurrences in different middle-eastern countries, stimulated this immigration in various forms. At 
large, with growing Jewish immigration, the land was perceived more than ever as a place where Jews 
could hold uninterrupted social and traditional lifeii (Tubi 1986, Bezalel 2007:19). These immigrants 
usually got incorporated to self-help religious institutions, or at other times created them, under varying 
degrees of affiliation to the Sephardic institutions. The European Zionist movement reached only few 
individuals in Muslim countries, usually in order to recruit funds and not with the purpose of promoting 
immigration like in Europe. Some Zionist associations were formed in Muslim countries, but these did 
not perceive Zionism as the modern secular national movement that it mostly was, but as another form 
of Jewish traditional settlement in the land that required funding from abroad, just like the Sephardic 
organizations (Abitbol 1989, Shenhav 2006).  
 
Neither the indigenous population nor the Ottoman authorities were pleased by the Zionist waves of 
immigration, because of their declared national intentions and the separate economy they were 
attempting to construct. In 1908-1909 freedom press was introduced in Palestine, and the new 
newspapers made public the bitterness, resentment and fear that Zionism evoked among some of the 
local population, and exposed the political significance of these feelings (Campos 2011). Lamdan 
(1994) claimed that among the Arab socio-political elite, the most dominant pattern of objection to 
Zionism was related to what Campos (2011) called "civic Ottomanism". Within this model of 
citizenship, Zionism was understood mainly as separatism and disloyalty to the empire. This attitude 
was shared by many of the Sephardic elite across the empire. They were taken aback by Zionism, for 
                                                             
i See Lehman-Wilzig (1976) about previous attempts to recruit Rothschild and Montefiore to do so. See Shilo (1994) for the 
interests and considerations of these capital-owners.  
ii The most unique case was that of the Yemenite immigration in 1910, as documented for instance in Shaffir (1993), Gorny 
(2003). For other experiences see Ettinger (1986). 
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the same reason many Jews everywhere also were: they saw themselves as loyal citizens of their 
countries and thought that the nationalistic tendencies were separatist and give Jews at large a dubious 
reputation (Campos 2011, Shapira 2012).  
Notwithstanding, many of the Sephardic elite in Eretz-Israel itself had a different philosophy. As some 
said, they were born in Zion and therefore, born Zionists (Bezalel 2007). Being a native in the land 
painted the Zionist project in utterly different colors. For the Sephardic elites, like others in the native 
population, the immigrants' foreign customs and secular ways of life were inconvenient, and were even 
perceived as a threat to the local Jewish populationi (Gorny 1985, Cohen 2015). Nonetheless, the project 
of Jews from everywhere settling the land, creating a united nation and becoming a local majority was 
often deemed desirable.  Zionism, for those who were in favor of it, was understood as strengthening 
cultural, spiritual and economic aspects of the Jewish community in Eretz-Israel. Different Sephardic 
individuals and associations did a great deal in order to spread the usage of Hebrew (Aliav 1982, 
Campos 2011). Some of the Sephardic notables saw their role as cultural and instrumental 
intermediaries between the Jewish European immigrants and the local population and authorities. They 
helped the immigration by facilitating land purchases and advocated for the immigrants' favor where 
necessary. However, they could also understand the resentment this organized and ideological 
immigration raised in the local population, and were greatly concerned about its explicit expressions in 
the press. At this point of this developing conflict, they were accomplices of both sides. They attempted 
to act as "a senior factor, guiding and orientating, that influences both sides from its experience and 
understanding" (Cohen 2015). As Cohen (2015) explained, these Sephardic notables found themselves 
between contradictory conceptions, interests, loyalties and solidarity alignments.  They believed they 
could prevent the animosity towards Zionism from growing if the immigrants understood how to treat 
the local population -for instance by not advocating for Hebrew Labor- and if the Arabs could 
understand the modernizing benefits the immigrants could bring to the land. They often claimed to 
promote mutual understanding and respect, but in fact they propagated for the Zionist narrative to be 
understood by Arabs, and for Arab culture to be respected by the Zionists. This native Sephardic attitude 
was recorded in numerous publications (Jacobson 2003, Bezalel 2007), and in initiatives like Hamagen 
association, whose main goal was to translate and write articles about the Zionist project and Judaism 
in Turkish and Arab press, as well as about Islam and Ottoman legislation in the Hebrew press, for the 
benefit of the "shared homeland" [moledet meshutefet] (Jacobson 2011). Different Sephardic notables 
advocated rapprochement and fraternity between Jews and Arabs and encouraged the Zionist 
immigrants to learn Arabic and Arab customs and culture. This line of advocacy reflected first and fore 
mostly the interests of this elite to maintain and enhance its power in the changing reality. However, it 
is worth noting that it was based on respect to Arab nationalisms, great appreciation to Islamic 
                                                             




civilization, and on a Jewish-national point of view. This national perspective was not a modern 
European secular one, but one that sought continuity with Jewish tradition and its yearning for 
redemption (Jacobson & Naor 2016). The immigration of the European Jews to Zion was conceived as 
a Jewish return to the East, allowing to recover an ancient Jewish national past within a modern 
framework: a process that could bring cultural fusions and changes for all those involved. The land, its 
native people and its languages were therefore viewed as an integral part of the Jewish national revival 
in several senses (Noy 2014, Bezalel 2007: 366). Sephardic and other native notables presented their 
own identity as a harmonious synthesis of east and west, a model Zionist ideology should naturally 
aspire to follow (Eyal 2005). Campos (2011) named this native national advocacy "cultural Hebraism", 
while Jacobson (2011) called it "inclusive Zionism". The Sephardic national perception was not based 
on the modern European experience, of nation states based on exclusive ownership rights over a certain 
territory. Rather, the nationalist sentiments of this public were anchored in the local Ottoman fabric of 
statehood, in which a plurality of minority groups had autonomous status that gave a legal framework 
to religious solidarity affiliations, side by side with others. The experience of ethnic plurality allowed a 
national sentiment of solidarity exempt of modern dichotomies and strict borders: territorial, 
epistemological or identitarian.  
The advocacy of these elites did not get too far, though. The Zionist leadership overlooked the Sephardic 
insights and generally ignored the question of the Arabs in the landi. As modern colonizers, they were 
satisfied with the promise of modernity they were bringing to the land, and certainly did not think they 
had anything to learn from the indigenous Jewish population. This induced a dynamic of cultural and 
political rivalry between the two groups (Eyal 2005).  
The rising hostility and the increasing prospects of collision between the local Arab population and the 
Zionist immigrants turned the Sephardic elites' border-epistemology into a political tool. Many of the 
younger generation of Sephardic elites proclaimed their border identity (Eyal 2005), claiming it could 
serve as a bridge between the political rivals. The native identity became symbolic capital for the 
notables that supported the Zionist ideas (Noy 2014). The main resource used to define the Sephardic 
identity as a political position was their relation to the east and to Arab culture (Evri 2013). Under the 
Ottoman regime, this rivalry was not yet defined as between Jews and Arabs, that is precisely what 
these elites saw as preventable in this stage. The rivalry they were bridging was between east and west: 
between eastern and western mentalities, manners and lifestyles; and between Zionist European colonial 
ambitions and local-patriotic, civic-ottoman or Pan-Arab ideological tendencies (Lamdan 1994). There 
were also Zionist newcomers who, from different predispositions, held similar views about the need for 
                                                             
i The Zionist leadership assumed that the tension with the local Arab population would cease once they see that the European 
Jews were bringing modern economic prosperity to the region, benefiting them as well. The leaders abroad were 
diplomatically focused, seeking support from the super powers for the Zionist project. The concern of the Zionist settlers in 
Palestine was a practical one, of constructing the forms and organization of Jewish settlement, and much energy was 
invested in debating the proper interpretation of socialism in everyday life and the way it could fit a national aspiration for 
a dispersed nation such as the Jews (Shapira 1992, 2012, Merhav 1980).  
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Zionism to integrate in the Middle East. Few of those were convinced by the Sephardic self-
presentation, and held them as a role model for Ashkenazim to follow (Jacobson & Naor 2016, Eyal 




The Beginning of British rule in Palestine                                                                           1917-1929 
 
After World War I and the failure of the League of Nations, new western solutions were suggested to 
the crisis in European international order. One was the Bolshevik revolution, and the other was US 
president Wilson's Fourteen Points document. This statement of principles that was to guide the peace 
treaties after the war, promised a new era of self-rule in which foreign western mandates will be installed 
in a temporary manner over the new states that were perceived unprepared to govern on their own. This 
was the capitalist-imperial answer to the Bolshevik revolution and to anti-colonial unrest (Sahpira 
2012). Both these western solutions strengthened the discourse of western versus eastern civilization, 
and they both inspired anti-colonial national movements worldwide (Aydin 2007).  
In 1920 the Allies held a conference in San Remo in Italy, in order to re-draw the maps of the fallen 
Ottoman Empirei. This conference, along with others that followed, divided the entire Middle East into 
territorial nation states, where institutions for local governance would get constructed. A French 
mandate was exerted over Lebanon and Syria, and a British mandate over Palestine and Iraq. Abdullah 
Hussein, one of the sons of the Sharif of Mecca, received control over the eastern bank of the Jordan 
River, which became the Kingdom of Transjordan. The British Balfour Declarationii got an official 
approval by the western super powers, giving hence official permission to the Zionist movement to 
construct a Jewish "national home" in Palestine. This in fact allowed a foreign Jewish minority the right 
to sovereignty in the entire land, which thereby consisted of a significant turn in Arab-Jewish relations 
(Khalidi 1997). The British managed the local population by dividing representation between Muslims, 
Christians and Jews (Kabha 2010), never representing the Muslims as the absolute majority that they 
were. As in other nascent Arab countries in the Middle East, the official name and borders gave the 
framework to what was becoming a Palestinian Arab national movement (Khalidi 1997). The Mufti 
(religious leader) of Jerusalem was nominated as the political representative of the Palestinian Muslim 
community. The Mufti cooperated with the British on educational, administrative and economic 
matters, but refused to any kind of political cooperation, as a protest to the discriminatory mandate 
commission (Pappe, 2006). The British built industries in a way that caused growing impoverishment 
                                                             
i See Map I. 
ii This declaration of the British intentions towards the Jews in Palestine was achieved thanks to successful lobby-building 
around the British Jewish Baron Rothschild. According to Shlaim (2000), it was based on British miscalculations as to the 
amount of power Jews actually held in revolutionary Russia.  
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and proletariat despair among many young Palestinian Arabs. This was a process which occurred in 
many places across the world: following improvement in sanitation and hygiene since the beginning of 
the 20th century, rural population increased in a way that made many people leave their villages, while 
in the cities there was not enough work or housing. British colonial policies of taxation, pricing and 
commercialization of agriculture augmented the urbanization and proletarization tendency (Yazbak 
2000).  
In contrast to the nascent Palestinian national movement, the Jewish national movement, i.e. the Zionist 
movement, had large foreign investments supporting its institutionsi (Grinberg 2001) and had already 
been in the midst of building a national society from scratch. From the first days of the British Mandate, 
Jewish "national institutions" were constructed, establishing a sort of state within the mandatory state 
(Bernstein 1957). Pappe (2006) mentioned that the mandatory system had no civilizatory mission 
towards the Zionists, and the capital they brought helped maintain a good relationship between the 
Zionist and British colonial systems. The formal representation of the Jews in Palestine passed from the 
hands of the Sephardic elites' institutions to the Zionist movements' institutions abroad. The mandate 
cancelled the Sephardic elites' statutory privileges, and collapsed their institutions, which had already 
been suffering from reduced prestige for some decades (Tubi 1986, Bezalel 2007). Furthermore, the 
British split the main Sephardic rabbinical authority between Ashkenazim and Sephardim.  
 
 
The political structure of the Jewish colony in Palestine 
The Zionist movement created a complex assembly of "national institutions" within two frameworks: 
in Europe and in Palestine. These institutions managed funds collected abroad and allocated them for 
land purchase, settlement construction and immigration certificates. These resources were distributed 
within different Zionist parties according to a party-key, corresponding to the parties' representation in 
the Zionist institutions (Lissak & Horowitz 1986). Essential themes like housing and employment were 
also allocated by the political parties, as well as education and cultural activities. So the way the party-
key distributed wealth and power influenced every aspect of the Jewish colony in Palestine (Horowitz 
& Lissak 1990). The Zionist movement constructed a Jewish community-government for the Jewish 
population. Though it had no legal authority, it held an executive committee as a government, a national 
assembly of elected political parties as a parliament, and a tax collection system. Different political 
parties and workers' unions composed the Labor movement, which in Palestine got united in an 
institution named the Histadrutii, through which it established educational institutions, companies, 
cooperatives and factories. The Histadrut served as the institutional infrastructure of the Labor 
movement, managing employment and providing healthcare to members of the Labor movements' 
                                                             
i Jewish philanthropic organizations and individuals, many that were not even Zionists, funded different aspects of the Zionist 
institutions, especially in establishing health centers and aiding weapon acquisitions (Shapira 2012).  
ii ha-histadrut ha-klalit shel ha-'ovdim be-eretz Israel: The General Workers’ Union of the Workers in Eretz-Israel.  
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parties (Horowitz & Lissak 1990). The Labor movement also established a military organization, the 
Haganai, which at first was mainly a passive-defensive military organization, not very well organized 
or equipped (Perliger & Weinberg 2003, Shapira 1992). The Labor movement represented a collection 
of eclectic ideologies, noted to be full of contradictions (Gorny 1985, Shapira 1992, Morris 2000). Its 
discourse addressed the benefit of the workers and propagated for proletariat struggles. As Grinberg 
(2001) explicated, this rhetoric corresponded very loosely to the reality of the colony. Nonetheless, the 
Labor movement successfully presented its goals as the general national goals, in terms of immigration, 
settlement and the creation of an exclusive Jewish economy. This self-image along with its 
organizational capacity helped it to gain coherency and strength within the Zionist movement. Because 
of the party-key system, most of the Zionist resources were hence used for the interests of the Labor 
movement. This caused rivalry, struggles and dispute with other sections of the Jewish public in 
Palestine, including the Sephardic elites (Shapiro 1971, Lissak & Horowitz 1986). The first elections 
to the national assembly were held in 1920 and revealed the political map of the Jewish colony, which 
Horowitz & Lissak (1979) interpreted by four different blocsii. Other than the bloc of the Labor 
movement, the biggest in representation, there was the ethnic bloc, the religious bloc, and the bloc of 
the center and right wing parties. This last contained the "civic circles", formed by different 
organizations of farm owners and businesspeople, representing most of Eastern European middle-class 
in the land. The "civic" organizations held conservative or liberal political-economic worldviews, 
sustaining that private capital, rather than philanthropic donations, should be the preferred and 
sustainable way to increase Jewish immigration and settlement in the land. They opposed both the party-
key and the elections mechanism, but unlike the Labor movements' affiliates, the leaderships of these 
organizations were not guided by organized ideological prism, but rather oriented their interests around 
instrumental and economic concerns (Shapira 1977). Like the parties of the ethnic bloc, most of them 
did not have representation in the European Zionist organizations (Shiloah 2003, Drori 1991), and they 
also had similar political-economic tendencies as the Sephardic notables leading the "ethnic" 
organizations. Another common interest of the two kinds of political leaders was advancing 
immigration of Jews from Arab countries: for the "civic" circles these were conceived as cheap Jewish 
labor force (Shapira 1977). They also objected the boycott the Labor movement promoted on Arab 
labor, and held economic relations with Palestinian Arab businesspeople and farm owners. The General 
Zionists party can also be considered as part of the "civic" bloc, although at this stage its representation 
was limited to the European Zionist institutions, representing within them capitalist-conservative or 
liberal political-economic tendencies. Another political movement on the right of the political map of 
the Jewish colony was the revisionist movement, led by Zeev Zabotinsky, giving voice to capitalist, 
nationalistic-belligerent political tendencies. In 1923 Zabotinsky published his famous article "The Iron 
                                                             
i The Defense.  
ii See Table II.  
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Wall". The article expressed recognition of Palestinian Arab national ambitions that the Labor 
movement was yet to express, and it also entailed a very real-politik attitude towards it. Armed with 
non-apologetic western superiority concepts, Zabotinsky claimed a violent and military clash between 
the Zionists and the indigenous Arab population was inevitable. He therefore advocated for the 
militarization of Jewish society in Palestine and asked to rely more heavily on the super powers. 
According to some authors, this feeling of inevitability of a violent clash would slowly trickle to the 
Labor movement as well, and would especially be normalized amongst the second generation born in 
Palestine (Heller 2003, Shapira 1992). Lastly, there was also a communist party established by Russian 
Jews in Palestine between 1921 and 1923. The Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) identified Zionism 
as a bourgeois movement, tightly linked with British imperialism. It was illegal throughout most of the 
British mandate period. In 1924 PCP got thrown out of the Histadrut for having consistently protested 
against its policies and its very existence. The party's ideology and the Russian institutions it was 
committed to, obliged it to attain Palestinian Arab members and leaders (Laqueur, 1953). This need led 
the PCP to purposely seek partnerships with Sephardic and other indigenous Jewish workers, which 
were seen as an inter-cultural and linguistic bridge to the Arab population (Ben Zaken 2006). 
Nonetheless, the PCP found recurring difficulty in addressing the local population, Jews or Arabs. Ben 
Zaken (2006) claimed this was due to the activists' foreign culture and manners, and their 
uncompromising ideology, that understood communism to be a universal and objective scientific truth. 
Rekhess (1988) emphasized the proletariat, atheist and democratic communist values, which did not fit 
well with the central role of religion and notable's politics in local society.  
 
 
Sephardic and Mizrahi initiatives and organizations  
For the Sephardic notables, the British Mandate signified an abrupt degradation in their official status. 
It removed them from their former leadership roles and placed them within a Jewish political system 
on whose contents and aspirations they had little say (Morag-Talmon 2000). The "ethnic bloc" generally 
represented organizations led by these the native notables or by middle-eastern immigrants who did not 
participate in the Zionist parties. These organizations were not usually included in the resource 
distribution system of the party-key, nor did their leaders get any significant positions in the "national 
institutions" of the Jewish colony. The Labor movement's modern/colonial ethos perceived the 
indigenous Jewish population as inferior, non-modern, frozen in time and unripe for leadership 
positions (Levy 1998, Noy 2014). Many of the Labor leadership considered that Sephardic Jewry in 
Palestine would require profound changes in order fit into to the advanced, modern European national 
and secular society they had envisioned. The east in general and the Sephardic and Mizrahi traditional 
lifestyle in particular, were getting marked by a new hegemonic discourse as inferior and irrelevant in 
the national Jewish society in Palestine. This had far-reaching epistemological and ontological 
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implications on this crowd's personal and collective self-image, and caused deep feelings of deprivation, 
frustration, pain and insult, which only rarely got to be expressed explicitly (Noy 2014, Haim 2000). 
Cohen (2015) suggested that there were three typical reactions of the Sephardic and Mizrahi publics 
and elites to the new political and normative systems: alienation from the Zionist movement, expressed 
in indifference and non-participation in the system; competition of the elites over seniority over the 
Jewish public in Palestine, while insisting to preserve their identity and values; and adaptation to the 
Zionist modernist perceptions, which was accompanied by attempts to change culturally to become 
more like Ashkenazim, in order to get integrated in the new system. Most Sephardic and Mizrahi public 
work throughout this decade continued to advocate for cultural integration and rapprochement of the 
European Jews to the Arabs, envisioning a process of mutual spiritual enrichment and learning. 
Jacobson & Naor's (2016) studied the "great diversity of facets and versions of rapprochement" (p.54), 
apparent in the political activity of Sephardic and Mizrahi activists. They showed the ambivalent work 
of the several individuals that were incorporated into the Jewish "national institutions" in positions that 
dealt with issues related to Palestinian Arabs. They also presented the particular Sephardic perception 
of Zionism, as it was expressed in articles of Mizrahi and Sephardic Jews in Zionist newspapers in 
Arabic, published in Palestine and in other middle-eastern countries. Jacobson & Naor claimed that 
while these newspapers are usually considered by historians as pure propaganda, since they mostly 
revolved around explaining the benefits of the Zionist movement to the Middle East, in fact the Mizrahi 
and Sephardic writers used them as a different sort of platform. Through these newspapers, the young 
educated natives expressed their identity, on the border between the Palestinian-Arab and Jewish 
national movements. They used the newspapers to express their unique interpretation of Zionism, that 
was based on a view of cultural, linguistic and political mediation between Jews and Arabs in the land 
(Jacobson & Naor 2016).  The initiative of the Histadrut of Pioneers of the Easti is another such 
ambiguous example. This organization was established as soon as 1917 by some of the Sephardic 
notables' youth, in order to promote Sephardic and Mizrahi youth joining the Zionist institutions, pay 
the Zionist taxes and spread the modern national idea amongst Sephardic and Mizrahi populations 
(Haim 1981). The organization also advocated for a Jewish-Arab cultural dialogue, and thought the 
native Jews had an important role in creating it (Jacobson & Naor 2016). Eliahu Eliachar, that would 
later lead a rival-competitive political stream which will be our main concern, also joined it. He recorded 
the organization's activity as also related to spreading Arabic among Jews and Hebrew among Arabs, 
as well as meant to reproach Arab youth in generalii.  
The line of advocacy that asked for rapprochement between Arabs and Jews was increasingly 
challenged throughout this decade. In the first years of the British Mandate in Palestine, the Sephardic 
self-representation as on the borders between the two national movements was challenged by both 
                                                             
i histadrut halutsei ha-mizrah. 
ii Eliachar (1975): 13-14. 
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movements themselves, and the Sephardic leaders had to choose and declare their loyalty to one or the 
other. Different Palestinian leaders made anti-Zionist declarations in which they excluded the native 
Jews, in order to show the political and non-essentialist nature of their opposition (Tamari 2004). The 
Mufti even sent appeals to the native Jews to join Palestinian Arab national initiatives. According to 
Jacobson & Naor, this forced the Sephardic and Mizrahi leaders to choose between a local-territorial 
identity, that was part of joint homeland for Jews, Muslims and Christians, and a Jewish ethno-national 
identity. In each such opportunity, they chose the last, and "loudly refuted" any affiliation to what was 
increasingly becoming the enemy camp (Jacobson & Naor 2016: 19-23).  In 1921 the first large-scale 
violent clash occurred between Jews and Arabs in Jaffa, when a nationalist belligerent Jewish parade 
and a nationalist-religious Muslim rally collided. The Sephardic leadership in Jaffa took initiative to 
calm the spiritsi.  
 
The main organized expression of the stream of Sephardic and Mizrahi notables that were determined 
to struggle over their lost political power was the political party the older generations of Sephardic 
notables ran to the first elections of the national assembly in 1920. Some of the Mizrahi organizations 
formed other parties and together they formed the "ethnic bloc" that succeeded in attracting the votes 
of most of the Sephardic and Mizrahi population in the land, becoming the second biggest blocii (Herzog 
1986).  The struggle of the Sephardic elites over seniority and prestige in the new colonial power 
structure centrally revolved around the mentioned vision of a different future, led by a process of mutual 
Hebrew-Arab spiritual enrichment, cultural integration and educational cooperation: this process would 
require this elite's intermediation skills, inherent in their knowledge and their tradition of mutual 
exchanges with Palestinian Arab elites (Alboher 2002, Jacobson & Naor 2016). This position often used 
the metaphor of the Sephardic Golden Age, to imply that the historical mission of Zionism was to 
establish a new Golden Age in Eretz-Israel/Palestine, creating again a synthesis between east and west 
as well as between Judaism and Islam (Eyal 2005). In 1918 a periodical was established to give stage 
to this position, with the simple and direct title of East and West. The periodical also published 
ethnographies and research about Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewries outside Palestine (Noy 2014). This 
way the periodical took part of another field of struggle over power in the growing Jewish colony, which 
started perhaps with the establishment of the Hebrew University in 1925, within which was established 
the Institute for Eastern Studiesiii. The mostly German gentlemeniv that composed this institute 
                                                             
i Chelouche (1931): 378-382.  
ii See Table II. See Table I for the population ratio between Mizrahim and Sephardim and Ashkenazim in this period.  
iii ha-makhon le-limudei ha-mizrah.  
iv The same gentlemen also founded an organization directed to encourage rapprochement with Palestinian Arabs, called 
Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace). This was a closed association that served as a debating club mainly for German and Czech 
European intellectuals (Ratzabi 1997). Like the Sephardim, many of these intellectuals saw Zionism as a movement that 
should aspire to create a new Hebraic culture based on a fusion of east and west (Gorny 1985), rather than focusing on the 
effort to establish a nation state. According to Maor (2007), they objected European colonialism, and also to nationalism as 
a colonial product, and preferred nurturing religious identities as the way for liberation from the identity the colonizer 
imposes. Like the Sephardic notables, Brit Shalom objected the Zionist ambition to construct a western enclave in the Levant.  
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established some contacts with the Sephardic intellectuals, but these last remained excluded from the 
academic establishment (Jacobson & Naor 2016). Each group of intellectuals thought the others' ways 
to produce knowledge was not a valid way to base truths (Eyal 2005, Noy 2014: 139-140). The 
epistemological field was another battlefield the Sephardic elites will eventually lose, within the 
processes of the coloniality of knowledge. Noy (2014) showed how throughout this decade the presence 
of European writers and methodologies grew in East and West, as the struggle over truth-production 
was slowly being won by the colonial mode and the modern European scientific thought it sanctifies i.  
Another component of the Sephardic struggle for dominance included strengthening international 
Sephardic networks, since much of the Labor movements' source of strength came from abroad. The 
Sephardic autonomous organizations in Palestine intended to recruit funds and organize immigration of 
Jews from Muslim countries to Eretz-Israel. This attempt was never successful in uniting and drawing 
Mizrahi and Sephardic communities and capital, neither in Eretz-Israel or in Europe, and was even less 
successful in Arab countries. In some Muslim countries Zionist activity was illegalized, and the 
traditional donations to the Sephardic community in Eretz-Israel were also withheld. Most European 
Sephardic communities preferred contributing to the mainstream Zionist movement (Haim 2000).  
 
The autonomous Sephardic organizations and newspapers formed in this period all intended to recruit 
the Sephardic and Mizrahi publics to the Zionist project through an autonomous framework. That is, 
they aspired to gain political power in order to take a significant and not marginal role in the Zionist 
movement. Two tactics can be distinguished in the activity of the stream of Sephardim that was 
struggling over Sephardic seniority in the land. One tactic involved leveraging their border-identity, 
and using its symbolic capital to claim for participation in the relations with the Arab population and 
leaderships. The other tactic tried to leverage the Sephardic traditional cultural and spiritual centrality 
within middle-eastern Jewry. According to Noy (2014: 143), East and West reflected an image of a 
Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewish sub-diaspora, versus an Ashkenazi sub-diaspora, and placed the native, 
                                                             
Some of these activists, notably Rabbi Binyamin of the moderate circle, did adopt enthusiastically an idea that came from 
within the Sephardic Community but was not very popular in it: Nissim Malul’s idea of Semitic Nationalism. This concept 
envisioned a national project that would create and be based upon a cultural symbiosis and eventual assimilation of Jews in 
the Arab population (Gorny 1985, Jacobson 2003). Notwithstanding, Herman (1989) claimed that Brit Shalom "withdrew and 
recoiled from the concrete orient", and did not attempt to integrate their thought with the Sephardim's, nor did they seek 
their help as intermediaries. By contrast, Brit Shalom was quite active in searching after partners among Palestinian Arab 
intellectuals. There was a certain rivalry between the Brit Shalom and the Sephardic elites' circles because of its members 
forming such an important part of the Institute for Eastern Studies, and the Sephardic elites were mostly excluded from it. 
An ideological source of dispute was Brit Shalom’s insistence on the Jews remaining a minority in the land, as a way to avoid 
a violent collision with the Arabs. This point was precisely where the Sephardic elites and Zionist movement were at complete 
accord, see Eliachar (1975).  
i Another possible example of this colonial subjugation can be seen in M. D. Gaon’s (1937/1982) introduction to his history 
book, that got to be canonical in the academic study of Jews in Eretz-Israel: "The book by itself is far from being scientific and 
it is directed to the people…I know some of the readers will find in this book deficiency [ta’am le-pgam], as it does not fit with 
the common scientific order…it is my duty to mention here that I am not a professional in the study of Eretz-Israel and only 
my observation of the state of the tribes of Israel in Eretz-Israel motivated me to write… a book. I am sure that this composition 
is not clean of disadvantages, mistakes, but I hold the impression myself that I filled the framework and content as well as I 
could".   
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Eretz-Israeli Sephardic and Mizrahi intellectuals at this sub-diaspora's spiritual center. Noy noted that 
by the end of the 1920s, the epistemological construction of a Sephardic and Mizrahi sub-diaspora 
began to express grander aspirations of establishing a collective identity, a unified ethnicity or a 
federation of ethnicities, led by the Sephardim in Eretz-Israel. According to Haim (2000), the way this 
aspiration should be expressed in institutional terms in Palestine was a source of dispute between 
different Sephardic streams. Some thought the Councils of the Sephardic Community (CSCs) should 
function as mother-organizations for all the other ethnic organizations. In this decade, the most 
dominant tendency to enact as such a mother–organization was to include symbolic and minimal 
representation of different ethnic organizations within the Councils, always keeping a big Sephardic 
majority (Levy 2000). The struggles over resources and power positions between Sephardic and Mizrahi 
communities led sometimes to organizational splits, which at times were also induced purposely by 
factors within the Labor movement (Haim 2000). The patronizing claim of the Sephardim to represent 
the other Mizrahi organizations was in fact not very different from the Labor movement's attempts to 
represent all the Jews in Palestine. Like the Labor movement did to them, some Sephardim claimed that 
the Mizrahi Jews were not ripe for leadership, and also blamed their autonomous organization in causing 
damaging splits, just like the Labor movement claimed about the Sephardic organizations (Levy 2000). 
As elites go, the Sephardic notables held an elitist stature, which for some also relied on the prestigious 
value of a unique Sephardic identity. Some researchers claimed this posture was the central factor 
undermining their political attempts to gain power (Levy 2000, Peretz 2000). By the second elections 
to the national assembly in 1925 they had lost many of their votesi. This period saw Jewish immigration 
of both European Zionists and of Mizrahi Jews, but Ashkenazim already composed the majority of Jews 
in the landii. The dominance of the Labor movement over Jewish life in Palestine allowed its parties to 
gain more strength in general, and among the non-Ashkenazi population as well (Herzog 1986, Cohen 
2015, Alboher 2002).  
 
As noted, during the 1920s The Zionist "national institutions" were focused on the active construction 
of the promised "national home", institutionally, politically, by land purchase and by increased 
immigration, in order to tilt the demography to the Jews' favor. The Zionist leadership assumed that 
when all conditions are ripe for a Jewish majority state to be founded, the British will allow it to happen 
(Shapira 2012, Kimmerling 2006). The Arab opposition to these ambitions was also growing in 
strength. A central source and symbol of the growing national dispute revolved around Haram el 
Sharif/Har Habait, a holy site located in Jerusalem which holds great importance to both religions. 
Some historians consider Palestinian national identity to be anchored in the Palestinian Arabs' role as 
the Muslim protectors of Jerusalem from foreign and particularly European influences, a role inspired 
                                                             
i See table II. 
ii See table I.  
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by the historic rivalry between the crusaders and Muslims (Gorny 1985). In August of 1929 the rising 
tensions between the national movements was brought to a violent peak around a recurring dispute in 
this holy site. A killing spree spread to different locations in the country, and had a total of nearly 300 
casualties, including massacres of native Jews in the cities of Hebron and Safed (Pappe 2006). 
Historians agree that these events were a decisive moment in the development of both national 
movements and in the relations between them (Campos 2007, Sela 1989, Cohen 2013). From this point 
the economies, societies and housing of the two populations started to separate from one another, 
personal mistrust and negative stereotypes intensified and militaristic attitudes in both societies got 
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The violent events of 1929 clarified the common identity and fate of the native Jews and the Zionist 
settlers (Sela 1989). Cohen claimed that Palestinian Arabs recognized the potential of Jewish unity that 
had not yet been completely fulfilled by the Zionist movement, and this enforced its practical 
implementation. Political alliances between Jewish and Arab notables became an impossibility, and the 
Sephardic and Mizrahi discourse of a shared homeland got to be understood as farfetched (Cohen 2013). 
While many of Sephardic and Mizrahi notables saw the events as a proof of the dire need for their 
intermediary skills, the nature of this claim changed. The advocacy for Jewish-Arab spiritual and 
cultural integration was reduced, and East and West stopped publishing studies about Arab culture 
(Alboher 2002, Noy 2014).  
In the inner politics of the Jewish colony, the 1929 events emphasized the importance of security and 
political issues and reduced the weight of social and economic disputes. The Sephardic political party 
weakened significantly and some of the notables joined other Zionist parties which opposed the Labor 
movement (Haim 2000, Alboher 2002). The political weakening encouraged the notables to threat to 
quit the "national institutions" altogether, which in turn allowed them to achieve a special arrangement 
for the 1931 election to the national assembly. This agreement made for a separate voting mechanism 
for the Sephardic and Mizrahi public, who elected a previously agreed upon number of representatives. 
However, this agreement eventually encouraged the creation of Sephardic lists in support of other 
parties, most notably the revisionist party (Herzog 1986).  As for the "civic" circles, in this decade their 
organizations ceased to advance their socio-economic agenda within the "national institutions". Their 
interests, basically aimed at economical stability, were sought directly from the British authorities, 
bypassing hence the Zionist organizations. The General Zionists got formed as a party in 1931 and 
encouraged the "civic" activists to join it (Shiloah 2003).  
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In this decade the Labor movement was gaining more centrality than ever before. In 1930 the political 
party of Mapaii was established. As of this decade and until 1977, Mapai dominated both the European 
and Eretz-Israeli "national institutions" as well as the Histadrut. This way, Mapai was established as 
"the national center" (Lissak & Horowitz 1986), and the party's mechanisms functioned as the central 
apparatus handling most aspects of the Jewish colony in Palestine. The Jewish Agency was established 
as another piece in the Mapai-dominated apparatus, performing as the World Zionist Organization's 
executive arm in Palestine (Kimmerling 2006). Shapiro (1993) referred to Mapai's role in the colony as 
a "dominant party system", in order to emphasize the lack of essential democracy it constructed in the 
colony's political system. Despite the diversity of political ideologies, parties, workers' unions and 
affiliations, and despite holding periodical elections, the entire system for allocating resources was 
designed and controlled by the one central mechanism of Mapai, headed by the dominant David Ben 
Gurion.    
One of Ben Gurion's conclusions from the 1929 events was recognizing officially for the first time the 
existence of a Palestinian national movement (Sela 1989), and the need to address the question of its 
opposition to Zionism. For the first time he held meetings with Arab nationalist leaders (Shlaim 2000). 
Also for the first time, an official Zionist organization was established with the participation of several 
Sephardic and Mizrahi leaders: The United Bureau was formed, in order to examine options for 
rapprochement with the Palestinian Arabs (Jacobson & Naor 2016). This short lived organization 
recommended various political and economic steps that could ease the national tensions, such as 
different socio-economic cooperative projects, establishing a regime based on bi-national 
representation, stop advocating publicly for Hebrew Labor and support the Palestinian-Arab opposition 
to the Mufti. None of these recommendations was implementedii, and no real change occurred in the 
Zionist movements' policies towards the Palestinian Arab leaders or population, except for 
strengthening the existing policies. These basically included distribution of pro-Zionist propaganda, 
gathering intelligence information, and bribing different Arab factors to display support to the Zionist 
project (Sela 1989).  The pivotal issue for discordance between the national movements was the 
question of limiting or advancing Jewish immigration, maintaining the Jewish population as a minority 
or pushing for it to become the majority. In this decade, the Zionist ambition to advance Jewish 
immigration gained the urgency of a security matter because of the rise of Nazism in Germany. This 
brought such waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine that by 1936 the Jewish population had doubled 
itself (Shapira 2012).  
 
Throughout the 1930s the described modern/colonial processes that impoverished the Muslim rural 
population reached a peak, with 30% of Palestinian Arab rural population made landless. Inequality 
                                                             
i Acronym for mifleget po'alei eretz-israel: Eretz-Israeli Workers Party. 
ii Eliachar (1975): 24-25.     
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was rising between Jews and Arabs and between Arab cities and periphery. Some of the new Palestinian 
Arab proletariat found a leader in Islamist Azz ad-Din el Quassam, who in 1931 started organizing 
secret militias that attacked Jews and British. In 1932 a significant Pan-Arab party was established, Al-
Istiqlal, which by 1933 was holding large and violent demonstrations against British presence (Sela 
1989). The Hagana got restructured and improved its military infrastructure (Perliger & Weinberg 
2003). In 1932 Zabotinsky formed the Etzel, a right wing national militaristic organization that 
supported militaristic activism and rejected the Hagana's merely defensive attitude and its cooperation 
with the British regime (Shapira 2012). In mid 1930s the revisionist party quit the "national institutions" 
and formed a new international organization of its own.   
 
In 1936 more violent outbreaks occurred, along with a long Palestinian Arab general strike, taken 
against both Zionist and British colonization. In local historiography, these events are referred to as The 
Great Arab Revolt, and many historians see it as a constitutive step in the formation of Palestinian Arab 
national identity. The events succeeded to recruit an unprecedented level of political solidarity within 
Palestinian Arab society, establishing cooperation between opposing sides of the urban elites and 
leaderships and with the rural population (Kimmerling & Migdal 1999). The Great Revolt was a real 
popular grassroots revolt, to which the leadership joined so as not to be left behind (Yazbak 2000). It 
was directed mainly against the British but included attacks against innocent Jews. In response to the 
revolt, Britain nominated the Peel Commission in 1936 to investigate the situation in Palestine and 
suggest solutions. In 1937 its conclusions were published: this was the first time the idea to divide the 
land between the national movements was suggested.  The committee suggested to establish a small 
Jewish state and to annex the rest of the territory to Transjordan. This was unthinkable for both sides, 
though the Zionist leadership ended up tactically declaring its consent (Shapira 2012). The revolt 
resumed in its course, but the united Palestinian Arab front ended up disintegrating into a civil war. 
Urban notables were attacked and killed, over political stances as well as over old resentments and 
rivalries, and many of them escaped the country (Sela 1997). In 1937 the British expelled the Mufti and 
by 1939 they were able to enforce an end the Arab Revolt.  
The Hagana kept a defensive position throughout the revolt, but the revisionist Etzel militia took an 
offensive line and attacked innocent Palestinian Arabs (Perliger & Weinberg 2003). Many of the "civic" 
organizations, as well as Sephardic and Mizrahi notables, supported the offensive line, seeing pure 
defense as an unwise demonstration of weakness. This did not necessarily lead to affiliation with the 
revisionist movement and its uncooperative line with the "national institutions" (Shiloah 2003). In fact, 
during the time of the revolt, many of the Sephardic notables asked the "national" leadership to hand 
them the authority to handle Arab-related politics (Alboher 2002). Some in the Sephardic and "civic" 
circles transferred weapons to Palestinian Arab notables that opposed the Mufti, in accordance with the 
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Haganai. In this decade the intelligence services of the Labor movement got consolidated, through some 
native notables and youth. Some used their social networks with Palestinian Arabs to gather 
intelligence, pass it to the Jewish Agency and the Hagana and advise them how to act. This was a direct 
continuation of their notable's politics, both in practical terms and in the meaning they endowed their 
actions, conceiving of themselves as professional advisors and mediators (Eyal 2005). Sephardic and 
Mizrahi youth, especially from mixed cities and borderline neighborhoods, also conformed much of the 
base for intelligence. For some of this youth this was also as a path for integrating Zionist identity with 
their own: "young men and women who grew up along the border between two cultures and two 
communities were hence recruited to cross the border to commit acts of murder and sabotage" 
(Jacobson & Naor 2016: 158).  
As happened in the United Bureau and in the security apparatus, also on the level of civil initiatives this 
decade brought a new level of cooperation between Ashkenazi and Sephardic elites, with the 
establishment of Kedma Mizrahaii in 1936. Some of the Sephardic notables cooperated with the German 
intellectuals mentioned earlier in order to found this association, which aimed at promoting cultural, 
social and economic cooperation of Jews and Arabs. Kedma Mizraha's main activity might be 
considered a type of Zionist propaganda, since it dealt with writing and publishing articles that 
distributed information in Arab countries about the Jews' doings on the land. The declared agenda 
however also asked to influence the Zionist institutions to be actively involved in negotiations, and 
make some compromises in order to reach understandings with Palestinian Arab leaders. This 
association had members from all across the political spectrum and from such a diversity of 
backgrounds, that it was practically impossible to formulate a platform or decide upon a strategy. Mapai 
was exerting heavy pressures and the question of cooperation with it was a cause for dispute, which 
eventually brought the associations' dissolvent in 1938 (Rolef 1989, Gorny 1985, Heller 2003). In these 
two years of activity different individuals within the association promoted different projects: An Arabic 
newspaper, a joint Jewish-Arab publisher and establishment of Kedma Mizraha offices in Jewish 
communities in Arab countries. Excluding Morocco, in most of these countries the Zionist organizations 
that had been established in the previous decades dissolved throughout the 1930s for various reasons. 
Among these reasons were the Arab states' prohibition of Zionist activity, and the lack of support from 
the Zionist movement itself (Abitbol 1989, Tubi 1986). The events in Palestine were increasingly 
influencing the anti-colonial Arab national discourses in the Middle East. Despite the liberal and 
democratic logics that were the basis of most Arab national movements, throughout the 1930s the 
movements started to increasingly identify their country's Jewish population with the Zionist movement 
(Behar 2007).  
 
                                                             
i Eliachar (1975): 66-70.   
ii Roughly, “Orient Eastwards”.  
122
 
The growing Anti-Zionist tendencies in Arab countries continued to hurt the income of the Sephardic 
institutions, and the local and community-oriented Sephardic organizations were unable to recruit 
resources, affiliates and leaderships to build the independent organizational and bureaucratic systems 
they had aspired to construct. Therefore, they did not successfully compete within the Zionist party 
systems. They became dependant on this system and yet were excluded from its mechanisms of 
distribution of immigration certificates, positions and lands. Few Sephardim got incorporated in Mapai 
and in other Labor parties, but usually not in senior positions (Haim 2000, Morag-Talmon 2000). The 
exception occurred in this decade, when Eliahu Sasson became responsible over the Hagana's 
intelligence network (Eyal 2005). The Sephardim in the Labor movement were often used for promoting 
the Labor parties' popularity within Mizrahi and Sephardic publics. That is, they served as 
representatives of their ethnic group inside these parties, but without being able to advance its own 
interest. As this last need was left unanswered, a Sephardic and Mizrahi workers' union was established 
in 1936. This was a unique organization within the Sephardic and Mizrahi public because it did not rely 
on the notables and held secular-oriented social and cultural events. It held militant and oppositional 
protests against the Mapai controlled mechanism, and even gained partial success in entering the party-
key (Haim 2000).  
 
The basic position of the Great Arab Revolt, as most of the Palestinian Arab protests against Zionism 
in the previous decade, recognized Zionism as an integral part of British imperialism. For communist 
Jews in Palestine, this caused some incoherencies which in turn caused for inner tensions within the 
PCP. The Jewish communists agreed with the imperialist interpretation of the Zionist project (Maor 
2007), but themselves were Jewish settlers in the land, though they were drawn to it by other factors 
and not by Zionist ideology. The PCP generally supported the Palestinian Arab opposition to British 
imperialism, which in this decade caused it to reduce greatly its activity within the Jewish public, and 
start addressing Palestinian Arab publics more vigorously (Rubinstein 1985, Ben Zaken 2006). Mizrahi 
and Sephardic Jews were sought by the PCP, as they were considered to contribute to the Arabization 
of the party, a process demanded from the PCP by Moscow (Ben Zaken 2006). As mentioned, they 
were considered as potential mediators between the party's Ashkenazi members, its Arab members, and 
native Jewish workers. Jacobson & Naor (2016) suggested that the presence of natives in the party also 
helped Jewish PCP members resolve the contradiction between their anti-colonial activity and their 
being part of the colonial process itself. Throughout the Great Revolt the PCP supported the Palestinian 
Arab national movement and participated actively in it. According to Rubinstein (1985), since the Jews 
could not participate in guerilla warfare against other Jews, the leadership decided in 1936 to establish 
a separate Jewish Section. The aftermath of the Revolt weakened the party significantly: many Arabs 
were incarcerated, many Jews had left, many former Jewish leaders had already been expelled by the 
British, or imprisoned, exiled or executed in Moscow in the early 1930s. When the revolt ended in 1939 
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the Jewish Section was cancelled, though some Jews continued working together in two different 
communist groups, separately from PCP (Rubinstein 1985).   
 
In 1939, with World War II breathing down their necks, the British suppressed the Arab Revolt 
forcefully, prohibited Jewish immigration entirely and announced supporting the right for majority 
based independence. Since Muslims were still a substantial majority in the land, this was in fact the 
long desired triumph for the Palestinian Arab national movement. However, this achievement was 
accomplished for a socially and institutionally broken society without present leadership. Other 
significant effects of the Great Arab Revolt were designing a pattern for the Arab countries' intervention 
in local politics (Sela 1997), segregating further Jewish and Arab economic activities, as had been 
advocated by both national leaderships (Pappe 2006), and strengthening Zionist militarism, letting an 
offensive ethos take the place of the defensive ethos it held until then (Shapira 1992). Gorny (1985) 
sums up the decade of the 1930s as a time of political achievements for the Palestinian Arabs but without 
advancement in forming an organized national force, whereas the Jews saw political losses but advanced 




Towards Partition of the Land                                                                                              1939-1948 
 
During World War II Palestine served as a British military base, which created various employment 
opportunities and helped the economic and industrial development of the country (Pappe 2006). 
Economic cooperation between Jews and Arabs in business, trade and employment patterns resumed 
some of its course, even though it had reduced and went less smoothly than before (Asaf 1970, Shapira 
1977). The Mufti, from his exile, supported the Axis powers, and was making diplomatic relationships 
within Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. He remained a popular leader also from exile, though naturally 
other leaders were also getting stronger (Kabha 2010, Kimmerling & Migdal 1999). The armed national 
struggle of both movements was halted during the World Wari (Asaf 1970).  
Civil initiatives for rapprochement continued to get formulated.  In 1939 the same intellectuals and 
activists from Kedma Mizraha established the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and 
Cooperation (hereinafter: The League), along with some PCP members and some from the leftist edges 
of the Labor movement (Heller 2003). The League had sub-committees for studying the question of 
relations with Arabs in politics, economics, culture and education, social work and health. They 
published their stands and even detailed plans. Heller claimed that the League's heterogeneous base and 
mainstream affiliations made it succeed in gaining a certain momentum. The members presented their 
                                                             
i Within the Jews this statement is not precise, since the Lehi split from the Etzel in 1940, in order to resume the armed 
activity against the British, which the Etzel had halted during the war. 
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ideas within Jewish settlements, organized Arab-Jewish meetings for professionals, and created Jewish-
Arab leisure events like a "Peace Party" and an "East Week". In 1942 some of the more radical 
Ashkenazi intellectuals quit the League to create Ihudi (Heller 2003). Ihud declared its will to participate 
in the Semitic revival process in the Middle East, and meant to work against the creation of a Jewish-
majority state (Gorny 1985). The establishment of Ihud drew much criticism of Sephardic notables. 
Their critiques blamed the European intellectuals in detachment from the land, and for holding baseless 
romantic and naïve views about Arabsii. In some of this critique there was also reference to the entire 
Ashkenazi left, the communists and the more radical branches of the Labor movementiii. This critique 
entailed one of the last expressions of the Sephardic privileged position for finding a solution based on 
mutual respect to Arab-Jewish animosity. It was published in Hed Hamizrahiv, a journal founded in 
1942 as Hamizrahv, edited and funded by Eliahu Eliacharvi. The journal served as stage for different 
issues of Sephardic and Mizrahi public interests (Meyuhas-Ginio 2014). By the way it advanced 
Eliachar's political position (Herzog 1986). Unlike East and West, that ceased issuing already in 1931, 
this publication did not usually deal explicitly with Jewish-Arab relations. In the first issue, the editors 
already admitted that "the road for peace and understanding has been blocked from us, and we do not 
know how to reach it"vii. Different projects some notables were attempting to promote for the sake of 
mutual respect and appreciation were not supported by the "national institutions"viii. The results of the 
Great Revolt left the Sephardic notables without viable political partners within the Palestinian Arab 
populationix. The notion of an inevitable violent clash between the two peoples was becoming 
established within most of the Jewish population in the land, including the native elites (Heller 2003). 
According to Levy (1998), by 1944 their advocacy about Jewish-Arab relations nearly disappeared. 
This was also due to the growing importance of inner Sephardic politics. Different Council of Sephardic 
Communities (CSCs) in different localities were opened and renewed since early 1940s, responding to 
the needs of the waves of immigration of middle-eastern Jews from the previous decades.  The Council 
of Sephardic Community of Jerusalem (CSCJ) suffered inner rivalries between Eliahu Eliachar and 
David Abulafia which weakened its centralized authority. The Tel Aviv CSC was renewed and headed 
by Bechor Chetrit, and it grew and gained centrality among the Sephardic elites, also thanks to its good 
relationship with Mapai (Levy 1998). Eliachar and Chetrit battled over power within an attempt to 
construct a National Union of the CSCs, and the union was never able to become activate or implement 
                                                             
i Unison.  
ii Eliahu Eliachar, "Jews and Arabs" (yehudim ve-'aravim), Hamizrah 11.9.42, p. 3; Meir Dahan, "Jews and Arabs- Slogan and 
Reality" (yehudim ve-'aravim: sisma ve-metsiut), Hamizrah, 23.10.42, p. 3; Yosef Y. Rivlin, "Jews and Arabs" (yehudim ve-
'aravim), Hamizrah, 29.9.42, p. 3.  
iii Yosef Rivlin, "Jews and Arabs" (yehudim ve-'aravim), Hamizrah, 6.11.42, p. 3.  
iv Eco of the East. 
v The East 
vi Eliachar (1980): 490-491.  
vii "Our Stage" (bamatenu), Hamizrah, 10.6.42.  
viii E.g. in Derri- Weksler (2013). 
ix See Eliachar (1975): 82-95, 108-110.  
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any policy in practice (Haim 2000). The dispute entailed inter-generational tensions and different 
political-economic ideologies, but revolved mainly around the desired attitude towards the different 
Zionist institutions, that is, towards the Labor movement and particularly towards Mapai (Herzog 1986: 
92). The dispute was over the best way to gain representation within the "national institutions" in order 
to affect the issues of the Sephardic and Mizrahi public. The Tel Aviv and Abulafia streams were 
characterized by a pragmatic attitude (Levy 1998), which was based upon a certain conviction in the 
superiority of the modern Zionist values: they sought incorporation by assimilation to the Labor 
movement. The Eliachar-led stream took an oppositional position, attacking the institutions for 
discriminating and depriving the Sephardic public from representation and attempting to erase the 
particular Sephardic identity and heritage. This stream was at friendly terms with the revisionist 
movement, since the revisionists did not express the same ideas about the need for Sephardim to 
assimilate in Ashkenazi identity, had always been in favor of Mizrahi immigration and also held a 
capitalist orientation (Levy 1998).  Also, they coincided in that the militant revisionist stream usually 
interpreted Sephardic identity as encompassing the other Mizrahi publics as well (Haim 2000: 168). As 
mentioned earlier, non-Sephardic Mizrahi notables and communities had a changing relationship and 
position within the CSCs. Since the Tel Aviv and Haifa CSCs were more opened to receive Mizrahim 
into their lines (Herzog 1986), the Jerusalem CSC also became more flexible with its restrictions in 
these yearsi. Nonetheless, it was only in 1947, when a new CSC was elected in Jerusalem with Eliahu 
Eliachar at its head, that the elected Council got a majority of non-Sephardic members, to prove that 
"the era of discrimination is over"ii. The internal Sephardic rivalries caused stagnation in the activity of 
the Sephardic organizations through most of this period. The militant Sephardic and Mizrahi workers' 
union was absorbed into Mapai in 1946 (Haim 2000).  
 
After the German invasion to Soviet territory in 1941, the common enemy drew the PCP closer than 
ever before to the Jewish public in Palestine. Both the communist and revisionist anti-British attitude 
changed in the years of war, and members even joined the British army. The PCP got legalized in 1942. 
In 1943 the Soviet internationalist body of the Comintern ceased working, consequentially leading to 
the demise of the internationalist structure of PCP, and the party split into its national Arab and Jewish 
components (Rubinstein 1985). Some of the communist Palestinian Arabs joined a recently born 
nationalist, socialist and democratic organization called the National Liberation League (NLL). 
According to Ben Zaken, the establishment of the NLL gave the Jewish communists legitimacy to 
identify with their own nationality, and some Jews established Zionist-communist civil organizations, 
                                                             
i It removed the regulations that had restricted non-Sephardic representation in the committee to a third of the members. 
They also lowered the tax that had to be paid in order to participate in the elections, but raised the tax required for the right 
to get elected. This helped maintain their position of power, as the Sephardic population was usually better off than most of 
the rest of the Mizrahim (Levy 1998). See: Letter from the CSCJ to Jerusalem Region Governor, 19.12.43, CSCJA container 
6329 file 1432. 
ii Avraham Elmalih in Haim (2000): 171.  
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while others established the Eretz-Israeli Communist Party (ECP) in 1944, that took a rather non-Zionist 
line. The ECP supported for the first time Jewish immigration, a line that after the end of the war, and 
getting the information about the Jewish Holocaust in Europe, the NLL also agree on (Ben Zaken 2006). 
This brought to its expulsion from the Palestinian Arab national institution in 1946 (Rubinstein 1985). 
 
The World War also affected Jewries in Arab countries, most directly in North Africa, where Nazi and 
Italian Fascist regimes spread. In some countries discriminatory laws were made against Jews. These 
were also made in middle-eastern countries that were not conquered by the Axis powers but were 
affected by the tensions in Palestine between Jews and Arabs. This hostile atmosphere culminated in 
lethal, popular riots against Jews in Iraq in 1941 and in Libya in 1945. For the first time since the dawn 
of Zionism, there seemed to be a real threat to the fate of middle-eastern Jewries, the kind of threat that 
until then was reserved for European Jewries. The magnitude of the danger European Jewry was facing 
in these years, the threat of its entire annihilation, was already made known in Palestine by early 1940s. 
Since the Jews in the Soviet Union were not allowed to immigrate, the Zionist movement was presented 
with a serious problem to its ambition to achieve a Jewish majority in Palestine by immigration. In 1942 
Ben Gurion presented a plan of immigration of the approximately one million Jews from Muslim 
countries (Meir-Glitzenstein 2009). The Zionist movement then started to act seriously in these 
countries for the first time, dispersing Zionist materials and organizing training for immigration 
purposes (Abitbol 1989, Winberg 1989).  In North Africa, the agents carrying out these missions were 
often Jewish soldiers in the British army (Abitbol 1989). In Iraq and Iran, they were often employees 
of Solel-Boneh, a big Zionist construction company contracted by the British for different tasks in these 
areas.  The first substantial contacts between the Zionist movement and middle-eastern Jewries provide 
very concrete examples of how Zionism intertwined Jewish nationalism and European colonialism in 
the Middle East, a process Shenhav (2006) discusses in detail regarding Iraq. Another process set in 
motion in face of the near extermination of European Jewry, was the growing involvement of ultra-
orthodox institutions within North African Jewry, once the war was over. This was mainly expressed 
in increasing the amount of youth from these countries that got sent to their toranic academies abroad 
(Lupo 2004). Some ultra-orthodox toranic academies depended on the recruit of these Jewries for their 
very survival (Horowitz 2000).  
Once the war was over, decolonization processes in the Middle East were set in motion. These processes 
usually left the Jews excluded from the Arab national movements (Abitbol 1989). If in previous decades 
the identification between Jews and Zionism was mainly a matter of discourse some political 
movements had been expressing, in these years this identification became practical, and was induced 
by Zionist agents and governmental forces and by different kinds of cooperation between the two. The 
sociologist Moshe Behar suggested that there was a structural alliance between Zionism and the Arab 
national regimes, the results of which can outline a claim that Zionism contributed to the formulation 
of Arab nationalism along xenophobic lines, nurturing elements of religious affiliation rather than 
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democratic and civil principles (Behar 2007). In Iraq, for instance, this occurred despite the fact that 
Jews there were very much "Arabized" and part of the local culture (Bashkin 2017). There, as well as 
in Egypt and Syria, Jews conformed a substantial part of the communist movements, which had been 
holding anti-Zionist positions until this time (Ben Zaken 2006, Budeiri 1979, Abitbol 1989, Shenhav 
2006).  
 
When the war ended, The Etzel resumed the armed struggle against the British, even cooperating 
militarily with Palestinian Arabs against the common enemy (Asaf 1970: 115). Sephardic and Mizrahi 
youths were prominent in this decade in both the Etzel and its splinter organization, the Lehi. Another 
military organization of the Labor movement, the Palmah, opened a unit of young immigrants from 
middle-eastern countries whose role was to collect intelligence and perform other tasks that required 
them to disguise as Arabs. By the end of this period, the intelligence network formed by native notables 
in the previous decade got more institutionalized, and the notables became informants, rather than the 
role of mediators and advisors that they performed previously. Their evaluation and advice was no 
longer requested, but only the information they could achieve by their networks of informers within the 
Palestinian Arab population (Eyal 2005).  
Jacobson & Naor (2016) researched the many different aspects of the border location of Sephardic and 
Mizrahi Jews between the two national movements along the period of the British Mandate in Palestine. 
In their conclusions, they asked to challenge the dichotomy between the Sephardic and Mizrahi role as 
cultural and spiritual mediators and their role as political spies. They claim that for them, there was an 
inevitably close link between the cultural and educational activities that asked to bridge between Jews 
and Arabs, and the political and security objectives that de facto crossed these bridges for the benefits 
of the Jewish colony. In their particular and unique position within the Zionist movement as non-
colonizers, natives of the land, there was a great diversity of facets and versions of the call for Jewish-
Arab rapprochement. Since their Jewish identities contained also Arab components, the different types 
of activities did not necessarily contradict each other, even if that is hard to perceive within 
modern/colonial dichotomist perceptions. For instance, the importance of learning the Arabic language 
was emphasized at the same time both as a political tool and for purposes of a cultural bridge, with no 
seeming contradiction between the two (Jacobson & Naor 2016).  
 
 
The international institution of the Arab League was established in 1945, without granting direct 
representation to the Palestinian Mufti (Pappe 2006). This helped to expropriated the Zionist-Palestinian 
dispute from the hands of the Palestinian Arab national movement. It became a matter of international 
politics, involving the western superpowers and the Arab states (Pappe 2006).  In 1947 the UK passed 
the mandate of Palestine to the nascent United Nations. One of the very first actions of the UN was to 
appoint a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to decide over the fate of the land. While 
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Palestinian Arab national leadership refused to participate in the committee's procedures, different 
streams within the Jewish population got to present to it their political understanding of the situation, 
including Eliahu Eliachar and other Sephardic notables, who presented their stances in name of the 
Sephardic public. Eliachar mainly expressed concern for resolving the situation of Jewries in Muslim 
countries. UNSCOP's resolution suggested dividing the landi. Since the Soviet Union agreed to the 
UNSCOP partition plan, the Palestinian Arab NLL also ended up accepting it. That caused it further 
friction with the Palestinian Arab public and leadership. Eventually the Jewish and Arab communist 
parties united to form the Israeli Communist Party in October of 1948. Though this union was seen as 
a success of the communist principle of internationalism, the ICP's leadership was principally Jewish 
again, as in the 1920s (Ben Zaken 2006).  
 
The UNSCOP partition plan was voted on in the UN by the 57 member countries in November of 1947 
and was accepted by a majority. Consequently, a war erupted between the two national movements in 
Palestine. On May of 1948 Israel declared its independence, and then a war with the surrounding Arab 
armies broke out, which ended in 1949 by armistice agreements. These agreements again drew new 
borders to the territoryii. The war had most detrimental results for the Palestinian Arab population: by 
January 1949 some 800,000 escaped or were expelled from their homes. These events, like the land 








                                                             
i See map II. 









INTRODUCTION: THE FIRST YEARS OF STATEHOOD  
 
 
The 1948 war resulted in the creation of a brand new geo-political entity in most of the territory 
of mandatory Palestinei. This was accompanied by the disintegration of all Palestinian Arab 
social and political structures. The Palestinians suffered many casualties, some by war, others 
by civilian massacres, and 75% of the population was displaced, dispersed into dozens of 
refugee camps in the surrounding Arab countries, including in the parts of Palestine that were 
conquered in the war by Jordanii and Egypt. From this point on, these war refugees would 
depend on the specific country's policies and politics to determine their fate, and on UN aid to 
supply their basic needs and future opportunities (Morris 2000). The defeat of the combined 
forces of the Arab countries left their publics incredulous and their leaders divided. The Arab 
League declared an economic boycott on Israel, and declared Israel's responsibility over the 
refugee problem; and that it this problem could be solved only with their return to their land. 
This was in line with the UN resolution on the matter, though the UN allowed Israel to pay 
compensations instead of repatriation (Shlaim 2000). Israel could agree to pay compensations 
to individuals but negated entirely the possibility of refugees' return, seeing them as potential 
enemies, that will consist of a security problem to the new state (Fried 2018). The Arab League 
required from the refugees' host countries not to give them citizenship, so as to maintain their 
claim for return; this was convenient enough for the different regimes that for various reasons 
could not sponsor responsibility for so many misallocated people. Jordan was the only country 
to grant some Palestinian refugees citizenship, officially annexing the West Bank in 1950, 
though this annexation did not gain international recognition. The Gaza strip was left under 
Egyptian hands (Shlaim 2000, Pappe 2006).  
From January to September of 1949 Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt held negotiations over 
the armistice agreements with Israel. Throughout and after the talks, the different countries 
conveyed offers for longstanding peace but Israel was unwilling to negotiate its newly achieved 
borders, the return of any significant amount of refugees or the status of Jerusalem. According 
to the 1947 UN Partition Plan, Jerusalem would have been an international area under UN 
mandate, due to its historical and sacred value for the three religions; Israel however wanted it 
                                                             
i See map III. 
ii In March 1948 Transjordan changed its name to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.  
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as its capital (Shlaim 2000). This was despite much US and UN pressure; in fact, Israel only 
conceded to declare its consideration to negotiate these points for just long enough to get 
accepted as a member of the UN (Pappe 2006). However, neither the surrounding countries nor 
the Palestinian refugees saw the armistice borders as final, and Israel's use of the land and water 
in its borders was perceived illegal by these parties (Morris 1997). The Arab countries promised 
their publics a second round of warfare. The cause of liberating Palestine from the obtrusive 
Zionist state gained a stronghold in popular Arab public opinion as a mobilizing force (Shapira 
2012, Pappe 2006, Shlaim 2000). As soon as the war ended, Palestinian refugees tried to 
infiltrate the new borders and return to their villages and their homes, reunite with family 
members left behind, harvest their crops, attain their belongings or take revenge in form of 
murder or theft. Israel took an uncompromising military stance against these infiltrations, which 
soon escalated to a reprisal policy, i.e. sending troops to infiltrate the borders and murder 
civilians on the other side. This deteriorated and increased the tensions not only with the 
refugees, who were getting better armed and organized in return, but also with Israel's relation 
with the surrounding Arab countries (Morris 2000).  
 
150,000 Palestinian Arabs remained inside the Israeli state borders. They were residents of 
towns or villages that did not fight against the Israeli army, within a broad range of degrees of 
cooperation or resistance (Cohen 2006). About 15% of those were internal refugees, displaced 
from their homes and villages under a great diversity of circumstances, and could not usually 
get their properties back (Cohen 2000). All the Palestinian Arab population inside Israel was 
considered hostile and dangerous to the state (Fried 2018). They received an Israeli citizenship 
but a military regime ruled over their villages and towns, restricting harshly this population's 
freedom of movement and endangering other rights as well. A series of laws were made to 
ensure Jewish privileges in the state, mainly in terms of land ownership and citizenship-
obtaining process (Pappe 2006). Since most of the remaining Palestinian Arab population was 
rural, the state's expropriations of lands vaulted up their levels of unemployment (Pappe 2011). 
Under the military regime, political cooperation with the authorities was rewarded with perks 
and privileges. Israel slowly constructed an extensive network of political cooperators and 
submerged spies within this society (Cohen 2006). Since this network required communicating 
in Arabic, much of the military regime mechanism relied on recruits of Mizrahi and Sephardic 
youth (Eyal 2005).  
 
As for Jewish-Israeli society, and for many Jews abroad, the establishment of a Jewish nation-
state evoked an enthusiastic history-making sensation. Political leaders and the public alike saw 
the results of the 1948 war as miraculous, having achieved the establishment of the Jewish state 
with a larger territory than originally assigned by the UN and with so many hostile Palestinian 
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Arabs made absent. Amidst the war Israel did not only declare independence but also started 
establishing government offices (Segev 1984). A provisional government ruled during the war 
and until the first elections that were held right on its end. The first elected government coalition 
did not last long and another elections was held by 1951.  
The political map of the new state was still dominated by Mapai that was the biggest party of 
the Labor movement. On the on its right edges of the Labor movement was the socialist-
religious Zionist party, Hapo'el Hamizrahii, and on its leftist edges was Mapamii, that 
represented a socialist-Zionist stream affiliated ideologically to the USSR, and consisted of the 
principal opposition to Mapai until 1955. Other political parties that held varying degrees of 
opposition to Mapai were the new revisionist party Herutiii, the liberal General Zionists party, 
the ultra-orthodox non-Zionist Agudat Israel,  and the non-Zionist Israeli Communist party. 
Despite the many ideologies and backgrounds this political map presents, all these parties had 
one thing in common: their Ashkenazi dominance. When Mizrahim or Sephardim were active 
members of one of these parties, it was usually in a subjugated manner, their incorporation 
mainly aimed at attracting Sephardic and Mizrahi votes, and not in order to incorporate their 
actual contribution to the party. The Ashkenazi dominance of the Israeli political parties was 
also related to the fact that they had an international structure and received western resources. 
Most of these parties also had representation in the (European) World Zionist Organization 
(Magil 1951). Hereinafter, these political parties, except for Agudat Israel and the ICPiv, will 
be referred to as Zionist parties, a term which will encompass also their Ashkenazi hegemony. 
The establishment of the state revealed the tensions between the Zionist movement, that 
represented particular groups, and the State and the Nation, which are supposed to represent 
broader interests of their own (Magil 1951). For this reason, once the main goal of the Zionist 
movement was fulfilled, and the Jewish state was established, prime minister David Ben Gurion 
asked to subjugate and incorporate the Zionist movements' mechanisms to the state and gain 
certain autonomy from world Jewry by implementing a principal of 'statism' (Kimmerling 
1993). On the level of discourse, the statist approach implied the need to impose the supremacy 
of the state's symbols and institutions, and enforce loyalty to it and to its representatives, above 
any other political or civil body, whether economic, juridical, cultural, educational or political 
(Kimmerling 1999). On a practical level, the statist approach meant nationalization of much of 
the economy: just like the armed forces got naturally nationalized, so did important resources 
like the main construction company Solel-Boneh and the expropriated Palestinian lands and 
                                                             
i The Eastern Worker. 
ii Acronym for mifleget po'alim meuhedet, United Workers' Party. 
iii Liberty.  
iv Agudat Israel and the ICP did not take part of the World Zionist Organization, but had their own international 
support system of resources and affiliations, within Eastern European networks and the USSR, correspondingly.  
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propertyi. The statist approach was the main discursive tool to impose Mapai's hegemonic 
dominance in the new state. As Grinberg (2001) pointed out, in Israel, as often happens in post-
colonial states, the state's institutions were built in a way that was meant to conserve the power 
of the elite that fought the war of independence, in a way that blurred the distinction between 
these elites and the state's apparatus. Mapai became a party that is also the apparatus of the state 
(Troen & Lucas 1995, Shapira 2012), in a kind of symbiosis between party and state 
(Kimmerling 1993). Mapai's empire relied on a tentacular set of institutions (Shohat 1988), as 
it dominated the Labor movement which dominated the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut. 
These two Zionist institutions were influenced by the political map and divided their resources 
between the Zionist parties according to their relative power. The Histadrut even held elections 
in which Zionist parties and the ICP participated. The bureaucratic apparatus of the state was 
also manned according to parties' strength (Horowitz & Lissak 1990). After 1948 the Jewish 
Agency continued its role as responsible over immigrant absorption and their settlement, and 
the Histadrut continued to function as a central mechanism for regulation of work and social 
welfare, providing health insurance, pension programs and much of the employment in this 
decade. Despite its declared nature of a voluntary mechanism, a workers' organization as it was, 
in fact the Histadrut had a monopoly over supplying much of the state's basic services in the 
1950s: Grinberg (2001) explained the ways in which being a member of the Histadrut was often 
essential in order to attain some basic rights of any citizen. This entire system was constructed 
by Mapai for its own benefit and in order to conserve its power; it was built upon its alliances 
with Zionist parties and by the distribution quotas of power to its partners in the governmental 
coalition. This system of Zionist institutions, that were state and semi-state institutional 
networks, will therefore be referred to at times as Mapai's apparatus of domination. This 
effective apparatus relied on the immense power of its leader, David Ben Gurion, who enjoyed 
extraordinary powers in the political leadership and in dictating Jewish Israeli public opinion. 
Ben Gurion performed, almost uninterruptedly, as both prime minister and minister of defense 
until 1963. 
The Grand Immigration and Dismal Absorption of Jews from Muslim Countries 
The war between Israel and its neighbors increased and formalized expressions of hostility 
towards Jews among Muslim regimes and Arab publics, especially but not only in the countries 
that were directly involved in the warfare. This hostility was cultivated by local factors who 
had different interests in the Jews' departure, by Zionist messengers arriving from Israel and 
Zionist activists from these very countries. The Zionists urged the Jewish communities to 
i Most of the confiscated lands was placed under the authority of the National Jewish Fund, a non-governmental 
Zionist institution, which in this way gained certain power beyond the state.    
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immigrate to Israel by various ways, and spurred the already strengthening identification 
between Zionism and the Jewish communities of these countries (Chetrit 2009, Behar 2007). 
There were also many factors drawing this immigration to Israel, Tsur (2001: 48) mentions the 
historical narrative and mythical image of the land, and the prospect for moral and economic 
wellbeing that is entailed in the opportunity to belong to the ethnic-religious majority in a 
strong, modern/colonial country. Shohat (2004) claimed that the question of the passion and 
agency in this act of immigration often remained ambivalent, and varied in each case. She wrote 
about mixed feelings of terror, confusion and powerlessness that accompanied this decision, 
and mentioned how the Zionist movement manipulated the religious-messianic emotions that 
many immigrants projected onto Zionist secular nationalism. At the end of the 1948 war, 
immigrants from Muslim countries arrived to Israel in large waves, practically vacating some 
Muslim countries from Jewish presence during the 1950si. The Jewish elite in many Arab 
countries had the means and disposition to immigrate to other western countries, and so it 
happened that many of the Mizrahi immigrants to Israel were of lower social stratums, and 
many also lost their property in the immigration process. 
These years also saw large waves of immigration from Eastern Europe, mainly Holocaust 
survivors, but Ashkenazi and Mizrahi immigrants were absorbed in distinct manners, and that 
would determine much of the social stratification prevalent until today. From the point of view 
of the new Israeli leadership, the vast amount of immigrants from Muslim countries could 
undermine the cultural dominance of western modernity in the nation that the Zionist regime 
intended to construct. Within the racist-colonial dispositions of Mapai's leadership, this 
consisted of a danger to the cultural and spiritual level of the nation and the state. Therefore, 
Mizrahi immigrants were expected to dispose of their primitive and backward mental constructs 
and ways of life in order to fit into the modern state. These fears and colonial conceptions were 
applied through intrusively insensitive absorption policies that entailed both material and 
cultural expropriation; in some senses and in some cases, a continuation of the material and 
cultural expropriation the immigrants went through in their country of origin. For instance, Iraqi 
Jews had to leave behind them their property, as well as their millennia-old immersion and 
modern cultural contribution to Iraqi culture. Shaul (2016) showed the existential aspect of this 
double expropriation, when she observed the feeling of powerlessness and loss of control that 
accompanied both the emigration decision and the immigration processes of Moroccan Jews. 
In these years, centuries' long civilizations of Jews in different Muslim countries were abruptly 
                                                             
i Many of these Jews emigrated to the Americas and Europe and not to Israel. Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and 
Libya indeed got vacated from Jews in the early 1950s. In Syria, Iran, Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia and Turkey, the 
emigration rhythm varied and in some continued into the next decades. For instance, Morocco, which had the 
biggest Jewish population, saw different waves of emigration that depended on local political developments and 
on changing immigration policies in Israel. The biggest wave was after Morocco's independence, from 1961 to 1964 
(Pikar 2009, Tsur 2000).   
134
dismantled, from the grand structural to the most intimate levels of life (Chetrit 2009, Shenhav 
2006). The processes of subjugation they went through in Israel entailed material and cultural, 
spiritual and ontological impoverishment. 
In past years much research has been dedicated to demonstrating how the Orientalist 
frameworks of the leaders of the Labor movement led to brute inequality in allocation of state 
resources, and the kind of spiritual and cultural oppression that accompanied that. The state 
mechanisms created a complete dependency of the immigrants in the government offices, the 
Histadrut and the Jewish agency for employment, welfare and housing (Grinberg 2001). Private 
initiatives of immigrants to improve their lives outside these mechanisms were disallowed and 
castigated by these institutions (e.g. Kemp 2002). These institutions, however, allowed 
European immigrants to achieve better housing as well as employment, sooner and usually 
better: closer to the modern center of the country around Tel Aviv, or in well off country-side 
settlementsi. The first European refugees received most of the abandoned houses of Palestinian 
Arabsii, and the rest of the immigrants were placed in transit camps in poor conditions until 
proper housing could be constructed. Mizrahi immigrants usually stayed in the transit camps 
for longer, got housing opportunities lateriii, usually in the periphery, often by deceitful 
promises and straightforward lies of the institutions (Pikar 2009). As the years went by the 
transit camps remained filled with Mizrahi populationiv, and carried certain similarities to the 
zone of non-being inhabited by Israeli Palestinian Arabs, under the rule of the military regime. 
The entry and exit of the camps was also limited (Gozansky 2018), and the colonial political 
oppression was not altogether dissimilar: Mapai used traditional leaders to control the Arab 
Palestinian population (Cohen 2006), and in the transit camps it nominated such leaderships in 
form of violent thugsv.  
                                                             
i These could be achieved through family members or acquaintances already in the country, through the Labor 
parties, which saw European immigrants as natural affiliates, and also due to direct governmental interventions 
(Segev 1984, Swirsky 1995, Pikar 2009). 
ii Most houses, indeed complete villages were grinded to the ground already in the summer of 1948 so as to prevent 
refugees’ aspiration to return and inhabit them (Pappe 2006, Morris 1997). Some urban houses that remained, got 
inhabited by Ashkenazim that could later get a chance to purchase them from the state. By contrast, Mizrahi 
immigrants had opportunities to inhabit deserted Palestinian properties in the big cities, but without the right to 
purchase the houses lawfully. These neighborhoods remained for many years without basic services and turned 
into slums. Such was the fate for instance of Musrara in Jerusalem, Wadi Salib in Haifa and Givat Amal and Kfar 
Shalem in Tel Aviv.  
iii By the end of 1950 about 80% of the transit camps inhabitants were from Arab countries, by 1953 it was already 
90% (Segev 1984). This despite being 14-37% of all immigrants in 1948 and 1952 (Tsur 2001). Most transit camps 
were dismantled before 1960, but it was not until mid-1960s, that all of them did (Segev 1984). 
iv For more on this matter see the doctoral dissertation of Hila Shalem Baharad that is to get published soon: "Low-
Heat Melting: inter-ethnic relations among immigrants in the transit camps" (hitukh be-hom namukh: yahasim 
ben-'adatiim be-kerev 'olim be-mahanot ve-ma'abarot ha-'olim). Hebrew University of Jerusalem.   
v This practice was often recorded in Kol Ha’am. E.g. "The Failure of Mapai's Plot in Or Yehuda transit camp" (kishlon 
‘alilat mapai be-ma’abarat or yehuda), KH, 4.5.52, p. 4. It was also recorded in novels such as Shimon Ballas’s 
(1964), "The Transit Camp" (ha-ma’abara), Tel Aviv: Am Oved; and Sami Michael´s (1974), "Equal and More Equal" 
(shavim ve-shavim yoter), Bustan. 
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The next step from the transit camp for many Mizrahim was getting allocated to the newly built 
"development towns", where they supplied cheap manual labor for national or private 
industriesi (Efrat 2009). These town had very limited employment opportunities, poor 
municipal services and a highly neglected education system, with mainly professional, non-
academic educationii (Shapira 2012). Some development towns and other Mizrahi-majority 
settlements were often located near the frontiers. As a result, most casualties and property 
damage caused by the Palestinian refugees who infiltrated the new borders were suffered by 
them (Morris 1997). The Mizrahi immigrants, with little relation to their background education 
and professional experience, often remained unemployed or got channeled to manual labor in 
agriculture and in remote factories (Sharon 2012). Schools that were constructed in Mizrahi-
majority settlements suffered from many aspects of negligence, which created an ethnic 
segregation within the Israeli educational systemiii (Swirsky 1989). Mariuma-Marom (2010) 
studies the Israeli welfare system in the 1950s, and found that de facto two different welfare 
systems were being employed: one system for Ashkenazi immigrants, functioning through their 
incorporation in the Labor movements' companies and organizations, and the other for Mizrahi 
immigrants, designed as a kind of charity for unprofessional and incompetent workers, 
requiring aid but hardly deserving it. The Mizrahi immigrants, without much distinction 
between social classes, were considered subjects for an acculturation process, which Shaul 
(2016) denominated "the Zionist civilizing process". This process assumed that the Mizrahi 
immigrants were damaged in all aspects of life: from social habits, customs and world views to 
the most intimate values, beliefs and family relations. Different efforts, including all imaginable 
atrocitiesiv, were made by the state apparatuses in order to save the "underdeveloped" immigrant 
children from their fates. Veteran Ashkenazim were sent to settlements or transit camps of 
Mizrahi majority in order to serve as role models for the Mizrahi immigrants, and manage a 
variety of issues, from education to political leadership (Sharon 2012). These messengers had 
a role of endowing the immigrants with emotional identification and loyalty to the national 
framework, as well as acceptance of the superiority of the Ashkenazi Zionist culture (Shaul 
2016). In sum, the Mizrahi immigration processes entailed both material and cultural 
                                                             
i Many of these towns were thought to serve as service centers near settlements of Ashkenazi majority, which 
enjoyed from higher quality of life, but this aspiration never got realized. Factories and companies were 
constructed there, creating employment opportunities of mainly manual labor. Most of these towns still consist of 
the country's poorest working-class areas (Shapira 2012, Swirsky 1995). 
ii For instance, Shaul (2016) tells that in the development town Dimona, the first high school was opened in 1963, 
and only in 1966 did it start to include the possibility to get diplomas that grant access to universities.   
iii Swirsky (1989) mentioned inappropriate facilities, a high proportion of disqualified teachers, incomplete 
curricula, and an alienated and sometimes even conflictual relationship between teachers and parents. These 
factors led to low scholastic achievements, a huge percent of drop outs and generally poor attendance.   
iv As kidnapping and experimenting with children, especially of Yemenite origins, and hiding any information of it 
until nowadays. See Shovali (2007), Massad (2007). 
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expropriationi, "calibrating the monetary and symbolic exchange values" of the entire baggage 
they came with (Adut 2006). The immigrants were homogenized, proletarized, de-urbanized, 
marginalized geographically to the periphery and to slums, their former training and education 
was considered worthless, and their culture- inferior, subject to indoctrination and 
transformation in the hands of modern/colonial state authorities. This deep institutional 
discrimination allowed veteran Ashkenazim to transform as well. Many left their employment 
in primary sectors, that required manual labor, and got installed in white collar jobs such as 
managers, business owners and public servants in the ever expanding welfare system, and the 
other developing state institutions (Rosenfeld & Karmi 1976).  
 
As Tsur (2007) and Leon (2009) explained, the immigration to Israel entailed a shift for 
Mizrahim from one model of colonial modernity to another, under conditions of violence, 
rivalry and conflict, characteristic of historical encounters between east and west (Santos 2006: 
118-121). The Zionist civilizing process was in fact also a battle against the Levant, carrying 
the intention to guarantee "Israelis" will become markedly distinct from Arabs (Dahan-Kalev 
2006). An integral part of the emigration and immigration processes of Mizrahim entailed 
forming an oppositional stance towards Arabs: towards their historical narrative of their 
countries of origin, and against Arab components of their own identity (Shaul 2016). Some 
Mizrahim, especially those from countries that participated in the warfare in 1948, had the 
opportunity to maintain and even leverage Arab components in their identity –mainly the 
language- in order to serve the settler-colonial system, getting incorporated into Zionist 
institutions of Ashkenazi dominance that focused on Arab-Jewish relations (Jacobson & Naor 
2016): namely, security services, the military regime's mechanisms, and Zionist propaganda 
tools, whose main purpose was to diffuse the resistance of the Palestinian Israelis (Bashkin 
2017). As Ben-Dor (2004) put it, this was the only place where Mizrahim got an Israeli license 
to continue to be Arab. These employment opportunities were not as accessible for North 
African immigrantsii. As discussed in the second chapter, those North Africans whose 
modernization processes went through French language and high culture usually found their 
cultural capital to have lost value in Israel, quite against their own self-perception (Tsur 2007). 
They were often considered "Levantine" in public discourse, meaning that they had adopted 
superficially symbols of western culture, without proper assimilation to it nor absorption in its 
intrinsic values (Sharon 2012: 162). North African elites that had Hebraic high culture, as some 
rabbis, could sometimes get incorporated into Ashkenazi dominated institutions.  
                                                             
i Lavi (2007), for instance, tells about the cultural relics of Yemenite Jews that were expropriated by the state 
authorities throughout the immigration process.  
ii This is due to quite practical reasons. The dialects of spoken Arabic in the Maghreb is very different from the local 
one and the one of the surrounding countries, which also mostly form the immediate security threat.  
137
Notwithstanding, many Mizrahi rabbis suffered a degradation of status upon immigration, and 
their position as community leaders was gnawed by Ashkenazi rabbinical authorities (Horowitz 
2000). The political system handed monopoly over religious matters in the state to the 
Ashkenazi religious partiesi, which gave less and lower positions and prestige to Sephardic and 
Mizrahi rabbis. The encounter in Israel between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi rabbinical elites 
revealed to Mizrahi rabbis that, in fact, their position in their communities was ambiguous and 
unclear (Leon 2009). In comparison with Ashkenazi society, the religious affiliation of Mizrahi 
communities seemed incoherent and undefined, impossible to classify under the Ashkenazi neat 
division between secular, orthodox national-religious and Haredim, the ultra-orthodox stream- 
which all had political parties, public representatives, and their own educational systems. 
Ashkenazi rabbis had stable organizations and clear narratives, which had been getting 
formulated throughout their decades of conflict with modern secular Zionism. In contrast, 
Mizrahi communities had been going through what Leon (2009) called, soft processes of 
modernization. When traditional religious routines were changing with modernity, rabbis in 
many Muslim countries remained of distinguished status, and they had important roles in the 
spiritual ritual life. However, their social role was not anywhere as clear and defined as the 
Ashkenazi ones, that had effective roles in Israeli society. In Israel, where nationality replaced 
religion as basis for popular identification, the significance of Mizrahi rabbis' role was vacated 
(Leon 2009). Within this context, it was easy for Ashkenazi rabbinical elites to mark Mizrahi 
rabbis as disqualified and inferior, to exclude them of official status in the state's apparatuses 
and monopolize these for themselvesii (Leon 1999). The fact many immigrant community 
rabbis did not get nominated to official local roles of the rabbinate was perceived as a 
humiliating degradation, and made many rabbis desert their communities and move elsewhere. 
The vacuum created in spiritual leadership contributed to deeper processes of toranic 
colonization that went through the education system and got stabilized and widespread in the 
state of Israel (Lupo 2004a). Ultra-orthodox activists went to great efforts to expand their 
influence in the education systems of many transit camps of Mizrahi majority. This was a 
counter-response to the Zionist civilizing process, which among others also attempted to 
enforce secular-national education and identity on the immigrants' children (Leon 2004a). The 
ultra-orthodox modern/colonial identity option was often perceived by Mizrahim as a cure for 
the social and economic distresses the harsh immigration process entailed, and as suggesting 
                                                             
i Ultra-orthodox Agudat Israel, Po'alei Agudat Israel and the orthodox national religious party, Hapo'el Hamizrahi.  
ii Despite the Zionist leaders' ambitions to construct a secular state according to European models, they could never 
get a wide enough consensus within Jewish publics without the support of religious parties. Therefore, from the 
inception of Zionism, coalitions and negotiations were made to satisfy religious pressures. In the state, these 
solidified in its institutions: rabbinical courts received the exclusive authority over all marital matters; and the 
Minister of Religion, the Chief Rabbinate and local Religious Councils got exclusive authority over Jewish religious 
life in the state and in local governance. These institutions were manned by rabbis from the religious and ultra-
orthodox parties mentioned above.  
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social mobility and empowerment (Leon 2009, Peled 2002). For many immigrants it served as 
a proper answer to the spiritual crisis caused by immigration into a modern-secular national 
society. As Leon (2009) put it, the encounter in Israel caused perplexity that turned into a 
consciousness of real crisis, only here, unlike 18th century Europe, the reaction to amend came 
from outside. By mid-1950s, Mizrahi immigrant children were the majority in ultra-orthodox 
schools (Horowitz 2000), receiving education by Ashkenazi study methods and studying 
Ashkenazi liturgy and dogmas. 
 
The deep effects of the colonial process as a spiritual, cultural and identity crisis were hard to 
detect, and even harder to contest, as they were taking place. In contrast, the socio-economic 
inequalities and institutional discrimination were easier to mark and resist. The 1950s was a 
period of multitudes of protests discharging in Mizrahi immigrants' concentrations, whether in 
transit camps, development towns or the poor neighborhoods in cities. Protesting within the 
transit camps could endanger the protestors' access to work (Bashkin 2017), and at times the 
protests got disturbed by violent thugs hired by Mapai (Gozansky 2018). Demonstrations 
outside the camps also sometimes turned violent, weather for police violence or for protestors' 
initiative. These protests always demanded basic necessities and rights: employment, housing, 
the right to choose where to live, and the need to improve conditions in the transit camps and 
in governmental initiatives of arranged manual labors (Chetrit 2004). The basis for protest was 
the principal of equal rights for Jews in a Jewish state (Bashkin 2017), and did not usually 
explicitly address the  ethnic basis of discriminationi. There were many different acts of 
resistance and protest, such as strikes, sabotage and roadblocks, petitions and letters to the 
authorities, refusal to participate in the military and refusal to settle the places they were sent 
to (Kemp 2002, Chetrit 2004, Roby 2015). However, these acts and demonstrations rarely got 
reported in the press, got criminalized by politicians, oppressed forcefully by the police, and 
delegitimized publicly for being unpatriotic (Shapira 2012, Roby 2015). In Roby's (2015: 73) 
research of these resistances he highlighted press reports that revealed especially excessive 
police retaliation against joint struggles of Mizrahim and Palestinians, organized by the Marxist 
parties, ICP and Mapam. Despite the violent oppression, the protests were found effective for 
fulfilling some concrete demands (Lehman-Wilzig 1992, Herman 1995). They did not usually 
get structured into organizations (Chetrit 2004, Roby 2015).  
The socio-economic inequalities and distance that were formed between Mizrahim and 
Ashkenazim geographically and through the education system, made the military a central tool 
in constructing Jewish-Israeli national society. Participating in the military is what made new 
                                                             
i Bashkin (2017) mentions that many petitions and letters complained for receiving violent treatment by the police 
because of the country of origins.    
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immigrants belong to the national collective, since the military had such a central role in the 
realization of the national-colonial project (Swirsky 1995, Levy 1999). The military was 
conceived as a tool for social integration, capable of modernizing Mizrahi Jews, and creating 
social cohesion in the overly heterogeneous Jewish population. Ben-Eliezer detailed how 
Mapai's 'statist' ideology included cultivating militaristic attitudes in Jewish-Israeli society. 
During the 1950s social inequalities were formed within a 'nation in arms': "a cultural construct 
used by political and military elites to justify solving political problems with military means, 
used to recruit the whole population into war" (Ben Eliezer 1994). Ben Gurion and other high 
rank security personnel conceived of Arab hostility as unavoidable, and the main ambition of 
the Israeli leadership was to be the ones determining the timing and conditions of the promised 
second round of warfare (Shlaim 2000). Most of Jewish Israeli society perceived the situation 
with the Palestinian Arab refugees and the Arab neighboring countries –the infiltrations and 
reprisals, the growing tensions and threats, the non-war non-peace status- in line with this 
hegemonic belligerent stream. The general atmosphere of emergency and everyday violence 
encouraged solidarity inside the newly founded state, helping it feel more like a proper nation 
(Ben Eliezer 1994). Nonetheless, the military regime imposed over Israeli Palestinian Arabs 
was opposed by most political parties, since it was used by Mapai to monopolize Arab voters, 
and make this population dependent on its ominous apparatus.  
The continuous violence around the borders soon indeed brought a second round of warfare. In 
1956 Israel aided France and Britain to seize the Suez Canal from Egypt after its nationalization 
and conquered the Sinai Peninsula. The successful attack was condemned by both USA and 
USSR and all three allies were compelled to retrieve (Shlaim 2000). On the same day the attack 
broke, the Israeli military regime cast a curfew on its Palestinian Arab citizens. In many villages 
farmers had already gone out to the fields before the declaration of curfew. In Qufer Kassem 
43 farmers that were returning from the fields after the curfew had already entered in vigor 
were shot to death by IDF soldiers. The aftermath of the Qufer Kassem massacre increased the 
opposition to the military regime in public opinion and among politicians (Herman 1995). The 
military campaign in Sinai allied with the former colonial powers, influenced Middle East 
politics in various ways. It established a decade of relatively few Palestinian Arab infiltrations 
to Israel, but also positioned Israel definitively as an aggressive extension of western 











War and State Building: The Predicament of Zero-Sum Zionism                      1948- 1949 
 
The 1948 war left the city of Jerusalem divided between Israel and Jordan, as the only mixed 
Jewish-Arab city located on the very borderlines of the armistice agreementsi. This meant that 
the war brought a simultaneous transfer of populations from both sides of the city. The Jews 
transferred from east to west were mainly Mizrahi and Sephardicii. The beginning of warfare in 
the city was marked by Jewish-targeted riots in a mixed Jerusalemite shopping center in 
December of 1947. Some of the local Sephardic elites lost their property in these eventsiii. Later 
on, explosions occurred in the Jewish city center, and the offices of the Council of the Sephardic 
Community of Jerusalem (hereinafter CSCJ) got partially burned. During the war, the CSCJ 
lost more than half its property, and the most historical and sacred of itiv. Many of its benefactors 
became refugees in the population exchange in the city, and CSCJ members themselves lost 
private property and old family inheritancev.  
During the months of battle over the city, the Jewish population in it suffered from isolation. It 
got isolated both from its "economic and financial home front and base"vi of the surrounding 
Arab villages and cities, and also from other concentrations of Jewish population, since the 
roads leading to it were under Arab militias' control during much of the war. This limited the 
Zionist military supplies and personnel and isolated Jerusalem from the state-building process 
that was taking place during that yearvii. as some said, "a siege was laid on us by the enemy and 
by the state of Israel"viii. Zionist militias like Etzel and Lehi, that opposed the hegemonic Labor 
movement, gained popularity within the Jewish residents of Jerusalem. Some CSCJ members 
were also affiliated to these militias, most notably David Siton that would become Eliahu 
Eliachar's right hand in the upcoming decade.  
1948 was a crucial year in designing the CSCJ's relation to the Zionist institutions. The war 
united the Jewish population in Israel like nothing else could:  
 "We have known what is one people: the enemy’s bullet does not differentiate"ix. 
                                                             
i See map III. 
ii Kark & Oren-Nordheim (2001): 7-25; Gaon (1937/1982).  
iii See Eliachar (1987).  
iv "Memorandum" (tazkir), 23.12.49, CSCJA container 6212 file 76.  
v Eliahu Eliachar himself claimed he lost 75% of his family property. Knesset Protocols 1950 (4), p. 962.   
vi"Our stance in the Jerusalem Municipality- Eliahu Eliachar’s lecture in the branch club" ('emdatenu be-'iriyat 
yerushalaim. hartsaato shel eliahu eliachar be-mo'adon ha-snif), Kol Habira 3, 16.2.54.  
vii See Eliachar (1987): 72; and Ben Gurion's own declaration about the difficulty of drafting soldiers to the city's 
defense: Security Council Protocols, 15.10.48, SA 435/20-8.  
viii"Matters of the Hour" (le-'inyaney ha-sha'ah), HH, 12.11.48, p. 2.  
ix "Third meeting of the Countrywide Union of the Sephardim and Eastern Ethnicities" (yeshiva shlishit shel moetset 
ha-ihud ha-artsi shel ha-sfaradim u-bnei 'edot ha-mizrah), 5.10.50, CSCJA container 6238 file 14.  
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"The entire Yishuv is united in the idea that there is no escape from a collision with the Arabs and it must 
prepare for battle."i                                             
Both the Sephardic and Zionist leaders saw the war as a fortunate occasion to incorporate 
Sephardic representatives in the "national institutions", especially due to the massive military 
recruiting needs. Eliachar was nominated to the temporary Security Council, as well as a 
member of Agudat Israel, who represented the non-Zionist ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi publicii. 
When the temporary government was established in May of 1948, Bechor Chetrit of the Tel 
Aviv CSC was appointed as Minister of Minorities and Police. The Jewish Agency opened a 
department for arranging immigration of middle-eastern Jewsiii. These ways to include the 
Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews in the national institutions and politics were historical 
developments, much a result of the pre-state struggle for Sephardic representation in those 
institutionsiv.  The public figures who got incorporated into the few key positions the Zionist 
leadership designated for Sephardic representatives were all tending towards the Labor 
movements' values and posed no threat to Mapai's reign (Derri-Weksler 2013). The CSCJ 
leadership of the Eliachar stream did not get as much power as they had expectedv, which might 
also be related to Eliachar spending much of 1948 in expeditions abroad, a fact he would regret 
until the day he diedvi. In these crucial moments of state building, the CSCJ under Eliachar's 
leadership only weakened its position, and this strengthened this institution's mistrust towards 
the newly established reign of Mapai. The CSCJ published posters condemning Ben Gurion 
and the government, denouncing the appointments made to state institutions as "secret 
plotting"vii, and one poster even cited Ben Gurion's personal letter to Eliacharviii. During the 
transition of state mechanisms from the British government, the Israeli state institutions were 
"purified"ix of Sephardic clerks under accusations of corruption and were manned by 
                                                             
i Fortnight Intelligence Bulletin #57, p. 3-4, SA 150, 66/44/G.   
ii Security Council Protocols, 19.10.47, p. 17, SA 0179:1. The first attendance of Eliahu Eliachar and of Moshe 
Shapira, Agudat Israel’s representative, was in the meeting that discussed general drafting for The People's Watch 
(mishmar ha-'am). Security Council Protocols, 20.11.47. SA 0179:1.  
iii See correspondence between Eliahu Sasson and Yaakov, 6.10.48. BGA, 252509.   
iv See Ben Gurion's reasoning for adding a Sephardic in the Security Council, in order to refute claims of 
discrimination and Ashkenazi control. Security Council Protocols, 28.10.47, p. 6, SA 0179:1.   
v That is, a role in the new government, which was entrusted to Bechor Chetrit, or a role in Jerusalem's municipality, 
to which David Abulafia got appointed. The mentioned department in the Jewish Agency was led by an Ashkenazi 
official. Eliachar also hoped to be part of the military governor offices of the Jerusalem district, during the military 
regime Israel imposed over the city for few months after the war had ended. See correspondence between Bechor 
Chetrit and Moshe Ben Ami, 2.8.48, CZA 53a.  
vi Interview of Eliahu Eliachar by Margalit Bajerno, 1980. Oral History Archives of the Institute of Contemporary 
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.  
vii The expression "nirkam be-hashai" was repeated in the poster, "Elected and not nominated institutions" (mosdot 
nivharim ve-lo memunim), 1948.  CSCJA container 6327, file 35/387; also see letter from Moshe Meir Levi to the 
Jewish Agency, 21.3.48, CZA S25/8922.  
viii "Proper Response" (tshuva ka-halakha), CSCJA container 6218 file 143. Another example of this established 
mistrust can be seen right after the war in 1949, when the political party of the CSCJ's blamed the government for 
attempting to damage its electoral campaign by keeping its key activists drafted for the elections period. 
"Discrimination in this field too?" (haflaya gam be-shetah ze?), HH, 24.12.48, p. 2. 
ix Knesset Protocols 1949 (1), p. 318.  
142
Ashkenazim instead. The hostility and mistrust between the CSCJ and the Zionist establishment 
was hence reinforced and in some ways aggravated within the new state's framework.  
Nonetheless, this established rivalry should not undermine the main meaning of the war for the 
CSCJ, that was dedicated to the project of Jewish nationalism. The war and the establishment 
of the state were described in their publication, Hed Hamizrah, as a miraculous and glorified 
event, with a precious and sublime resulti. For the first time in its centuries-long history, the 
CSCJ acted in an all-Jewish city, and the public it represented became part of the ethnic majority 
of the new state. For an ethnic minority group that always had to struggle for its place and for 
the representation of its interests with majority groups and imperial governments, this meant an 
opportunity to finally take part of the ruling eliteii. They had hopes that within the new state 
there would rule "a Jewish hegemony of all the tribes and not just one."iii After the war ended, 
these hopes were proven false.  The new political reality disconnected Jerusalem from its former 
environment and tied all diplomatic exchanges and community matters to the state mechanisms. 
The Sephardic notables' politics were hence made largely irrelevant. Some Sephardim extended 
their linguistic and social skills to the state's service, for purposes of security and intelligence 
work within the Palestinian Arab population in Israel. Throughout this period, these skills 
would develop into the tricky governance expertise of the military regime (Eyal 2005). Other 
Sephardim got incorporated into Zionist parties in a subjugated manner. The CSCJ circle was 
excluded entirely from the ruling elites' circle within the new state, and Eliachar's diplomatic 
contacts and skills were rejected by the state institutionsiv. During Eliachar's voyage to the 
Americas, he held several conversations with Arab leaders in Lake Success, New York. In his 
extensive repertoire of writings, he never wrote about the content of these informal 
conversations, but he did mention getting more understanding from the Arab leaders than "any 
of the democratic diplomats"v. It can be assumed that Eliachar proposed to these leaders the 
initiative the Sephardic elites were advocating throughout the armistice negotiations of 1949. 
The idea was to initiate a formal population exchange between Palestinian Arab refugees and 
Jews residing in Arab countriesvi. The numbers were similarvii; the Arab League was involved 
directly in the war over Palestine, and the war itself put the Jews of these countries in varying 
                                                             
i "Matters of the Hour" (le-'inyanei ha-sha'ah), HH, 2.6.49, p. 2; "Itamar Ben Avi and the Vision of the state" (itamar 
ben avi ve-hazon ha-medina), HH, 13.4.49, p. 8. "Matters of the Hour" (le-'inyanei ha-sha'ah), HH, 14.1.49, p. 2. 
ii Avraham Elmalih, "From Arab to Hebrew Municipality" (mi-baladiyat el-quds le-‘iriyat yerushalaim), HH, 28.1.49, 
p. 3.  
iii Eliahu Eliachar, "The Ethnic Problem, Part two" (be'ayat ha-’edot- helek bet), HH, 13.10.50. 
iv E.g., Ben Gurion turning down Eliachar’s suggestion to intermediate a meeting between the Exterior Minister and 
the French Counsel. Security Council Protocols, 29.10.48, p. 9. SA 435/20-9.  
v Eliachar (1975): 169, 181.  
vi See Segev (1984). E.g. Eliachar (1975): 170-200; (1980): 295-300. E. Eliachar, "The problems of our public in the 
Knesset" (be'ayat tsiburenu ba-knesset), HH, 16.3.49, p.3; “Matters of the Hour" (le-'inyanei ha-sha'ah), HH, 8.4.49, 
p. 2. 
vii There were around one million Jews in Arab countries and the Palestinian refugees are estimated at 700-900,000.  
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degrees of physical and civic dangeri. This initiative, however, did not fit the negotiations made 
by the Israeli exterior ministryii, who chose not to include the question of the refugees in the 
negotiations (Fried 2018), and other spheres of diplomatic exchanges no longer had any 
validity.  
During the war and right after it massive waves of immigration began to arrive to the new state, 
from Europe and from Muslim countriesiii. The new immigrants were seen by all parties as a 
potential electoral base, as were also the Palestinian Arabs that became part of the new Israeli 
state. The Labor parties Mapai and Mapam both opened Arab and Mizrahi departments within 
their lines in order to address these populations. The CSCJ and the Tel Aviv CSC were able at 
the last moment to get organized in a common faction that ran to the elections held in early 
1949. Though Eliachar wanted the faction to address the middle-class elites, the CSCJ 
determined to turn to the new immigrants as a supposedly natural electoral base. Thus the 
campaign focused on different forms of ethnic discrimination, particularly condemning 
numerical and status discrimination in work places and in governmental positions. This last was 
what allowed the cooperation with the Tel Aviv CSC, which tended towards the Labor 
movement and its socialist, workers-oriented discourseiv. The party got four out of the 120 
parliamentariansv: Bechor Chetrit, Eliahu Eliachar, Moshe Ben Ami and Avraham Elmalih. In 
the new government, Bechor Chetrit, the head of the Tel Aviv CSC, got to keep his previous 
appointment in the temporary government as a minister, but got degraded to be only the 
Minister of Police, a role that as Meir-Glitzenstein explained, carried almost no real authorities 
of its own, and was chosen for Chetrit precisely because of its perceived marginality (Meir-
Glitzenstein 2004).  
Right at the end of the war Telemvi was founded, an organization led by young Jerusalemite 
Sephardic elites affiliated to the CSCJ circle. Telem aspired  to become a national political 
party, by first forming a broad movement within the Sephardic and Mizrahi immigrants and 
nativesvii. Telem certainly reminds of the Histadrut of Pioneers of the East, which was 
established at the very beginning of the British Mandate. Eliahu Eliachar was partially involved 
i E.g. Pikar (2013) about the situation in North Africa; Bashkin (2012) about Iraq.   
ii See Eliachar (1980).  
iii Over 340,000 immigrants, about 60% from Europe. See, "The immigration to Israel according to country of origin 
and year of immigration" (ha-'aliya le-israel le-fi erets motsa ve-shnat 'aliya), May 1948- end of 1953. Matah Virtual 
Library, retrieved from: http: //lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?Item= 19970 (last accessed 12.3.20).   
iv"Executive Committee Meeting" (yeshivat ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 1.1.49. CSCJA container 6320 file 28/299.    
v See table IV.  
vi Movement of Mizrahim's Unification (tnu'at likud mizarhim). As Chetrit (2004) mentions, this was the first 
movement to use the term Mizrahim, much before it became commonplace.  
vii "What is Telem Movemnet" (mahi tnu’at telem), undated, CSCJA container 6214, file 12/103; Letter from A. 
Toledano to Meir Ben Kiki, 24.9.50; CSCJA container 6214, file 12/103.   
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in both initiatives, and both expressed a very quick understanding of the new political order and 
of the actions required in it by an autonomous Sephardic organization.  
Nonetheless, in the new reality formed between Israel and the Arab world it was somewhat 
harder to propose a significant role for the Sephardic and Mizrahi notables to play, other than 
roles related to security and intelligence services within the state's apparatus. Not including 
Eliahu Eliachar or other Sephardic notables in the state's exterior diplomacy in its most crucial 
time during the armistice negotiations, invalidated the Sephardic pre-state claim for a mediating 
position with the Arab worldi.  Eliachar (1975) would later claim that the leadership "…told us 
what to vote on these issues" (p. 335), and "treated us as minors and not as adults" (p. 512). 
Others later said that these notables could contribute to Israeli diplomacy their native 
knowledge and skills to create "diplomacy of respect"ii. After all, they knew not only Arabic, 
but also the 
"language of appeasement of the Arab gesture, the sound of the voice and intonation of the words …the 
[Jewish] sons of the east use the same manners and style within themselves and with the Arabs… A whole 
doctrine is necessary for us in these days to set the relations between a person of Jewish origins and an 
Arab person. Even more so in diplomatic relations between countries…We must know not only the 
language of our Arab interlocutor but also the mentality in him"iii.  
Notwithstanding, the Sephardic public who often understood Arabic was exposed to the 
radicalization of the public discourse in the Arab world, which after the war continued to exhibit 
strict objection to the existence of Israel. This prompted an uncompromising stance in return, a 
la Jabotinsky's 1923 Iron Wall article.  Throughout 1949 Hed Hamizrah displayed vehement 
right wing opinions, uncompromising positions towards the Arab population in Israel and 
outside itiv, and dehumanizing despising discourses about Arabs, that expressed deep contempt 
and animosity:  
"I understood the mindset of the enemy from listening to the radio waves that sent any useless utterance 
made by Arabs this morning…from reading Arab press you cannot be mistaken that any change occurred 
from the previous framework of vain glorification, superficiality and hypocrisy I used to find in the past. 
As far as I’m concerned, the Arab intellectual stayed exactly the same: he learned nothing and does not 
                                                             
i There was an exception to this: Eliahu Sasson, that served as the head of the Arab affairs department of the Jewish 
Agency from 1933, and from 1948 as the head of the middle-eastern department in the Ministry of Exterior. He 
was part of the delegations that conducted the armistice negotiations in 1949. A specific research about Sasson's 
activity is still pending in order to view to what degree he was able to bring his particular, Sephardic or middle-
eastern perspective into his work, and to what degree he complied with the Labor-Zionist perspectives, as designed 
by the dominant Ashkenazim in it.  His particular Sephardic standpoint was elaborated, for instance, in: G. Cohen, 
"How to Speak with the Arabs" (eikh ledaber 'im ha-'aravim), Maariv, 16.8.63, p. 6.   
ii Y. A. Abadi, "Sephardic Judaism and our Political Battle" (ha-yahadut ha-sefardit ve-ma’arhtenu ha-medinit”), 
Shevet Va'am 1954, p.23. Also see Eliachar (1980): 209-211.   
iii Y.Y. Rivlin, "Our Relation to the Arabs" (yahasenu el ha-'aravim), undated [approx. Autumn, 1949]. JCA, container 
2717. My gratitude to Yohai Ben Gdalia for helping date this document.  
iv "Matters of the Hour" (le-'inyanei ha-sha'ah”), HH, 2.6.49, p. 2; 4.3.49, p. 2.  
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wish to learn… Its [Al Bia'at, a specific newspaper] words are built on emotions alone. And the emotion 
is expressed in empty phrases. This is the character of any Arab newspaper in this country or anywhere."i 
This quote might reflect the habitual mainstream discourse in Israeli media about Arab 
countries, which, according to Efron (2005), tended to emphasize these countries' corrupt and 
inferior nature. In this period, Hed Hamizrah sometimes translated to Hebrew from foreign 
western press articles which reflected this racist attitude, as if the fact those papers published it 
gave it an extra validity:  
"The only thing that blossoms there [in "the part of Eretz-Israel occupied by Arabs", i.e. the West Bank] 
is schemes and quarrels of families…Israel for the falah [farmer] is an important economic advantage- 
for the purpose of smuggling... The Arabs do not know how to work the land."ii 
David Siton, the co-editor of Hed Hamizrah, along with Eliachar, had a regular informative 
column about Arab politics during the 1948 war. During the period of the armistice negotiations 
this column appeared less and less frequently.  Both on press and in the parliament, Sephardic 
activists insisted peace with the Arab countries was not a possibilityiii and strictly opposed Israel 
receiving any Palestinian Arab refugees backiv. They supported the military regime imposed on 
the Israeli Palestinian Arabs and opposed them receiving equal rightsv. These uncompromising 
political positions were often soaked with hateful discourse, perhaps also for being exposed to 
hateful and dehumanizing discourses on the other side. The rise of Arab nationalist discourses, 
which often excluded Arab-speaking Jews from the national collective and treated them with 
hostility, found this way its mirror image among Arab speaking Jews in Israel.  
Another factor that possibly designed the Sephardic elites' attitude towards the Arabs during 
this period is the role that Mizrahi immigrants played in the hegemonic Zionist imagination. 
Some Jews in Arab countries identified with Arab nationalisms and were declared anti-Zionists, 
but some of those would also be compelled to immigrate to Israel (Bashkin 2017). The Zionist 
leadership's perception of the immigrants was influenced by this factor, by the immigrants' Arab 
customs and manners, and by the leaderships' own modern/colonial orientalist and alienated 
mental frameworks (Eyal 2005). As Eyal claimed, the immigrants were seen as carrying hybrid 
identification, and the Zionist leadership did not know to what degree they could be trusted to 
maintain the new strict identity borders created between Jews and Arabs, and to play by the 
new rules of the zero-sum game. Since the hybrid identity was part of the Sephardic notables' 
                                                             
i A. Michaeli, "The Arabs are Scheming Plots" (ha-‘aravim horshim mezimot), HH, 18.2.49, p. 7.  
ii Sunday Times Reporter in Jerusalem, "The Arabs in Israel", (ha-‘aravim be-israel), HH, 17.2.50, p. 6.  
iii E.g. Eliachar (1980): 304-310.   
iv Y. Y. Rivlin, "The Problem of Arab Refugees", (be’ayat ha-plitim ha-‘aravim), HH, 19.8.49, p. 5; "Matters of the 
Hour" (le-'inyanei ha-sha'ah), HH, 2.6.49, p. 2.  
v "Matters of the Hour", (le-'inyanei ha-sha'ah), HH, 2.6.49, p. 2; 4.3.49, p. 2.   
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self-presentation in the Ottoman and Mandatory periods (Eyal 2005), and because of their stated 
rivalry with the Zionist ruling elites, the CSCJ had to clarify the limits of its opposition to the 
government, to frame the terms of their rivalry, by stating their loyalty to the statei:  
"Today is not like beforehand, when it was possible to [rebel]…today there is a state and [we] must not 
do against it."ii 
As Eliachar observed, "the merging of Sephardim and Arabs puts the Jewish society at risk and 
contaminates government policy"iii. The need to set the framework of rivalry with Mapai within 
terms of loyalty to the state was also reflected in the Sephardic leaders' hesitance in confronting 
the government about the fact the Jews in Arab countries were in danger due to the 
establishment of the state, "innocent victims of the state itself"iv. Though a considerable amount 
of struggles and speeches were made in upcoming years in order to advance the immigration of 
Jews in Muslim countries, this argument for the state's responsibility over these Jews would 
almost never be usedv. The need to demonstrate loyalty to the state and the sever identity 
borders it molded, could have been another factor that encouraged the open manifestation of 
animosity and contempt towards the Arabs.  
Yosef Yoel Rivlin, a native Ashkenazi intellectual close to the CSCJ circle and to the revisionist 
party, had his own take on the matter. He explained this discourse among the natives Jews as a 
response to the Orientalist-romantic image of the Arabs that the Jewish Israeli left exhibited.  
He wrote of "the sons of the land", whose 
"Flag, as discovered, is not usually of special sympathy to the Arab. The first cause to that is the words 
of praise whose foundation is but an imagination, exaggerations about the virtues of the Arab…the 
character the [Ashkenazi] 'peace people' bestow to the Arab, from lack of knowledge and from far-
reaching imagination…On the other hand,  as is the nature of things, [the Mizrahi Jews] know the Arab's 
disadvantages from up close…this created the response of those who know the real thing…and [they] 
take it to the last extreme…by the way it must be mentioned that the same characteristics that exist within 
the Jews of the east did not attract the attention of the Jews of the west… When those exist in his Jewish 
brother they seem as disadvantages and sometimes even as incapacities."vi  
                                                             
i For instance, when writing the declaration of the Israeli branch of the Sephardic World Federation, the CSCJ circle 
thought fidelity to the state must be stated, whereas others that were incorporated to the Zionist institutions saw 
such a declaration as humiliating. "Protocol" (protokol), 14.4.52, CSCJA container 6239 file 417.  
ii "Executive Committee Meeting" (yeshivat ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 1.1.49, CSCJA container 6320 file 28/299. 
iii This was said in what seems to be a cynical manner, to explain why the responsibility over minorities was 
expropriated from Bechor Chetrit. "Third meeting of the Countrywide Union of the Sephardim and Eastern 
Ethnicities" (yeshiva shlishit shel moetset ha-ihud ha-artsi shel ha-sfaradim u-bnei 'edot ha-mizrah), 5.10.50, CSCJA 
6238-14.  
iv Eliachar, Knesset Protocols 1949 (1), p. 267. 
v For instance, Binyamin Sasson, representative of the Sephardic faction in the second parliament assembly (as of 
1951), made this statement in the parliament and then apologized and withdrew from it: Knesset Protocols, 9.7.52.  
vi Y.Y. Rivlin, "Our relation to the Arabs" (yahasenu el ha-'aravim), undated [approx. Autumn of 1949], JCA, 
container 2717.  His notion in this text about the centrality of the “peace people” in setting the Israeli public 
discourse was probably somewhat tilted not only by his political tendency, but also by his own social and 
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What Rivlin mentions as marginal in his argument might well be the most important factor for 
the Sephardic elites: the fact that the romanticist, positive orientalist attitude within a leftist 
minority among the Ashkenazi Jews was reserved to Palestinian Arabs alone, and was not found 
in their perception of the Mizrahi or Sephardic Jews: these last were expected to change and 
integrate into the Ashkenazi modernist mentality of the new Zionist regime.  
This attitude of leftist movements like the party Mapam, was also expressed in its chase after 
Israeli Palestinian Arab affiliates and voters, that was more avid and integral than their chase 
after Mizrahim and Sephardim. From the Sephardic elite's perspective, the proof for this 
tendency was verified in the composition of the first parliament, that had more Palestinian Arab 
MPs than Sephardic onesi. Perhaps partly as response to this tendency, Hed Hamizrah 
encouraged Israeli Palestinian Arab autonomous organization and representation: 
 "It is our duty to ensure that minorities have representation in the ... [parliament] that will be 
established…these Arabs should have the freedom to choose their own representatives…If there is a 
Minority Department in the government it is its duty to guide the Arab voters towards self-consolidation 
and organization."ii 
This argument perhaps mostly reflected inner Sephardic struggles for hegemony between the 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv CSCsiii, but it also expressed the Sephardic historical experience in the 
Ottoman Empire as an ethnic minority that held certain political autonomy, and reflected their 
unique native understanding of how a state apparatus can work in the heterogeneous Middle 
East with regards to ethnic and religious minorities.  
 
In sum, the regional Rupture of 1948 enforced a zero-sum game between Jews and Arabs in the 
Middle East, a game the Sephardic notables were drawn into despite efforts to prevent it. 
Eventually they lost from both sides: they lost their personal and economic relations with the 
Arab world but did not gain a higher stature in return. Instead, they lost most public positions 
and valuable assets. Becoming part of the national majority of the new Jewish state did not 
entail becoming part of its ethnic majority. The social and numerical Ashkenazi majority would 
include them in the national collective only in the price of their subjugation and not as equal 
partners of the ruling elites. This consisted of an insult, a slap in the face of this honorary elite. 
The native elites were excluded from the role of intermediaries, their native skills and 
knowledge either discarded or drafted to be used to control and spy after Palestinian Arabs. 
                                                             
professional circles; and his status as an Ashkenazi native to the land, affiliated to both Sephardic and Ashkenazi 
elites. I thank Hanan Harif for pointing this out to me. 
i There were three Palestinian Arab MPs and two non-Ashkenazi Jews representing Zionist parties in the parliament, 
besides the four members of the Sephardic faction.  
ii "Matters of the Hour" (le-'inyanei ha-sha'ah), HH, 10.12.48, p. 2. 
iii It was basically used while Bechor Chetrit headed the Ministry of Minorities. See also "Matters of the hour" (le-
'inyanei ha-sha'ah), HH, 7.1.49, p. 2. 
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Even the orientalist-romantic views that prevailed within certain sectors of the Israeli left were 
applied to the Arabs and not to this population, adding insult to injury. Of course the Sephardic 
notables had little experience in national or international politics, but they felt entitled to this 
role by their stature and heritage:  
"The government and the Histadrut like a body with a sole are working to distance the Sephardim from 
the network of political rule and administration…it is unthinkable…that the Jewry that is the first in the 
land and on which the entire Jewish settlement relied in the period of establishing the state will become 
miserable by discriminations."i  
The native elites of Labor tendencies who got included in the ruling elites got marginalized to 
powerless roles as the Minister of Police (Meir-Glitzenstein 2004), or recruited for security 
purposes. 1949 was a year of general disillusionment of the Jewish public from the prospect of 
Israel resolving its contradictions with the Arab states through the armistice negotiations, and 
getting accepted as part of the region. But it turned out that the role of the Iron Wall was not 
finished with the 1948 war, as some might have hoped. The Sephardim suffered a double 
disillusionment: one from the hope that the Jewish state would get accepted as part of the region, 
another from the hope they themselves would get accepted equally as a part of the state. The 
1948 zero sum game entailed for the Sephardic elites the loss of their native rights and their 




The Years in the Parliament                                                                                       1950-1955                                                                                       
 
In 1949 The Sephardic faction joined a very broad coalition that Ben Gurion composed. The 
faction was composed by different CSCs around the country, as was the Sephardic Countrywide 
Union, that in some senses was the central institution of the factionii.  However, some members 
of the Countrywide Union belonged to Zionist parties, and therefore the nature of the relation 
between the faction and the Countrywide Union was never agreed uponiii. Telem was expected 
by some from both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem CSCs to take charge of the Countrywide Unioniv, 
but that never occurred.  In March of 1950 Eliachar quit the government coalition on his own, 
                                                             
i "Manifesto to the Jews of Arab lands and Sephardic Jews" (giluy da'at le-yehudei artsot 'arav ve-yehudei sfarad), 
1948. CSCJA container 6238 file 393.  
ii "The Countrywide Union of the Sephardic Jews" (ha-ihud ha-artsi shel ha-yehudim ha-sfaradim), 1949. CSCJA 
container 6238 file 14.  
iii While Eliachar insisted that the CSCs should be the base for electing the Countrywide Union and exclude other 
parties’ members, the Tel Aviv leaders sought opened elections to it. See "Protocol of the council elected by the 
executive committee" (protokol mi-yeshivat ha-va'ada she-nivhera al yedei ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 8.6.50, CZA 
430A/60.  
iv Ibid. and "Protocol of the executive committee of the Jerusalem Community Council" (protokol ha-va'ad ha-po'el 
shel va'ad ha-'eda be-yerushalaim), 18.9.50. CSCJA container 6236 file 34/378. 
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following a disagreement about the budget. This move was perhaps mainly aimed to draw a 
clear distinction between a Jerusalem line of opposition to the government, versus the Tel Aviv 
pragmatic line of cooperation. This difference between these two political lines was also 
marked by ideological political-economic tendencies: Tel Aviv CSC's Labor-socialism and 
Jerusalem CSC's liberalism. The Countrywide Union, that never really got active in any 
practical sense, dissolved before the next elections that came soon in 1951. The big CSCs of 
Tel Aviv and Haifa declared their withdrawal from electoral politics as an organizationi. Their 
heads, Bechor Chetrit and Avraham Khalfon, joined Mapai. Eliachar formed a Sephardic 
faction inside the liberal-oriented General Zionist party (hereinafter GZ). This decision was 
taken without consulting with the younger cadre of the Telem activists, to their dismayii. This 
embitterment escalated into a full scale conflict, perhaps encouraged by Mapai infiltrators in 
the movementiii. Telem split between Eliachar's supporters and his opposition, and 
consequently ceased functioning as a political movement. The Sephardic faction within the GZ 
got two parliamentarians in the 1951 elections, while the GZ got twenty, becoming the second 
largest party. The faction also gained representation in Jerusalem's municipality. Hed Hamizrah 
stopped publishing after these elections, and in fact it practically stopped publishing in the 
period of preparation for new elections as well, besides two issues of propaganda right before 
it. This is probably due mainly to financial difficulties, but may also be related to a responsible 
decision to lower the flames of the conflicts with other Sephardic and Mizrahi circles outside 
the direct CSCJ circle, or at least to minimize public exposure to them.  
 
Eliahu Eliachar's career as a parliamentarian was not his main interest. He often travelled 
abroad, and put much of his efforts into rebuilding the international Sephardic communities' 
network, most prominently within communities in Paris, London and Buenos Aires. The World 
Sephardic Federation (hereinafter the Federation) was established between different circles of 
Israeli and Diasporic Sephardic elites, holding international conferences in Paris in 1951 and in 
Tel Aviv in 1954. Eliachar's attempt to set its center in Jerusalem was not accomplished, nor 
was his stubborn endeavor to organize it to compete with the Jewish Agency. This would have 
made the Federation a resource-raising mechanism for encouraging and absorbing immigration 
to Israel of Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewry from all over the world. However, many activists and 
capital-owners opposed this bold defiance of the hegemonic national-Zionist institutionsiv.  
                                                             
i "The Countrywide Sephardic Union has been Dismantled" (purak ha-ihud ha-artsi shel ha-sfaradim)Davar, 16.3.51, 
p. 1.  
iiLetter from Meir Matza to Eliahu Eliachar, 11.11.51, CZA 430A/34a.  
iii About this conflict see in: Herzog (1986): 135; "Trial over Violence in Telem Council" (mishpat 'al makot be-
mo'etset telem), Herut, 10.9.51, p. 2. The reasons to suspect Mapai's involvement here will be clarified with more 
detail in chapter 6.  
iv E.g. "Protocol of the management of the Sephardic Federation" (protokol yeshivat hanhalat ha-federatsia), 
3.11.53, CSCJA container 6239 file 417.  
150
Eliachar also raised funds from the international Sephardic community for the CSCJ's electoral 
campaignsi. Another purpose for which he raised funds was for the project of the Great Mativta, 
that consisted of a toranic high school and academy. The construction of the Great Mativta was 
the most central project of the CSCJ in this period, meant to educate Sephardic "spiritual 
leaders": rabbis, other ritual community roles and community leaders, worldwideii. The Great 
Mativta project was probably the principal public action to respond and set an alternative to the 
slowly expanding process of toranic colonization. The building was planned in honor of the 
Chief Sephardic Rabbi, and was designated to be his residence.  
As notable politics goes, the role of member of parliament for Eliachar was just another thing 
that he did, another one of his positions, another activity he engaged with along other private 
businesses and public projects. In the parliament, he most consistently and vigorously fought 
for his line of political economy, encouraging liberal economy, free markets and capital 
investments. This was against Mapai's policies that concentrated the entire economy around the 
party's mechanisms, while nurturing dependence in large donations from abroad. Eliachar also 
fought for specific issues related to Mizrahi immigration, mainly for increasing its quantity and 
quality. The motivation for this struggle was coherent with his other politics. He was moved by 
honest anxiety for the wellbeing of communities he conceived to be under danger of losing life, 
rights or property- usually the last. He was also greatly concerned by the fact that most Jewish 
community leaders and capital owners from different Arab countries did not immigrate to 
Israel, and thought that attracting their immigration should be a great priority, for the 
communities' and the country's sake. Therefore, the phenomenon of immigrants returning to 
their countries of origins and "slandering Israel"iii was also a consistent topic of his concern.  
Meir-Glitzenstein (2004) claimed the Sephardic members of Mapai did not foresee the deep 
ethnic inequality that was getting woven into the history of the state of Israel in those years, 
perpetuating a geographical and social distance between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim. In general, 
Sephardic activists in Zionist parties more often complied with their parties' view of Mizrahi 
immigrants, their need to change and shed their Arab costumes and cultureiv. The Sephardic 
party led by Eliachar certainly did see the inequalities getting formed and rooted, and 
emphasized consistently that the governments' treatment of Mizrahi immigrants was creating a 
problem of national and historical standards. Evidently, social inequalities by themselves was 
not the main interest of this circle of notables. The assumption of backwardness of the crowds 
                                                             
i Interview of Eliahu Eliachar by Margalit Bajerno, 1980. Oral History Archives of the Institute of Contemporary 
Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.  
ii "On Your Walls, Jerusalem. Document of the Problems and Activity of the CSCJ" ('al homotaih yerushalaim. kovets 
'al be'ayoteha u-pe'uloteiha shel va'ad 'edat ha-sfaradim be-yerushalaim), 1957, Jerusalem: Azriel.  
iii "The Subcommittee of the Interior Committee against Permanent Emigration from Israel" (va'idat ha-mishne shel 
ve'idat ha-pnim le-meni'at yerida me-ha-arets), 30.12.53, CZA 430A/86a. 
iv See for instance, "Merger of Ethnicities in Israel- How?" (mizug ha-‘edot be-israel: ha-keitsad?), Hame'orer (the 
organ of Tel Aviv CSC), January & February 1954. 
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of lower-stratum immigrants was also shared by the Sephardic notables. The issue that was so 
intolerable for the CSCJ circle was the reflection of this backwardness in the Israeli public 
discourse as racial matter, which thus reverberated on the notables as well.  
By the end of 1952 the immigrant transit camps had a clear Mizrahi majority, at least according 
to numbers, because this was an issue practically no public or political body in Israel raisedi. 
The CSCJ's proposed solution to the inequalities in immigration absorption was by a just 
redistribution of political power, which would combine Sephardic and Mizrahi notables in key 
positions in the immigration process: these positions were reserved to Ashkenazi experts and 
technocrats. Researchers have tended to dismiss this Sephardic political goal as self-interested 
(e.g. Derri-Weksler 2013, Chetrit 2001, Levy 1998). This was of course the case, but it was 
also a battle between different kinds of expert knowledge, different types of experiences that 
made for different bases for legitimacy to handle a certain problem (Eyal 2005). The Sephardic 
notables' claims were based on a correct assumption, that they would treat the immigrants with 
more sympathy, from a position that understands the immigrants' "hearts and…spirit and [most 
importantly] language"ii. Though the CSCJ had quite limited contacts with the new immigrants, 
when addressing their needs, they often exhibited empathy and closeness. Their attitude was 
not one of patronizing pity, but displayed sensitivity to the immigrants' cultural, spiritual and 
psychological straitsiii. Hed Hamizrah publications often expressed honest proximity to these 
immigrants' experiences and backgrounds:  
"These immigrants come here from a country of Arab-French culture… with a noble Jewish honor… 
They come here and everything they had imagined changes.  If on the boat they decided to be religious-
when they reach the transit camp or to some combat unit they see it is not easy… They get mocked at for 
their accent, their lifestyle. If on a certain moment when happiness strikes they respond with expressions 
of happiness of their own, in their songs and dances and laughter- they get mocked at. All this inserts in 
the immigrants feelings of inferiority and mental depression that later affects their thoughts and 
worldviews."iv  
                                                             
i For statistics see: Miriam Kachensky. "The Transit Camps" (ha-ma'abarot). Retrieved from: 
http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=12939&kwd=789 (last accessed on 13.3.20). The CSCJ mentioned it rarely 
in their meetings and in their publications, but they probably avoided making it a public issue because that could 
harm their attempts to attract further immigration. Only in 1957, when the newspaper Haaretz published this 
matter did the CSCJ spread that article broadly: "The Blacks and Whites" (ha-shhorim va-ha-levanim), CZA 
430A/33b. Also see, Y. Kalderon, “Opened letter to Avraham Abas man of Mapam” (mikhtav galuy le-avraham 'abas 
ish mapam), HH, 10.3.50, p. 12.  
ii "Matters of the Hour" (le-'inyaney ha-sha'ah), HH, 17.6.49, p. 2.  
iiiExamples for this can be seen in the series of articles by Dan Hason about this immigration in the Autumn of 1950, 
in Hed Hamizrah. The journal also published the fact that all cultural events in the immigrant transit camps were 
of European orientation, and stressed the extremely significant issue of food in the transit camps being 
inappropriate for the immigrants from Arab countries. "The Ways of Absorption of Mizrahi immigrants" (le-darkei 
ha-klita shel ha-'olim mi-'edot ha-mizrah), HH, 7.1.49, p. 15; "Matters of the Hour" (le-'inyaney ha-sha'ah), HH, 
28.1.49, p. 2.  
iv Shimon Shalem, "The Problems of Moroccan Youth in Israel" (be'ayot ha-no'ar ha-marocani be-israel”, HH, 
29.7.49, p. 14.   
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The struggle for Sephardic inclusion in the state's immigration mechanism was one of the 
principal ways to fulfill the alternative Sephardic vision of the Merger Diasporas. This was a 
central ethos of the Zionist institutions in their course of formulating the nation-building project 
they faced. In practice, this term was employed as an almost technical mission, left in the hands 
of clerks and social scientists that were entrusted to modernize and reeducate the immigrants 
from Muslim countries to fit into the hegemonic Ashkenazi Zionist identity. The Sephardic 
activists also tended to see the answer to this immigration's problems in education, but many of 
them, including the ones incorporated in the Labor movement, thought education should be 
aimed at raising leadership and nurturing elites within the immigrants' populationsi. The main 
project of the Federation in this period was to establish a system of scholarships for Sephardic 
and Mizrahi youth, but this initiative was thwarted by the central Zionist institutionsii.  
A further difference between the Sephardic and Ashkenazi Zionist elites was in the diagnosis 
of the problem. As some progressive Ashkenazim, the CSCJ circle did not challenge the 
perception that the immigrants had a "low cultural level", but they did not see it as an inherent 
quality. They considered it solvable by intensive investments of funds, organizations and 
personnel that should be provided by the local Sephardic and Mizrahi elite as an initiative of 
state authorities. The attitude that perceived the Mizrahi immigrants as inherently inferior was 
understood to be "defeatist" and racist by the CSCJ circleiii. These notables had an alternative 
perception of the meaning of the Merger of Diasporas. For them, it was about "Sharing with 
the Diasporas"iveconomic and symbolic resources, including them in "designing the nation's 
image"v, and in the "building of the nation and revival of the people"vi. That is, setting 
institutional, spiritual, organizational, cultural and educational policies. That would mean some 
modern Eurocentric patterns of the state would have to change, and Ashkenazim would require 
reeducation as wellvii. However, this claim was rarely made directly, either for cautious or for 
lack of coherency. What was usually emphasized was that the alternative conception of the 
Merger of Diasporas rendered the Sephardic and Mizrahi native elite indispensable: "the 
                                                             
i "Merging of the Diasporas- How?" (mizug galuyot- ha-keitsad?), Hame'orer, Janurary and Feburary 1954.  
ii "Protocol" (protokol), 14.4.52, CSCJA container 6239 file 417. "Committee of preparation of the Sephardic world 
conference" (va'ada le-hakhanat ha-kongres ha-sfaradi ha-'olami), 11.2.54, CZA 430A/58a 
iii Y. Ben Shimon, "The Defeated and the non-Defeated" (ha-nikhna'im ve-habilti nikhna'im), HH, 21.1.49, p. 13; 
"Maroccan Jewry Looking Towards Israel" (yahadut marocco tsofiya le-israel), HH, 22.7.49, p. 12; E. Eliachar, "The 
problem of Absorption of North African Immigrants. Was Mr. Gelblum Right?" (le-be’ayat ha-klita shel oley tsfon 
afrika. ha-nehona da'ato shel mar gelblum?), HH, 29.4.49, p. 8; "What is Telem Movement" (mahi tnu’at telem), 
undated, container 6214, file 12/103, CSCJA. 
iv shituf galuyot. E.g. Eliahu Eliachar in “Meeting #9” (yeshiva tet), 12.5.52, CSCJA container 6239 file 417; Knesset 
Protocols 1953 (2): 667.  
v dimuyo shel ha-'am. Moshe Ben Ami in Knesset Protocols 1949 (1): 113.  
vi "Preface" (ptah davar), Shevet Va'am 1954.  
vii  B. Arditi, "The Problem of all Problems: Discrimination" (be'ayat ha-be'ayot: aflaia), Shevet Va'am, 1954.   
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merger will not stand without us"i; because "even…if there was a Sephardic government, the 
ones ruling would be from the intelligentsia, as it is among the Ashkenazim"ii. Only towards the 
end of the second parliamentary term it seems Eliachar realized that immigrants' organizations 
themselves should also play a central role in this visioniii. 
During 1950 and 195  4 Eliachar insisted to hold serious conversations with Mapai and the GZ 
leaders, respectively. This was to be a deep conversation about the Sephardic and Mizrahi 
problemiv, in which this broad vision was probably meant to get clarified and made concrete, 
in order to recruit the relevant political elites to the missions required. However, the Ashkenazi 
Zionists leaders did not respond to this petition, which caused him great bitterness and created 
friction, first with the parliamentary coalition of 1949-1950 and afterwards within the GZ. 
Eventually the GZ formed an immigrants' department for spreading elections propaganda in 
1955. It was mainly aimed towards Eastern European immigrants, and did not count with 
Eliachar's participationv.  
Another department of the GZ Eliachar did not get incorporated to was the Minorities' 
Department, aimed at gaining an electoral base among Israeli Palestinian Arabs. The party tried 
to designate this role to himvi, and many of his colleagues from the Federation formed part of 
this department at a certain pointvii. Eliachar did not decline but neither was he inclined to take 
responsibilities within the department. The politics of intermediating between the government 
institutions and other ethnic minorities had very little to do with the Sephardic faction's political 
interests and prioritiesviii. If they were concerned about the Israeli Palestinian Arabs, it was 
mainly due to the humiliating fact that there were more Arabs in the parliament than Sephardim 
and Mizrahimix. 
                                                             
i Eliahu Eliachar in "Protocol" (protokol), 19.3.52, CSCJA container 6239 file 417.  
ii B. Arditi, "The Problem of all Problems: Discrimination" (be'ayat ha-be'ayot: aflaia), Shevet Va'am, 1954.   
iii "The Subcommittee for Merger of Diasporas" (ha-ve'ida le-mizug galuyot), 7.6.55, CZA 430A/81.  
iv "Meeting of the Executive committee of the Countrywide Union of the Sephardim and Eastern Ethnicities" 
(yeshivat ha-va'ad ha-po'el shel ha-ihud ha-artsi shel ha-sfaradim u-bnei 'edot ha-mizrah), undated, CSCJA 6238 
file 14; Letter from Eliahu Eliachar letter to P. Bernstein, 15.8.54, CZA A430/88b.  
v "The committee for clarifying the problem of new immigration in the party” (ha-va'ada le-berur be'ayot ha-'aliya 
ha-hadasha ba-miflaga), 28.1.55, CZA A430/88b. Previous attempts to construct a department for Mizrahi and 
Sephardic Jews in the GZ did not pull through. As apparent from different correspondences, some GZ leaders 
treated Eliachar with much more respect, as equals, than Mapai's leaders and other parliamentarians. They shared 
a social class and ideology, and the ethnic division was less of an obstacle in this relationship. However, the GZ did 
not give any institutional backing to the Sephardic faction unless it was for elections propaganda.  
vi Letter from A. Ben Zeev to Eliahu Eliachar, 22.4.53, CZA A430/88a.  
vii "Minorities Department" (mahleket ha-mi'utim), in: booklet of 19th Committee of the General Zionists, 3.4.52, 
CZA A430/88a.  
viii Eliachar made various attempts to discover what the line of the department was when was during this process, 
as can be seen in various correspondences in CZA A430/88a and CZA A430/253. On 24.10.54 Eliachar wrote to Y. 
Tamir of the GZ to remind him that he would wait for a serious discussion about the Sephardic and Mizrahi problem 
before attending the committee related to minorities, in CZA A430/88b. 
ix "Protocol of the Meeting of the General Committee" (pirtei-kol, yeshivat ha-va’ad ha-klali), 25.5.55, CSCJA 
container 6237, file 35/387.  
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Since Jerusalem was ethnically cleansed and physically cut off from Palestinian Arabs, and 
most Jerusalemite Palestinian Arabs notable had escaped before or during 1948, the CSCJ circle 
had quite limited relations with this populationi. Nonetheless, the natives of the land could  fully 
appreciate the magnitude of destruction that had stricken the Palestinian Arab society that 
remained in Israel. This based political attitudes that fluctuated between mistrust and 
commiseration:     
"It is difficult now for the Jew in Eretz-Israel to set his relation to the Arab, and it is even harder to 
express these things, even if we had them clear within ourselves. The Arab that is beaten now, whatever 
you may say to him would be like comforting the bereaved with the dead still in front of their eyes… 
From 'time to hate' there is no direct transfer to 'time to love', or to 'time for friendship'…"ii 
I believe the confusion described in this quote characterized many of the Sephardic and native 
elites during this period. Even though there were various attitudes as to the proper way to handle 
the new reality of the military regime, many of the Sephardic notables were unclassifiable in 
terms of the Zionist parties. The CSCJ barely ever referred to the Israeli Palestinian Arabs, but 
when they did it was with a mixture of rivalry and respect, superiority and proximityiii. The 
patterns of superiority were not dissimilar to the CSCJ's discourse of the Mizrahi immigrants, 
at least towards those sectors of these populations that were mostly of the same, lower social 
stratums.  
Since the death of the Chief Sephardic Rabbi in 1953, the CSCs and most Sephardic rabbis had 
been struggling to influence the election of the new Chief Sephardic Rabbi, an authority that 
belonged to the Ministry of Religion, commanded by the religious Zionist party of Ashkenazi 
hegemony. In 1955 the ministry appointed the rabbi that most Sephardic leadership opposediv. 
The new Chief Sephardic Rabbi Yitzhak Nissim undermined the CSCJ's Great Mativta project, 
and initiated a lawsuit against the CSCJ because of the funding they had used for itv. This caused 
much damage to the CSCJ's public image. This case reflected their distance from the religious 
institution at large, distancing them further from more religiously observant crowds and greratly 
                                                             
i Some old acquaintances or their acquaintances contacted Eliachar for help as MP.  E.g. Letters from Eliahu Eliachar 
to Eliezer Angel, 12.2.50, 6.3.51, CZA A430/239/6.  
ii Y.Y. Rivlin, "Our Relation to the Arabs" (yahasenu el ha-'aravim), undated [approx. Autumn of 1949], JCA, 
container 2717. 
iii "Nazareth Beyond the Jewish Jurisdiction" (natsrat mi-huts la-thum ha-yehudi), HH, 25.9.50, p. 18; Moshe Rabi, 
"An Arab School in the state of Israel" (bet sefer 'aravi be-medinat Israel), HH, 27.5.49, p. 11. Letter from Eliahu 
Eliachar to D. Grad 17.5.55; and to GZ ministers, 20.4.55, CZA A430/88b. Also see Derri-Weksler’s (2013) analysis 
of some of the other Sephardic elite's relations with this population.   
iv As compensation, Moshe Toledano, the CSCs' nominee and the head of the Sephardic Rabbinical Organization, 
that was supported for this nomination by most Sephardic leadership, got appointed in 1958 as the Minister of 
Religion without belonging officially to any political party. 
v See "What is Sacred in the Sacred Property?" (ma kadosh be-hekdesh?), Ha'olam Haze 31.5.56; "On Your Walls, 
Jerusalem. Document of the Problems and Activity of the CSCJ" ('al homotaih yerushalaim. kovets 'al be'ayoteha 
u-pe'uloteiha shel va'ad 'edat ha-sfaradim be-yerushalaim), 1957, Jerusalem: Azriel, pp. 32, 44-59. 
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undermined their public credibilityi. This affair probably put the final seal on the CSCJ's 
lowered prestige and determined its political marginality. By the 1955 elections, the CSCJ's 




Beyond National Politics: Politics of Honor                                                              1956-1957                                                
 
During the entire period studied in this chapter the CSCJ gave great importance to its own 
traditional honorary statusii. Taylor (1997) defined the notion of "politics of honor", as those 
politics based on an understanding of identity as constructed from social positions that are fixed 
in class hierarchies. The centrality of the politics of honor was one of the points of dispute 
between the CSCJ and Sephardic notables of Labor tendencies. This was reflected in various 
discussions of the Countrywide Union and the Federation, and most explicitly in the insistence 
to maintain Jerusalem's traditional central position and make it the central branch of activity of 
these institutions. The more pragmatic Sephardim, as the members of the Tel Aviv SCS, 
obviously would not benefit much from elevating the CSCJ's status this way, but they were also 
more eager to integrate in the apparatuses of the state as constructed by Mapai. Unlike the 
British Mandate, and despite the ethnic discrimination between Jews, the plundering of Israeli 
Palestinian Arabs and the practices employed in the military regime, Mapai's apparatus of 
domination carried a somewhat misleading discourse that depicted the state as a modern 
socialist democracy. In this political culture, the politics of honor were discredited as 
"effendism", belonging to a feudal backwards system. While most of the Labor-tending 
Sephardic elites adopted this notion, within the CSCJ circle the traditional notions were 
conserved. The honor of the Council for them was one with the honor of the Community, and 
Eliachar's personal honor was also intertwined in it: up to these last years, he practically was 
the Council. This made his rivals accuse him of being motivated only by his own personal 
interests and honor.  
Since 1955, the honor of the Community Council was constantly put on stake by different trials 
and lawsuits, centrally the one of the Chief Sephardic Rabbi. The diversity of private businesses 
and public activity typical of notable politics inevitably mixed private and public capitals: 
social, human and economic. Therefore, accusations in embezzlement or corruption were a 
brute offence in these circles, however it was almost always possible to claim, and could mainly 
                                                             
i Part of the problem was that their degree of religiosity was itself questionable by some. "Rally in a Tel Aviv Hotel" 
(asefa be-malon be-tel aviv), June 1956, CSCJA 6236 34/379. 
ii E.g. "Protocol" (pirtei-kol), 20.1.53; "Meeting. Management of Sephardic Federation" (yeshiva. hanhalat ha-
federatsia ha-sfaradit), 25.9, CSCJA container 6239 file 417; letter from Rabbi Uziel to Eliahu Eliachar, 14.2.51, CZA 
430A/88a; "Protocol" (pirteikol), 18.3.59, CSCJA container 6266 file 638.  
156
be avoided due to the established respect and trust acquired to the people in question. Lacking 
such personal respect opened the door to numerous types of accusationsi. The wave of conflicts 
and trials in this period made the CSCJ concern for its honor become ever more central in these 
years. One of the first actions of the new executive elected in 1957 was to establish a "Public 
Committee for Restoration of the Community's Honor"ii. Other than these issues, the CSCJ was 
mainly occupied with the building of the Great Mativtaiii, and other small-scale projects on the 
seam-line between business, charity and community developmentiv. It continued to advocate 
against different aspects of ethnic discrimination, with somewhat more emphasis on the 
rabbinical and cultural-religious spheres.  
The final retirement from national politics, the recurrent failures of Eliachar to politicize the 
Federationv, or perhaps the fact he left Jerusalemvi, all led to an institutional change of attitude 
towards the CSCJ circle. The 1956 Sinai campaign also did its share. According to Siton,  
"The government and Jewish Agency reached a turn after the Sinai campaign in their approach to the 
role eastern ethnicities… can play in the political field. At the time, there was a question about what 
would happen in a time of war with 'second Israel' that is composed especially of eastern ethnicities. The 
army includes now many of the immigrants whose conceptions are different than ours. And there, a 
pleasant surprise, they stood to the test, their spirit stood strongly and made a revolution. Also in the 
field of propaganda [hasbara] and intelligence we have succeeded thanks to the immigrants that speak 
the Arabs' language and we used it for propaganda mainly in Gaza Strip. For the first time we heard in 
the Agency that they understand that the matters related to these [Egyptian] Jews can only be treated by 
people who understand their language and spirits, and that it was a mistake not to understand it until 
now. They now want to recruit these factors and activate them. We were invited to set in motion the 
Federation to a series of activities, the Sephardic public must be alert and guide this process." vii  
Siton's description of the immigrants' participation in battle as a revolution, a test and a surprise 
might reflect his perceptions of them as incapable and inapt agents, in congruence with the 
hegemonic Ashkenazi perceptions. However, it also reflects a central concern of the native 
Sephardic elitist circles, not yet publicly addressed in this period, that the discrimination the 
i E.g. "Protocol. Meeting number 24" (pirteikol. yeshiva mispar 24), 30.3.59, CSCJA container 6266 file 638. Such 
accusations were also made around the split in Telem, see correspondence of Mr. Alankwa, Achva Press and the 
manager of the Balilius Fund in CZA 430A/40.  
iiva’ada tsiburit le-hahzarat kvod ha-‘eda. "Protocol. Sixth meeting" (pirteikol. yeshiva shishit), 16.6.57, CSCJA 
container 6266 file 638.  
iii Most of the CSCJ's resources were put into the Great Mativta, see budget in: "On Your Walls, Jerusalem. 
Document of the Problems and Activity of the CSCJ" ('al homotaih yerushalaim. kovets 'al be'ayoteha u-pe'uloteiha 
shel va'ad 'edat ha-sfaradim be-yerushalaim), 1957, Jerusalem: Azriel.   
iv For instance, a sowing school and a private equity.  
v E.g. "Protocol of the management of the Sephardic Federation" (protokol yeshivat hanhalat ha-federatsia), 
3.11.53, CSCJA 6239-417.   
vi Eliachar (1980): 341.  
vii This was stated in the context of the need to transit Egyptian Jewry to Israel. "Protocol. Meeting of the General 
Committee" (pirtei-kol. yeshivat ha-va’ad ha-klali), 4.8.55, CSCJA container 6237 file 387.  
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immigrants suffered within the Zionist regime was so dire that it would impede their loyalty to 
it, and would encourage them to help its enemies.  
As seen in this quote, it was once again the Mizrahi unique contribution to the manipulation of 
Palestinian Arab civil population which won this public some positive points, and its 
participation in warfare allowed the Zionist institutions to imagine its incorporation into 
influential positions in it. The de-politicization of the Sephardic activists was also the very basic 
condition for getting the ruling elites to cooperate with their institutions. By the end of 1957 
the Federation won a long standing struggle it had had with the Jewish Agency, and got to 
receive the desired 25% percent of all the funds recruited from Sephardic communities in the 
world by the Jewish Agencyi. The Federation was designed to create and maintain contacts 
between all Sephardic Diaspora, in Israel and abroad, in service of certain elitist circles. It was 
an organization around which Sephardic elites of all party affiliations gathered. Some of its 
goals were still getting defined and negotiated over between the parties involved in these years. 
In practice, it focused on production of knowledge about Sephardic and Mizrahi folklore and 
history, by organizing cultural events and publishing the journal Shevet Va'amii since 1954. As 
mentioned, the grand aspiration of the Federation was to raise independent funds from 
Sephardic communities abroad, in order to provide scholarships to Mizrahi and Sephardic 
youth: high school in this period, not to mention university, required paying high tuition fees, 
and this elite's top priority was to supply the next generation with tools for social-economic 
mobility in the modern world. This goal was practically the only thing that united the entire 
cadre of the Federation, but until this year the Jewish Agency strictly opposed any form of such 
distributions of its own funds, and also acted against their independent recruit of fundsiii. 
Eventually, Mapai succeeded to compel all the CSCJ's organizations to its terms, by 
fragmenting it and piling obstacles in its way, as it attempted to do to all its rivals.   
 
                                                             
i "Protocol" (pirteikol), 19.1.58, CSCJA container 6266 file 638.  
ii Roughly meaning, Tribe and Nation.  
iiiE.g. in "Protocol" (protokol), 19.3.52, CSCJA container 6239 file 417; "Review of the activity of the CSCJ for the 
year 1953" (skira me-pe'ulot va'ad ha-'eda ha-sfaradit be-yerushalaim li-shnat tashyag), CZA 430A/33a, letter from 
Eliahu Eliachar to Peretz Bernstein, 15.8.54, CZA 430A/88b. 
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PART III- DISCUSSION 
 
NOTABLE POLITICS                                           Autonomy and the Coloniality of Power                                                                              
 
Since the late Ottoman period, the CSCJ was the only institution in the country to have had the 
role of spiritual and symbolic leadership of the entire imagined community of Sephardic, North 
African and middle-eastern Jews. This was the base of social legitimacy for the CSCJ's claims 
to represent this public. For them, it was unimaginable that another kind of organization could 
have legitimacy to represent this collective, or at least it was considered highly unlikely to work. 
This was mainly a question of honor and social legitimacy, but also a question of organizational 
culture.  
Traditionally, the CSCJ functioned as a mother organization, patron of smaller organizations, 
each for different Mizrahi ethnic-cultural origins. These small organizations depended on the 
bigger one as a potential source of funds. Since 1947 the executive council kept safeguarded 
places for the different ethnic organizations' leaders. Organizations formed by new immigrants 
after 1948 almost never cooperated with the CSCJ in any sense. Immigrants often wrote to 
Eliachar for aid, and were benefactors of the CSCJ women organization's charity and education 
institutions, but they hardly ever became members or got included in the patronage systemi.  
Each of the ethnic organizations incorporated to the CSCJ kept its autonomy. According to one 
view, the Sephardic ethnicity was a patron of the rest of the ethnicities, in a sense due to its 
superiority, while another view understood it to represent a "general" ethnicity that is the sum 
of all the other ethnic identities. Eliachar held the last view, which brought the reform in the 
executive in 1947 (Haim 2000). Nonetheless, his practices and style of an exalted capital-owner 
could reflect either attitude. The system of patronage left much room for mutual insults and 
accusations of discrimination or of passivityii. These accusations were not uncommon in the 
relationship of Mapai with other parties as well. In fact, there are other comparable aspects 
between the CSCJ's political culture and the Israeli political culture dominated by Labor 
Zionism. Such was the basic political ambition of any particular elite circle to unite and 
represent an entire public, by nurturing dependence of other groups in the elite circle, as part of 
its struggle to hegemony. However, the essential difference between the Ashkenazi-Zionist and 
Sephardic elites was that the CSCJ was formulated in the context of the multi-ethnic Middle 
                                                             
i This observation is based on contrasting official address lists with the population dispersal tendencies of 
immigrants and old-timers in different neighborhoods. "Names of members of Bnot Yerushalaim association" 
(shmot ha-haverot be-agudat 'bnot yerushalaim'), CSCJA container 6228 file 628. "List of Needed Sephardim and 
Eastern Ethnicities" (reshimat nizkakim mizrahim u-bnei 'edot ha-mizrah), undated, CZA 430A/34g. "List of suffrage 
holders" (reshimat boharim), 1957, CSCJA container 6215 file 7. 
ii For example, see the bitter correspondence in 1953 between Eliahu Eliachar and Nahum Yaakov Mizrahi, a 
representative of the Union of Kurdistani Jews in the Council’s executive, in CZA 430A/34a.  
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East, it was accustomed to managing diversity, and its organization required the other groups 
maintained their autonomic representation. Mapai, in contrast, tried to dismantle any competing 
organization and absorb it. The main distinctive feature of the CSCJ circle between other 
Sephardic activists was that it did not intend to fight for the crumbs left to it by the Ashkenazi 
Zionist leaders. Rather, it intended to lead a comprehensive change in the state's institutions 
themselves. The main tool for this struggle was self-organization, maintaining an autonomous 
organization not dependent in the Ashkenazi-dominated Zionist institutions:  
"Cancelling discriminations depends on our ability to get organized and ensure representation in state 
institutions"i 
"…Two peoples are getting created here... I get letters from many different places that describe the 
relations getting created between the different tribes… If we by ourselves by auto-emancipation will not 
reach merger we will not accomplish this task. This state needs another Sephardic arm or it will be lost"ii 
 "I respect Mapai as a rival but not as a partner in our public work because it wants to extract [la'akor] 
both Chetrit and me from the roots"iii 
This was the essence of the efforts of the Federation to raise its own funds, and of all of CSCJ's 
factories, that attempted, on small and highly limited scale, to create autonomous systems that 
would consist of practical alternatives to the huge apparatus of Mapai's domination. This strive 
for autonomy was the main tool in the decolonial Sephardic struggle, because it was the only 
way to make things work as they saw fit, and differ from the modern/colonial practices of the 
ruling elites.  
 
As mentioned previously, in the framework of the Jewish state, the Sephardic notable politics 
became irrelevant to the role of intermediaries with the Arab world. This pre-statehood claim 
was replaced after 1948 in a claim to intermediate between the state institutions and the 
immigrants. Despite some researchers' observation that the Sephardic public was of a mid-
stratum social class between the Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews, and held customs that were also 
mid-way between these two populationsiv, the CSCJ did not succeed to translate this position 
to a viable political claim. It was not able to create networks that would attract the multitudes 
of lower-stratum immigrants that lacked notables' leadership. They had no significant allies in 
the transit camps and very few allies within the immigrants that arrived. This is another reason 
that much of Eliachar's work in the parliament was aimed at advancing the immigration of 
                                                             
i Document undated and untitled, a platform to explain joining the General Zionists in 1951. CZA 430A/60.  
ii Eliahu Eliachar in "Protocol" (protokol), 19.3.52, CSCJA container 6239 file 417.  
iii Eliahu Eliachar in "Protocol of Countrywide Union executive meeting" (pirteikol mi-yeshivat ha-ihud ha-artsi), 
27.8.50, CSCJA container 6238 file 14.  
iv See: Baharad (2011), Gurevich, A. (1940). Bulletin #21. Demographic Survey. The Jewish Settlememt in Eretz-Israel 




Mizrahi elites. Moreover, the politics of honor that was the base of their notable politics was 
not justified in the ethos of a modern-western democracy Israel was nurturing. The CSCJ, 
unlike other circles of Sephardic elite, did not aspire to unlearn its practices and change its ways 
and worldviews in order to fit into the Israeli political system, and the ominous apparatus of 
Mapai's reign was certainly not a good example of how a liberal democracy should work. From 
the Sephardic marginalized place, no wonder they considered it a "wretched disease from the 
west: the sickness of political parties"i, and that they thought that the combined power of all 
the CSCs might be able to challenge the political culture of the Zionist regime:  
"We represent more than our own powers [le-ma'ala mi-kohenu], more than a democratic body can 
represent… [since] we have been uplifted beyond the Community and became an organization. That is 
why the path of the Union is only through the Councils"ii.   
Even if the CSCJ attempted at times to compete by the rules of the new game, it could not really 
lead any other form of autonomous organization other than a Community Council: they did not 
have the organizational tools, the schemes of habitus or the social contacts or skills to build 
another kind of social legitimacy.  
Bourdieu (1984) reviewed the reasons for unequal participation in electoral politics between 
social classes and sexes, and emphasized the way in which technical competences and social 
competences nurture each other, reducing this way the possible participation of people who do 
not already have the disposition to participate in politics. People's habitus is another expression 
of their dispositions: the way people claim physical space, their presence and bearing, gestures, 
postures, body language and words. Using Bourdieu's logic, it is clear that the Sephardic 
notables' very sense of entitlement to approach the political field, their perceived authority to 
talk about public affairs, was directly related to the kind of political culture that they were 
immersed in and nurtured from. Their technical competences, their discourses and ways of 
action were rooted in it, and their social competences and habitus allowed them to gain respect 
among certain circles and make alliances. Notables are made notables by their public 
recognition as an important and respectable people, but they must also be noted as such by an 
official, universal authority. Eventually, it is the state that holds the monopoly over the official 
recognition of the proper social classification (Bourdieu 1985). The Sephardic classification as 
notables was entirely disqualified by the state. This led some Sephardic elites to acquire the 
technical and social competences required for competing successfully within the new political 
                                                             
iMoshe Ben Ami in "Third meeting of the council of the Countrywide Union of the Sephardim and Eastern 
Ethnicities" (yeshiva shlishit shel moetset ha-ihud ha-artsi shel ha-sfaradim u-bnei 'edot ha-mizrah), 5.10.50. CSCJA 
container 6238 file 14.  
ii Eliahu Eliachar in his opposition to free elections to the Countrywide Union, "Protocol of the Executive committee 
of the Jerusalem Community Council" (protokol ha-va'ad ha-po'el shel va'ad ha-'eda be-yerushalaim), 18.9.50. 
CSCJA container 6236 file 34/378. 
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culture. However, the CSCJ's very sense of entitlement to be concerned about the Sephardic 
and Mizrahi publics arrived from applying their own political culture: their notable politics, 
even though disqualified, was indispensable in guiding their political participation, and so was 
the autonomy expressed in the CCs' structure. The CC structure was imperative for an 
autonomous Sephardic and Mizrahi organization in order to manage the diversity of this public, 
handling the identity and class differences in it while guarantying its unity. Unity was necessary 
for gaining power against the Zionist-Ashkenazi coloniality of power. The Zionist coloniality 
of power, its matrix of control, created a system of multiple hierarchies that benefited the entire 
Ashkenazi population economically, geographically, professionally and culturally, ethnicity 
functioning as an organizing principle. These Heterarchies (Grosfoguel 2011) were woven into 
the institutional structure of the Zionist regime. The historical party-key, that redistributed most 
jobs and housing, was the most important institutional tool in this process. The party-key was 
the strongest mechanism to prove to the Sephardic and Mizrahi public that autonomy was not 
worthwhile: the CSCJ was simply not enough of a political party to ever get the chance to get 
included in it. 
 
Unlike the older generation of Sephardic notables, the younger generation that was organized 
in Telem did imagine anew and had the inspiration to construct a different kind of political 
organization that would express Mizrahi autonomy. I believe the main obstacle for Telem was 
the old generation's politics of honors, inherent in their notable politics.  
The technical details concerning the nature of relationship between the CSCJ and Telem, like 
the relationship between the Countrywide Union and the Sephardic parliamentary faction, were 
never entirely agreed upon, and so the relations between the institutions were conceived 
differently by the different agents involved i. This eventually brought the split and the end of 
Telem, because it was not able to establish its autonomy from the CSCJ, neither in term of 
action nor by sources of fundingii. Eliachar was the one who held relationships with Sephardic 
notables abroad who were potential funders of autonomous Sephardic action in Israel.  Telem 
remained dependent, bound to give the CSCJ an honorary position within the movement and 
follow the politics it dictated. Under these conditions, Telem could not transform itself into a 
progressive democratic tool for broad Mizrahi publics. The CSCJ would certainly not fund or 
support any organization that did not give it centrality: its pro-Sephardic and Mizrahi ambitions 
were a weaker component in its ideology than the honor and heritage of the CSCJ itself. This 
central concern of the CSCJ for "symbolic aspects of existence" was a direct expression of its 
                                                             
i "Protocol of the council elected by the executive committee” (protokol mi-yeshivat ha-va'ada she-nivhera 'al yedei 
ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 8.6.50, CZA 430A/60. 
ii Letter from Shlomo Bahar to Eliahu Eliachar, 21.9.49, CSCJA container 6214 file 12/103; Letter from Meir Matsa 
to Eliahu Eliachar, 8.12.53, CZA 430A/236a/5. 
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social class, "freed from more brutal forms of oppression and exploitation" (Bourdieu 1984). 
However, the struggles were inherently intertwined: the honor of the CSCJ was perceived to be 
as one and the same with the honor of the Sephardic public. The pride of the Community was 
measured in power positions of the Council's members in the state's mechanism, but also in the 
dignified acceptance of the Mizrahi immigrants in the state, on both a discursive and practical 
level. The demands for personal honor towards the notables and for dignity for their perceived 
broader public were interconnected in the core.  
 
 
BORDER THINKING                                                       and the Coloniality of Knowledge                               
 
Eyal (2005) wrote about the different types of institutions established in Israel since 1948 that 
monopolized three types of Orientalist expert knowledge. Production of knowledge about 
Mizrahi Jews was entrusted to social scientists, knowledge about the surrounding Arab states 
was monopolized by state Intelligence, and the military regime concentrated knowledge about 
Israeli Palestinian Arab population, mostly gathering information of how to exploit and 
encourage socio-political schisms in this society. After the establishment of the state almost all 
mediation skills or expertise related to Arabs got framed as security-oriented knowledge, or 
were used for the purpose of attracting electoral votes. As mentioned, this had a significant 
effect on the trajectories of Jews from Arab countries, as the military regime recruited mostly 
Mizrahi immigrants from middle-eastern Arab countries because of their language skills, 
Intelligence also recruited many. The Sephardic notables' native expert-knowledge and skills 
were mostly not regarded as relevant expertise for any other mechanism of the state (Eyal 
2005). The violence that compromised the Israeli-Arab borders between 1949 and 1956 kept 
Israel in a status of constant, low-key war: the kind of persistent tension that makes citizens 
more loyal to the state, that makes it taboo to speak against the government, because it is 
supposedly doing its best to secure its citizens lives. It could be claimed the CSCJ endorsed this 
taboo, since it avoided almost entirely from voicing opinions about Arab related politics in this 
period. However, I believe that in fact, they simply did not know what to say. Their particular 
potential contribution, the claim to serve as a bridge to Arabs, the possibility of founding 
regional and local cooperation, all lost their validity. As Bourdieu (1984) suggested, their 
indifference to the field of exterior politics was a simple manifestation of their incompetence: 
their approach to the issues of appeasement was irrelevant under the constant warfare.  
For this reason, the CSCJ's claim for expert knowledge switched its object of knowledge from 
the Palestinian Arabs to the Mizrahi immigrants: this was the field where they could still claim 
for a power position as the educated native elites, despite the little to null contact they actually 
had with new immigrants. This claim exempted them from dealing with issues of national 
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security, thus also releasing them from the need to prove their loyalty to the state.  This claim, 
however, collided with the social scientists' role. Even though the last had the official, scientific 
seal of experts, during this decade they were challenged at times by the Sephardic intellectual 
elite. Eliachar and others criticized the social scientists' inaccuracy and insufficient knowledge 
to address the Mizrahi and Sephardic problemi.  
The battle over the experts' position about the Mizrahi immigrants reflected the Sephardic 
border-thinking, which enabled them to think from and to criticize both western and non-
western forms of knowledge. Within this intellectual elite there were autodidactic social 
scientists, which continued a Jerusalemite-Sephardic tradition of producing ethnographies of 
Mizrahi Jewry (see Noy 2014). There were others who casted doubt over the relevance of the 
academic establishment and held extra-academic research projectsii. Still though, the 
immigrants were measured by the tools and standards of western modernity, evident in the 
Sephardic recurring concern over the immigrants' "low cultural level"iii. At the same time, their 
experiences and life styles were understood and accepted, and they were not often estranged or 
thought of as inherently inferior. I agree with Noy (2014: 47) that in a certain sense, the 
Sephardic elitist condescendence was "completely different from missionary or colonialist 
attitudes", as it perceived the immigrants as brothers in a common project, whom they 
recognized, were compassionate for, and felt responsibility over, in contrast to the fear, pity 
and authoritative attitudes common among the Ashkenazi elites.  
Nonetheless, the perceived inferiority of the Mizrahi public by the Zionist ruling elites was not 
something the Sephardic notables could afford getting themselves contaminated with, and this 
tilted their border-thinking further towards the hegemonic European modernist patterns. As 
much as the Mizrahi immigrants were getting stereotyped negatively by the ruling discourse, 
the CSCJ circle nurtured further a feeling of superiorityiv (Peretz 2000): 
"This journalist exposed without fear or restriction what he saw in the camps…above all there is a 
serious problem, and that is the lack of any ability to get accommodated to the country, first and fore 
mostly- chronic laziness and hate of work. All of them, without exception, are without a profession and 
of course extremely poor. They will all tell you that in Africa they were 'merchants', that is, petite 
traders… Hundreds and thousands of African sit, therefore, in camps, and claim that they are being 
discriminated against by the Ashkenazim…But this is not intentional discrimination…its simply easier to 
                                                             
i "The situation of Mizrahi Jews" ('al matsavam shel yehudei ha-mizrah), HH, 12.8.49, p. 11; "The Subcommittee for 
Merger of Diasporas" (ha-ve'ida le-mizug galuyot), 7.6.55, CZA 430A/81.  
ii These could get published for instance in Shevet Va'am; also see for instance, Moshe Rabi, "Shabbat Prayer with 
Immigrants from Morocco" (tfilat shabat ‘im mehagrim me-moroko), HH, 13.4.49, p. 15. 
iii E.g. Letter from A. Toledano to Meir Ben Kiki, 24.9.50, CSCJA container 6214, file 12/103; Eliahu Eliachar, "The 
Problem of Ethnicities in Israel" (be’ayat ha-‘edot ba-arets), HH, 25.9.50, p. 5. 
iv See Baharad (2011) for these processes among Sephardim in the transit camps in the early 1950s.  
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organize the rest and more difficult to organize the Africans."i 
The new social order made the Sephardic elites closer than ever before to the ruling Ashkenazi 
elites. After all, the Jewish population that lived in the land for the past decades shared not few 
important, constitutive experiences, that designed a certain collective mentality and certain 
shared ideological commitments (Bashkin 2017). This reality got translated into the state 
mechanisms, which used administrative division of population data according to the categories 
of old-timers, or veterans, versus new immigrants, the Statistical Bureau collecting data only 
of individuals' country of birth and not of their parents or origins. As shown by Bonilla-Silva 
(2004), the Social Census forms an important part of states' "racial governability", and has far 
reaching and profound effects on individuals' subjectivity and self-understanding. The ways in 
which states count, classify and identify their citizens through the categories the Census uses 
can have the effect of "making up people" or "nominating into existence" new kinds of persons 
for individuals to be. In the new Israeli state, Ashkenazi veterans were identified as "the natives" 
who receive the foreign immigration (Efron 2005). The state's reality created new "situated 
knowledge" (Haraway 1995), another corporal position from which to construct particular 
knowledge, a position from which the Sephardic elites shared more attributes and had more in 
common with the Ashkenazi elites than ever before. While for many Sephardim and Mizrahim 
of the elites the identification with Ashkenazi elites was a conscious choice they purposely 
sought, the case of the CSCJ circle emphasizes the involuntary nature of the processes of 
cultural assimilation, enforced by institutional expressions of the structures of power.  
This process did not start in 1948 but it certainly got institutionally stable in this period, and 
was reflected in certain battles yielded to the ruling elite. For instance, one struggle of the CSCJ 
circles in this period was for Sephardic elites to get qualified and hired by the Zionist 
institutions for the different immigration-related tasks in Israel and abroadii. While before 1948 
the struggle was for gaining positions within the Zionist institutions in order to provide 
guidance or at least mediation, now the elites asked themselves to be guided by the Zionist 
institutions. The force of the coloniality of knowledge was also evident in some of the CSCJ's 
political demands, language and practices. They greatly emphasized any Ashkenazi who 
claimed against discrimination, as a cutting proof for the very existence of ethnic 
discrimination. This entailed certain adaptation of the quoted person's terminology, and raised 
demands the CSCJ did not dare utter beforehandiii. Some could claim that the mere adaptation 
of the ethos of Merger of the Diasporas is an example of this, though I would claim that the 
                                                             
i "The Problem of Absorption of Mizrahi Jews- is Mr. Gelblum Right?" (le-be’ayat ha-klita shel oley tsfon afrika. ha-
nehona da'ato shel mar gelblum?), HH, 29.4.49, p. 8.   
ii E.g. "Matters of the Hour" (le-'inyanei ha-sha'ah), HH, 3.2.50, p. 2; 8.7.49, p. 2; Eliachar (1980): 311.   
iii For instance, the following article reverberated widely in Hed Hamizrah, and increased the use in the term 
“hegemony” in the journal: Y. Shprintzak, "Talk to the Sephardim" (ledaber 'im ha-sfaradim), Davar, 11.9.50. Also 
see: “The Blacks and the Whites” (ha-shhorim ve-ha-levanim), 1957, CZA 430A/33b.   
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Sephardim often creatively appropriated it, as in Eliachar's claim for "Sharing with the 
Diasporas". As a political faction, the CSCJ also attempted to imitate certain aspect of the 
Zionist parties' political culture. It democratized its inner elections regulationsi and invested in 
"constructive factories". This Zionist Ashkenazi term was adopted to relate to different projects 
the CSCJ established in order to supply financial loans, work and education opportunities to 
the public, that would not be framed as charityii. Their resources allowed them to fulfill projects 
only on tiny scales, and these were not fully adapted to the new political system anyways: the 
Sephardic "factories" functioned more like small businesses, and it is not clear that the users 
were obliged in any way to become members of the CSCJ or encouraged to vote it on elections, 
as in Mapai's apparatus of domination. The Federation focused on production of knowledge 
about Sephardic and Mizrahi folklore and history. However, as some researchers showed, this 
kind of knowledge production did not necessarily empower these cultural heritages, but mostly 
led to their folklorization and academization (Behar 2007: 14, Eyal 2005: 143). In fact, it would 
bring the near erasure of Sephardic culture as a live culture from the next generation born in 
Israel (Meyuhas-Ginio 2014).  
 
The processes of the coloniality of knowledge might also be told as "a creative process of a live 
community" that entails exchanges of knowledge and learning (Behar 2007). What made it 
colonial is that the exchange was not mutual, and that this process of learning and adapting 
necessarily meant the unlearning of the Sephardic political discourse, culture and practices. 
Despite rejecting cultural-political ashkenization of the style of Labor-tending Sephardic elites, 
the CSCJ circle also sought ways to keep high stances within the Zionist colonial westernization 
scale. A principal way for these activists to do so was first to mostly mark Arabs as inherent 
enemies during 1949, and then to ignore Arab-related politics for the rest of the period. This 
designed their particular process of ashkenization, as a process of de-Arabization. For many 
immigrants from North African countries the rejection of similarity to Arabs completed a 
process that began in their countries of origins (Tsur 2007). By contrast, for many immigrants 
from middle-eastern countries, setting Jewishness and Arabness as antonyms was cause for 
"profound and visceral schizophrenia" (Shohat 1992). Slabodsky (2014) wrote about this 
process of self-rejection among colonized native intellectuals, and the ways it entails an attempt 
                                                             
i The central institutions were opened for women, the tax for voting was lowered and was removed altogether for 
the right to get elected. See "General Elections to the CSCJ" (bhirot klaliyot le-va’ad ha-'eda ha-sfaradit be-
yerushalaim), HH, 16.2.51, p. 8. A tax was placed again for getting elected in their internal elections in 1957. "List 
of Contributors" (reshimat tormim), CSCJA container 6218 file 145.  Also, if before statehood there were 
restrictions on the form in which non-Sephardic groups could enter, in 1951 the only requirement was "any 
Sephardic or Mizrahi that would abide to the authority of the Community and its decisions", HH ibid. 
ii The Great Mativta project was considered a constructive factory. In the first half of the period mainly Telem and 
Bnot Yerushalaim association run such "factories", after 1957 the CSCJ initiated more "factories" that concentrated 
on finance.  
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to assimilate into a system built upon racial constructions that the self-rejecting subjects attempt 
to ignore. While the CSCJ did not at all ignore the ethnic inequality between Jews, their 
withdrawing from discourse about larger middle-eastern politics, and avoidance of opining 
about the Arabs inside Israel as well, was an important factor designing their ashkenization as 
a process of de-Arabization. This is because it neutralized them as subjects of alternative 
knowledge to the dominant Ashkenazi one. The story of the CSCJ's political decline, 
accompanied by the tilt towards the modern European side of their border-thinking, is the story 
of the slow infiltration of the coloniality of knowledge. This was the meaning of their growing 
identification with the Ashkenazi Zionist elites. It is a demonstration of the coloniality of 
knowledge at work, in its process of fragmentation of knowledge and swallowing of identities. 
This is the reason the Sephardic elites lost in their competition with Ashkenazi social scientists, 
and the reason they depended on Ashkenazim for developing their own discourse. The 
coloniality of knowledge undermined the unique value of their potential contribution to policies 




COLLECTIVE IDENTITY                                                       and the Coloniality of Being                                   
 
To use Social Movement Theory language, it can be said that Israel's separation from the Arab 
world in general, and Jerusalem's division in particular, closed the CSCJ's political structure of 
opportunities and also reduced significantly their resources. The political system itself was very 
limiting to all the rivals of Mapai, and those not included in the party-key had even less chances 
to attract followers. On the other hand, the waves of immigration from Muslim countries opened 
the CSCJ's political structure of opportunities considerably. This opening was not well 
exploited, both because of the lack of resources and also for bad resource mobilization, an effect 
of the political culture of notable politics in the field of the Zionist political culture. Another 
considerable obstacle in the CSCJ's political trajectory, which Social Movement Theory points 
at as well, was the need to create a collective of Mizrahi and Sephardic Jews, immigrants and 
old-timersi, indeed to generate a collective identity that they could actually represent.  
 
As mentioned, the creation of a modern/colonial Jewish state entailed the discrediting of 
traditional middle-eastern politics of honor. According to Taylor (1997), with the rise of the 
identity of the individual within modern European states, the notion of honor was replaced with 
the modern notion of dignity, which is equal for all. As Taylor explained, this change in 
                                                             
i This was the name of the Sephardic faction for the third parliamentary elections, see table IV.  
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modernity entailed the birth of the politics of difference, which has as principal demand the 
recognition of unique identities:  
"The convention addresses the management of the party in a demand to renew and expand the special 
department of Sephardim and eastern ethnicities in the state, in order to take care of the urgent and 
special problems of the public."i 
The politics of difference and the politics of equal dignity are both universal, explained Taylor, 
and therefore they collide, since the first actually asks for recognition and status for something 
that not everybody shares. The antagonism this request may arouse within democratic 
institutions can well be seen in Eliachar's performance as MP. So for instance, in response to 
Eliachar's complaints about his opinion not getting considered in a parliamentary discussion, 
the parliament's chairman replied:  
"I have no claim for a Member of Parliament that cannot fit himself into the framework of parliamentary 
technique. I have no claims. And slowly he will fit… (laughter) but this inability must not be made into 
privilege.  The parliament cannot be run this way." ii 
The politics of difference and the politics of equal dignity, both based on respective equality, 
may contradict and interfere with each other. From the same assumption that dignity is shared 
by all, some promote recognition in the value of the uniqueness of a group, while others call to 
abolish distribution according to groups' specificity (Fraser 1993). In fact, denying the 
relevance of race in politics is the norm of nationalist discourses worldwide (Bonilla-Silva & 
Embrick 2006). The national elites demand blindness to difference, while ethnic groups may 
request recognition and fostering of particularity. Each mode of politics delegitimizes the other, 
claiming it forms a basis for discrimination (Taylor 1997). Of course, often the discourse 
requiring blindness to difference asks to eliminate only certain kinds of difference, those of the 
groups that compete with the groups who compose the elite. However, that does not necessarily 
make this discourse any less effective on the groups that have less power. Despite the clear 
racist practices of the state, the Ashkenazi elites maintained a rhetoric of national equality 
between Jews, and from this standpoint often accused the CSCJ of causing separatism and 
creating discriminatory politics by their very discourses about ethnic discrimination. This 
conduced much of efforts of the CSCJ's political faction to the defensive front, centered on 
legitimizing the very existence of the autonomous organization and attempting to disprove the 
negative stigma. The struggle over legitimacy was not very successful, considering the limited 
structure of opportunities under the reign of Labor Zionism (Herzog 1986: 109-110). Many of 
the native elites soon got convinced that there was not only no utility, but also no moral 
                                                             
i Y. Elakana, "To the Sephardic and Mizrahi activists of the General Zionist Organization" (el pe'ilei ha-sfaradim u-
bnei 'edot ha-mizrah be-histadrut ha-tsiyonim ha-klaliim), 31.5.53. CZA 430A/88a.  
ii Knesset Protocols, 7.3.50.  
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justification to hold a Sephardic or Mizrahi autonomous organization or struggle. A major 
obstacle for the CSCJ to credibly confront these assaults was the lack of a collective identity to 
give its discourse positive ideological content. In lack of such positive content of a collective 
identity, the politics of difference the CSCJ developed was mostly for the sake of the Sephardic 
and native notables, expressed in their main struggle for representation in the state institutions.  
The Federation, which concentrated more on the cultural struggle, could not form a collective 
identity either. The activity it promoted was mainly intellectual, focused on education, cultural 
events, publishing and research. The cultural struggle was based on giving stage to past 
heritage, folklore, culture and history: in the cultural struggle, the fragmentation of the 
Sephardic-Mizrahi collective into its different countries of origin is inherent i.  
The economic struggle was the primary source of split and not union within this Sephardic 
activist circles, because of their dispute about the solution for Israel's economic issues, which 
surmounted to alliances with different Zionist parties. The only way opened to attempt to 
establish a collective identity could have been by emphasizing common liturgy and rabbinical 
schools of thought. The spiritual-cultural sphere indeed was a central platform of struggle of 
the CSCJ by the end of the period, with the toranic academy of the Great Mativta their main 
project during most of it. The Eurocentric rabbinical system would eventually win this struggle 
as well, as we will see in the next period.  
 
The very notion that there was a collective identity that the CSCJ represented relied on an earlier 
imagination of a Sephardic and Mizrahi Diaspora, versus an Ashkenazi European Diaspora, 
which had Jerusalem as its spiritual base (Noy 2014). Bartel (1997) said Eliachar had a vision 
of an alternative middle-eastern Zionism, whereas Herzog (1986) claimed the Sephardic parties 
did not present a unique ideology that challenged the existing order with an alternative. I agree 
with both. The CSCJ certainly nurtured an ideology based on a middle-eastern collective 
identity, which could be elevated to cause deep changes in the Zionist regime of the state of 
Israel. Nonetheless, this ideology was not formulated coherently. I believe one of the difficulties 
in explicating the meaning of a middle-eastern Israeli identity was the established detachedness 
between Israel and the Arab world:  
"We will not determine here our exterior-politics orientation [ha-orientatsia hamedinit shelanu]…but 
discuss it, because that requires seriousness [koved rosh]…and perhaps with time we can clarify to 
ourselves concepts that are blurred nowadays."ii   
                                                             
i See for instance the closed event -for Sephardim only- that hosted a lecture about Maimonides, which the CSCJ 
arranged in the framework of the gathering of the World Federation in Israel in 1954. See various correspondences 
and invitations in CSCJA container 6329 file 1432.  
ii David Siton, "Deepening Eastern Consciousness among Us" (le-ha'amakat ha-toda'a hamizrahit bekirbenu). Shevet 
Va'am 1959.  
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A middle-eastern native identity without any contact to the Arab world would be devoid of 
substantive positive content, it would have little to rely on if Arabic language or Arab customs 
cannot play in it a positive part. The need of the Sephardic notables to shake off the negative 
stereotypes of the Mizrahi immigrants prevented the CSCJ from explicating a defense to their 
Arab culture and costumes. Arabic was rarely used in the CSCJ campaigns, and knowledge 
about the Arab world was hardly ever used to claim any postures. Criticizing Israeli policies 
related to Arab countries was precisely the limit the CSCJ members put to their critique on the 
government, within the effort to prove their loyalty.  
The work of the coloniality of knowledge, the de-Arabization and ashkenization that shaped 
the tendency towards the modern European side of the Sephardic border-thinking has a 
significant ontological dimension:  the coloniality of being (Maldonado-Torres 2007). The 
coloniality of being shaped the CSCJ's activists' growing identification with the Ashkenazi 
Zionist elites, and distanced them from the immigrants they presumed to represent.  
This ontological dimension was directly related to the miraculous establishment of the state by 
the resources and initiative of the Ashkenazi Zionist movement. The Zionist colonial project 
could have hardly contained a native middle-eastern collective identity. This identity could 
exist even less in the state of Israel, in the solitary fortress of European modernity that was 
hurriedly formed on the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea. In the new reality formed by the 
violence of war, "historical circumstances" handed Ashkenazi Zionists "the primogeniture over 
the people"i.  
Itamar Ben Avi, an Ashkenazi native affiliated to the CSCJ, was one of the prominent activists 
for respectful integration of the Jews in the Middle East in the pre-state period. After his death 
and after the establishment of the state, a Hed Hamizrah article wrote about him:  
"He felt himself an Israeli citizen even before the Hebrew settlement was independent, even before the 
existence of the state. While all the other settler' hearts were abroad and the vision of independence was 
far from them, he already walked in every corner of the land, and in his every step he felt as a native, a 
member of 'Free Judea'… all his manners here were of a Hebrew man that tasted the built homeland… 
He already felt himself in those days a citizen of the following generations."ii  
In this text, we can see the ceding of the primogeniture rights over the land from the native 
Jewish population to the Zionist movement and its accomplishments. The independence and 
national freedom achieved by the following generations is what allowed the indigenous Jews 
to become the de facto owners of the land. After centuries of existence as a minority group 
under foreign rule, the CSCJ became part of the ruling majority:   
                                                             
i Eliachar (1980): 483.  
ii"Itamar Ben Avi and the Vision of the State” (itamar ben avi ve-hazon ha-medina), HH, 13.4.49, p. 8.  
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"Our entire business here was to cease to be a minority"i  
"[the Jerusalem municipality] will fulfill its roles as a municipality that represents all its residents, who 
are entitled to enjoy municipal services, exercise its language in all the fields of its work, nominate its 
functionaries without discriminations and percentages, and manage its issues as required towards its 
residents without fights and struggles…. in the mixed municipality…for every little thing they had to 
struggle forcefully with their "colleagues", the Arabs, which perceived the municipality as the 
inheritance of their fathers…"ii 
Tsur claimed that for Moroccan Jewry, the victory in the 1948 war realized a secret wish of the 
Jewish minority: not only to become equal, but superior to their Muslim neighbors. The 
establishment of the state of Israel symbolized exactly this turnover in power relations between 
Jews and Arabs (Tsur 2000). I believe that the Sephardic notables shared this secret wish, but 
having lived the violent process of its gradual realization, and seeing how it entailed their own 
subjugation, designed a complex approach to minority-majority relations in Israel/Palestine. 
However, in this period, the complex approach of this native minority became redundant by the 
fact that the Zionist movements' diplomatic policies, economic base and institutional structures 
was what allowed the establishment of a Jewish majority in the land. Since the Zionist 
movement was structured by the binary categories of western modernity, its middle-eastern 
politics could only be structured in terms of superiority or animosity. Any other orientation 
towards the Middle East was excluded. As Ben Gurion retorted to Eliachar in another context, 
"If you want this kind of regime- you build it"iii.  
 
The loss of the primogeniture right- the native's right to design the state formed in its land, the 
calibrating of the value of native thinking and its contribution to this state- this was the action 
of the coloniality of being, the ontological dimension of the victory of Zionist colonialism in 
the 1948 war. The coloniality of being expresses the inter-subjective colonial relation. It refers 
to the lived experience of the colonized and the colonizer, their modes of being, lifestyles and 
conceptions. It refers to the self-image of the subalterns, that has been rendered inferior and 
demeaned, and of the colonizers' generated as superior, as a model of humanity. It entails in it 
the process of erasing and fragmenting of Other forms of creating, thinking, living, interacting 
and producing goods. In this case, what stands out is the way the coloniality of being 
undermined these activists' very ability to define and establish an independent understanding 
of the new geo-political reality. The physical borders drawn by the violence of the 1948 war 
permanently established identity borders, keeping outside complex middle-eastern identities, 
                                                             
i “Matters of the hour” (le-'inyanei ha-sha'ah), HH, 13.4.49, p.2.  
ii Avraham Elmalih, "From Arab to Hebrew Municipality" (mi-baladiyat el-quds le-‘iriyat yerushalaim), HH, 28.1.49, 
p. 3. 
iii Security Council Protocols, 11.12.47, p. 22, SA 0120.  
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fixating anything related to Arab culture, knowledge and customs as undesirable and inferior. 
Without nourishment from their Arab and Muslim roots, the Sephardic and Mizrahi native elites 
could not construct a middle-eastern collective Jewish identity to serve as basis of their political 
struggle. Despite of themselves, they yielded the power to define the collective identity of Jews 




CONCLUSION                                                                         Sephardic Zionism 1948-1958 
 
In the pre-state period, the Sephardic alternative, inclusive form of Zionism has been 
emphasized mainly with regards to their discourse about Palestinian Arabs. In the first years of 
statehood, it can be emphasized that this inclusive attitude was also expressed in their relations 
with Ashkenazim. Despite forming certain rivalry with the Ashkenazi Zionist elite, the 
Sephardic notables accepted them as brothers since the beginning of Zionism, allowing an 
opened exchange, seeking to guide the immigrants but were also opened to be guided by them 
(Bezalel 2007). With the installation of the British Mandate, this exchange became unequal, 
gradually subjugating the native elites to a modern/colonial rule, expressed by the coloniality 
of power, of knowledge and of being. This rule became permanent with the establishment of 
the state of Israel when it became grounded in its institutions. The state institutions and their 
domination by Mapai, the party that constructed and ruled them, became a stable fact. Not only 
the government, the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut, but also the administration, the military, 
the Chief Rabbinical Authority and the Supreme Court- were all under the dominant power of 
the Labor movement, perpetuating Ashkenazi majority and superiority in them.  
In these first years of statehood, the CSCJ was an address and home for some Sephardic and 
Mizrahi activists and intellectuals who tried to struggle against different forms of coloniality. 
As a tool for organizing political action, the CSCJ metamorphosed throughout this period, 
trying out different recipes. First it battled over the leadership of a Sephardic faction based on 
a union of the national CSCs, and aspired to support a cadre of younger activists on the 
beginning of their public career. Then it maintained itself the faction inside the General Zionists 
party, in a unique structure of a bonded autonomy (Herzog 1986: 134-146). It also held 
municipal factions, some small scale social initiatives, and participated in the World Sephardic 
Federation. The CSCJ circle led by Eliahu Eliachar was the only one in this period to hold and 
maintain an autonomous Sephardic political action. The final failure in gaining political power 
in 1955 was the end of a long process, which started in the first colonial victory of Zionism 
with the installation of the British Mandate's colonial rule:  
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"We uprooted from the base the old [vatik] tools of public work and we did not build other institutions.  
We were a majority in the country right after the Belfour declaration. Since then we became a minority.  
Our Ashkenazi brothers took control over the institutions and we lost from both sides.  This expropriation 
process developed further... We must educate the generation to modern Zionism, train the new Sephardic 
generation. Did we get any real encouragement? We didn’t get a penny for our old [vatikim] 
organizations and institutions… I have looked into this problem: the complex of fear from the Sephardim, 
the belief that it is not in their reach [ein be-yadam] to create and make bloom…I was born here and my 
family arrived 600 years ago. I will not have my son become a second-grade citizen in the state of Israel"i.       
This quote summarizes most of the aspects discussed of the crisis of the Sephardic elites after 
the establishment of the state. The Sephardic organizational culture became irrelevant in the 
political game by the coloniality of power: Mapai's apparatus of domination was so effective 
that it excluded them from the very ability to compete in the political field. The coloniality of 
being and of knowledge increased the identification of the Sephardic notables with the 
modern/colonial patterns of Ashkenazi Zionism. This designed their demands in a way that 
expressed mainly a desire for social recognition, as proleptic identification with the dominant 
classes (Bourdieu 1984). This took away their moral and epistemological grounds to represent 
the Mizrahi immigrants. They became an irrelevant minority group that represented only its 
own limited circle, their most coherent demands expressing the liberal-conservative approach 
of dominant classes under threat that their next generation's capital will not be able to reproduce 
its properties and maintain its status (Bourdieu 1984). The coloniality of being and of 
knowledge entailed the loss of coherency and legitimacy of any alternative, non-modern 
practices, discourses and visions this native minority group had for the region and for the state. 
Both the Sephardim and Ashkenazim lost this way the ability to participate in an equal and 
creative cultural exchange, and lost from view alternative political models grounded in the 
native middle-eastern experience.  
Naming this a "loss" is not in order to idealize the Sephardic organizational culture or their 
intermediating capabilities. The same way, Sephardic Zionism should not be considered as 
carrying some ideal alternative for a peaceful and harmonious Middle East. From a critical 
Marxist or socialist perspective, the CSCJ's politics were despicably classist, and certainly this 
circle did not offer any liberatory prospects for women. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to observe 
the alternative native politics they had, in order to search within it emancipatory horizons, 
within the practice of the hermeneutics of absence and emergence. Within this mode of analysis, 
the attempt is to recognize alternative politics that has been deemed as an irrelevant and erased 
by the wheels of history, and yet can still form concrete possibilities understood to be relevant 
in the horizons of present reality (Santos 2006).  
                                                             
i Eliahu Eliachar in "Third meeting of the Countrywide Union of the Sephardim and Eastern Ethnicities” (yeshiva 
shlishit shel moetset ha-ihud ha-artsi shel ha-sfaradim u-bnei 'edot ha-mizrah), 5.10.50, CSCJA 6238-14. 
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The alternative native politics the CSCJ advanced were based on the Sephardic elite's self-
presentation as carrying an advanced, respectful, tolerant and moderate heritage, seeking to 
promote a similar ideology in both political terms and in religious-cultural normsi. This heritage 
was anchored in what according to Taylor (1997) are non-modern notions of honor, and was 
reflected in the demand for equal dignity in the state for the native elites, Mizrahi immigrants 
and less pronouncedly, for the Israeli Palestinian Arabs. The Sephardic notion of honor was 
also the base of the alternative nationalist perception of Sephardic Zionism, after all they were 
"born and raised in Zion and therefore… Zionist"ii. The centrality of the politics of honor was 
the essence of this Sephardic circle's alternative Zionism, it is what made the CSCJ a proud part 
of the Jewish national collective, and at the same time guided its insistence on self-organization. 
Sephardic Zionism was not based on modern European national theories, but on the importance 
of the honor of one's own collective, expressed in a central and consistent ambition to elevate 
its stature. The fact their nationalism was not based on ideology or on dichotomist modernist 
categories made it questionable by the Zionist regime and possibly by some in the Arab world 
as welliii. This alternative nationalism contained strong group identification, along with a 
combative disposition to strengthen the group's status and improve its conditions on the expense 
of other groups. However, there was an important difference between the modern/colonial 
nationalism of Ashkenazi Zionism and the Sephardic native nationalism: the possibility of 
getting inspired and learning from the east and from the surrounding Arab world: 
"Let us learn from a country which is similar to us in its population and size more than other countries 
with whom we do not have common traits. In the comparison I mean our neighbor the Lebanon.." iv  
The different national dispositions also entailed occasionally different tactic considerations as 
to when and how should force be exercised over the Arabs, within the state and outside itv.  The 
Sephardic faction did not take any stand regarding exterior politics or Israeli Palestinian Arabs, 
but it had some unique ideas. No other political party in Israel spoke of population-exchange 
between Palestinian Arab refugees and Arab Jewry or about autonomous representation for the 
Israeli Palestinian Arabs. This last was essentially the same expectation for the Israeli 
Palestinian Arabs as for the Sephardim and Mizrahim, reflecting their native experience of how 
multi-ethnic societies can be managed under a central rule. The multi-ethnic organizational 
                                                             
i E.g. "The Way of the Rabbi Nissim" (le-darko shel ha-rav nisim), undated, CZA 430A/33a, also see in Eyal (2005).   
ii "Meeting #9" (yeshiva tet) (of the Federation and the Jewish Agency), 12.5.52. CSCJA container 6239 file 417. 
iii See Herzog (1986): 152, and with more detail in chapter 6.  
iv Eliahu Eliachar about economic issues, "The Subcommittee for Merger of Diasporas" (ha-ve'ida le-mizug galuyot), 
7.6.55, CZA 430A/81. In another occasion he claimed the situation between ethnicities in Israel is becoming like 
there, "Meeting. Management of Sephardic Federation" (yeshiva. hanhalat ha-federatsia ha-sfaradit), 25.9, CSCJA 
container 6239 file 417.  
v E.g. "Nazareth Beyond the Jewish Jurisdiction" (natsrat mi-huts la-thum ha-yehudi), HH, 25.9.50, p. 18; Security 
Council Protocol, 18.12.47, 13-18, SA 0120.   
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culture was also reflected in the CSC structure that contained various autonomous ethnic 
organizations.  
I believe many Sephardic and Mizrahi native elites in this period, in many senses lived and 
sustained "un mundo donde quepan todos los mundos"i, as the Zapatista saying goes. They had 
a pluralistic vision of what the Zionist project could achieve, and in principal, they awarded 
equal value to European and middle-eastern ways of knowing, being, producing, doing politics 
and creating economics, at least among the elites. Their own personal trajectories were designed 
by a mosaic of sources, modern and non-modern, European, Jewish, Arab and Ottoman. Their 
consciousness was designed as what Gloria Anzaldúa called the Mestiza consciousness. They 
grew up in the Borderlands, with the socio-political position and accumulated knowledge to 
make links, serving as different kinds of bridges, able to translate and mediate between 
Ashkenazi and Arab people (Keating 2009). According to Anzaldúa, the Mestizas are a product 
of this ability of theirs to transfer cultural and spiritual values from one group to the other. This 
creates a personality that has multiple facets, which makes their surroundings uncomfortable, 
and therefore makes the Mestizas uncomfortable as well. They may encounter colliding voices 
that cause them ambivalence and perplexity, lack of confidence and lack of decisiveness 
(Anzaldúa 1987/2016). In the context of the violent conflict of this period between the two 
sides of these Mestizas' Borderlands, this perplexity and ambivalence led to complete paralysis 
in anything related to these activists' potential role as mediators. In the most acute moment, 
during the 1949 armistice agreements, there was an intentional, hyperbolized and declarative 
withdrawal from the Borderlands to the one, secure side of the borders. During this period, 
Israel was getting established as a "modern Sparta" (Bashir 2007) and a new colonial reality 
was getting formulated and stabilized. This new reality gradually clarified that the Sephardic 
elite's Mestiza consciousness, with the organizational and leadership patterns, knowledge and 










                                                             
i A world where all worlds have room.  
175
CHAPTER 6 




INTRODUCTION: STABILIZATION AND REVOLUTION  
 
The period of late 1950s and early 1960s was the heyday of global political decolonization. By 
early 1960s most of Asia and Africa consisted of independent nation states. Garavini (2012) 
wrote of how these countries in this time were attempting to reformulate, by themselves and 
for themselves, the meaning of modernity and their desirable models of internationalism. The 
Algerian war of independence, ending in 1962, was especially important for Palestine/Israel. In 
France's determination to put an end to this revolt, it tightened up its relationship with Israel, 
first around supplies of arms, and then around various forms of political and military 
cooperation, including the Sinai Campaign of 1956. In 1957 it also supplied Israel with nuclear 
energy (Shlaim 2000). This relationship deepened the identification of Israel with European 
imperialism in the Middle East to Arab eyes. In the neighboring countries, nationalist and 
modernizing revolutions were taking place using socialist rhetorici. These revolutions affected 
frictions and tensions that rose between Israel and Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, within a dispute 
over common water resources, which all countries aimed to exploit for developing their national 
infrastructure (Shlaim 2000). The Palestinians national liberation movement was also getting 
reorganized and re-acknowledged internationally. In 1964 the Arab League established the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the official representative of a "Palestinian 
entity", and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) as the military portrayal of this entity, trained 
and supported by several countries (Shemesh 2004). In mid 1960s, the Palestinian Fatahii 
movement started challenging the dependency on the Arab states and resumed autonomous 
Palestinian actions, in form of fedayeen activity: infiltrating across the border and committing 
                                                             
i Since 1957 the US intervention in the region grew with the implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
Consequentially, the governments of Iraq, Lebanon and Syria were replaced in 1958 by ones less cooperative or 
opposed to western intervention. In 1963 other coups d'états took place in Iraq and Syria by the Baath party of 
each country (Rodinson 1968, Petran 1972). Hinnebusch defined Baathism, similarly to Nasserism, as a socialist but 
not communist regime, backed by Pan-Arab ideology. These regimes were constructed by the nationalist elites for 
state building in the post-colonial era. The Baath regimes were supported by a small middle class, based on military 
command and bureaucracy, and sought above all to consolidate national independence by modernization and 
development. The ideology behind these regimes was egalitarian, challenging traditional and privileged status-
quo, and attempting to mobilize, and yet control, popular participation. That is why its actual benefit to the lowers 
strata can be placed in doubt (Hinnebusch 2002).  
ii The Fatah movement was composed of the young generation of university students and graduates Palestinian 
refugees. It is considered the first Palestinian movement to construct an orderly ideology and strategic plans for 
the national struggle.  
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different types of hostile acts and sabotage, centrally on new Israeli infrastructure (Shemesh & 
Tlamim 2002).  
In this period, the charismatic and influential figure of Egypt's president  Gamal Abdel Nasser 
got to his peak of power and popularity. In 1958-1961 a political union was made between Syria 
and Egypt, within the United Arab Republic (UAR)i(Ronald 2009). This union also expressed 
the growing strength of Pan-Arab ideology, which especially in this period of decolonial 
successes, entailed an existential threat to the Jewish-European state. Rodinson (1968) 
explained how Israel was perceived as an outpost of western imperialism that blocked Arab 
territorial continuity, and had humiliated the Arab nation by seizing its lands and defeating its 
armies. The existence of this state was a problem for Arab leaders of the neighboring states, 
and many reiterated statements about the future destruction of Israel, and these threats 
eventually developed into military tensions as well. Nonetheless, this period of reforms and 
revolutions in the Middle East, led by fresh and young spirits of nationalist modernization, 
influenced Israeli intellectuals, as well as some political and cultural groups, like the Semitic 
Actionii, to encourage openness to the Arab world. Efron (2005) showed how in this period 
there were some marginal yet impactful trends in Israeli press and literature, that involved some 
opening of curiosity about the Arab world, and about the question of Israel's relationship with 
it.  
 
Since 1958 the restrictions imposed on Israeli Palestinian Arabs by the military regime got 
gradually alleviated, until its final abolishment in 1966. Even with the official abolishment, 
however, restrictions on individual activists and on collective freedom of speech persisted 
(Jiryis 1976). The loosening of the abyssal line between Jews and Arabs in Israel, did not mean 
liberation to Israeli Palestinian Arabs from their situation as an internally colonized population, 
in enclaves of non-being: Zureik (2016), for instance, details the Israeli policies of population 
management and territorial control which ensure until today perpetual Jewish dominance in the 
country.  
The alleviation of the military regime was related, both as cause and as effect, to the beginning 
of Mapai's weakening. The party suffered from internal discussions and certain decrease in 
popularity (Kimmerling 1993). In 1963 Ben Gurion left the premiership to Levi Eshkol, and 
constructed a new party on the right of Mapai named Rafi. However, not even Ben Gurion's 
dominant figure was able to dismantle the mighty, centralist apparatus of domination he himself 
had constructed, and his party was not able to disinherit Mapai from its position in the political 
system. The central state institutions, its public services and the Histadrut continued to 
                                                             
i Il-jumhuria il-arabiya il-mutahida.  
ii ha-pe'ula ha-shemit. It was established in 1958 around Uri Avnery, the editor of the anti-establishment journal 
Ha'olam Haze; but held its own journal called Etgar. Its cause was to open and integrate Israel in the Middle East.  
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distribute resources by the relative power of Zionist parties of Ashkenazi hegemony in them 
(Horowitz & Lissak 1990).  
During this decade Israel invested in developing massively its industry, infrastructure and 
housing. This brought economic growth and reduced unemployment (Dahan-Kalev 1991). 
According to Grinberg (2001), the almost full employment in the labor market until 1965 
weakened the mechanisms of control of both the government and the Histadrut, as workers 
were able to struggle and gain better conditions regardless of both, strengthening organizations 
and leaderships not related to the Labor movement. The Jewish Agency also lost some of the 
importance it held in the previous decade of massive immigration. In 1965 there was an 
economic crisis that was followed by a recession policy, which increased unemployment 
mainly in concentrations of Mizrahi immigrants, hurting the lower stratums and increasing 
inequalities (Dahan-Kalev 1991). This was the background of many workers' struggles, not 
necessarily Mizrahi, which would continue until the end of the period. Different authors agree 
that if it was not for the 1967 war, this popular discontent would have brought far-reaching 
results (Tsur 2000, Grinberg 2001). The recession redrew the political map, as the revisionist 
and the Liberal party (formed from General Zionists) united to form Gahal, and Mapam and 
Mapai united to form the Ma'arakh. Two blocks were created: a "left" meant to control the 
Labor institutions, representing the managers of state and semi-state organizations, owners of 
Histadrut companies, the workers organized through the Histadrut and the new Ashkenazi 
middle class, formed by the state's establishment. The "right" represented the opposition to this 
centralized control mechanism, in the form of private capital owners and the less organized, 
weaker layers of workers (Grinberg 2001).  
  
The economic growth in the beginning of the period created new proletariats within the 
industrial and agricultural sectors, that is, within Mizrahi immigrants both in big cities and in 
the periphery (Tsur 2000). Even with a high percentage of employment, 80% of the 
beneficiaries of the welfare system were of Mizrahi origins. The welfare system got more 
regulated in this period but it reserved its stringent and deterring characteristics, as well as its 
hostile attitude, and served, as Mariuma-Marom (2010) claimed, as another mechanism that 
perpetuated Mizrahi poverty, and inscribed Mizrahi youth to manual labor. Some transit camps 
were still standing in this period, populated almost exclusively by Mizrahi immigrants. Mizrahi 
and especially Moroccan immigration continued in this periodi, and was often sent to populate 
one of the many "development towns" that were built and expanding in the periphery (Tzameret 
& Yablonka 2000). These towns of Mizrahi majority are a central part of the colonial policies 
                                                             
i Between 1960-1964 the same amount of immigrants from North Africa arrived as between 1948 and 1960, about 
100,000 people (Tsur 2000).   
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of territory and population management designed to benefit Ashkenazim. With the declared 
aim of modernizing Mizrahi immigrants, these policies pulled Mizrahim into conditions of 
under-development, which strengthened the socio-economic gap and the spatial segregation 
between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi populationsi (Sharon 2012, Cohen & Leon 2008). Since 1956 
different changes in policy in the educational field ended up excluding most Mizrahi youth 
from high school education. Over 70% of Mizrahi youth did not graduate high school in this 
period (Chetrit 2004: 123). One reason was the gradual increase in tuition fees along the 
decadeii, which made high school inaccessible for most Mizrahi familiesiii. During the 1960s, 
the education system created differential educational frameworks to train high skilled workers 
and low skilled manual workers and clerks, in order to accommodate the developing industry 
needs. Mizrahim were often sent to the latter kind (Swirski 1995), without necessarily 
considering the youths' own skills and tendencies. 
Different authors have studied the way these government policies were advised by social 
scientists influenced by Modernization Theory and European superiority concepts (Swirsky 
1989, Sharon 2012, Bernstein 1976). In the second half of the 1960s there was an evident 
increase in scientific knowledge production about Mizrahim and Sephardim in Israel. A 
consensus was getting formulated among social scientists, declaring the 1950s policies a 
mistake since they expressed an expectation that the immigrants would immediately integrate 
into "modern Israeli society". In this decade, social scientists advised a slower and more gradual 
integration process. Public discourse about Mizrahim was changing from one dealing with an 
"absorption problem" to one of "gaps" (Shapira 2012): a socio-economic problem that would 
gradually be solved by the education system. In reality, it can be claimed that the beginning of 
the end of the transit camp period marked a transition into permanent and institutionalized 
oppressive practices. The Zionist myth of creating an equal and united Jewish nation in Israel 
was getting undermined, and a clear gap was getting marked between the official Zionist 
discourse about the Merger of Diasporas and the reality experienced by Mizrahi immigrants. 
This reality, along with the scientific discussions and developing public discourse "reflected 
the growth of a new Jewish ethnic group, to which different minorities, which never saw 
themselves as one collective identity, got related" (Tsur 2000): Israeli Mizrahi identity was 
getting formulated and stabilized by hegemonic discourse.   
                                                             
i Mutzafi-Heller (2012) referred to these towns in the context of employment opportunities as concrete boxes, 
rather than a glass ceiling. 
ii A. Yishai, "Will High School Education Become a Privilege?" (ha-yehafekh ha-hinukh ha-tikhoni le-nahalat bnei ha-
yekholet bilvad?), IB, 5.4.62, p. 7; Eliahu Eliachar, "Who Will Carry the Weight of the Budget for Reducing 
Educational Gaps" (Mi iisa be-'ol ha-taktsiv le-hisul ha-pa'ar ba-hinukh). IB, 11.1.63, p. 3.   
iii High school tuition was subsidized to families with many children and of low economic abilities, however these 
subsidies depended on the student's academic skills, and were not sufficient for many families to afford sending 
all their children to high school, also due to families' need for the extra financial support the children could supply. 
See, Mordechai Zar, "The Consciousness of Education Spreads to the Wide Public" (toda'at ha-hinukh hoderet la-
tsibur ha-rahav), IB, 26.5.64, p. 6; A. Yishai, ibid.    
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At the same time, in this decade new routes for ashkenization were breached for Mizrahi 
immigrants. Ashkenization went through increasing co-optation of Mizrahim in Zionist parties, 
which also gradually increased the representation of Mizrahim and Sephardim in mainly local 
Labor institutions like the Histadrut, workers organizations, and in municipalities i (Deshen 
1972, Tsur 2000). The economic growth of early 1960s also improved the economic status of 
many Mizrahim, who got established within the middle-class bourgeois, a process often 
accompanied by adaptation to Ashkenazi standards and norms. Upward social mobilization was 
more common among middle-eastern Jews than North African ones, sometimes thanks to 
positions that they could gain within the military regime and the state's security apparatus. Tsur 
(2000) claimed that immigrant communities that had more westernized elites within them, as 
Iraqis and Egyptians, got classified in higher ranks in public imagery. North African children, 
because of their vulnerable place in society, were often objects of another type of ashkenization 
processes, of toranic colonization (Lupo 2004a), getting incorporated massively into Ashkenazi 
ultra-orthodox religious schools. Different forms of covert and overt discrimination between 
Ashkenazim and Sephardim prevailed in all fields of religious life. As in secular Zionist 
Ashkenazi society, in the ultra-orthodox sphere Mizrahim also had limited opportunities for 
attending higher education institutions. As recalled, the way political parties dominated the 
official local religious institutions left many immigrant communities without the guidance and 
support of their own rabbis, which was source for a spiritual crisis on a community level as well 
as on a personal level (Leon 1999). Many religious practices of Mizrahi immigrants were 
abandoned in Israel, but unlike the secularization processes that took place in Europe, these 
were not accompanied by changes in faith and belief. Therefore, the immigration process was 
often accompanied by a "general and pervasive feeling of dejection, failure, and self-
depreciation in religious matters which affects the devout and less observant alike" (Deshen 
1972a). The process of religious subjugation and assimilation advanced so, that by the end of 
this period there were already many Mizrahi young adults graduates of these systems, 
immigrants that got their spiritual identity converted into the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox socio-
cultural model, in a manner that perpetuated low economic abilities as adultsii (Leon 1999). 
Mizrahi adults could be found wearing ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi uniform, and using Yiddish 
                                                             
i Abraham Abbas, "Between Gathering of Diasoporas to Merger of Diasporas" (ben kibuts galuyot le-mizug galuyot), 
Shevet va-'am, May 1958. 
ii This is because the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox model developed in Israel created a vast "learners' society" that 
depends on welfare and support from the state, allowing most men to dedicate themselves for many years, 
sometimes for their entire lives, exclusively to religious studies. Before statehood, this privilege was conserved 
only to few that were supported by their community's charity (Leon 1999). Both Yosef Tubi and Tuvia Sulami 
mentioned this point in their interviews, claiming the ultra-orthodox education system does not prepare its 
graduates well for modern life, and therefore perpetuates poverty. 
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phrases and terms. Sephardic and Mizrahi rabbis started to develop similar fundamentalist-
conservative discourse and logics as Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox rabbis. 
 
The Fatah movement was supported ideologically and economically by Syria, and so its activity 
was source of escalating tensions on the Syrian-Israeli border throughout this decade (Shlaim 
2000). In 1966 a large scale Israeli reprisal action in the West Bank, against what Israel 
perceived as a village of Fatah supporters, became an aggressive military confrontation with 
Jordan. This turned the formerly cooperative Jordanian government against Israel (Shemesh & 
Tlamim 2002). As the tensions grew with Syria and Jordan, Egypt was also forced to take 
position as a counter-response (Shlaim 2000). Tensions and threats of immediate war rose until 
the 6th of June of 1967, when Israel attacked its three neighbors, in six days conquering large 
areas from under their control. This war is perhaps the most important point of inflexion in the 
history of Palestine/Israel. It set Israel's status as a regional superpower, and initiated the system 
of military colonial rule over millions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, which got 


























1958-1959                                                                                        Entering a Second Decade  
 
Between 1956 and 1958 tens of thousands of immigrants from Eastern Europe arrived to Israel 
and got allocated directly into permanent housing in the center of the country (Pikar 2013), on 
the expense of long term dwellers of transit camps. This affair got published widely within 
Mizrahi and Sephardic publics as a bitter symbol of unjustifiable and indisputable 
discrimination based on the ethnic origins of immigrantsi. Mizrahim's protests started taking 
more violent form, for instance by increasing sabotage to Mapai properties (Roby 2015). The 
rise in discontent might have been what led Mapai to yield to the Sephardic political and 
rabbinical elites a great public achievement in 1958: the nomination of Rabbi Moshe Toledano 
as the Minister of Religion, without requiring him to officially belong to any political partyii. It 
would not take even a year for this victory to go sour, and for Toledano to become another tool 
in Mapai's apparatus of dominationiii. In these years organized Mizrahi political activity 
increased, perhaps as a result of the reduced heat around Israel's borders. Another, perhaps more 
significant reason for this, was the simple fact of having passed a decade since the establishment 
of the stateiv: politicians' discourse of Israel being a newborn state under immediate threat, 
which could not afford to attend to the sordid life conditions of its own poor, was losing 
credibility:  
"After 10-12 years we started to see that much of the slogans are not getting implemented. The principals 
the state was talking about were not being implemented equally to everybody…and the years go by… it 
started creating tension and criticism, among activists and in the public, there was bitterness…You can't 
fool me all the time, eventually you must implement what you say!"v  
The decade that passed had another implication on the Mizrahi political field, because it meant 
that many immigrants had already established certain stability in the country and had been 
gaining experience in Mapai's apparatus of domination and the political culture it had 
constructed. By 1958, there were dozens of autonomous Mizrahi local organizations that 
                                                             
i "Unjustifiable" is in Ben Gurion's own words, in Weiss (2007): 93. See Pikar (2009) for the justifications that were 
nonetheless provided. About the resentment it aroused, see for instance, Giladi (1990); Shoshana Arbili, "The Duty 
of Israeli Intelligentsia" (hovata shel ha-intiligentsia be-israel), Shevet Va'am, May 1958; Letter from David Ben 
Harush to David Ben Gurion, 22.5.59, BGA: 127908. "Who is Really to Blame?" (mihu ha-ashem ha-amiti?), EM, 
28.7.59, p. 1; "Protest Against 'Preference in Housing'" (mohim neged 'ha'adafa be-shikun'), Maariv, 3.3.57, p. 8.   
ii See "Word of the Battle" (dvar ha-ma'arakha), IB, 13.8.61, p. 2. 
iii Y. Betzalel, "Rabbi Toledano Suggested We'd Form an Ethnic List" (ha-rav toledano hetsi'ah lanu leyased reshima 
'adatit), Maariv, 21.8.59, p. 5.  
iv Two autonomous Mizrahi publications, Shevet Va'am and El Hamizrah, started publishing (or re-publishing) 
around the 10th independence day. On this issue also see Avner Shaki, "The Question of 'Jewish Consciousness'" 
(le-sugiyat 'ha-toda'ah ha-yehudit'), Shevet Va'am, Nov 1958; A. Yanai, "We are a million- we are the majority in 
Israel" (anahnu million-anahnu ha-rov ba-arets), Maariv, 18.7.59, p. 2.  
v Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18.  
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provided for cultural and educational activities, social mutual help and religious services. These 
organizations were usually formed by specific communities according to places of past origins 
and present residencei. The CSCs formed part of these networks, but organizations of old timers 
and immigrants' were more often than not separateii. Some organizations attempted to form 
nation-wide coalitions for a specific profession or place of originiii. Some initiatives spread 
across the country, as a volunteers-based free evening school for Mizrahi immigrantsiv. Mapai's 
apparatus of domination incorporated and infiltrated these organizations and annulled their 
autonomy, using means other political parties also adopted (Bernstein 1976). Any emerging 
Mizrahi leadership was drawn into different parties' stages as "votes' brokers", with no actual 
influence within the parties' mechanism (Lissak 1972, Chetrit 2004:101-115)v. The Zionist 
parties, most notably Mapai and the National Religious Party, made protégé ethnic lists in order 
to gain votes of immigrants of specific countries of origin. Indeed, many Mizrahim voted for 
their ethnic representatives (Deshen 1972, Lissak 1972). In some localities these protégé lists 
rebelled and protested, some constructed independent lists and others got better positions in the 
same party this wayvi.  
The defeat and subsequent retirement of the CSCJ from parliamentary politics left a vacuum, 
opening the structure of political opportunities for the younger generation to attempt represent 
the collective identity of this public, and in the second half of the 1950s new initiatives emerged 
on local and national scalesvii. Between 1956 and 1958 autonomous initiatives attempted quite 
directly to inherit the CSCJ, requesting its support in form of funding and endorsementviii. 
Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon was the first activist to get inspired to national politics by the CSCJ's 
demiseix. Cohen-Tzidon was a young lawyer born in Egypt, who completed his higher 
                                                             
i For instance, in Haifa in 1959 there were nine such Sephardic and Mizrahi registered organizations. See Nachmias 
& Spiegel (2009): 113. 
ii "Report of Special Investigation Committee to the Wadi Salib Events Affair" (doh va'adat ha-hakira ha-tsiburit le-
'inyan meora'ot vadi salib), 9.7.59. For an example of cooperation between old timers and immigrants: Yosef 
Shavit, "Yeitiv Makes a Factory" (yeitiv ose mifa'al), Davar 13.5.58, p. 4.  
iii Abraham Abbas, "Between Gathering of Diasoporas to Merger of Diasporas" (ben kibuts galuyot le-mizug 
galuyot), Shevet Va'am, May 1958; "12 organizations convened in Haifa" (ve'ida shel 12 irgunim hitkayma be-heifa), 
EM, 23.9.58, p. 8. 
iv "Entry to Sephardim Only" (haknisa le-sfaradim bilvad), Davar, 13.2.59, p. 18; "Protocol" (pireti-kol), 5.8.58, CSCJA 
container 6266 file 638.   
v Purchasing votes, for instance, seems to have been a regular practice. See "Report of Special Investigation 
Committee to the Wadi Salib Events Affair" (doh va'adat ha-hakira ha-tsiburit le-'inyan meora'ot vadi salib), 9.7.59. 
vi "Upheaval of Sephardim and Mizrahim in Mapai in Lod, Beer Sheva and Jerusalem" (tsisat ha-sfradiim mizrahim 
be-kerev mapai be-lod, be-er sheva ve-yerushalayim), EM, 23.9.58, p. 8; "Sensitive Matters and Discoveries" (nosim 
ve-giluyim 'adinim), EM, 3.4.59, p. 1; Abraham Abbas, ibid.; "We united and still haven't decided" (hitlakadnu ve-
'adain lo hehlatnu), Maariv, 16.6.61, p. 9; Shlomo Nekadimon, "'The Sephardic Party' Dismantled" ('ha-miflaga ha-
sfaradit' purka), Herut 3.10.58, p. 8. 
vii Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon, "Merger of Diasporas- Only a Slogan" (mizug galuyot- sisma bilvad), Hame'orer, February 
1956.  
viii E.g. Y. Betzalel,"Will the Ethnic Lists Succeed in the Elections?" (ha-yatslihu ha-reshimot ha-'adatiyot ba-bhirot?) 
Maariv, 7.8.59, p. 4; Letter from David Siton to Mr. Cohen Solel, 25.3.57, CSCJA container 6237 file 390.  
ix Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon, "Merger of Diasporas- Only a Slogan" (mizug galuyot sisma bilvad), Hame'orer, Feburary 
1956; Sh. Cohen-Tzidon, "What is the idea, who are we fighting for and how?" (mahu ha-ra'ayon, le-tovat mi 
anahnu neevakim ve-eikh levats'o?), EM, 23.9.58, p. 1-2.  
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education in Tel Aviv and was active in Mapai for a short whilei. The initiative led by Cohen-
Tzidon started with a conference of prominent activists from the entire country held in 1958. 
The participants, from all over the country, mostly had higher education, were of different 
ideological tendencies, and included both native elites and immigrants. Rabbi Toledano 
noticeably abstainedii. This was the widest attempt to create a network for the Mizrahi and 
Sephardic public on a national level since the attempt to unite all CSCs in "The Countrywide 
Union" in 1949-1951. Though a political party was not established then, the activists could 
define some common goals for the Mizrahi and Sephardic publiciii. The conference was used 
as a launching pad  for El Hamizrahiv, a newspaper directed to the Mizrahi and Sephardic 
public. Two months after issuing the publication, a new political faction, named the National 
Unionv, was declared by the initiators of the conference and others. Many of the members of 
the new faction had already acquired some experience inside the Zionist parties' mechanisms, 
and "the old parties had been a school for the ethnic activists"vi. For this reason, nothing 
demonstrates better the Zionist parties' methods of espionage, infiltration and collapsing of 
autonomous ethnic organizations than this group's caution in incorporating new members. 
Membership was endowed not by payment, as in the CSCJ, but by signing a legal statement of 
loyaltyvii. Recurring alarms were made about the courting and temptations presented to the 
Sephardic and Mizrahi activists of the National Union by other partiesviii.   
 
Another group formed in this period that made its members swear loyalty to it over other 
political parties, was the Unification of North African Immigrantsix (hereinafter UNAI). 
However, theirs was not a legal statement written up by certified lawyers, but an oath taken 
verbally over the biblex. This organization started functioning in early 1959, and would be the 
                                                             
i Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon participated in Egypt in the Zionist movement. He immigrated to Israel in 1949 at the age 
of 26, and completed his qualification as a lawyer. He resided in Tel Aviv, and during the 1950s was active in the 
Union of Egypt Descendants, and later in Mapai. 
ii Rabbi Toledano was in the original meeting for planning the conference Cohen-Tzidon and others organized in 
1958. However, within few months he withdrew from his approval of autonomous organizations and did not arrive 
to the conference itself. Compare, "Consulting Meeting of the Sephardic-Mizrahi Activists" (yeshivat hitya'atsut 
shel ha-'askanim ha-sfaradim-mizrahim), EM 22.7.58, p. 1; with "Thinking out-loud" (hirhurim be-kol ram), EM 
25.12.59, p. 2.  
iii "The Organization of Sephardic and Middle Eastern Descendants" (irgun yotzei sfarad ve-hamizrah ha-tikhon), 
7.4.58, CZA 430A/210/c.  
iv "To the east", very similar in sound to CSCJ's Hed Hamizrah, "eco of the east".   
v ha-ihud ha-leumi.  
vi Immanuel (1964): 39.  
vii "Declaration" (hatshara), MSA 2-013-1959-441.  
viii E.g. "Editoial Notes" (dvar ha-ma'arekhet), EM 2.9.58, p. 1; "Plenty of Compliments but No Representation" 
(shefa mahmaot ve-yitsug en), EM, 18.11.58, p. 1.  
ix likud 'olei tsfon afrika.  
x "A Leader Born" (leidato shel manhig) Ha'olam Haze, 29.7.59, p. 5; Cohen (2009); "Wadi Salib Events" (meora'ot 
vadi salib), undated, MSA 2-013-1959-406. This last document was made by Mapai's spies, and documented the 
oath to be over a bible and a gun. However, it also mentioned that members paid an astronomical amount of 
money each month (1.500 Israeli pounds), a fact completely refuted by members' own testimonies.  
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only one in this period to not only attempt to defend the weaker social stratums of Mizrahi 
immigrants, but to actually be entirely composed by them.  
UNAI got organized in the northern city of Haifa around David Ben-Harush, a young immigrant 
from Morocco, where he had been in the beginning of a Frenchization process (Tsur 2007). 
Immigrating to Israel was part of this quest for upward socio-economic mobility through 
westernization and modernizationi. However, the cultural capital he had accumulated in 
Morocco was not the correct one in order to blend with the Zionist elites (Tsur 2007). As many 
others, he found himself going through the opposite process of social mobilization and his level 
of life worsened in Israel. For years, Ben Harush had been contesting the proletarianization 
processes imposed by governmental and municipal policies by various pathsii. Under the title 
of the UNAI, Ben-Harush wrote letters to governmental institutions, attempting to provoke 
emotional responses within officials in key positions, and making specific demands to improve 
immigrants' conditions, including recognition in UNAI and allowing it representation in 
different institutionsiii (Tsur 2000, Marinsky 1992). On the other hand, UNAI attempted to gain 
trust and public recognition in the organization within their Haifa neighborhood. Wadi Salib 
was one of the old neighborhoods inhabited by Palestinian Arabs before 1948, which after 1948 
was used to relocate new immigrants. Governmental neglect allowed the neighborhood to 
become a refuge for Mizrahi immigrants, mostly North Africans, who refused to settle in the 
remote and small places that the government and Jewish Agency had designated themiv. The 
neighborhood populated much more people than the original population and in very hard living 
conditions. Very soon it became an overcrowded rundown slum, with "crime…and poverty that 
was also cultural, intellectual poverty"v. UNAI supported local struggles and printed out posters 
of encouragement in their favorvi. At least on one occasion, their advocacy led to a violent clash 
between this group and organized thug troops of Mapaivii.  
In the summer of 1959 UNAI initiated its first demonstration, gathering hundreds of Wadi Salib 
residents. The demonstration had a militant tone and it turned violent in an exceptional way, 
raiding Ashkenazi private property in a nearby neighborhood, damaging cars and window-
                                                             
i See for instance his ambition to open a modern Café with an espresso machine and modern decoration, as in the 
upscale neighborhoods in Haifa (Weiss 2007:58).    
ii As others, like Yitzhak Yeitiv, he started his social activism by using his writing skills in Hebrew to help individuals 
to write letters to institutions in order to solve different bureaucratic problems. He also met with some local 
officials to try to promote housing solutions. See Ben Harush's testimony to the investigation committee, 26.7.59; 
SA ISA-PMO-WadiSalibRiots-000jq34.  
iii E.g. letter from David Ben Harush to David Ben Gurion, 22.5.5, BGA:127908 
iv See Wesis (2007): 84-96; Avigdor Eshet's testimony to the investigation committee in: SA ISA-PMO-
WadiSalibRiots-000jq34. For other cases see for instance Nurieli (2015).  
v Moshe Fish in Meyuhas et. al (14.7.16).  
vi See in MSA: 2-013-1959-406.        
vii These thugs were organized through Mapai's "Workman´s Companies" (plugot ha-po'el). This clash was 
described most in details by Marinsky (1992). Compare to "Wadi Salib Events" (meora'ot vadi salib), undated; MSA: 
2-013-1959-406.  
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shops, as well as Mapai-related property. This kind of rioting aroused Ashkenazi collective 
memories from the European Holocausti. Press coverage and public interest in the 
demonstration grew, which in turn legitimated increased police presence in the slums and many 
arrests in the following days and weeks: 
"They made it like a war for us here, closed down electricity and water, what not."ii 
The existence of an organization behind the protest sparked the alarms of the governmentiii. 
Parliamentary elections were only few months ahead. The occurrences that followed had been 
described in detail by various authors and are recorded as the "Wadi Salib events" or "Wadi 
Salib revolt". The next ten weeks saw various acts of protest in different locations in the 
country, mainly in concentrations of North African new immigrants in the heyday of their 
proletarization process. Giladi (1990) rightfully called it an Intifadaiv, because the main effect 
of these demonstrations was shaking off of oppression and lifting up of heads. The protests 
were accompanied by varying degrees of violence: threatsv, police and protestors' violence and 
forceful oppression by massive police forces. The growth in violent tension within 
impoverished North African immigrants, was accompanied by certain turmoil within the more 
established and old timer North Africans as well:  
 "The reign of fear that they had imposed on Wadi Salib puts us in place where anyone that has pride 
and self-respect has to act…"vi   
However, many of the Mizrahi intellectual elite abstained from making commentaries about 
these events (Efron 2005: 202). There were also different attempts to get this turmoil organized 
on a national level, some through contacts UNAI members had from before immigrating to 
Israel (Dahan-Kalev 1991)vii. The mutual fear of the government and UNAI from each other 
brought to increasing violent tensions which eventually exploded in another round of riots in 
Wadi Salib, which brought to the immediate arrest of UNAI leaders (Cohen 2009). The far from 
fair trail that was held (see Marinsky 1992) pushed UNAI to declare candidature for national 
elections. This was contemplated mainly as an act of protest against the aggressive unfair 
                                                             
i To be precise, Haifa's mayor Aba Hushi stated publicly that it reminds of the Nazi Kristallnacht pogrom of 1938. 
See Cohen (2009), Grinberg (2014), David Siton in interview to Mati Ronen, 13.2.84, CSCJA container 6330 file 1451, 
part 9.  
ii Anonymous interviewee in Sharonk (15.4.17).  
iii Also because it was a moment Mizrahim were making independent lists to the Histadrut elections.   A. 
Sfaradi,"Sephardim and Liberals" (Sfaradm ve-liberalim), Niv ha-hma'arakha, 8.6.61.   
iv From the Arabic verb ntafad, to shake off; used to describe Palestinian revolts against the military control of 
Israel in the West Bank and Gaza in 1987 and 2000.   
v It seems for instance that some Ashkenazim living in Wadi Salib were threatened by some in the angry crowds. 
See Speigel & Nachmias (2009): 196; Shalom Cohen, "Black Thursday" (yom hamishi ha-shahor), Ha'olam Haze, 
15.7.59, p. 4-5.   
vi Moroccan bourgeois testimonies, in: Shalom Cohen, "After the storm-fear" (ahrei ha-se'ara- pahad), Ha'olam 
Haze, 12.8.59, p. 8-9.   
vii Also see, Yosef Galili, "The struggle of Mizrahi ethnicities belongs to the entire working class" (ma'avakan shel 
'edot ha-mizrah shayakh le-ma'amad ha-poalim kulo), Al Hamishmar, 28.7.59, p. 2. 
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treatment of state authorities and was part of the attempt to establish stature of leadership. The 
main campaign suggested electing UNAI candidates in order to release them from prison by 
popular supporti.  
The organization was able to run to elections in November with Ben Harush still imprisoned, 
but it had already been crushed by Mapai by mid-August (Speigel & Nachmias 2009:64). This 
was achieved in various ways: from forceful oppression by threats, extortions and direct pay-
offs, to what Dahan-Kalev (1991) referred to as short-term cover-up solutions to the 
neighborhood's inhabitants' structural problems, such as a summer camp for the neighborhood's 
children. The organization was infiltrated by crossing loyalties and disconnected from its local 
baseii. That is, if UNAI would not win a parliamentary seat in the elections, it would no longer 
have any base from which to resume its oppositional activity. It seems that in Wadi Salib itself 
the party got about as many votes as the members who took the oath of loyaltyiii. The networks 
the activists were trying to construct around the country were also crumbled down by Mapai 
infiltrators by various techniquesiv. The wide de-legitimation and criminalization of the 
organization by both politicians and the press was very damaging as well (Chetrit 2004, Dahan-
Kalev 1991). However, from the point of view of the activists, the best counter-propaganda was 
handing a reduced sentence to Ben Harush but few weeks before electionsv.  
 
These events of the summer of 1959 caused general political embroil among Mizrahi activists. 
Parties raced to recruit Mizrahim to their lines and more Mizrahi and Sephardic lists split and 
got formed. A competing party of North African immigrants ran to elections, supported by 
                                                             
i It should be mentioned that despite the many books and essays written about the events, this factor in the 
decision to go to elections has been widely overlooked. See untitled undated document, MSA 2-013-1959-406; 
Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to David Ben Gurion, 3.1.60, CZA 430A/251; M. Misels, "26 Lists in Search of Voters" (26 
reshimot mehapsot boharim), Maariv, 9.9.59, p. 2; "Ben Harush's People Go to Elections" (anshei ben harush 
holkhim le-bhirot), Haaretz, 23.10.59; "Dear Reader" (kore yakar), Ha'olam Haze, 31.10.59, p. 2.     
ii According to Mapai's report, towards elections the synagogues in the neighborhood still distributed posters of 
UNAI but did not agree to help in any other way (for instance, gathering funds or allow speeches or meetings). 
"Union of North African Immigrants" (likud yotsei tsfon afrika), MSA 2-013-1959-406.  
iii According to Negri (2014), UNAI got 159 votes in Wadi Salib (out of 4000 votes in total); before the events it 
seems over a hundred people took the oath, though the report that established this is not particularly reliable: 
"Wadi Salib Events" (meora'ot vadi salib), MSA: 2-013-1959-406. It seems most of the neighborhood's votes were 
bought by money, or by other indirect incentives, as mentioned above. See Shalom Cohen, "After the storm-fear" 
(ahrei ha-se'ara- pahad), Ha'olam Haze, 12.8.59, p. 8-9; A. Markowitch, "Ben Harush: I refused to ask for amnesty 
and mercy" (ben harush: seravti levakesh hanina ve-rahamim), Maariv, 20.1.60, p. 10.   
iv The journalist Shalom Cohen (ibid.) wrote of how the de-legitimation and oppression of protest was such that 
many people were not even sure that they were allowed to protest. However, what the government was most 
afraid of was not sporadic protest but organization, and therefore a variety of techniques were employed in order 
to separate and spark dispute between different groups. Some efforts were less successful, and some were more. 
For instance, UNAI had a strong support base in the Jerusalem slum of Musrara, in a group led by David Vaaknin 
with whom they had social contacts in Morocco before immigration. Mapai infiltrators report a complicated and 
changing relationship with this group. Eventually they ran to the Jerusalem municipality under a different name, 
while Vaaknin was on the UNAI's list for parliament. "Wadi Salib Events" (meora'ot vadi salib), MSA 2-013-1959-
406, "The Union of Egyptian Descendants Denies a Report of the Newspaper Al-Yawm" (hitahdut 'olei mitsraim 
makkhisha yedi'ah she-hofi'ah be-'iton el-yom), Herut, 6.8.59, p. 4. Mapai's techniques of oppression had been 
studied broadly, among others by Bernstein (1976), Dahan- Kalev (1991) and Chetrit (2004).   
v Ben Harush in: "After the 'revolt'- a mystery" (ahar ha-mered, ta'aluma), Maariv, 16.6.61, p. 9.   
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Mapam, formed mainly in order to steal votes from UNAIi (Herzog 1986). Indeed the name 
was so remarkably similar that the press often got confused between the two, and unsurprisingly 
so did some votersii. This puppet-party was still able to gather some significant local North 
African leaders and groups from across the countryiii. On top of the National Union, there was 
yet another group, formed by Jerusalemite young educated immigrants and natives and led by 
Avner Shaki. This group formed a coalition with one of the groups from the National Unioniv 
and on this base formed a party, not with a dissimilar title:  the Sephardic National Partyv. Like 
the National Union, this group was based on intellectuals of both native and of other middle-
eastern immigrant ascendency, graduates and students of Israeli universities, involved in 
themes of education and youth. Despite a similarity in program and discourse, and despite 
having held several discussions about uniting, Mapai infiltrators were able to prevent such 
union from occurringvi.   
 
 
An Old-New Discourse 
The three autonomous organizations postulating the representations of the Mizrahi and 
Sephardic public for the 1959 elections all had similar programs. Their demands were 
formulated on a collective Israeli level and with a progressive spirit. Instead of denouncing  
discrimination, they presented numerous practical proposals in the fields of education, 
economy, housing and employmentvii. The national spirit reflected in the names of the two 
parties was expressed also in various demands: extinguishing the category of country of origins 
from official state formsviii, appointing one Chief Rabbi for all, instead of one Ashkenazi and 
                                                             
i See the account in "The embittered is not bitter anymore" (ha-memurmar hadal lehitmarmer), Maariv, 16.6.61, 
p. 9.  
ii If the full name of the UNAI would be translated as Union of North African Immigrants, the other list would be 
Unity of North African Descendants, independent. [likud olei tsfon afrika versus ihud yotsei tsfon afrika, bilti tluyim]. 
In Jerusalem's municipality UNAI got a vote despite not running to elections there: Gabriel Shteserman, "The GZ 
representation in Jerusalem depends on one vote" (netsigut ha-klaliyim be-yerushalaim tluya al kotso shel 
'tsaddik'), Maariv 28.1.60, p. 10.  
iii For instance, in Bat Yam with Matityahu Ganim and Akka with Maurice Ben Shushan, both have established 
successful independent lists for the Histadrut elections few months beforehand. "The Ethnic Lists" (ha-reshimot 
ha-'adatiyot), 16.9.59, MSA 2-013-1959-460.  
iv Led by Shmuel Cohen-Solel, who gathered around him a group in Netanya. "Born for Greatness" (ehad she-nolad 
le-gdolot), Davar, 4.9.59, p. 24.  
v ha-miflaga ha-sfaradit ha-leumit.  
vi "Report Summery" (sikum yediot), 23.8.59, MSA 2-013-1959-441.  
vii This was noted also by Y. Betzalel,"Will the Ethnic Lists Succeed in the Elections?" (ha-yatslihu ha-reshimot ha-
'adatiyot ba-bhirot?) Maariv, 7.8.59, p. 4 
viii "Manifesto of the National Sephardic and Eastern Ethnicities Party, Netanya Branch" (giluy da'at shel ha-miflaga 
ha-leumit ha-sfaradit ve-'edot ha-mizrah snif natanya), MSA 2-013-1959-441. 
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another Sephardici, and merge Sephardic and Ashkenazi liturgy, synagogues and ritualsii. The 
demands in the spiritual field were sometimes conditioned by the end of the monopoly of 
political parties over religious institutionsiii.  
These groups ran for elections without the charter of any important religious authority. On the 
contrary, some criticized the Sephardic rabbis for their subjugation to the National Religious 
Partyiv, although that was the only way they could even have a right to have an authority.  This 
criticism was an important and not simple step in the process of shaking off the authority of 
Zionist Ashkenazi elites. It was also an essential difficulty in building public legitimacy and 
coherent discoursev. Emotional declarations about "a chance for Sephardic Judaism to retrieve 
its past glory [lahzor le-mlo tifarta]"vi, and "the noble values of the Sephardic and Mizrahi 
tradition" vii were left without content: these activists would not have the religious authority or 
knowledge to detail the actual meaning of Sephardic Judaism and tradition. They could and did 
struggle over rabbinical representation in state and local institutions, and had support of local 
synagogues that spread their propagandaviii.  
 Lacking any historical status as the CSCJ's, these groups had to invent public legitimacy from 
scratch. An interesting step they took for this purpose was to insert in their programs the old 
claim the Sephardic notables had abandoned in 1948, about the positive role Sephardim and 
Mizrahim could play in relations with the Arab worldix.  This was also one of the five things 
agreed upon in the conference Cohen-Tzidon organized with Yitzhak Moshe Immanuel in 
1958x, and few months afterwards David Siton wrote a constitutive article about thatxi.  
Reclaiming a role for Mizrahim and Sephardim within middle-eastern politics was perhaps 
abandoned as a political line of the CSCJ, but Mizrahi Marxist activists wrote about it in Arabic 
                                                             
i Gadi Algazi, "A Voice from the Past: Wadi Salib Revolt. For the memory of Hannah Shem Tov" (kol min ha-'avar: 
mered vadi salib: le-zikhra shel hana shem-tov), 3.12.08. Retrieved from: shorturl.at/yHJ02 (last accessed on 
12.5.20).   
ii "Manifesto of the National Sephardic and Eastern Ethnicities Party, Netanya Branch" (giluy da'at shel ha-miflaga 
ha-leumit ha-sfaradit ve-'edot ha-mizrah snif natanya), MSA 2-013-1959-441; "Editorial Notes" (dvar ha-
ma'arekhet), EM 30.6.59, p. 2.  
iii E.g. "The Decisions of the First Conference of the Council of Eastern Ethnicities" (hahlatot ha-kenes ha-rishon shel 
mo'etset 'edot ha-mizrah), EM 3.4.59, p. 3.  
iv E.g. Shalom Moial, "Our Problem is the Problem of the State" (be'ayatenu be'ayat ha-medina), EM, 27.5.58, p. 1. 
v The National Union, for instance, solved this difficulty by declaring its orientation on religious matters as according 
to the Sephardic Rabbinical Organization.  
vi "Editorial Notes" (dvar ha-ma'arekhet), EM 30.10.59, p. 1.  
vii "The National Party" (ha-miflaga ha-leumit), undated, MSA 2-013-1959-441.  
viii El Hamizrah's only advertisement was of their affiliated synagogue. Also see, "Report Summery" (sikum 
yediot),23.8.59, MSA 2-013-1959-441; "Union of North African Immigrants" (likud yotsei tsfon afrika), MSA 2-013-
1959-406. 
ix E.g. "Ben Harush's People Go to Elections" (anshei ben harush holkhim le-bhirot), Haaretz, 23.10.59; "The 
National Party" (ha-miflaga ha-leumit), undated, MSA 2-013-1959-441; Dov Goldstein, "A Party Born with Slogan 
of Discrimination" (miflaga nolda be-sismat kipuah), Maariv 25.8.59, p. 2.  
x "The Organization of Sephardic and Middle Eastern Descendants" (Irgun yotzei sfarad ve-hamizrah ha-tikhon), 
7.4.58. CZA 430A/210/c. 
xi David Siton, "Strengthening Eastern Consciousness Among Us" (le-hizuk ha-toda'ah ha-mizrahit be-kirbenu), 
Shevet Va'am, November 1958. 
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throughout the 1950si, and in 1958 this kind of discourse was also developed among some 
circles of the Ashkenazi left, most notably the Semitic Action. However, the National Union 
and the National Sephardic Party emphasized their distance from both these Ashkenazi 
streamsii. The secularist rhetoric of the mainly Ashkenazi leftist groups collided with the respect 
these activists gave to Jewish tradition. Moreover, the Marxist rhetoric of proletariat pride was 
not relevant for these activists, who were seeking for social mobility, and whose main struggle 
was precisely against the ethnic channeling into a proletariat status.    
The discourse about the Arab countries or about Israeli Palestinian Arabs was not a central issue 
for these groups. In fact, the National Union in its mouthpiece froze the discussion about these 
issues during the elections period. Before the elections period, it criticized harshly the Zionist 
Ashkenazi exterior politics, reflecting ignorance about the Middle East and expressing an 
attitude of European superiorityiii. This line of discourse was influenced by Arab anti-colonial 
discourse: Cohen-Tzidon, who was its main formulator, seems to have been informed by 
Egyptian Nasserist Arab-national, "third world" oriented pressiv. Following his lead, this circle 
advocated for Israel to integrate in the "Afro-Asian space"v, since Israel was "an eastern 
country, with Mizrahi population its grand majority"vi. This discourse marked the Israeli regime 
as colonial and related Mizrahim's internal oppression with Israel's failures in middle-eastern 
politicsvii.  
"…The regime could change completely if the Sephardim-Mizrahim will play their designated role as 
citizens of equal rights…the term 'regime' includes here both opposition and coalition. It refers to all the 
bodies that benefit from the foreign and oligarchic structure of the state…is not the situation of the 
Sephardim-Mizrahim like the blacks in a colonial country?...the source of the failure of the efforts of the 
                                                             
iNot few intellectual Mizrahi Jewish immigrants, especially from Iraq and Egypt, wrote in the Israeli-Arabic press 
affiliated to different parties. All the ones that wrote in oppositional parties' press -Mapam, Maki and Herut- 
related the discriminatory policies against Mizrahi immigrants to the military regime imposed on Israeli Palestinian 
Arabs (Kabha 2006); which as Snir & Einbinder (1991) and Roby (2015) claimed, implied also their struggles were 
inextricable. While all Jewish writers in Arabic press promoted fraternity and co-existence, there were some like 
David Cohen in Mapam that also aspired for Israel to shed its colonial nature and become part of the Middle East 
(Roby 2015). While the native Sephardic notables mainly ignored anything to do with middle-eastern politics during 
the 1950s, there were also exceptions; e.g.  Yitzhak Abadi, "Sephardic Jewry and Our Political Battles" (ha-yahadut 
ha-sfaradit be-ma'arkhtenu ha-medinit), Shevet Va'am 1954.   
ii "With a Grain of Salt" (be'eravon mugbal), Davar 9.8.59, p. 2; "The Decisions of the First Conference of the Council 
of Eastern Ethnicities" (hahlatot ha-kenes ha-rishon shel mo'etset 'edot ha-mizrah), EM 3.4.59, p. 3.; "Ahdut 
Ha'avoda Requires Additional Mizrahi-Sephardic Strength" (ahdut ha-'avoda zkuka le-tosefet koah sfaradi-mizrahi", 
EM 21.4.59, p. 6; Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon, "The Happiness of the Sephardim and Mizrahim is the Happiness of the 
State" (oshram shel ha-sfaradim ha-mizrahiim- osher ha-medina), EM 16.10.59, p. 1; "The National Party" (ha-
miflaga ha-leumit), MSA 2-013-1959-441. Ben Harush's testimony to the investigation committee, 6.7.592 , SA ISA-
PMO-WadiSalibRiots-000jq34.  
iii E.g. "Middle Eastern Matters" (pinat 'inyaney ha-mizrah ha-tikhon), EM 2.9.58, p. 2; Avraham Danino, "The 
Question of the Essence" (le-sheelat ha-mahut), EM, 30.1.59, p. 2.   
iv Evident for instance, in his article "The Policy of India and Egypt in the United Nations" (mediniyut hodu 
ve'mitsrayim ba-um), EM, 18.11.58, p. 1.  
v E.g. "Middle Eastern Matters" (pinat 'inyaney ha-mizrah ha-tikhon), EM 24.6.58, p. 2.  
vi Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon, "Editorial Notes" (dvar ha-ma’arekhet), EM, 9.6.59, p. 1.   
viiRabbi Haim David Halevi, "The Peace: important clues to Israel's policy in our country" (ha-shalom: remazim 
mealfim le-mediniyut israel be-artsenu), EM 21.4.59, p. 5.  
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state of Israel towards Jewish-Arab rapprochement and for our integration in the Afro-Asian space is 
anchored in this fact."i 
"It appears as if all the residents of the country are of European origins. That is called a 'colonial' 
regime, and that contradicts the aspiration to merge the Diasporas"ii 
El Hamizrah marked the regime as its adversary and emphasized its colonial facets. This 
perspective was inspired by the international anti-colonial discourse of the time and the way 
that other Asian and Arab countries viewed Israel and its role in the regioniii. However, unlike 
leftists Ashkenazi-dominated Israeli groups that were influenced by this international 
atmosphere, El Hamizrah did not go as far as imagining the Arab revolutionary forces as 
potential partnersiv. Still, it opened cracks for learning from the political experiences of the 
Muslim worldv. The National Union's discourse appropriated and transported anti-colonial 
theories and attitudes into the Israeli context. It could be claimed that the mere name of the 
National Union was inspired by the Egyptian ruling party of the UAR, established only few 
months before the Israeli groupvi. However, despite this group's attempts to challenge the 
Zionist colonial westernization scale, it was also struggling to advance in it. This limited its 
Arab orientation, as was expressed for instance in its stronger affiliation with French language 
than Arabicvii.  
UNAI was the only group whose platform reflected the kind of concern for the welfare of Israeli 
Palestinian Arabs that comes from actual contact with people, asking to "improve the level of 
lives of the villagers [bnei-hakfarim]"viii. Within the state of social exclusion of these Mizrahi 
immigrants, they maintained cultural contacts with the Arab world and with the neighbor Arab 
                                                             
i "Editoial Notes" (dvar ha-ma'arekhet), EM, 23.9.58, p. 1.  
ii""Editoial Notes" (dvar ha-ma'arekhet), EM 3.4.59, p. 1.  
iii E.g. Avraham Danino, "The Question of the Essence" (le-sheelat ha-mahut), EM, 30.1.59, p. 2.   
iv In general, it seems these activists were corresponding with the Semitic Action and with the journal Ha'olam 
Haze, as they used similar language. However, while the editor of the hournal and leader of the group, Uri Avnery, 
supported the revolutionary regimes in the Arab countries, El Hamizrah did not, assuming that only a change of 
regime to the next generation of intellectuals could compose a government that would be a possible partner for 
peace with Israel. See: Uri Avnery, "The Subject: To the Jordan" (ha-nidon: la-yarden), Ha'olam Haze, 7.4.54, p. 4; 
Erel (2006): 61-64; Shalom Moial, "The Problem of Israeli-Arab Relations" (be'ayat ha-yahasim shel yisrael-'arav), 
EM, 23.9.58, p. 2; "Middle-Eastern Matters" (pinat 'inyanei ha-mizrah ha-tikhon), EM, 10.6.58, p. 2. Other 
Ashkenazi groups that could imagine certain Arab forces as their allies are of course Marxist groups as the 
communist party or The Third Force (ha-koah ha-shlishi).  
v E.g. "The integration of Sephardic and Mizrahi in government and administration as Ataturk in Turkey" (shibutz 
ha-sfaradim ve-'edot ha-mizrah ba-shilton u-ba-minhal dugmat ataturk be-turkya), EM 23.12.58, p. 2.  
vi "al-ittihād al-qawmi" versus "ha-ihud ha-leumi": both translate to English as "the National Union". The Egyptian 
National Union was the temporary name, within a series of names, of the party led by Nasser between 1958-1961. 
After 1961 it changed its name to "The Arab Socialist Union" (al-Ittiḥād al-Ištirāki al-ʿArabi), which lasted in power 
with this name until Nasser's death in 1970. See Arafat (2009).  
vii El Hamizrah started as a duo-lingual journal in French and Hebrew; however, the National Union claimed to print 
its platform in all three languages. "The Essence of the National Union's Platform" (tamtzit matsa ha-ihud ha-
leumi), EM 30.6.59, p. 3.  
viii The term of villages in Israel is used mainly to refer to Arabs, and in this paragraph it came along with the demand 
to cancel the military regime. Gadi Algazi, "A Voice from the Past: Wadi Salib Revolt. For the memory of Hannah 
Shem Tov" (kol min ha-'avar: mered vadi salib: le-zikhra shel hana shem-tov), 3.12.08. Retrieved from: 
shorturl.at/yHJ02 (last accessed on 12.5.20).   
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population: many preferred listening to the radio from neighboring states or were obliged to 
use Israeli Palestinian public transporti. However, this kind of proximity did not base much 
political solidarity of the oppressed, but rather tended to evoke dynamics of rivalry. This was 
related to what Tsur (2000) called "the cosmic rivalry" between Muslims and Jews, based on 
the experiences of these Jews as minority groups in their countries of origin. In Israel this rivalry 
sharpened, influenced by recent experiences of decolonization of the countries of origin, which 
were accompanied by affirmation of Arab-Muslim national identities, which excluded 
minorities like Jews or Christians, or at least considered them as conditioned co-nationals. 
These tendencies were accompanied also by growing domination of Arab-Muslim cultural 
patterns: 
"'The Jews, that considered themselves proper French for any purpose, were insulted in their national 
feelings by the [imposition to wear] Arab fez…and they couldn’t buy alcohol in the bars…so I arranged 
a fez sale to purchase alcohol-and got kicked out of the navy. Already then I couldn’t stand 
discrimination', told Ben Harush"ii 
This rivalry received new significance in Israel, in the context of the violent oppression of the 
demonstrations, because Druze policemen, belonging to a Palestinian Arab religious minority, 
usually used to suppress the Israeli Palestinian Arab population, were brought to Wadi Salib to 
control the revolt. This equation between the populations was a source of humiliation and rage:  
"They brought many policemen and that made a mess because they hit people, and besides they brought 
Druze policemen- and that’s what stirred up the crowd. That is what hurt because what are Druze officers 
doing here, where there is a problem of discrimination. What are Druze officers doing here, aren't there 
enough Jewish policemen? Maybe it's that Ben Gurion went to some village and had to be protected so 
there were not enough policemen and they had to call the Druze?"iii 
"We were shocked by the cruel means the police used to oppress our brothers, the Jews of North Africa, 
men, women, and children, and especially for activating Arab Druze against our brothers"iv 
The choice to use Druze policemen to suppress the Mizrahi immigrants' protests can be thought 
to have been designed within a 'divide and conquer' strategy. Using Druze officers to suppress 
Mizrahi protest was significant in sharpening the distinctions between those excluded and those 
included in the national collective. The native population that was anyway excluded from the 
Jewish national collective was divided and conquered this way, it's more collaborative parts- 
for instance the Druze- distinguished from non-collaborative sectors of Palestinian Arabs, 
                                                             
i "The Riots in Migdal Ha'emek on 19.7.59" (ha-mehumot be-migdal ha-'emek mi-yom 19.7.59), MSA 2-013-1959-
406. 
ii "A Leader Born" (leidato shel manhig), Ha'olam Haze, 29.7.59, p.4. 
iii Ben Harush's testimony to the investigation committee, 26.7.59; SA ISA-PMO-WadiSalibRiots-000jq34. 
iv Quoted in Gidi Weitz, "What did the founding fathers really think of the Mizrahim?" (ma beemet hashvu ha-
avot ha-meyasdim 'al ha-mizrahim), Haaretz, 13.2.14.  
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within different levels of exclusion. In Wadi Salib the same collaborative native population was 
brought to discipline rebellious immigrants into the order of the national collective. This was a 
somewhat ironic manner to draw the borders of the Jewish national, immigrant collective, 
depending not only on religious-ethnic affiliation, but also on obedience to the ruling elites of 
the state. This distinction was of great importance to the state. The surrounding Arab regimes 
had been evoking a political alliance with the oppressed Mizrahim through the radio, which 
were covering with interest the 1959 revolti (Roby 2015). The immigrants' Arab language, 
culture and  physical appearance, and especially the high levels of social and economic 
exclusion they revolted against, all these were good reasons to consider the Mizrahi immigrants 
as potential enemies of the state; occasional proof could even be foundii.  In this sense, the 
nationalist components in Ben Harush's discourse were not merely an act of "reconciliation and 
socialization with the Ashkenazim" (Tsur 2000). The national discourse reflected genuine 
sentiments of pride and belonging to the Jewish state, and it also fulfilled the state's requirement 
to demonstrate loyalty to it. The demonstrators had to prove that they "do not have a fight with 
the state"iii itself, that they wanted to keep their civil status and to struggle within the limits of 
the Jewish state. In fact, they had nowhere to goiv, no other country suggested them such an 
opportunity to belong to the national collective. Therefore, the struggle asked to fulfill the 
formal status of equal citizens with the adequate content, a demand to fulfill the Zionist 
promises of citizenship and modernity: equality within a modern national collective in a way 
that enables equal opportunities for upward social mobility. 
 
The Socio-Economic Breach 
The risk of getting marked as a threat to state security was not shared by the same generation 
of Mizrahim within the more accommodated classes. Unlike the notables of the CSCJ in the 
previous decade, they did not have the need to prove their loyalty to the state in this way 
anymore. Within the rebellious spirit that surged, the intellectuals in fact expressed the same 
                                                             
i See David Ben Harush's (Another one, from Halisa) testimony to the investigation committee, SA ISA-PMO-
WadiSalibRiots-000jq36.  
ii For instance, in the big demonstration in Wadi Salib some wanted to express their allegiance to the King of 
Morocco over their allegiance to the state, however they were stopped by the organizers. "Who are the Leaders 
of the Revolt?" (manhigei ha-mered- mi hem?), Ha'olam Haze, 31.10.59, pp. 8-9; David Ben Harush's testimony to 
the investigation committee, 26.7.59, SA ISA-PMO-WadiSalibRiots-000jq34. In a different context: Giora Yosftal, 
Life and Work. Mapai Ltd., 1963, p. 148. In another moment of UNAI's activity, they attempted to recruit soldiers 
with weapons, but that was most likely for defense against the police. See Marinsky (1992); "Meeting", MSA 2-
013-1959-612.  
iii David Ben Harush's testimony to the investigation committee, 26.7.59, SA ISA-PMO-WadiSalibRiots-000jq34. 
iv Since 1956 Moroccan passports were revoked from immigrants upon arrival to Israel, because emigration to 
Israel became illegal in Morocco (Shaul 2016).  
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concern about the proletarized stratums of immigrants, using this concern to leverage their own 
demandsi:   
"This population is easy to incite…. In a time of emergency, a fifth column can approach the deprived 
multitudes and tell them to ease down on the national effort, since they do not take part in the governance. 
Those who understand Arabic and listen to our enemies' broadcasts in Damascus and Ramallah know 
that more than once our enemies tried to exploit the discrimination claims. Their efforts are in vain… we 
must destroy every truth that will help our enemies come between us" ii 
The fear from national betrayal or of a violent revolution of the lower social stratums of 
impoverished immigrants will continue to worry Mizrahi and Sephardic intellectual elite 
throughout the period at hand. This concern created a sort of breach between the struggles of 
Mizrahim and Sephardim of different socio-economic stratums, which was evident in El 
Hamizrah since its beginning: unlike the CSCJ's discourse, the National Union did not pretend 
to represent the poverty-stricken multitudesiii. However, in 1959, the National Union and the 
National Sephardic Party were able to establish some bases in poorer peripheral areasiv. The 
National Sephardic Party exhibited a similar attitude to the old Sephardic and Ashkenazi elites, 
in the ambition to rescue or guide the "faltering social layers [shkhavot nekhshalot]"v. By 
contrast, the National Union saw their platform for national elections, unlike the one for local 
elections, as strictly conserved to members of the intelligentsia, for practical and tactical 
reasons. The leaders were afraid that speech produced by proletarized subjects might sound like 
hatred towards Ashkenazim, and saw the "extremists" as a potential "danger to the people and 
the security of the state"vi. On the practical level, the ability to speak eloquent Hebrew and 
remain economically independent was seen as essential for leading a Sephardic-Mizrahi 
autonomous organizationvii. This was part of a more general debate about who could and who 
was proper to represent this public.  
 "It is dangerous to abandon the problem in the hands of hasty people, who lack experience and 
knowledge, who do not even master [shgura al pihem] the language of the state, the holy language"viii  
                                                             
i E.g. Letter from David Ben Gurion to Eliahu Eliachar, 3.1.60; CZA 430A/251; Mordehai Kadosh's testimony to the 
investigation committee, SA ISA-PMO-WadiSalibRiots-000jq36.  
ii Cohen-Tzidon (1956): 36-37; also see Shalom Moial, "Editor's Note" (dvar ha-'orekh), EM 18.11.58. 
iii dalat ha-'am or ha-hamonim. For the CSCJ's approach, see "Matters of the Hour" ('inyanei ha-sha'ah), IB 9.8.60, 
p. 2.   
iv This is apparent mostly in the local elections results. Also see Y. Betzalel,"Will the Ethnic Lists Succeed in the 
Elections?" (ha-yatslihu ha-reshimot ha-'adatiyot ba-bhirot?) Maariv, 7.8.59, p. 4. 
v "Manifesto of the National Sephardic and Eastern Ethnicities Party, Netanya Branch" (giluy da'at shel ha-miflaga 
ha-leumit ha-sfaradit ve-'edot ha-mizrah snif natanya). MSA 2-013-1959-441; "The National Union reached out, 
the small bodies refused the proposal" (ha-ihud ha-leumi hoshit et yado, ha-gufim ha-ktanim dahu et ha-hatsa'ah), 
EM 1.9.59, p. 1; compare to Eliahu Eliachar's letter to Mr. Ramba, 29.11.61, CZA 430A/250/a.  
vi"Editorial Notes" (dvar ha-ma'arekhet), EM, 11.8.59, p. 1.  
viiShlomo Cohen-Tzidon, "Frank Words to Mizrahi Activists" (dvarim gluyim le-'askanei 'edot ha-mizrah), EM, 
23.9.58, p. 1.  
viiiShlomo Cohen-Tzidon, "The Happiness of the Sephardim and Mizrahim is the Happiness of the State" (oshram 
shel ha-sfaradim ha-mizrahiim- osher ha-medina), EM 16.10.59, p. 1 
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 "Has the Sephardic tribe… reached such a low level? [To support] an ignorant that cannot even write 
a short letter…He is not the proper man, does not have the talent, social ascription, culture, education 
or grand personality to stand in front of the most powerful people of the nation [gdoley ha-uma] to 
represent this tribe called by honor and glory the Sephardim" i  
This debate was so important that Mapai infiltrators succeeded to avoid unification of the two 
National parties around the question of which role could the impoverished social stratums play 
in a united list for electionsii. Even UNAI presented a similar discourse when needed:   
"Most [people] that tried to use our help were surprised by my appearance, I don’t look like a head of 
an organization…We were afraid of getting organized because we lack education and experience. That's 
why we established the organization as a mutual-aid organization and not a political one. I do not think 
we are ripe to run for the Parliament"iii 
The fact that UNAI did get organized politically was a result of a deep disappointment from 
and mistrust in the North African educated elites: both the leaders abroad that chose to 
immigrate to more comfortable countries and the local native elites who "had forgotten the 
people in the neighborhoods…and…were sold out to the regime"iv.   
 
In sum, the Wadi Salib revolt sharpened the distinction between Mizrahi socio-economic 
stratums, "the poor [dalat ha-'am], and the wide circles of Sephardim and Mizrahim whose 
conditions are not lower than the Ashkenazim's, but feel outside the camp"v.  The impoverished 
social layers were considered by the younger Mizrahi elites as possible political allies: not 
considering them so would be replicating the CSCJ's mistakesvi. But the intelligentsia organized 
in the National Union made a direct relation between activists of impoverished social layers 
and what they called, extremism, demagogy and blind hatred. Therefore, they could only 
cooperate if this new proletariat remained in local or non-political organizations, and not by 
proposing them political representation on the national level.  
 
  
                                                             
i A letter (replete with spelling mistakes) to Eliahu Eliachar (about Moshe Yishai) from Brakha Sh.David, Shmuel 
Saporta, Moshe H.Ben Adon, and Haim Konfino, 7.8.61, CZA 430A/39.   
ii The National Sephardic Party was formed by unification with "the Netanya group", led by Shmuel Cohen-Solel 
who had less socio-economic mobility. Unity between the groups could only be achieved by giving him a leading 
role, which the National Union opposed. However, the possibility to reach compromise was thwarted by Mapai's 
infiltrators. See: "The National Union reached out, the small groups refused the proposal" (ha-ihud ha-leumi hoshit 
et yado, ha-gufim ha-ktanim dahu et ha-hatsa'ah), EM 1.9.59, p. 1; "With a Grain of Salt" (be-'eravon mugbal), 
Davar, 9.8.59, p. 2; "Report Summery" (sikum yediot), 23.8.59, MSA 2-013-1959-441. This report by Mapai 
infiltrators informs that "we have succeeded to prevent union", in a serious negotiation between the leaders. 
iii David Ben Harush's testimony to the investigation committee, 26.7.59, SA ISA-PMO-WadiSalibRiots-000jq34. 
iv David Ben Harush's testimony to the investigation committee, 26.7.59, SA ISA-PMO-WadiSalibRiots-000jq34; "A 
Leader Born" (leidato shel manhig), Ha'olam Haze, 29.7.59, pp.4-5; "Ben Harush's People Go to Elections" (anshei 
ben harush holkhim le-bhirot), Haaretz, 23.10.59.  
v Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to David Ben Gurion, 29.7.59, BGA 127651 
vi See "Letters to the Editor" (mikhtavim la-ma'arekhet), EM, 9.6.59, p. 2.  
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The CSCJ's Relations to the Organizations 
In general, this CSCJ circle was disappointed by the emerging Sephardic and Mizrahi 
leaderships' inability to unite. The disappointment was increased by the fact that the best results 
in elections were gained by the organization that represented merely North Africans and not a 
collective Sephardic or Mizrahi publici. Those who did pretend to speak for such a collective 
could not even unite with each other, and either way all failed on the national scale.  
As mentioned, the failure of the CSCJ in the 1955 elections opened the structure of political 
opportunities for other groups and leaderships who wished to fill the vacuum. This vacuum was 
expressed in the two National parties' slogan, which used the traditional Jewish phrase "If I am 
not for myself, then who will be for me".    
The main activists in the National Sephardic Party had a bitter history with Eliachar and the 
CSCJii. The National Union activists  had a better experience of cooperation with this circleiii, 
but they decided to exclude the "old Guardia"iv from the organization. The CSCJ's endeavor to 
maintain autonomy within the General Zionists was not perceived by the next generation as 
different enough from other partnerships their elite's made within the different Zionist parties, 
a tendency all the groups denunciatedv.   
"Ben Harush emphasized in the name of the organization the word immigrants ['olei] and not 
descendants [yotsei] in order to emphasize the needs of the immigrants and block entry to the old 
community leaders [parnasim vatikim] that mostly had already been sold out to the regime."vi 
The younger generation also kept its distance from the older elites because of their notable 
politics and the centrality of the politics of honor for them, which did not allow free election of 
leaders (Zenner 1967). As seen in the previous period, in this period younger people in the 
CSCJ were still encouraged to lead only under the elders' authorityvii, and the gap between the 
                                                             
i Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to Aharon W., in: Goldstein (2005): 287.  
ii In 1957 Avner Shaki, the National Sephardic Party's leader, along with some ex-CSCJ members, established "The 
Union of Sephardic Communities" (hitahdut kehilot ha-sfaradim). Probably by the support of Rabbi Nissim, this 
organization tried to compete in certain ways with the CSCJ. It expressed dismay from Eliachar’s dominant 
leadership in such a hateful way that the CSCJ sued them for slander. See "Statute of the Union of Sephardic 
Communities (takanon hitahdut ha'kehilot ha'sfaradiyot), undated, CZA 430A/53/1; "Protocol of Executive 
Committee Meeting" (pirtei kol yeshivat ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 19.4.57, 28.4.57; CSCJA container 6266 file 638. 
Notwithstanding, Sidi Toledano that was closer to the CSCJ also took part of The National Sephardic Party.  
iii Firstly, Eliachar was included in their 1958 activists' conference, and Yitzhak Moshe Immanuel took a writing 
course with Siton before 1948. David Siton in interview to Mati Ronen, 29.1.84, CSCJA container 6330 file 1451. 
also see "Consulting Meeting of the Sephardic-Mizrahi Activists" (yeshivat hitya'atsut shel ha-'askanim ha-
sfaradim-mizrahim), EM 22.7.58, p. 1 
iv Y. Betzalel,"Will the Ethnic Lists Succeed in the Elections?" (ha-yatslihu ha-reshimot ha-'adatiyot ba-bhirot?) 
Maariv, 7.8.59, p. 4.  
v"By 'Mapai's Orders'?" (le-fi 'horaot mapai'?), EM 9.6.59, p. 3; Letter from Yitzhak Moshe Immanuel to Eliahu 
Eliachar, 24.4.57, CZA 430A/53/2.   
vi "A Leader Born" (leidato shel manhig), Ha'olam Haze, 29.7.59, pp.4-5. 
vii See for instance, "Protocol of Executive Committee" (pirteikol ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 1.3.65, 18.8.65; CSCJA 
container 6236 file 380. 
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CSCJ's discourse about democracy and the reality in the institution was eminent i. 
However, the CSCJ's legacy and Eliachar's charisma were not overlooked altogether. The 
National Union was inspired to national politics not as consequence of the Wadi Salib revolt, 
but by the heritage of the CSCJ. Even after shaking off the affiliation to any of the old elite 
circles, both National parties fought over the right to use the letter "S" used by the CSCJ as 
their electoral letterii. The younger generation of activists in the National Union saw themselves 
as successors to the CSCJ as reformers of its ways, with a responsibility to break through its 
authority and lead by themselves. They paid certain respect to the traditional institution, but 
they also insulted it and altogether did not consider it a viable political partneriii. This 
generation, that had matured and been educated with Ashkenazim, was also inspired by 
Ashkenazi leftist anti-institutional discourse, as the periodical Ha'olam Hazeiv. The "national" 
in National Union corresponded with an ambition to change the nation's nature, by participation 
in the public debate and in the making of policies that determine the face of the Jewish national 
society and culture. This was not different from the CSCJ's aspiration, but the young 
organization had learned from the elders' mistakes. Rather than insisting on the abolishment of 
institutional discrimination, they tried to attribute content in form of specific demands to what 
correct Merger of the Diasporas should mean, apart from the right of the same activists to gain 
power positions:  
"We do not know at all the original cultural creation of the Jews of Muslim countries, as is necessary for 
a proper Merger… in many fields -Jewish culture, intelligentsia, initiative- there are differences in the 
forms and the content between the different ethnicities, but not differences of level. In other fields like 
western education there is a difference of level. But education for adults has to be based first and 
foremost on mutual respect and any overtone of insincerity that there is, is outrageous and sabotages… 
We are planning and carrying out a huge social and human revolution but we are not consistent in our 
talk, our ways of life and our deeds."v 
 "We must remember that the term Merger of Diasporas cannot be done but through coupling… and not 
assimilation…. In all the levels of management of the Ministry of Education we must give preference to 
Mizrahim and safeguard positions only to them…they must get preference in teachers' training."vi  
By using explicit demands, the National Union's discourse was able to escape essentialist ethnic 
discourse, as the CSCJ's could sometimes come through, and could speak beyond mere  
                                                             
i See for instance the one and only list to the institution's elections, in CSCJA container 6218 file 147.  
ii That is, the letter written on the notes in the ballot box on elections day. The letter S was probably chosen to 
symbolize Sephardic. 
iii Letter of Moshe Elharif, "Letters to the Editor" (mikhtavim la-ma'arekhet), EM, 28.7.59, p. 2.   
iv "Thinking out-loud" (hirhurim be-kol ram), EM, 25.12.59, p. 2. All these organizations raised much interest among 
Ashkenazi extra-parliamentary oppositional groups, as the Semitic Action, the New Regime and the Third Force.  
v M. ktron. "The Warning" (ha-azharah), EM, 25.12.59, p. 1.  
vi Yitzhak Moshe Immanuel, "It is time to include the Sephardim and Mizrahim in Managing Education" (shituf ha-
sfaradim u-bnei 'edot ha-mizrah be-nihul ha-hinukh- tsav ha-sha'ah), EM 10.6.58, p. 3.  
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"mathematical representation… asking to send 'Sephardim' only because they are 'Sephardim'"i. 
During election campaign, much of the direct criticism of the National Union disappeared. That 
means that they were not sure what would draw the crowds, but comparing to the CSCJ's faction 
they had more confidence to raise discourse that their formers either feared to make explicit or 
could not make coherently enough. 
"I will not be afraid of rebuking the Ashkenazim [lehatif musar] and educate them about the Merger of 
Diasporas, a term that had lost all practical meaning to them."ii  
To summarize, the National Union attempted to inherit the CSCJ by correcting its past mistakes. 
They sharpened discourse that the CSCJ left ambivalent, waged for positive rather than negative 
claims, and expanded their lines to include immigrants of deprived socio-economic stratums, 
though in quite a limited manner.   
 
Throughout the 1959 rush of parties to nominate Sephardic and Mizrahi candidates, the General 
Zionist party nominated the son of the CSCJ's prime enemy, Rabbi Nissimiii.  From this point 
the circle of activists of the CSCJ was consciously searching for routes to influence and 
different ways to become a proper extra-parliamentary lobby. A central path was through the 
Sephardic Federation and its struggles within the international Zionist institutionsiv. On a 
practical level, the Federation was not very different from other Mizrahi associations that 
maintained and established relations with their particular Diasporas. The difference was that 
the Federation held the theoretical pretension to represent the entire Sephardic and Mizrahi 
imagined collective in the sphere of higher international Zionist politics. This made it an 
oppositional organization to Mapai, and it could not get its backing as other associations did. 
The Federation gave a common platform to the CSCJ circle and the native elites of Labor 
tendencies. Its activity was followed by the young native Sephardic generation as well. Through 
the tense summer of 1959 the major focus for the old notables' activity was the Jewish Congress 
in Stockholm rather than the riots and revolts around the country. Just like most political groups 
in Israel (Yorman 1995), the CSCJ also saw the popular discontent as an opportunity to promote 
the Federation's agendas. At the same time, though, Eliachar recognized the potential of this 
revolt, perhaps also due to the international Jewish-Sephardic attention it got (Dahan-Kalev 
1991). Though still seeing the Sephardic elite's role as intermediating between the Ashkenazi 
elite and the lower social stratums of immigrantsv, he could already see a more significant role 
                                                             
i Cohen-Tzidon (1956): 33.  
ii Letter from Y.M. Immanel to Eliahu Eliachar, 9.5.57, CZA 430A/53/b.  
iii See correspondence between Eliahu Eliachar and Salman Shina, CZA 430A/251.  
iv David Siton in interview to Mati Ronen, part 6, 30.10.83. CSCJA container 6330 file 1451. 
v Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to Ben Gurion, 6.10.61, BGA: subject files, container 42 file 245. 
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these immigrants could take in leading and establishing Sephardic autonomyi:  
"If Ben Harush would declare he would vote for changing the [voting] system…it would be an 
opportunity for Ashkenazim and Sephardim as one to vote for him as a strong [harifa] protest of the 




Conclusion                                                                                                            the 1959 Turn  
 
The impact of the Wadi Salib events and its meanings have been described and analyzed from 
many different angles. On the long term, it has established a collective rebellious Mizrahi 
memory (Negri 2014), but in the 1960s the state's counter reaction was more significant.  
Perhaps the most important impact for our concern is the way the lifting up of heads in the 
summer of 1959 effected that years' election campaign, by publicly exposing the way Zionist 
parties used threats, extortions and bribes in order to recruit activists and dismantle autonomous 
Mizrahi and Sephardic political organizationsiii. Along with the general rebellious atmosphere, 
this encouraged even more activists inside Zionist parties to apply their own extortions and 
threats in order to gain higher positions inside their local parties and institutionsiv. In the 1959 
elections, very few cities did not have at least one group and often more than one running for 
municipal councils, representing Mizrahim, Sephardim, or certain Muslim country of originv. 
Many achieved representation in municipalities and local councils. On both municipal and  
parliamentary levels, most Zionist parties added Mizrahi and Sephardic representatives or at 
least pushed some to higher positions in the listvi (Herzog 1986). This way not few towns got 
Mizrahi mayorsvii. As Chetrit (2004) pointed out, collective confrontation against the 
establishment bore fruit mainly for those who did not participate directly in it, but rather 
collaborated with it, since they are the ones the establishment was willing to negotiate with. 
None of the autonomous Mizrahi parties that ran for parliament gained representation, UNAI 
was the only one that got mighty close.  
                                                             
i Letter from Eliachar to Ben Gurion, 29.7.59; BGA: subject files, container 42 file 245. Afterwards he would always 
stress the contribution of the lower stratums of immigrants to the state building and guarding. E.g. Letter from 
Eliahu Eliachar to H. Hahelgi, 28.11.65, CZA 430A/210/4.  
ii Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to Haaretz editorial. 25.10.59, MSA 2-013-1959-406.  
iii E.g. M. Tenenbaum, "The 'Yekke' Grandfather of Sephardic Miki" (ha-saba ha'yeke' shel miki ha-sfaradi), Maariv 
26.10.59, p. 6.  
ivE.g. "The Babylonian List" (reshimat ha-bavlim), 20.10, MSA 2-013-1959-441. 
v"Jerusalem Broke Record: 16 Lists" (yerushalaim hesiga et ha-si:  16 reshimot), Maariv, 2.10.59, p. 2. 
vi M. Misles, "'The Sephardic' Revolution" (ha-mahapekha 'ha-sfaradit'), Maariv, 10.9.59, p. 2. 
vii Mainly, but not only, "development towns" like Dimona, Sderot, Qiryat Shmona and Bet Shean. See "Summery 
of the Meetings of the 16th and 18th of June of the year 1961" (taktsir shtei ha-yeshivot asher hitkaymu ba-yamim 
16 ve-18 le-yuni shel shnat 1961), MSA 2-013-1961-782. 
199
This was one main implication of the Wadi Salib events: Mapai realizing, subsequently and 
gradually making other parties realize, the importance of making the symbolic gesture of 
inclusion towards Mizrahi Jews. As a "brave Ashkenazi"i suggested, eventfully the impact of 
the revolt on the political system was similar to the impact of the communist struggles on 
capitalism: social capitalism. The political system started to trickle Mizrahim and Sephardim 
into it. More representation was gained for Mizrahim in state and municipal institutions through 
Zionist parties (Negri 2014, Bernstein 1976, Dahan-Kalev 1991), which accompanied by 
personal benefits. The Zionist system gave space for including the struggle that could have been 
against it, right into a struggle inside the system. This struggle was over limited and mainly 
local matters, which therefore entailed implicit acceptance of the foundations of Ashkenazi 
Zionism. Thanks to this moment of shaking off and rising of a Mizrahi-Sephardic autonomous 
voice, it was now publicly known that parties exploited their Mizrahi and Sephardic members 
to divide, extort, threaten and purchase other Mizrahi and Sephardic groups and activists. This 
exposure throughout the 1959 election campaign threatened the apparatus through which Mapai 
concentrated its domination. Mapai then had to find another way to co-opt the emerging 
leaderships, instead of gathering "votes-brokers" (Lissak 1972) and recruiting "mukhtars" and 
"fist men", i.e. notables and bullies. The main consequence then of the Wadi Salib events was 
an increased "business" of trading Mizrahim and Sephardim in political positions. For many of 
the Mizrahi and Sephardic intelligentsia this was a significant lesson in Israeli democracy and 
its manipulation. The second decade of statehood opened a new path for Mizrahi and Sephardic 
activists to participate in the political game: getting organized in a democracy (Lissak 1972: 
269) 
"The secret of organization-this secret that is a valuable asset became…the property of many youngsters 
in different parts of the country that want to get organized in a movement".ii  
Many of this generation had not been politically active in their countries of origins, and some 
countries did not yet have parliamentary elections when the immigrants left them. As limited 
as democracy was under Mapai's apparatus of domination, organized political collective action 
could influence the system. Naturally, this was known to Mizrahi activists before the revoltiii, 
but the resonance of this protest on the national level made this path ever more popular. Mizrahi 
and Sephardic activists started gaining some limited influence by forming "pressure groups in 
the parties, like the industry owners or the kibbutzim"iv. Lacking funds and mechanisms, 
activists got organized in order to enter different parties and gain positions in them. There was 
                                                             
i "The Opinion of a Brave Ashkenazi"(da'ato shel ashkenazi amits lev), EM, 30.10.59, p. 1.  
ii Immanuel (1964): 10.  
iii E.g. Letter from Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon to Golda Meir, 25.5.55; and to M. Eliakim, 5.6.55. MSA 2-013-1955-352.     
iv Avner Shaki in "We united and still haven't decided" (hitlakadnu ve-'adain lo hehlatnu), Maariv, 16.6.61, p. 9. The 
National Union also declared it would cancel its candidature if parties gave representation to Mizrahim. "Editor's 
Note" (dvar ha-'orekh), EM, 1.9.59, p. 2.   
200
no other way for them to reach audiences of thousands in order to speak about their burning 
issues. Therefore, many of the activists and leaders who surged in or before the summer of 1959 
found themselves zigzagging between different parties and organizations. Quitting coalitions 
and parties in order to form independent lists became a widespread tool for gaining political 
positions. As Herzog (1986) claimed, getting organized was explored as a way to make 
manipulations inside the political system, rather than as a way to gain autonomy. In a sense, the 
relative success in this struggle over political representation realized the demand of "real 
Merger of the Diasporas", which all Mizrahi and Sephardic organizations called for. However, 
it was a subjugated realization of this ethos, from a position that maintained Mizrahi inferiority 
in the system. Representation became a purpose by itself, a struggle to get included in the 
regime that sanctified Ashkenazi superiority, and not at all to transform it.    
Moreover, the path that opened for incorporation in the Zionist parties often went through 
creating political animosity between activists of different places of origins. It was a form of 
"collective ethnic separatism"i (by countries, regions or cities of origin), introduced to the 
political and public spheres because of the structure of political opportunities. Activism for 
one's own specific community was a principal way to achieve and maintain political support 
and public legitimacy. The relative success of the North African UNAI in the ballot-boxes was 
the best proof of thatii. The need to organize apart is typical of immigrant societies, which share, 
"tongues and ways of lives, customs and manners, opinions and beliefs and even liturgy and traditions… 
these became sacred to them with the passing of the generations…"iii  
However, in the political climate that was created, the result was "mobilization of ethnic 
identities in latent and indirect ways, without opening a political space to discuss or formulate 
these identities" (Grinberg 2014). In 1970 the Anthropologist Shlomo Deshen concluded half a 
decade of ethnographic research in a South Tunisian immigrant community. He documented 
how different ethnic groups were seeking representation in parties not in order to promote 
particular policies, but as a question of social prestige and recognition vis-à-vis other Mizrahi 
ethnic groups that were already represented in it (Deshen 1976). He wrote of how Zionist 
political parties designed politics empty of contents, except for conjuring purely sentimental 
reactions, which often underlined, channeled, manipulated and deepened ethnic differences 
between groups, and fed hatred between rival ethnic groups (Deshen 1970: 213-216). Deshen 
(1974) named this "political ethnicity", characterized by power struggles that have been 
                                                             
i Eliahu Eliachar, "Conclusion from Past Failures" (maskana mi-kishlonot ha-'avar), IB, 7.7.63, p. 3.  
ii UNAI received over 8,000 votes, three times more than the National Union (the next in popularity). Cohen-Tzidon 
also started his political career in an Egyptian immigrants' association. It is probable that his decision to quit Mapai 
and initiate an independent party around 1957-1958 had to do with the Egyptian immigration in 1956, which 
supplied him with some public base.    
iii Y. M. Immanuel. "The Sephardic Problem in the Educational Field" (ha-beaya ha-sfaradit be-ma'arakhot ha-
hinukh), Young Israel, 1.2.62, p. 1.  
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emptied of further significance. As David Siton said about the Federation, "there was no 
ideology but only dynamics"i, power struggles that by the way deepened the competition and 
rivalry between different ethnic groups within the Mizrahim and Sephardim (Bernstein 1976), 
creating "a new repertoire of ethnic misrepresentation by tribal challenging of collective 
feelings of fear, hostility and vengeance" (Grinberg 2014).  
The Wadi Salib events and its aftershocks solidified processes that took place since the 
establishment of the state, crystallizing the vacuums of leadership and identity within the 
Mizrahi and Sephardic publics (Bernstein 1976). Zenner (1967) claimed that the fact that the 
emerging leaderships tried to lead their communities by representation in Zionist parties and 
without rabbinical guidance, reflected the deep crisis caused by the lack of spiritual leadership 
that was created by the immigration process. The fact that Rabbi Toledano, in his role as "rabbi-
minister", changed his skin from a supporter of Sephardic autonomy to one of Mapai's envoys 
reflected the same crisis, as was the general incorporation of old timer Mizrahi rabbinical elite 
into the Religious National Party under Ashkenazi hegemony. Given all of the above, it is of 
no surprise that that the percentage of voting for "ethnic parties" got lower and lower as much 




 1960-1961                                                                                                           The Corollaries 
 
One result of the summer of 1959 was prime minister Ben Gurion learning the discourse of 
addressing the "non-Ashkenazi" public's special issues and miseries. This led him to appoint a 
new role in the government, a PM Consultant for Merger of the Diasporas, which was a sort of 
a parallel position to the PM Consultant for Arab Affairs. This latter was never an Arab but 
rather some high ranking official in the security mechanism, who was in charge of coordinating 
different bodies that managed the civilian life of Israeli Palestinian Arabs (Ozacky-Lazar 2006). 
The nomination of a PM Consultant on Merger of the Diasporas corresponded with an old 
demand made by wide circles of native elites, to construct an official representative body for 
this public by the stateii. The question of who should be included, how they should get elected 
                                                             
i  David Siton in interview to Mati Ronen, part 6, 30.10.83, CSCJA container 6330 file 1451. Also see Meir Chetrit in 
Michael (1984).   
ii This request was made since early 1950s. See Y. Nitsani, "For Establishing an Institution to Merge the Tribes" 
(yakum mosad le-mizug shvatim), Shevet Va'am, May 1958. Also see Y. Yeitiv, "Paradoxes in Our Social Life" 
(paradoxim be-hayeynu ha-hevratiim), Shevet Va'am, November 1958; Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to David Ben 
Gurion, 29.7.59, BGA 127651; David Ben Gurion's journal, entry of 21.2.60, BGA 217390; "Demanding an Office for 
Merger of Diasporas" (tov'im misrad le-mizug galuyot), Davar, 27.7.59, p. 6; Ezer Abutbol's testimony to the 
investigation committee on 30.7.59, SA ISA-PMO-WadiSalibRiots-000jq34. The latter investigation committee 
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and how could such a body take care of this publics' interest was a source for dispute between 
different organizationsi. The role of the PM consultant was designed as a symbolic gesture, and 
was appreciated as such by most activists' circles. The consultant André Shoraki was indeed 
left without real competences or authority. The role was dismissed by Ben Gurion as 
unnecessary before longii, and by 1963 got cancelled altogether.  
Many of the prominent activists of the four lists that ran for parliamentary elections in 1959 
pursued their political career. Some entered to, exited from or switched between Zionist parties, 
others eventually found their place in one party (Deshen 1970). Ben Harush left Wadi Salib 
about a year after he got released from his six months sentence, got disenchanted with the public 
struggle, and never resumed it againiii. Other activists continued to pursue unification in an 
autonomous framework, seeing that the accumulated votes of all the parties could have 
probably assured two parliamentariansiv. These last constructed again a "Countrywide Union"v, 
carrying the very same title as the organization all the CSCs had in 1949-1951, and also asked 
for Eliachar's endorsementvi. Since elections soon came in 1961, another wave of negotiations 
that included temptations, threats and extortions began between this Union and the Zionist 
partiesvii.  
Another group involved in this kind of negotiations was a network of different groups of Iraqi 
immigrants that had achieved representation in different municipalities in the center of the 
countryviii. This network was formed within a climate of public cultural-intellectual activity of 
the Iraqi immigrants elites, considered by some as "the intellectual and financial aristocracy of 
the Mizrahim"ix, organized through a club and a newspaper (Meir-Glitzenstein 2009). The 
leader of the political initiative, Abraham Avisar, was from Ramat-Gan, which was the center 
of this sort of activity throughout the 1950s. This network was in a sense an attempt to develop 
this cultural activity into the political sphere, but that made all the difference: 
                                                             
adopted this request into its recommendations. See "Report of Special Investigation Committee to the Wadi Salib 
Events Affair" (doh va'adat ha-hakira ha-tsiburit le-'inyan meora'ot vadi salib), 9.7.59. 
i E.g. Letter from David Ben Gurion to Babilonian Community Council, 8.3.61, CZA 430A/236/1/1.  
ii Letter from David Ben Gurion to Eliahu Sasson and Bechor Chetrit, 11.10.62, BGA: subject files, container 42 file 
245. Uri Avnery, "The Subject: The Equator" (ha-nidon: kav ha-mashve), Ha'olam Haze, 19.12.62, p. 4.  
iii "The Leader Abandoned the Wadi" (ha-manhig natash el ha-vadi), Maariv, 17.2.61, p. 18.  
iv ; M. Misles, "A Sephardic 'Headache' for the Parties" ('keev rosh' sfaradi la-miflagot), Maariv, 15.6.61, p. 3; also 
see "Spirits of Renewal and Re-Consolidation" (ruhot hidush ve-gibush me-hadash), EM, 25.12.59, p. 2.   
v "The Countrywide Union of the Sephardim and Mizrahim in Israel" (ha-ihud ha-artsi shel ha-sfaradim u-bnei 'edot 
ha-mizrah be-israel), IB, 14.7.61, p. 19.  
vi Letter from Sidi Toledano to Eliahu Eliachar, 8.12.59, CZA 430A/53/2. 
vii E.g. M. Misles, ibid.  
viii "Meeting of 16.6.61. Secret" (yeshiva mi-yom 16.6.61. sodi), MSA 2-013-1961-782.  
ix "Sensitive Matters and Discoveries" (nosim ve-giluyim 'adinim), EM, 3.4.59, p. 1.  
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"Our public got spread in other parties, not for ideology…we did not think about it from 1952, but the 
same educated people of the community were deliberating [hitlabtu] other questions until 1955…the 
people we represent we've liberated them from parties that took their voice in some way."i 
Founded by activists that had gone through the "schooling" of the Zionist parties, this group at 
this stage sought ways to increase representation of Iraqi immigrants in state institutionsii.    
Cohen-Tzidon, along with others, left the National Union and joined an initiative to re-establish 
the General Zionists party, now named the Liberal Partyiii. Off the sphere of parliamentary 
politics, he maintained his support in anti-colonial struggles, joining a small initiative to support 
Algerian independence (Erel 2006: 102), and was prominent in other struggles with a clear 
Mizrahi agenda: 
"His presence in the liberal party was technical, because his public work was militant, in the Mizrahi 
ethnic field of rights and so on. The fact he was in the Liberal party was more a lever to reach, say, the 
political level, namely the parliament…He was no propagator of the Liberal ideology. That is 
negligible…[he needed it to] struggle against the establishment".iv   
 The National Union's number two, Yitzhak Moshe Immanuel, took dominance in the 
autonomy-seeking circle that remained. Just like in the network of the National Union, this 
activist was always trying to make networks with other groups, and was one of the engines 
behind "the Countrywide Union"v.    
The National Religious Party was quite behind most parties in terms of gestures towards the 
Sephardic and Mizrahi publics, especially because of its objection to Rabbi Toledano's 
nomination as Minister of Religion in 1958.  Since early 1959 it had been having inner struggles 
over Mizrahi representation, which resulted in a group splitting from it to run to the 1961 
elections separately, led my Moshe Yishaivi. While Yishai enjoyed the support of the Sephardic 
Rabbis Organization, and therefore had certain backing from the CSCJ as well, his main goal 
was to gain better representation inside the National Religious Partyvii.  
                                                             
i "Meeting of 16.6.61. Secret" (yeshiva mi-yom 16.6.61. sodi), MSA 2-013-1961-782. In Hebrew the word kol means 
both vote and voice, reinforcing the idea of representation. Therefore, this quote expresses beautifully the role of 
political parties in the democratic system, as the tool created in order to speak for the voters, rather than taking 
away their voice.  
iiAt least, this was the demand that was explicitly repeated in an organized meeting between different activists of 
these local groups and Mapai's Iraqi MPs: "Meeting of 16.6.61. Secret" (yeshiva mi-yom 16.6.61. sodi), MSA 2-013-
1961-782. 
iii The Liberal party merged with Herut to create Gahal in 1965. Cohen-Tzidon formed part of the Liberal Party's 
central committee, and as of 1966 he was MP for Gahal, and responsible within it to relations with the Mizrahi 
development towns, particularly for making parliamentary questions and also as a speaker in these towns before 
elections: a kind of an up-scaled "vote-broker", then. 
iv Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18 
v Moshe Nekadimon, "Elections Journal" (yoman ha-bhirot), Herut, 14.6.61, p. 2.  
vi Sh. Quedem, "Conflicts in the National Religious Party over 'the place in the list'" (sikhsukhim ba-miflaga ha-datit 
leumit 'al 'ha-makom ba-reshima', Herut, 26.8.59, p. 1.  
vii Moshe Nekadimon, "Elections Journal" (yoman ha-bhirot), Herut, 14.6.61, p. 2. 
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Mapai branches in many other municipalities had been going through similar inner turmoil in 
these years. This happened in concentrations of Mizrahi immigrants, where external Ashkenazi 
party officials were brought to rule municipalities, and most notably in the two big cities of the 
south, Ashdod and Beer Shevai. Mizrahi groups were formed behind major Mizrahi activists in 
these municipalities and clashed with the Ashkenazi heads in order to obtain power and 
positionsii. 
 
The CSCJ                                                                                                
As new Sephardic and Mizrahi leaderships were emerging, discovering new ways in which 
getting organized can exert pressure in order to gain representation, the CSCJ was doing its 
proper exploration in its attempt to become an extra-parliamentary pressure group. A natural 
path was to publish a periodical. In August of 1960 the CSCJ, by David Siton's initiative, started 
publishing a journal, which by July of 1961 got to be a steady monthly titled In the Battleiii 
(hereinafter IB). The IB was almost a direct continuation of Hed Hamizrah, in its contents and 
form. It published mainly medium-length theoretical and informative articles about the 
problems of Mizrahi and Sephardic representation, along with articles by or about Sephardic 
lay and religious public figures, and reviews of Sephardic and Mizrahi customs, heritage and 
folklore. Unlike Hed Hamizrah, this was not a mouthpiece of a political party, but was simply 
meant "to show that this old [vatik] institution has a line and has a stand"iv. The magazine was 
sent to wide circles of the Sephardic and Mizrahi elites as well as to Ashkenazi decision 
makersv. The journal was a tool for the CSCJ's struggles, as well as a way to maintain the honor 
of the CSCJ as an institution dealing with public affairs. The first and most important struggle 
of the CSCJ with state institutions was over the Chief Sephardic Rabbinate. Reflecting over the 
period, Siton could not emphasize enough how this battle alone kept the institution alive in 
those years, "filling [it] with content and form and [making it] take actions the Sephardim had 
not thought of"vi. According to the conservative perception of the CSCJ, it was its own 
traditional role to determine the identity of the Chief Sephardic Rabbi, for laws that had legality 
beyond the statevii. This struggle allowed them to join forces with any rival of the Ashkenazi-
                                                             
i Uri Porat, "Conflicts and Conspiracies Destroy Ashdod" (tkhakhim u-mezimot horsim et ashdod), Yedioth Ahronot, 
1.7.63, p. 4.  
ii E.g. "Storms and Conflicts in 'Happy' Ashdod" (se'arot u-tkhakhim be-ashdod ha-'meusheret'), Yediothh Ahronot, 
27.10.61, p. 4; "Matters of the Hour" (le-'inyanei ha-sha'ah), Hed Ma'arakhtenu, 26.3.61, p. 2.   
iii ba-ma'arakha. Another possible translation is, "on the battlefield".  
iv David Siton in interview to Mati Ronen, 30.10.83, CSCJA container 6330 file 1451. 
v "Protocol of Executive Committee" (pirteikol yeshivat ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 6.11.60, CSCJA container 6236 file 380. 
Yehezquel Sofer, "Words to the Intelligentsia" (dvarim el ha-intligentsia), IB, 11.10.61, p. 2.  
vi David Siton in interview to Mati Ronen, Part 3, August 1983, CSCJA container 6330 file 1451. 
vii Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to Haaretz editor, 26.1.61, CSCJA container 6227 file 6.  
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dominated religious parties, creating some coalitions that indeed bore fruiti. Nonetheless, they 
did not abandon altogether the struggle over representation of the Mizrahi and Sephardic elites 
in other state institutions. Part of this struggle even included a short episode of supporting 
Mapai for the 1961 electionsii.  
 
By the end of 1961, "The Countrywide Union" was disintegrated, and its place was taken by a 
"Union for Merging of Diasporas", where the old elites were somewhat more dominantiii. 
Yitzhak Moshe Immanuel started publishing a newspaper called Young Israel and to lead a 
group by the same name, with a clear political cause to grow and maintain organized until the 
next elections, foreseen to 1965. This caused a breach between him and the CSCJiv. By the end 
of 1961 there were two journals that declared themselves as "the one and only stage for the 




1962-1967                                                                                      Autonomous Organizations                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Young Israel 
Young Israel had one main goal: to gather around it people from all generations, social stratums, 
and Sephardic and Mizrahi communities, and if possible also Ashkenazimv. This was somewhat 
over-ambitious and caused some contradictory political dynamics. For instance, they called to 
annul the CSCs but negotiated unification with In the Battlevi. Young Israel supported 
rhetorically struggles of proletarized immigrants, but they only really invested efforts in 
defending old timers' rightsvii. They had certain success making pacts with local groups and 
struggles (Herzog 1986), and they also cooperated with the CSCJ around specific actionsviii. 
                                                             
i David Siton, in his interview to Mati Ronen, mentioned a few of these coalitions. The most important achievement 
they gained this way was getting rabbi Moshe Toledano to cancel the lower status of municipal Sephardic rabbis. 
CSCJA container 6330 file 1451. 
ii "The Sephardim and Mizrahim and the Parliamentary Elections" (ha-sfaradim u-bnei 'edot ha-mizrah ve-ha-bhirot 
la-kneset), IB, 13.8.61, pp. 4-5.  
iii ihud le-mizug galuyot. See Letter from Yitzhak Cohen to Eliahu Eliachar, 18.1.62, CZA 430A/53/2.   
iv Yitzhak Moshe Immanuel wrote to Eliahu Eliachar in a less respectable manner, and Eliachar reproached him for 
publishing the magazine. See correspondence between the two on December 1961, CZA 430A/250/1; and in that 
Autumn in CZA 430A/53/2. 
v"Editorial Notes" (dvar ha-ma'arekhet), Young Israel, 18.4.63, p. 1.  
vi Victor Chetrit, "Cancel the CSCs, Unite the Sephardim" (yevutlo va'adei ha-'edot, yitahdu ha-sfaradim), Young 
Israel, 21.6.62, p. 4; "What is Happening in the Movement" (me-ha-mitrahesh ba-tnu'ah), Young Israel, 18.4.63, p. 
4.  
vii One of their main public struggles was over the poor infrastructure of Grin neighborhood in Holon, "the first in 
the city". "Grin neighborhood" (shkhunat grin), Young Israel, 23.12.62, p. 3.    
viii For instance, a protest in the Zionist Congress in Jerusalem in 1965; "The Problems of the Sephardic Public" 
(be'ayot ha-tsibur ha-sfaradi), IB, 29.1.65, p. 23. They also informed the IB about the movement's development.  
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However, the ambition to address the entire Sephardic and Mizrahi publics often resulted in 
unwarranted appropriation of other struggles and superficial building of alliances through a 
dominating authoritative attitudei. Though continuously making contacts and connections with 
other local groups, Young Israel broadly united forces with others only around the struggle over 
the Chief Rabbi of Tel Avivii. 
When Young Israel succeeded the National Union, they continued the struggle for autonomous 
Sephardic representation and maintained the support of the same synagogue, managed by the 
father of its now number two, Shalom Moialiii. Young Israel continued with some of the same 
discourse as the National Union's, but without Cohen-Tzidon it mainly reproduced hegemonic 
Zionist discourseiv. The cadre's tendencies, the attempt to speak to many different publics, 
including to progressive Ashkenazim, and the political context in which it was working 
reshaped the same arguments and contents from the past in a more superficial and less coherent 
way. Young Israel aspired to become the umbrella-organization that many Sephardic and 
Mizrahi activists were repeatedly asking to structurev, though it was usually proposed as a non-
party institution with official recognition from the government. For this reason, it kept an 
apolitical tone, and sustained quite a shallow political discourse.  
Their propaganda contained mainly repetitive calls against discrimination and deprivation of 
Mizrahim and Sephardim. In 1964 a racist book named "The Ashkenazi Revolution" got 
published, containing racist propaganda against Mizrahim and Sephardimvi. This book gave 
Young Israel a serious boost in motivation, and they even perceived it as preparing their ground 
for success in electionsvii. Their discourse about the Arab world also demonstrates the way this 
group used the National Union's discourse in more shallow and superficial manners. The 
National Union criticized Israel's middle-eastern politics, but silenced much of this criticism 
                                                             
i For instance, by claiming that leaders of a certain protest were Young Israel activists, while they denied it. Avraham 
Rotem, "The Tenants Burned the Trash" (ha-dayarim sarfu et ha-ashpa), Maariv, 24.8.64, p. 22. Another example 
of this tendency of this group may be seen is their relationship with the Fraternity activists, a relationship in which 
Young Israel repeatedly took credit for not taking credit over their activity: E.g. M. Avi Eyal,"The Lessons from Beer 
Sheva and Ashdod" (lekah beer sheva ve-ashdod), Young Israel 15.9.63, p. 1. 
ii E.g. M. Avi Eyal,"Order on Probation" (tsav 'al tnai), Young Israel, 28.9.62, p. 4.  
iii See Immanuel (1968).  
iv For instance, in the booklet "The Sephardic Revolution" (ha-mahapekha ha-sfaradit), which was an important 
propaganda tool for the movement, Immanuel wrote of the how the environment Mizrahi immigrants came from 
"had no meaning to these [full democratic] rights, [they] did not know the paths of industrial society, did not know 
to exploit opportunities and did not know how to advance…in the economic life. They were not trained in professions 
that are required in this society, and therefore too many remained in the bottom of the social ladder and a depriving 
reality was created. The principals of western democracy of the regime in the state of Israel, despite its good 
intentions, were foreign to the Sephardo-Mizrahim…" (Immanuel 1964: 7-8). 
v E.g. "Union and Unity: the movement united with the National Sephardic Party" (ihud ve-likud: ha-tnu'ah hitahda 
'im ha-miflaga ha-sfaradit leumit), Young Israel 4.11.62, p. 4. 
vi The book was written by Kelman Katzanelson, Russian in origins, that was a journalist and activist in the extremist 
right circles of the revisionist movement.  
viiY. M. Immanuel, "Before the Leap" (likrat zinuk), Young Israel, 18.11.64, p. 1. This book gave a boost of activity to 
Sephardic and Mizrahi public action in general: it was written by certain acquaintance with this sub-political sphere, 
addressed particularly some activists of the old Sephardic elites and adopted Young Israel's terminology, referring 
to this public as Sephardo-Mizrahim. This terminology will be discussed further in continuance.     
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towards elections. In contrast, Young Israel added positive clauses about Arabs to its agenda 
only towards elections, and probably just in order to attract some Israeli Palestinian Arab votesi. 
Before elections they demonstrated little more than mistrust and contempt towards Arabs, and 
Immanuel insinuated to the press that they would obtain Arab votes thanks to a good position 
one of its members in the military regimeii.  
Immanuel was a teacher, and the Young Israel newspaper focused much on education, usually 
from a progressive humanist perspective that some Ashkenazi intellectuals also expressed. This 
attitude defended the Mizrahi immigrants' backwardness as merely cultural, and not biological, 
and therefore fixable by resource allocation. However, Immanuel accepted the Zionist 
educational goals and perceptions that required these immigrants to change profoundlyiii. This 
was somewhat ironic, since just few years beforehand Immanuel rebuked Eliachar for being 
too afraid to preach to the Ashkenazim to changeiv. In fields of education and economy Young 
Israel defined certain particular collective needs of the "Sephardim-Mizrahim", that were in 
fact the needs of the poor.  However, they also opposed the discourse that portrayed the problem 
as a mere class issuev. Attempting to capture audience from all social stratums and political 
tendencies sterilized most of their critique towards Ashkenazi hegemony. Even Zionist Mizrahi 
MPs found occasions to carry more direct political critique about the need of Ashkenazim to 
change and act with humilityvi. However it is also true that any hint of hostility Young Israel 
would dare show towards the state institutions could be interpreted by some Sephardic 
intellectuals as alarmingly violent, potentially fanatical and possibly disastrousvii. 
The two main leaders of Young Israel were of accommodated native Sephardic families, and 
their motivation to get organized was rooted in this social and political world. Young Israel saw 
itself as carrying the voice of a Sephardic-Mizrahi collective identity, part of a certain heritage 
of autonomous political organizationsviii. They were indeed encouraged to keep an autonomous 
organization by practically all possible circles, because it was a way of exercising constant 
                                                             
i Concretely, they got one vote in the Bedouin village of Ibtin. In general, in small settlements they did not get more 
than 3 votes in one place. See "High Participation in the Elections for the 6th Parliament" (hishtatfut gvohah ba-
bhirot la-kneset ha-6), Hatsofe, 3.11.65, p. 1.    
ii M. Misles, "Young Israel Returns to the Collection of Parties" (israel ha-tse'ira hozeret le-ma'arakh ha-miflagot), 
Maariv, 30.7.64, p. 10.  
iiiE.g. Immanuel (1964): 15-16.  
iv Letter from Y. M. Immanuel to Eliahu Eliachar, 9.5.57, CZA 430A/53/b. 
v E.g. Y. M. Immanuel, "What is the Problem?" (mahi ha-be'aya?), Young Israel, 26.8.63, p. 1. 
vi "The Source of the Mizrahi Problem: lack of Equal Opportunities for All" (mekor ha-aflaya shel 'edot ha-mizrah 
he'ader hizdamnuyot shavot la-kol), IB, 25.12.64, p. 14-15; Roby (2015): 160.  
vii For instance, see in Rejwan (1964). Nissim Rejwan was part of the Iraqi intellectual's political networks and also 
had contacts with the CSCJ circle. This critique about Young Israel was in line with the general prudence Sephardic 
intellectuals exhibited against extremism and potentially disastrous Mizrahi movements. E.g.  Sh. Cohen-Tzidon, 
"Against the incitement against the Sephardim-Mizrahiim" (nokhah masa'a ha-hahasata neged ha-sfaradim 
mizrahiim), IB, 18.9.63, p. 4.         
viii Apart from learning from the mistakes of the CSCJ, they also learned from the National Union's errors. For 
instance, they were more transparent about their deeds and members, whereas the National Union kept these 
more secretive in order to appear stronger and bigger than what they actually were.   
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pressure on the Zionist parties to include Sephardic and Mizrahi representationi. However, the 
older conservative elites did not fully endorse the movement. Despite coming from the same 
social sphere, the generation that got educated in the Zionist-Ashkenazi dominated education 
system had been too ashkenized to gain the older elites' support. In their form of organization 
they attempted to copy the dominant Ashkenazi model alone, and did not follow the 
autochthonous Sephardic precedenceii. Their discourse about the older elites was too arrogant 
and their attempts to approach them were not courteous enough to gain their support. The 
younger generation's process of lifting up its head was too antagonistic towards the older 
generation, having internalized cultural coloniality: they saw their parents' generation just as 
the Ashkenazi Zionist elites did, as old-fashioned and irrelevant to the systems of the modern 
state (see also: Levy 1998). This formed an obstacle for Young Israel's attempts to build public 
legitimacy, because they were deprived of the older generation's support, both intellectuallyiii, 
financiallyiv and symbolically, of endowing acknowledgement to the movement.  
 
Young Israel hanged its hopes in cooperation with the independent elected forces in municipal 
elections, especially the mentioned Iraqi network. Some negotiations were held with this 
network before the 1965 elections, but these were unsuccessfulv. The latter gained more votes, 
though both groups remained outside the parliament. Some of the network's activists did not 
see self-organization as a cause but rather as means and therefore were not proper partnersvi.  
Before the 1965 elections a hot piece of news got unfortunately related to Young Israel: a spy 
for Egypt was caught within their ranks. Shmuel Baruch was new in the organization and had 
promised to raise its funds. He was arrested and judged, leaving the party with a need to keep 
a low profile and without an economic plan in the year before elections. There is certain basis 
to believe that he had joined Young Israel as an additional and marginal part of his spying 
activity, namely in order to pass information about the grievances and struggles of the 
Mizrahim, for Egypt to try recruiting them against the statevii.  
                                                             
iE.g. M. Levi, "Wishing Success to the Ethnic Lists in the Elections" (derekh tsleha ba-bhirot la-reshimot ha-'adatiot), 
IB, 26.9.65, p. 16.   
ii "Interview with Prof. George Harar" (reayon 'im prof. george harar), Young Israel, 24.9.65, p. 3.  
iii See Immanuel (1968a): 387-392.  
iv For instance, almost the only advertisement in Young Israel periodical was of the synagogue that supported them, 
whereas the IB had all their circles' businesses supporting the periodical through advertisement.  
v Some negotiations about uniting the two groups started already in 1962. "The Occurrences in the Movement" 
(me-ha-mitrahesh ba-tnu'ah), Young Israel, 1.2.62. About this failure also see "To Our Brothers Votimng in Ashdod" 
(el ahenu ha-boharim be-ashdod), Young Israel, 15.9.63, p. 4; Y. M Immanuel, "Sephardic and Ashkenazi Leadership 
in the State of Israel" ('al manhigut sfaradit ve-ashkenazit be-medinat Israel), Young Israel, 15.9.63, p. 3.   
vi E.g. Y. Aviam, "Negotiation and Contacts for Coalitions in the Local Elections" (mum ve-gishushim le-koalitsyot 
ba-rashuyot ha-mekomiyot), Maariv, 7.11.65, p. 22.  
vii At least the Palestinian Liberation Organization that was based in Egypt was definitely interested in that, 
according to Roby (2015): 157. Baruch was caught with an economic report he was preparing for the movement's 
newspaper, and at the same time he was making such reports for his operators. The main plan of the operators 
was different though. Some of the materials he passed to the Egyptians were fabricated, and others did not entail 
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After the 1965 elections, and probably mainly for lack of funds, the newspaper almost ceased 
completely to issue, and Immanuel invested himself in the project he has been trying to develop 
since early 1960s, books about Sephardic heritage, as well as about The Gap (Immanuel 1968a), 
just as the institutional framing of the problem between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim was  




The network of Iraqi municipal leaders that got formed following the 1961 elections continued 
to expand and articulate, and developed countrywide aspirations. In the beginning of 1963 an 
organization was officially formed, and in that summer it got a boost of activity within sudden 
municipal elections in the two southern cities Ashdod and Beer Shevaii. These elections were 
urged following clashes between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi local Mapai leaders, which received 
broad media coverage. The Iraqi and Egyptian Mapai activists who led these struggles were of 
lower social stratums, and sought the support of this network, despite the geographical distance 
and socio-economic difference, and the network recruited itself totally, as well as Young Israel, 
in what was described as a rare moment of intra-ethnic solidarity: 
"In the Beer Sheva elections was the first time ethnic solidarity was put into work: owners of factories 
and workers, people from all across the country opened their pockets and hearts, Young Israel agreed 
not to run its own list. This was the first time that the inner communal wrangling was blocked… inter-
city inter-communal solidarity…"iii  
Within this turmoil, Fraternity was established, based on the previous network of municipal 
leaders, and as a movement/party/faction/network of municipal factions, each conserving its 
own autonomy. "The List for Fraternity and Progress" ran failingly to the 1965 general 
elections, but it gained some small victories under various trademarks in different localities. 
Meir-Glitzenstein (2009) claimed that since many of the local lists did not enter municipal 
coalitions but remained in the opposition, the enthusiasm from it subdued in the second half of 
                                                             
any security threat. He was released after serving 10 out of the 18 years of his sentence, and continued to live in 
Israel, keeping a low profile. See Yossi Melman, "During Some Months in the Years 1964-1965 He Was a Famous 
Spy" (le-meshekh kama hodashim, ba-shanim 1964-1965, hu haya meragel mefursam), Haaretz 22.8.11; "'Sam' 
Baruch Aspired for a 'Public Position'" ('sam' barukh shaaf le-'ma'amad tsiburi'), Maariv, 1.12.64, p. 2; "This is How 
Sam Planned Conquering the Government of the State of Israel" (kakh tikhnen Sami et kibush ha-shilton be-
medinat Israel), Herut, 3.12.64, p. 2; Gideon Reicher, "Sami Baruch's Speed Trial" (mishpat ha-bazak shel sami 
barukh), Yedioth Ahronot 10.1.65.  
i See Y. Maas, "The Silence Conspiracy" (kesher ha-shtika), IB, 10.3.63, p. 10.  
ii Arieh Avnery, "An Anonymous Governmental Official is 'Shraga Netzer' of the Mizrahim" (pakid memshalti almoni 
hu 'sharga netser shel 'edot ha-mizrah), Yedioth Ahronot, 17.1.63, p. 7; Arieh Avnery,"A New Political Movement 
was Established Today in Israel" (tnu'ah politit hadasha kama ha-yom be-israel), Yedioth Ahronot, 7.8.63, p. 6.  
iii Immanuel (1964): 39. Immanuel also got invited to speak in a conference of Fraternity. "The Words of Young 
Israel in a Conference of Fraternity in Ramat Gan" (dvar tnu'at israel ha-tse'ira be-kenes ha-ahva be-ramat gan), 
Young Israel, 26.8.63, p. 4.   
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the 1960s, and it ended up disappearing. Indeed after 1965 some of its prominent activists 
started zigzagging between different Zionist parties, searching for a position that would give 
them political influencei.  
Still though, some observations can be made about this short lived network. The title of 
Fraternity and Progress was strikingly similar to titles of Israeli Palestinian Arab parties' 
affiliated to Mapaiii. Fraternity was also a name of a cultural-political community-club made 
by Moshe Yishai in 1965, independently from the Religious National Party, and enthusiastically 
supported by the CSCJ and other Mizrahi activistsiii.   
If Young Israel inherited the National Union, which continued the CSCJ, the electoral list of 
Fraternity was in some senses inheritor of the UNAI (Meir-Glitzenstein 2009), mainly because 
of its relative success among the impoverished social stratums of immigrants. It had some 
charismatic local "street-leaders", and it expanded its bases by attracting ex-Mapai bullies to its 
rows, offering them constructive political activism, just like Ben Harush also didiv. Its program 
was also composed by progressive egalitarian clauses directed to the entire population, 
including equal rights to the Israeli Palestinian Arabsv. Curiously enough, both groups 
suspected the ballot box results, but Fraternity had the social resources to also apply for a 
recountvi. Fraternity was also an organization that was constructed upon certain disappointment 
from the elites of the community, as shown previously. The main difference between the groups 
was that the spokespeople of Fraternity were acculturated and educated, and nobody found 
reasons to discredit them (Meir-Glitzenstein 2009). Another difference is that this group could 
not raise enough popular bases by simply addressing the Iraqi community, which was smaller 
in size and often better-off than other Mizrahi communities. Therefore, in the national list and 
in some of the local ones, they included representatives of other places of origins, mostly of 
other middle-eastern countries, who participated in the initiative and felt it as their ownvii (Meir-
Glitzenstein 2009). However, they were not able to shake off their image as an Iraqi movement, 
established to promote the interests of this particular ethnic groupviii. As for the CSCJ, not much 
cooperation or relations were found between these groups. Fraternity's Jerusalem municipal list 
                                                             
i "In Ashdod They Ask, To Who's Side is Mr. Robert Haim?" (be-ashdod shoalim: le-tsad mi po'el mar robert haim?) 
Maariv, 6.9.65, p. 16.  
ii One was Progress and Development, another was Fraternity and Participation.   
iii "The Activity of the Fraternity Club" (pe'ilut mo'adon ha-ahva), IB, 28.2.65, p. 15; Eliahu Eliachar (in pseudonym 
ha-mashkif), "Contradictions of Cultures in Israel" (nigud tarbuyot be-israel), IB, 6.5.65, p. 16; "Moshe Yishai and 
Prof. Hirschenberg in an evening about North African Jewry" (moshe yishai ve-prof. hirshenberg be-'erev 'al 
yahadut tsfon afrika), Hed ha-me'orer, 1966, p. 14. CZA S62/576. 
iv Arieh Avnery, "An Anonymous Governmental Official is 'Shraga Netzer' of the Mizrahim" (pakid memshalti almoni 
hu 'sharga netser shel 'edot ha-mizrah), Yedioth Ahronot, 17.1.63, p. 7.  
v Arieh Avnery, ibid.  
vi "Demandng to Make Re-Elections: in Three Ballot-Boxes (doresh la'arokh bhirot hadashot: be-shalosh kalpiyot), 
Maariv, 22.11.65, p. 1. Chetrit (2004) said that about the popular discourse around the UNAI.  
vii Yehiel Limon, "The Heads of Fraternity List in the Capital: We will get two representatives in the municipality" 
(rashei reshimat ahva ba-bira: yihiyu lanu shnei tsirim ba-'iriya), Maariv, 20.10.65, p. 18.   
viii Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18 
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had Yitzhak Tusia-Cohen in its head, who was the lawyer leading the lawsuits against the CSCJ 
in late 1950s. However, as Fraternity's prestige was declining, around 1966, some cooperation 
was sought between the two groups by the intermediation of Nissim Rejwani, within the CSCJ's 
efforts to expand the distribution of the IBii. 
 
 
The Student Cell for the Merger of Diasporas (SCMD)
iii
  
In the 1960s, Israeli student cells were organizations formed in universities often by political 
parties. The student cells were spaces in which young people could experiment with politics, 
often for the first time, and without the obligation to fulfill their aspirations in the public sphere 
outside the campus. This is also due to the ephemeral nature of participation in the cell, which 
lasted only during the students' period of study, and often even exclusively during the years of 
the BA. In early 1960s in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem there were very few Mizrahi 
students. Therefore, it was somewhat natural for them to find each other's company. Some of 
those formed the Student Cell for the Merger of Diasporas (hereinafter SCMD), which 
represents the youngest organized group covered in this research, composed by university 
students in their early twenties.   
The SCMD got formed within Mizrahi students of Humanities and not of Science, that is, by 
students who searched in the university expansion of their horizons rather than a direct 
professional trajectory. The founding core of the organization were students of the Institute for 
Oriental Studiesiv, that taught Islamic history, culture and literature. The institute functioned as 
part of the state's training apparatus for cadres for military intelligence (Mendel 2014: 75), but 
for these Mizrahi or Sephardic students these studies were also way to explore their own history 
and heritage, which could not be found in departments such as Jewish Science or History. By 
the end of the academic year of 1960/1961 some of these students, that shared "perplexity 
                                                             
i Nissim Rejwan in fact reminds in his writing of Nissim Malul, who was active before 1948 in different Sephardic 
organizations. Malul promoted a radical ideology of Jewish-Arab cultural and spiritual symbiosis (Bezalel 2007). 
From 1959 Rejwan was the editor of the Mapai Arabic newspaper Al-Yawm, where he extensively wrote about 
Mizrahim's problems. He published his articles in many different newspapers in Israel and also in Arab countries. 
According to Efron (2005), he was interested in identities created by colonial modernity in Muslim Arab countries, 
and saw the Sephardic Golden Age as a model for Israel to cooperate with Palestinian Arabs. He got fired from Al-
Yawm in 1966 and started seeking cooperation within the CSCJ's publications. He edited the bulletin Israel's 
Oriental Problem after Michael Selzer, and wrote in the IB about the need for Mizrahi culture to get reconnected 
with its Arab roots. His insistence upon the existence of a Jewish-Arab identity eventually got him fired from there 
as well. See: Sh. Ya'akovi,"Why was Nissim Rejwan Fired?" (madu'a putar nissim rejwan?), IB, 14.9.66; and David 
Siton in interview to Mati Ronen, part 7, 30.10.83, CSCJA container 6330 file 1451.  
ii Letter from David Siton to Eliahu Eliachar, 24.7.66, CZA 430A/42/3/2; Letter from Nissim Rejwan to Eliahu Eliachar, 
27.1.67, CZA 430A/237/4.     
iii ta ha-studentim le-mizug galuyot.  
iv Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18, and interview with Yosef Tubi, 12.11.17.  
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[mevokha] and anxiety"i by the current socio-political situation of Mizrahim, turned informal 
scholarly conversations and gatherings into a semi-formal student cellii . In the first year of the 
cell's activity, 1961/1962, it functioned mainly as a space for different Mizrahi students to 
gather and learn. They shared  information about the heritages of different countries of origins 
and about the problems of Mizrahim in Israel, especially but not only in the field of educationiii. 
Because of the vast array of political orientations of its members, this was the only way to 
outline the common goals such a circle could have: in its second recorded meeting, the only 
thing all members could agree on was that "there is a problem", but the content or name of the 
problem could not even get agreed uponiv. The meetings took place in the student dorms and 
expanded only through acquaintances, never making special efforts to recruit new members.  
In its second year of existence, 1962/1963, the circle defined its titlev and therefore its mandate 
as a group of students with the ideological cause of national unity. They represented this cause 
using the official Zionist language that called for Merger of Diasporas, maintaining the state 
ideology and its discursive framework. The now defined SCMD expanded its milieu and 
repertoire, first by hosting or getting hosted by affiliated scholars or government workers from 
the field of educationvi, and then by organizing public events meant to bring ethnic-social issues 
into greater public awarenessvii. It also mobilized its members to actions and demonstrations 
around cases of blunt and explicit discriminationviii. In its last year of activity, 1963/1964, a 
North African student-group officially joined the cell, and there was an attempted to publish a 
regular bulletin on campus, containing members' articles, called For Your Informationix. In this 
final year the cell also focused more on mutual-aid activity, such as teaching Hebrew and 
handing books to high school immigrant studentsx.  
Despite this group constituting de facto a Mizrahi organization, its leaders did not support the 
idea of autonomous Mizrahi political parties, neither in theoryxi nor in practicexii. 
                                                             
i Yehezquel Shemesh, "The reader to the editor" (ha-kore el ha-orekh), IB, 8.4.63, p. 23.   
iiInterview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18. and interview with Yosef Tubi, 21.1.18. 
iii Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18, "Protocol of meeting num. 2" (protokol shel yeshiva mis. 2), 27.2.62; 
"Protocol num. 3" (protokol mis. 3), 5.3.62. TA.   
iv "Protocol of meeting number 2" (protokol shel yeshiva mis. 2), 27.2.62, TA.  
v Undated draft in handwriting of an article directed to new members of the SCMD, TA.  
vi Yehezquel Shemesh, ibid.  Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18, interview with Yosef Tubi, 12.11.17. 
vii Among others, in their interviews (ibid.), Tuvia Sulami for instance told about a public conference with Moshe 
Sharett, that at the time was head of the Jewish Agency, and Yosef Tubi told about a meeting with Andre Chouraqui, 
the special PM advisor for Merger of Diasporas. 
viiiAs Sulami (ibid.) emphasized, these got active in cases where Ashkenazim expressed shamelessly racist opinions. 
The CSMD mainly got reactive around two cases, both involve direct racist expressions against Yemenites. See for 
instance: List of ten actions to do in the case of Yosef Yam, untitled in handwriting; "To our Yemenite Brethrens!" 
(el ahenu ha-teimanim!), poster signed by the residents of De-Haz street, 6.7.62, TA.  
ix le-yediatkha. 
x Undated draft in handwriting of an article directed to ne members of the SCMD. TA. 
xiShlomo Abayo, "Required: New Leadership" (mevokeshet: manhigut hadasha), FYI, 1.9.63, TA; Yosef Tubi's 
journal, entry of 10.3.62, TA.    
xii Yosef Tubi, for instance, was simultaneously active in a Mizrahi faction inside the Religious National Party for the 
Jerusalem municipality.  
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Notwithstanding, the way Mizrahim and Sephardim were getting included in the Zionist parties 
was seen as harmful and wrong. The justification for their own self organization could be 
summarized by a small piece of data that repeated in several debates: the fact that their 
generation had fewer Mizrahim and Sephardim with higher education than the previous 
generation, both the native ones and from the different Muslim countries of origins. This piece 
of data encompassed the entire story of "inter-generational collective trajectory of descent" 
(Bourdieu 1984). This proved that Mizrahim were not inherently inferior, but were made 
inferior in the state of Israel, because of an absorption process that did not discriminate between 
different social classes and educational levelsi, but did discriminate on ethnic basis. Therefore, 
and this was another central point for these young scholars, there was no justification to exclude 
Mizrahi and Sephardic heritage and history from the educational curriculum, in fact, this 
knowledge should be strengthened for the process of Merger of Diasporas. For many of these 
youngsters, this was the first space in which such discrepancy with the narrative of hegemonic 
Zionism was raised and heard: 
"This was actually the first place in which we started revising the first model that was the melting pot, 
that is actually an Ashkenazi [pot]. We said…we won't agree... Merger of Diasporas- yes, where 
everybody brings everything, not a melting pot to make us ashamed of what we have and destroy it and 
let go of it…this was the first time... we started to talk in the cultural aspect about multi-culturalism…a 
society that respects the roots and heritage of everybody."ii  
From meeting protocols and from the interviews conducted, it is apparent that there were two 
trends in the group. Some adopted the dominant Ashkenazi interpretation of the Merger of 
Diasporas as assimilation, and some gave it a different interpretation, one that required mutual 
changeiii. The difference was usually set according to the lived experiences of the individuals. 
Those who immigrated in a young age and got settled through dependency in Mapai's 
institutions, tended to think assimilation and mimicry of Ashkenazim was the proper path for 
Mizrahim to enter modernity and climb out of povertyiv. On the other hand, Yosef Tubi, Tuvia 
Sulami and others, who were second generation of Yemenites in the country, were more 
militant, their perspective relying on closer acquaintance with Ashkenazim and on the 
accumulated experience of discrimination of the past generation. This allowed them to see more 
clearly the inter-generational deterioration, the expansion of socio-economic gap in 
                                                             
i This last in particular was a central point for Yosef Tubi that repeated several times in his journal and in his public 
writing. See: Letter from Yosef Tubi to Israel Yeshaayahu, undated, TA; Yosef Tubi, "The social gap in the state of 
Israel" (ha-pa'ar ha-hevrati be-medinat Israel), June (sivan) 1963, TA. Also see: "Protocol of meeting num. 2" 
(protokol yeshiva mis. 2), 27.2.62; untitled undated document in handwriting containing data, TA.  
ii Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18.  
iii  "The Goal of the Cell of Mizrahi Students" (matrato shel ha-hug le-studentim bnei 'edot ha-mizrah), Yosef Tubi's 
journal, entry on 5.3.62, TA. 
iv "Protocol of meeting num. 2" (protokol yeshiva mis. 2), 27.2.62, TA.  
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opportunities, and the way "Ashkenazim mostly avoid and evade"i the problems of Mizrahim. 
Also, there were more militant voices emerging from graduate students of Iraqi origins that 
joined the circle, represented perhaps most loudly by the Marxist scholar David Tzemahii. These 
immigrants had had been politically educated in their country of origins, influenced by Arab 
nationalism and communism rather than Zionism:  
"You could see it, everybody got connected. For instance, the Iraqi Jews…were very connected to the 
Arab culture, they would stick to Arab culture and Arab language more than to the Jewish parts…In the 
last generations there was very strong secularity and their Jewish part was not nurtured as within 
Yemenite Jews that were so very observant. So for instance in our forums they would quote proudly from 
Arab poetry, in the meetings!... We would sit and listen to Arab music, we [Yemenites]…it would never 
occur to us."iii 
Unlike the assimilated immigrants, these activists brought to the SCMD's meetings meaningful 
cultural baggage from their countries of originsiv. The Iraqi communists that joined also brought 
a Eurocentric modern ideological orientation that was not Zionist. In the local Zionist-
colonialist context, the kind of cultural colonization they had gone through in Iraq carried the 
seed of decolonization (Ben Zaken 2006: 24-25), even though it was foreign as "a winter coat 
on a steaming-hot Tel Avivian day"v. As an organization, however, the cell  distinguished itself 
from the communist party, which was conceived as anti-Jewish and anti-patrioticvi.  
In the SCMD, students from different backgrounds were able to find a common ground and 
formulate it by different authorities. The organization encompassed activists from a great 
variety of ethnic origins, and for many this was a first space to meet different types of 
immigrants or nativesvii. In its meetings, the SCMD in fact experimented with the future multi-
cultural society it aspired to live in. In a protected and limited space and time, the SCMD lived 
up to the fusion that the ideology of the Merger of Diasporas implied. The encounter with 
immigrants that were still very much connected to their heritage and roots, along with the data 
about the deterioration of Mizrahi middle-class, got Mizrahi Zionist activists to conceive of the 
Ashkenazi Zionist enterprise as an "unjustified cultural war"viii. Then the organization 
attempted to create "a synthesis of action of all ethnicities"ix: a political platform drawn from 
the diverse experiences of its participants: their diverse geographical backgrounds before 
                                                             
i Yosef Tubi's journal, entry of 23.3.63, TA.  
iiInterview with Yosef Tubi, 21.1.18.  
iii Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18.  
ivPhone-interview with Tuvia Sulami, 4.2.18.  
v Shlomo Abayo, "Required: New Leadership" (mevokeshet: manhigut hadasha), FYI, 1.9.63, TA.  
vi Yosef Tubi and Tuvia Sulami explained in their interviews that they added a clause of loyalty in the platform of 
the SCMD in order to distinguish themselves from communist ideology. Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18; 
interview with Yosef Tubi, 21.1.18.  
vii This is also due to the fact that few members of this group attended to their academic studies as part of a military 
program which recruits to the army after completeing the BA ('autuda).   
viii Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18. 
ix Avraham Sofer in "protocol num. 3" (protokol mis. 3), 5.3.62, TA.  
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immigration, and the processes they endured in Israel since. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
political platform designed out of the convergence of this diversity was no other than asking 
the fulfillment of the official state's goals. As other Mizrahi organizations of the time, their 
goals were defined in national-patriotic terms, and their tone "attempted to maintain statist, 
meaning, not to be unruly, neither in speech nor in action"i. That was despite the fact that some 
thought this tone might vitiate them and make their principles too abstract and generic ii. This 
choice of tone was not only a result of the diverse positions between the cell's members. As 
Sulami suggested, since the speakers of the establishment kept their own racist discourse 
obscure and "wrapped with pretty words", it forced such discursive terms also on those wishing 
to challenge itiii.  
 
In the very end of 1964 some of the original leaders had finished their studies and moved to Tel 
Aviv, where they continued working for the same goals in the framework of a new journal 
called Afikimiv. Afikim re-defined the SCMD's goals in its sub-title as a threefold purpose: 
spiritual and social revival, meaning giving stage for young Mizrahi writers, poets and 
researchers; defense of rights, meaning publishing public struggles and articles against 
discrimination; and Merger of Diasporas, meaning giving stage for people of all ethnic originsv. 
Nissim Rejwan aided Afikim as a backstage advisor and a close friend of the editorial, and used 
to participate in their closed ideological debates and decision making, as well as in Afikim's 
public eventsvi. The Marxist scholar Shlomo Swirsky later on also contributed to the journalvii. 
For Tuvia Sulami, who led the SCMD in its first two years and then edited Afikim in its first six 
years, Afikim was the realization of the SCMD ideology and goals in the public sphere. Even 
though its milieu of writers and readers remained mainly Yemenite intellectuals, and its subject 
matter mostly focused on issues of the Yemenite community, it succeeded in bringing together 
a diverse spectrum of Yemenite communities and political orientations in a manner that is 
unique for this ethnic community, characterized by multiple organizationsviii. Afikim abstained 
completely from parliamentary politicsix, which gave it public credibility and allowed it to 
                                                             
i Interview with Tuvia Sulami, ibid. 
iiLetter from Ar.i.s.to to Cadet Tubalkiahu (from Tuvia Sulami to Yosef Tubi), 11.8.62; "Meeting 3" (yeshiva 3), 
18.3.62, TA.  
iii Interview with Tuvia Sulami, ibid. 
ivHorizons or Routes. Afikim was established when a central group from the Yemenite journal Da'at quit the 
editorial. Da'at was established in March of 1963 and Sulami and Tubi probably spent more of their time 
contributing to it than in the SCMD, from its inception.   
vInterview with Tuvia Sulami, ibid. 
vi Interview with Tuvia Sulami, ibid.; phone-interview with Tuvia Sulami, 4.2.18.   
vii Interview with Yosef Tubi, 21.1.18.   
viii Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18, Phone-interview with Tuvia Sulami, 4.2.18.  
ix This was the main reason for establishing Afikim, as Da'at was considered by Afikim's editorial members as 
directed to the personal political gain of its chief editor. See "Every operation hurts but heals" (kol nituah koev akh 
merape), Afikim, 28.12.64.  
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continue publishing until nowadaysi. By 1966 it became a central tool for uncovering the 
systematic abduction of  Yemenite and other newborn children in Israeli transit camps in the 
1950s, which according to Sulami, brought to the establishment of the first governmental 
investigation committee on the matter in 1967ii.  
Young Mizrahim that were graduates of the Institute for Oriental Studies often found the path 
for upward socio-economic mobilization by joining the state's security services. This path 
neutralized them politically -both practically and ideologically- because it entailed total 
identification with the state and its causes. Many of the participants in the SCMD indeed got 
incorporated into this route, and quit any public activity. Sulami quit Afikim in 1969 when he 
joined the security services as well. Some continued to other types of public positions, in the 
academy or in municipal politics. In the first case that also entailed certain withdrawal from 
public strugglesiii. One of the members of the younger Iraqi immigrants, Eli Amir, became a 
famous novelist. His occupational biography can be brought as an example for the way the 
Ashkenazi-dominated institutions absorbed such Mizrahi activists. By 1964 Amir had a 
government job at the office of the PM's Consultant on Arab Affairs. He remained within 
governmental institutions all his life, serving the settler-colonial system either by managing 
absorption of Jewish immigration or by managing the control over Palestinian Arab population.  
 
The Torah Loyalists Circleiv 
During the 1960s an autonomic Sephardic retort rose against the process of toranic colonization, 
which has been influencing Sephardic spiritual sphere since the 1940s. Conjuring this 
autonomic retort was a slow process, difficult to grasp in progress: "concealed, dim, quiet and 
hard to hear" in its initial stages (Leon 1999). Retrospectively, it is clear that this process 
matured in the 1980s into the political party of Shas, serving as a political home for many 
Sephardim and Mizrahim still today. 
The protagonists of The Torah Loyalists Circle were graduates of Porat Yosef, which might be 
considered the main Sephardic ultra-orthodox toranic academy in Israelv. During the 1930s and 
                                                             
iNowadays it is published roughly yearly, and mainly online, with just few paper editions printed and sent out to 
subscribers. The last issue was published on December 2015.   
iiEli Aliahu, "The poet Tuvia Sulami is convinced that the Ashkenazim have exaggerated" (ha-meshorer tuvia sulami 
meshukhn'a she-ha-ashkenazim hegzimu), Haaretz, 14.7.16.  
iiiInterview with Yosef Tubi, 21.1.18.   
iv hug neemanei ha-tora.  
v Porat Yosef is still considered the central Sephardic ultra-orthodox academy. It was opened in 1923 in the old city 
of Jerusalem, closed in 1948, and re-opened only in 1957 in an ultra-orthodox neighborhood of Jerusalem (Geula). 
It was different than other Sephardic toranic academies in various manners, for instance by being dedicated to 
toranic studies exclusively and promoting a severe Halachic life-style. It was rather an exception in the climate of 
Muslim countries in its aggressive orthodox reaction to modernization and secularization (Leon 2011). After 1967 
it re-opened a branch in the old city which was considered its more prestigious wing, where the system of teaching 
was completely Ashkenazi. Therefore, it became another Sephardic center that the main Sephardic component in 
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1940s Porat Yosef comprised what Leon (2013) called proto ultra-orthodox circles, which 
expressed Sephardic reactionary-conservative conceptions and practices, under varying degrees 
of influence from Ashkenazi reactionary-conservative conceptions and practices. The main 
characteristic of reactionary-conservative, ultra-orthodox Judaism [harediut], is the rejection of 
modernity, viewing it as a secularizing force that threatens Jewish tradition and religioni. For 
our purpose, the important sociological difference between the Ashkenazi and Sephardic 
reactionary-conservative view is the Ashkenazi obligation to beware of external influences and 
remain within closed communities, while the Sephardic conservative's vocation is to guide and 
incorporate broad publicsii (Leon 2013, Horowitz 2006, Pikar 2003). The Sephardic toranic 
academy of Porat Yosef indeed aspired to serve the community rather than constitute a 
segregated enclave (Leon 2011).   
Those graduates from Porat Yosef who saw orthodoxy and ultra-orthodoxy as a proper answer 
to Israeli modernity, were still few and marginal in this decade. Along with others, some of 
them established the Circle of Sephardic and Mizrahi Torah Loyalists in 1962. It started issuing 
a monthly called Kol Sinaiiii, which was distributed in toranic academies and synagogues of 
Mizrahi immigrants (Leon 2009). The Circle's aspiration was to develop a mass movement with 
educational, charity, women and youth organizations, directed by a council of great scholarly 
rabbisiv.  In the 1980s, similar sociological circles would indeed succeed in developing these 
institutions around a Sephardic political movement (Leon 1999). In this decade, however, this 
remained a mere ambition. The group functioned more like a think-tank, a circle for 
deliberating, discussing and theorizing, and developing inner-coherency: not unlike the CSCJ's 
activity around the IB. If the IB produced historical, sociological, ideological, literary and 
folkloric knowledge, Kol Sinai produced Halachic and Toranic knowledge.  Like the CSCJ and 
Young Israel, the Torah Loyalists also aspired to create a united Sephardic-Mizrahi 
organization and identity in order to achieve better representation, but the purpose of 
representation was utterly different. The Torah Loyalists wanted to elicit and promote 
Sephardic and Mizrahi "toranic aspirations" and "toranic rights", within a certain, theoretical 
ambition to create a non-democratic Halachic-Jewish statev. Since Sephardic and Mizrahi 
                                                             
it is the student body, established as way to prevent them flooding Ashkenazi centers. The Porat Yosef graduates 
that established the Torah Loyalists circle and wrote in Kol Sinai were more prominently graduates from before 
1948 (Leon 2013).  
i As explained shortly in chapter 4, Jewish ultra-orthodoxy developed mainly in Europe as a reaction to the 
Enlightment and emancipation of Jews. In Hebrew, the ultra-orthodox are named Haredim, meaning "the anxious 
ones": anxious for the conservation of religion and tradition from the changes of modernity.   
ii Leon (2011) called this, broad ultra-orthodoxy (harediut rehavat shulaim), based on the inclusive attitude of 
principal of extending to the public (zikuy rabim) teachings and knowledge.    
iii Sinai Voice.  
iv"Platform" (mats'a), Kol Sinai, December 1961 (kislev-tevet tashkab). 
v As Brown (2012) explains, Haredi political thinking does not treat this kind of long term large scale institutional 
ambitions. On the one hand, they are aware to the fact that democracy is what allows their safe existence, and no 
concrete vision for a theocratic state has ever been adopted by a political Haredi movement. On the other hand, 
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Jewries did not go through the same secularization process most European Zionists did, they 
were conceived by this circle as the relevant public from which such a political force can be 
constructed: a natural political force that could democratically endow more power to the Torah 
over secular liberal values in the statei.  
For such a goal they certainly did not have any political partners among the other progressive 
Sephardic and Mizrahi organizations examined here. Rather, their main comrades in this quest 
were Ashkenazi dominated orthodox and ultra-orthodox political parties and activists. These 
were their main groups of reference (Leon 1999, 2009, 2013), their only potential political 
partners to create a "toranic camp against the secular camp"ii. They were all part of the same 
basic global Jewish streamiii (Horowitz 2006). By this stage, however, it was already publicly 
known that there is opened discrimination against Sephardim and Mizrahim within ultra-
orthodox Ashkenazi society, expressed mainly in limitation in Mizrahim's acceptance to 
Ashkenazi toranic academies, an inferior status of Sephardic rabbis' rulings and Ashkenazi 
refusal to mixed marriageiv. Kol Sinai never openly attacked these discriminatory policies or 
the underrepresentation of Sephardim in the state's religious institutions, which is part of what 
makes the autonomous Sephardic voice so difficult to detect in this period.  
Leon (2009) presented a discussion between researchers who see Sephardic ultra-orthodoxy as 
an external force imposed on Sephardim and Mizrahim, and researchers viewing it as an 
autonomous, albeit late, response to the modern secularity the immigrants faced in Israel. These 
last tend to emphasize the conservative tendencies that had already existed in Muslim 
Diasporas. I agree with Leon that this debate might well be concluded by examining Kol Sinai. 
The journal certainly uncovers an independent Sephardic reactionary-conservative voice, that 
is shaped both by experiences in the Muslim countries of origin and by current occurrences and 
movements in Israel. For instance, one of the motivations for issuing the periodical, as other 
Sephardic and Mizrahi initiatives, is the Ashkenazi coercion through the  Zionist civilization 
project (Shaul 2016)v, and its expressions within youth and in the education system. These were 
themes Kol Sinai focused on, covering occurrences within youth of kibbutzim and in the cities. 
The Torah Loyalists presented an approach of their own about Zionism and the state, which 
could be viewed as a middle way between the anti-Zionist ultra-orthodox and Zionist-orthodox 
theological conceptions of the state. They reflected an ironical approach towards the state and 
                                                             
their basic principles contradict the legitimacy of secular and people-based rule, since in their view the only 
sovereign is God and the only authority are the great rabbis. The orthodox streams of Religious Zionism, in contrast, 
do promote the political ambition to establish Israel as a non-democratic Halachic state.  
iE.g. Eliahu Ben Zimra, "In the Margins of Kol Sinai" (be-shulei kol Sinai), Kol Sinai, April 1962 (nisan tashkab).  
ii "Proper Representation for the Sephardic and Mizrahi Public Loyal to the Torah!" (netsigut holemet la-tsibur ha-
sfaradi ve-'edot ha-mizrah neemanei ha-torah!), Kol Sinai, July 1965 (tamuz, tashkah).   
iii See letter from rabbi Schibel to Eliahu Eliachar, 16.3.64, CZA 430A/38/1.  
iv E.g. Letter from M. Elitov to Eliahu Eliachar, 22.9.62, CSCJA container 6263 file 587. Also see Deshen (1970): 188.   
v "Versus the Ashkenazi Revolution" (mul ha-mahapekha ha-ashkenazit), Kol Sinai, March 1964 (nisan tashkad).  
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Zionism, that was nonetheless intertwined with unmistakable national pridei: 
"it is only thanks to us [the Sephardim] that we arrived to the beginning of redemption… the message 
[besorah] of Zion neither Herzel nor "Zionism" brought us to the Diasporas of the east…a vision of 
generations… [brought us] to Zion…but this was not for…copying the regime of corrupt European life 
into Zion...we blame all the different parties. [Their] programs and criterions are ideas and ideologies 
of the peoples and parties of Europe and other foreign countries… With god's will the Torah Loyalists 
will be an original Israeli movement."ii 
A similar ironic approach was reflected at times in their usage of the category 'religious' [dati]iii, 
as a European category per se (Shenhav 2008, Leon 2009, 2013, Horowitz 2006). This category 
was not usually used at all: Kol Sinai normally referred to its public as those Sephardim and 
Mizrahim loyal to the Torah. Also, often the contributors used the adjective toratic, and not 
toranic, to refer to organizational frameworks, characteriv and Judaismv. 
As Leon (2009) illustrated, the journal was also openly encouraging an outreaching approach 
to broader publics. Kol Sinai was a tool for constructing an independent Sephardic extremist-
conservative voice. It was constructing it in order to convince Sephardim and Mizrahim of this 
voice's validity, for the purpose of gathering force in order to enable the formation of egalitarian 
coalitions with Ashkenazi conservatives.  
The Torah Loyalists Circle was well aware of the unfavorable structure of political 
opportunities this decade entailed for autonomous Sephardic initiativesvi. Therefore, it strictly 
refrained from party politics of any kind, and abstained from the struggles over Sephardic 
representation in religious institutions. This way it gained legitimacy and respect from its peers, 
the ultra-orthodox Ashkenazimvii. Towards the 1965 elections, these peers were given broad 
space for spreading their world-views and propaganda:  
"So that the non-party-affiliated Torah loyalists will know the positives and negatives in these 
movements, out of hope to arouse a toranic Sephardic movement."viii  
Due to the closed structure of political opportunities, this circle focused on building inner 
Sephardic strength. This focus was also expressed in Rabbi Ovadia Yosef's career. Ovadia 
                                                             
i See also front and back cover of Kol Sinai, May 1967 (iyar tashkaz).  
ii "The Torah Loyalists" (ne-emanei ha-torah), Kol Sinai, December 1961 (kislev-tevet tashkab).  
iii "Bring About Visionaries and Action People" (havu anshei hazon u-ma'as), Kol Sinai, Janurary 1962 (shvat 
tashkab); "Lights and Shadows in the state of Israel" (orot ve-tslalim be-medinat Israel), Kol Sinai, October 1963 
(tishrei tashkad).  
ivE.g. "Lights and Shadows in the state of Israel" (orot ve-tslalim be-medinat Israel), Kol Sinai, October 1963 (tishrei 
tashkad). 
v E.g. A. Ben-Haim, "Time for Action!" ('et la'asot!), Kol Sinai, August 1963 (av tashkag). 
vi Eliahu Ben Zimra, "In the Margins of Kol Sinai" (be-shulei kol Sinai), April 1962 (nisan tashkab). 
viiE.g. D. Ainer, "A Voice that Deserves Getting Heard" (kol she-raui lishom'a), Kol Sinai, July 1962 (tamuz tashkab).   
viii Front page, July 1964 (av tashkad).  
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Yosefi was the main rabbinical figure around which the Torah Loyalists Circle was formed, a 
recognized Halachic genius, considered one of a kind in his generation. He viewed the center 
of rabbinical life in guiding the public, rather than learning in a "ghetto" of learners (Leon 
2011).  Most Sephardic rabbis and the CSCJ had been wanting to nominate him Chief Sephardic 
Rabbi, or at least Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, since 1960. However, he refused to present 
candidacy to these positions until 1967, and centered on writing and teaching instead (Horowitz 
2000).     
By 1965 rabbi Menashe Halevy, Kol Sinai's editor, became the administrative headmaster of 
the CSCJ's toranic educational institution of the Great Mativta. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef became its 
pedagogical head, expanding the Mativta to include an academy for toranic judges ii. He was 
handed complete authority over the entire institutioniii. The Mativta included a toranic high 
school which also taught "secular studies" [limudei hol]. Its graduates could thus attend 
universities as well as toranic academies. This was completely in contrary to Ashkenazi ultra-
orthodox academies, but in accordance with the type of education developed within Jewries in 
the Middle East and North Africa since the 19th century. the National Religious education 
system also teaches these two types of knowledge. Ovadia Yosef referred to the toranic 
academy and the high-school in the Mativta as two separate entities (Lau 2005), but by joining 
the Mativta he in fact enabled its continuity: the CSCJ needed his endorsement in order to grant 
prestige to the institution, within a dire competition over resources between the Mativta and 
Porat Yosefiv. The political choice of some native intellectuals to identify with traditional or 
religious leaders was noted by Amilcar Cabral, the African anti-colonial fighter. He wrote of 
how for those assimilated colonized native intellectuals, this identification compensates for 
their cultural alienation from the colonized people. The traditional or religious leaders are 
considered to have maintained a certain level of cultural "authenticity"(Cabral 1973/1994). The 
CSCJ indeed required this identification with religious leaders, but a major ideological breach 
marked the two different camps of progressives and conservatives, making their potential 
collaboration quite limited. The two publications these circles published mainly ignored the 
other, even though some of the contributors and many of the advertisers coincided. The 
collaboration that did exist between the circles was based on the common aspiration to "retrieve 
past glory" to Sephardic Jewry. They shared certain aspects of the analysis of the situation of 
                                                             
iOvadia Yosef was born in Baghdad in 1920, and his family immigrated to Jerusalem in 1924. He studied in Porat 
Yosef and after graduation, between 1947-1950, he served in rabbinical positions in Cairo. For more about rabbi 
Ovadia Yosef's special views and professional trajectory, see: Horowitz (2000, 2006), Lau (2005), Pikar (2003). For 
more about his public activity and popular figure, as seen from his contemporaries, see for instance, "The Genious 
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef Shalita" (ha-rav ha-gaon rabi 'ovadia yosef shalita), Young Israel, 23.12.62.  
ii The Israeli court system is comprised by religious and secular courts, the religious ones encompassing exclusive 
authority over anything to do with marital relations and can also be used for other matters to applicants' discretion.  
iii Letter from M. Levi, David Siton and Eliahu Eliachar to Ovadia Yosef, 13.2.66, CSCJA container 6300 file 890.  
iv See letter from David Siton to Eliahu Eliachar, 15.6.62, CSCJA container 6263 file 587; Leon (2013).  
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this Jewry in Israel, as the danger of losing their essence for lack of proper leadership:  
"Eastern Judaism that was saturated with simple and complete faith was left without a shepherd and 
leader, and does not have anybody to illuminate its eyes to the light of Judaism and its treasures. This is 
why the phenomenon of utter assimilation has strengthened."i 
The end and means for retrieving past glory was even generally agreed upon: nurturing wide 
knowledge and profound consciousness within Sephardim and Mizrahim of their traditional 
roots, in order to allow them to participate in building the new nation:  
"In front of those crying about discrimination and deprivation, stand hundreds of Sephardic and Mizrahi 
toranic academy students- they are the way for a unified cultural creation." ii  
However, there were more factors that differentiated the groups than those uniting them. The 
notables of the CSCJ were considered a certain danger, like all those  
"standing outside, listening to [toranic] explanations distant from the truth and relating it to Jewish faith 
[emunat israel], finding justifications to their assimilating view and behavior".iii 
The Sephardic ultra-orthodox advocacy naturally contradicted in many senses the CSCJ's 
liberal views. They collided when the IB opposed Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox forcing education 
on Mizrahi children, a phenomenon Kol Sinai denied as fictitiousiv. Another example for the 
liberal/conservative breach can be illustrated with the visit of the Pope to the holy land in 1964. 
While the Torah Loyalists Circle helped prevent the Pope's meeting the Chief Sephardic Rabbi 
and opposed his entire visitv, Eliachar was advocating the Chief Jerusalem Rabbi to at least be 
able to have the honors of meeting the Pope, in order to fix that perceived injusticevi. Another 
example can be seen in the discourse about the Arab World. Yitzhak Abadi wrote in the IB 
about Marxist Aharon Cohen's book "Israel and the Arab World" as an instructive example for 
alternative Arab-Jewish relationsvii. The Torah Loyalists, in turn, used Cohen's figure as an 
example for national treasonviii.  
Notwithstanding, during the 1960s both circles needed each other in order to achieve their 
common meta-goal. The CSCJ needed Ovadia Yosef to endow legitimacy and prestige to the 
                                                             
i Letter from M. Elitov to M. Hacohen titled, "The educational way of the Mativta" (le-darka ha-hinukhit shel ha-
mativta), 11.5.62, CSCJA container 6261 file 564.  
ii "Versus the Ashkenazi Revolution" (mul ha-mahapekha ha-ashkenazit), Kol Sinai, March 1964 (nisan tashkad). 
iii Here assimilating means to become as people of non-Jewish faith. For a live example of this tendency and its 
consequence for Sephardic rabbis see, Eliahu Eliachar's correspondence with Y.M. Schiber between March and 
May of 1964, CZA 430A/38/a.     
iv See "Word of the Battle" (dvar ha-ma'arakha), IB, 13.9.61, p. 1; "Lights and Shadows in the state of Israel" (orot 
ve-tslalim be-medinat Israel), Kol Sinai, October 1963 (tishrei tashkad); March 1962 (adar bet tashkab).  
v "Lights and Shadows in the state of Israel" (orot ve-tslalim be-medinat Israel), Kol Sinai, October 1963 (tishrei 
tashkad), 
vi See Eliahu Eliachar's journal, entry of 5.1.64, CZA 430A/233.  
vii Y. A. Abadi "Our Way to the Arab World" (darkenu la-'olam ha-'aravi), IB, 26.9.65, pp. 4-5.    
viii" "Manifesto of the Sephardic and Mizrahi Public in Jerusalem" (gilui da'at mi-ta'am ha-tsibur ha-sfaradi ve-'edot 
ha-mizrah be-yerushalaim). Kol Sinai, November 1963 (heshvan tashkad).  
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Mativta in order for it to work: to raise funds and recruit students, and Ovadia Yosef could use 
the Mativta to gain autonomy for his Sephardic judges schooli (Leon 2004a, Lau 2005).   
         
 
The CSCJ  
Immediately after autonomous Sephardic and Mizrahi organizations went out of fashion, 
Eliachar became again a point of reference for organizing collective action for a variety of 
activistsii. Since the CSCJ failed to make any actual impact by leveraging the public atmosphere 
of 1959, a somewhat innovative tactic was explored very briefly. Some of the native elites, 
most probably Haifan Yitzhak Cohen along with Eliachar, led younger crowds, most probably 
composed of North African immigrants and Sephardic natives, into an action with tactic and 
discourse that was inspired by a combination of UNAI, the CSCJ and the Jewish anti-British 
underground organizations of the 1940siii. Around September of 1962 they hanged three posters 
in the three big cities in varying degrees of a militant tone. The first poster presented the 
organization behind the posters, "The National Front for Equality", as a militant organization 
with different troops named after Mizrahi impoverished neighborhoods where revolts had 
occurred (Wadi Salib and Sha'araim)iv. The second poster recycled the old claims of the native 
elites for representation in all the Zionist and state institutions, using somewhat different 
language of more pathos than what was widespread among these elitesv. The press called it an 
underground organizations and attributed to it characteristics used to describe UNAI as well, 
such as bitter and hot headed. The third poster was used to speak against this press coverage, 
and particularly the one in the IBvi. The clandestine organization indeed got the attention of the 
                                                             
iLetter from David Siton to Eliahu Eliachar, 15.6.62, CSCJA container 6263 file 587. According to David Siton, Ovadia 
Yosef needed the CSCJ to advance in the rabbinical world as well, and leaned on it for building his initial status. 
David Siton in interview to Mati Ronen, part 14, 10.9.84, CSCJA container 6330 file 1451.  
ii See letters to Eliahu Eliachar from: Y. M. Immanuel, 10.7.63; Leon Danon, 14.1.62; Yitzhak Cohen, 20.3.62, 
Umberto Boaron, 18.6.62. CZA 430A/53/2.  
iii Shalom Cohen, "An underground organization that aims to fight" (mahteret ha-mitkavenet lilhom), Ha'olam Haze, 
19.9.62. I base my assumption of the involvement of Eliachar and Cohen on evidence from the following 
documents: David Siton in interview to Mati Ronen, part 1, August 1983, CSCJA container 6330 file 1451; Letter 
from Yitzhak Cohen to Eliahu Eliachar, 17.8.61, CZA 430A/39. Shalom Cohen, ibid. However, correspondences 
found in CSCJA (container 6263 file 587) indicate that Eliachar should have been in New York at the same time the 
leader of this organization was interviewed on Israeli press in person. From my acquaintance with his archives, 
though, I would not hold it as a definite proof of his non-involvement. Rather, it could very well may be a deliberate 
misleading of his part, of both his contemporaneous circles and in order to manipulate the archives.    
iv Shalom Cohen, "An underground organization that aims to fight" (mahteret ha-mitkavenet lilhom), Ha'olam Haze, 
19.9.62. 
v The second poster was printed only a night after the first, CZA 430A/236/1/5. 
vi CZA 430A/33/2. It also refuted the police's announcement about catching members of the organization. Compare 
to Yehezkel Zamir, "Merger of Diasporas and Security. One Versus the Other" (mizug galuyot ve-bitahon. ze neged 
ze), IB, 2.12.62, p. 9. In between the printing of posters, a threatening letter was sent by the organization to 
(possibly) one of the members' employer. Y. Kalderon,"I will not fall Silent for the Truth" (le-ma'an ha-emet lo 
ehshe), IB, 1.10.62, p. 30. It is likely that Yaakov Kalderon, who publicly defended the receiver of this letter- his 
manager- was involved in this initiative. In this case the letter was a mere tactic to prove his innocence in case 
people had suspected his involvement in the group. He was in the CSCJ, and one of the establishers of Telem, that 
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press, but it only had a short term action plan that was made even shorter in realityi. This is 
quite likely because of the high risk involved, and the negative resonance it got from the native 
elite's circlesii. Even though it seemed the posters were attempting to conjure popular rage, it 
was neither the intention nor within the scope of capabilities of its leadersiii. In a sense, it seems 
that as in the case of Telem, here too there was a harmful monopolization of old leaderships of 
a potentially popular and innovative actioniv.  
 
In these years, not only Eliachar, but also the institution of the CSCJ was going through a 
"political soul searching" (Zenner 1967). The institution imvited to its lines different Sephardim 
and Mizrahim who held positions within Zionist and governmental institutionsv. Though this 
was not an easy combination of forces, it worked to a certain extentvi. In these years David Siton 
was leading the CSC in practice, as chairman of the executive committee, while Eliachar 
remained the president: in the backstage, as the financial back, and also on the front, as its 
official representative. Siton democratized the institutions in some senses but it was still very 
much patriarchal and hierarchicalvii. Though it got some new members and even sprinkles of 
                                                             
is, he had a trajectory in activism within the younger natives of Jerusalem, and had a good relationship with 
Eliachar. However, later on, in his role as the CSCJ as "honorary secretary", he tended more to charity than to 
politics (and clashed with Siton over it).   
iEliachar spoke in an interview about a plan for three months. Uri Saraf, "First Interview to the Commander of the 
'Equality Underground Cell'" (reayon rishon 'im mefaked 'mahteret ha-shivyon'), Haboker, 14.9.62, p. 1.    
ii Eliachar said in an interview that the whole point of secrecy was against the fear of getting infiltrated and 
dominated by the governmental bodies. Indeed, six people got arrested. Shalom Cohen, "An underground 
organization that aims to fight" (mahteret ha-mitkavenet lilhom), Ha'olam Haze, 19.9.62. For negative resonance 
see for example: Yehezquel Sofer, "The National Front and Around it" (ha-hazit ha-leumit u-mi-saviv la), IB, 1.10.62, 
p. 2; "Editorial Notes" (dvar ha-ma'arekhet), Young Israel, 4.11.62, p. 1.  
iii The Front's leaders suggested their next step would be a popular struggle in the streets, which is exactly what 
the posters sounded like they were attempting to conjure. However, they did not intend for this popular struggle 
to involve the weaker social stratums, which they conceived as angry mobs. See Shalom Cohen, ibid.; Uri Saraf, 
ibid.   
iv The discourse the Front continued publishing in the press throughout October lost much of its militant 
revolutionary overtones. It seems that later on, the younger generation in it attempted to continue to act, but the 
older leadership detained them. See, "Word of the Battle" (dvar ha-ma'arkha), IB, 7.7.63, p. 2. The National Front 
for Equality drew the hearts of publics like the readers of Ha'olam Haze, but after getting exposed to its editor, the 
journal lost interest in the Front. Young Israel of course was also drawn to their activity. As a movement, they 
disdained from it officially, but they recognized the Front as part of the same struggle, an acknowledgement the 
CSCJ never got from them publicly. See "Readers Write" (korim kotvim), Ha'olam Haze 24.10.62, 14.11.62, 
21.11.62; "In the State. Ethnicities" (ba-medina. 'edot), Ha'olam Haze, 14.8.63. "Editorial Notes" (dvar ha-
ma'arekhet), Young Israel, 4.11.62, p. 1. Years afterwards, Young Israel might have been inspired from the Front to 
call for a "march of equality". See ad in Young Israel, 24.9.65, p.4; compare to another poster of the National Front 
for Equality, undated, CZA 430A/210/2/2. 
v The Labor MPs Mordechai Zar and Victor Shem-Tov, for instance.  
viE.g. "Protocol of Executive Committee" (pirtei kol ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 31.12.63; 5.5.64, CSCJA container 6236 file 
380.  
vii"Protocol of Executive Committee" (pirtei kol ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 1.3.65; CSCJA container 6236 file 380; "A New 
Council was Elected to the Sephardic Community in the Capital (nivhar va'ad hadash la-'eda ha-sfaradit ba-birah), 
IB, 24.4.67; Letter from David Siton to Eliahu Eliachar, 27.5.62, CSCJA container 6263 file 587.   
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new discoursei, its cadre was becoming irrelevantly oldii. 
The journal In the Battle (IB), however, was flourishing, around debates such as the correct 
terms to refer to the questions of the Sephardim and Mizrahim and the different goals most 
urgent to be faced. Many wrote in it about questions of rabbinical representation and status, the 
party system and the relation between the two. Eliachar and others invoked the need to change 
the electoral systemiii, others wrote in specific or general manners about the special values and 
knowledge of Mizrahi Judaism and about how and what is to be learnt from themiv. The IB was 
an intellectual stage, promoting debate about what was the Mizrahi and Sephardic battle and 
what were its tools. At the same time, it was also promoting the CSCJ's institutional battles. 
Eliachar and Siton engaged in other kinds of  lobbying for the CSCJ's public and private causes 
within the state authorities, taking whenever they could the attitude of "speaking directly to the 
responsible and not to the delivery boys"v. The CSCJ maintained various institutions, but its 
crowning glory continued to be the Great Mativta. This was until a young man named Michael 
Selzer arrived to Israel, and for about two years marked Eliachar, the CSCJ and the Sephardic 
struggle in general as his personal goal, in both militant and professional waysvi.  
Selzer was of German origins, grew up in India and Pakistan, got educated in London and by 
1964 was working for the periodical the Jewish Observer. His interest and project was to 
transport Asian anti-colonial discourse and practices to the Israeli context. He did so by writing 
in the IB, instigating public actions inspired by Gandhi, and by distributing CSCJ's materials 
within the impoverished socio-economic stratums of immigrants, as well as within certain 
sectors of Ashkenazi leftvii. The Sephardic and Mizrahi anti-institutional discourse had been 
getting positive resonance within some sectors of Jewish Diasporaviii, supporters of the anti-
                                                             
i For instance, some started using "Sephardic and Mizrahi" instead of just Sephardic or other combinations. See 
"Action Plan of the New Council, 1963" (tokhnit ha-pe'ula shel ha-va'ad ha-hadash, 1963), CZA 430A/33/2.  
ii For instance, it stands out that most of the CSC meetings began with eulogies; and though there were younger 
people involved in the institution they did not assume many responsibilities or lead the general direction. When 
they attempted to, it did not end well. See for instance, "Protocol of Executive Committee (pirtei kol ha-va'ad ha-
po'el), 8.12.65; 1.3.65; 18.8.65, CSCJA container 6236 file 380. 
iii Eliachar was part of a group trying to influence and change the voting system, so that local elections would gain 
more influence over national elections instead of the system that strengthened the opposite, since local elections 
depended on the results on the national level. This would be perhaps the only way new local leaderships could 
influence national politics. David Ben Gurion also supported this move after he quit Mapai.  
iv E.g. Shimon Marcus, "The Assimilation of Ashkenazim in Sephardim" (tmia'atam shel ashkenazim be-sfaradim), 
IB, 14.9.66.  
v Letter from Yitzhak Cohen to Eliahu Eliachar, 18.1.62, CZA 430A/53/2.  
vi See initial letter of Michael Selzer to Eliahu Eliachar, 24.9.64, CZA 430A/42/2. At around March of 1965 he already 
had an official paid role, the CSCJ's "liaison officer". By February of 1966 he left Israel for good, and joined an 
American Anti-Zionist organization. In that summer he lost his CSCJ's payroll position. See Letter from Eliahu 
Eliachar to Lea Ben Dor, 14.3.65, CZA 430A/42/1; and multiple correspondences between Eliahu Eliachar, Micheal 
Selzer and David Siton in CZA 430A/42/3/1 & 2.    
vii E.g. Letter from M. Selzer to E. Eliachar, 4.7.65, CZA 430A/43/3; Letter from M. Selzer to E. Eliachar, 14.9.65; CZA 
430A/50/4; Michael Selzer, "Why did I decide to fast?" (madu'a hehlateti latsum), IB, 25.12.64, p. 3.  
viiiE.g. T. Bavli, "Don't Patronize Mizrahi Jews" (bal tihiyu apotrofosim le-yehudei ha-mizrah) (translated article from 
Jewish Observer), IB, 11.10.63, p. 8.  
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colonial struggles in Africa and of the Civil Rights Movement in the USAi.  By the end of 1964 
Eliachar and Selzer started issuing a militant bulletin in English called Israel's Oriental 
Problem (hereinafter IOP). The IOP was sent abroad and it even reached Arab pressii. The 
bulletin published the Sephardic theoretical perspectives that were developing in the IB, as the 
aspiration to make Israel an oriental country. This would be achieved if Ashkenazim shared 
responsibilities with the Sephardim and did not attempt to subjugate them nor merge their 
culture into Ashkenazi culture. It also referred to the positive effect this would have for Israel's 
relations with the Arab worldiii. Within the 1960s revolutionary anti-colonial climate in Europe 
and the USA, the bulletin did not fall on deaf ears. In fact, this bulletin turned out to be the best 
strategy the CSCJ had developed in decades. The institution became a reference for some 
western scholars and journalists, who came to hear lectures and asked it for materials. Finally 
the CSCJ got the Ashkenazi recognition and base for legitimacy it has been searching for the 
past decadesiv. This caused alarm within the government and the Jewish Agency. Selzer was 
called for questioning and the editorial was searched by the policev. Eventually, Selzer got 
marked as the radical, and the CSCJ as an institution worth negotiating and reasoning with. 
This opened a track to friendly relations with Zionist institutions and their funding, using the 
bulletin as quite an effective tool for exerting pressure on the Jewish Agency and the Ministry 
of Exteriorvi. The Mativta expanded its funding from the Ministry of Education and the IB 
expanded its funding for distribution abroadvii. The IB got distributed also in poorer areas of 
immigrants' concentration, in some of which strikes and local revolts had been taking place 
                                                             
i In the IB the possibility of comparing between African-Americans and Mizrahim in Israel was debated, some made 
this comparison while others rejected it. For instance: Eliahu Eliachar, "After the Elections in Ashdod and Beer 
Sheva" (be-'ikvot ha-bhirot be-ashdod u-be-beer sheva), Haaretz, 29.10.63; M. Abraham "The Ethnic Problem in 
Israel and the Race Problem in the US" (be'ayat ha-’edot be-israel u-be'ayat ha-gza'im be-artzot ha-brit), IB 28.5.67; 
Sh. Yerushalmi, "Why Not Ethnic Lists?" (madu'a lo reshimot 'adatiyot?), IB, 25.12.64, p. 13; David Siton, "Los 
Angeles and Wadi Salib", IB, 26.9.65, p. 3.  
ii"My Country Right or Wrong", IOP, November 1965. An important part of this strategy was also to disperse a 
"frank and cruel" booklet that was handed to all the delegates to the 26th Zionist Congress in Jerusalem 1965. 
"Danger, Jewish racialism! Israel's Sephardim: integration, or disintegration?" 1965. Jerusalem: Council of the 
Sephardi Community of Jerusalem.  
iii "The Knesset Debate on Integration", IOP, February 1965.  
iv "Letter from Philadelphia" (mikhtavim mi-filadelfia), IB, 1.11.65, pp. 4-5; Eliahu Eliachar (psed. Mashkif), "Eshkol 
and the Sephardic Problem" (eshkol ve-ha-be'aya ha-sfaradit), IB, 6.8.65, p. 9; David Siton in interview to Mati 
Ronen, part 7, 30.10.83, CSCJA container 6330 file 1451.  
v Letter from E. Eliachar to M. Nurock, 11.4.65, CZA 430A/42/1.  
viSee Chetrit (2004: 38) about the ability of radical groups to bring success to other more moderate groups in their 
negotiations with the establishment. The negotiations also brought to a long pause in publishing of the IOP for 
almost the entire year of 1966. For the use of the IOP for lobbying, see letters from M. Nurock to E. Eliachar, 
27.12.66, CZA 430A/42/3/2; 2.8.65, CZA 430A/42/1. For the success of this strategy see "General Committee 
Meeting" (yeshivat va'ad klali), 8.12.65; "Protocol of Excecutive Committee" (pirtei kol ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 8.2.66; 
CSCJA container 6236 file 380; "Word of the Battle" (dvar ha-ma'arakha), IB, 9.7.65, p. 1; David Siton in interview 
to Mati Ronen, part 7, 30.10.83, CSCJA container 6330 file 1451; Letters to Eliahu Eliachar from M. Nurock, 2.8.65; 
and from Lea Ben Dor, 3.2.65,  CZA 430A/42/1.   
vii See various correspondences with the Jewish Agency's Bureau for Communities and Organizations (lishka le-
kehilot ve-irgunim), CZA S76/163/2.    
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more often from 1965 and until the end of this periodi.  By 1966 the CSCJ gained some public 
appreciation from the Young Israel activists, the Torah Loyalists Circle and others, around the 
Federation's struggles for representation in the international Zionist institutionsii. However, 
through the same struggles and the hard line Eliachar took, he lost some of his confidence 
within his own crowdiii.  
 
Since 1962 Eliachar had been very mildly involved in various platforms of Ashkenazi Zionist 
leftists for cooperation and fraternity with Arabs in Israel and beyondiv. During the 1960s 
Ashkenazi leftists, both in Israel and abroad, developed growing fascination with the idea of 
Sephardim and Mizrahim serving as cultural bridge to the Arab worldv. This interest gave 
legitimacy for the Sephardic and Mizrahi intelligentsia to treat again themes of diplomacy and 
middle-eastern politics. It might also be claimed that the discursive campaign in early 1960s 
that distinguished between Mizrahi social stratums, and marked the lower stratums as the 
potential security threat, also aided the elites to return to reclaim stances on Arab issues, as it 
could no longer undermine their patriotic status. Notwithstanding, the most important factor to 
enable such discourse to rise was probably the relative calm across Israel's borders until late 
1966. Throughout the 1960s, a distinctively Sephardic discourse about the Arab world 
strengthened and developed within the pages of IB and in public speeches of intellectual 
activistsvi. Eliachar resumed handing public and private advice to decision makers about Arab-
related diplomacyvii. He and other Sephardic native elites again highlighted the need to insert 
Mizrahim and Sephardim into high-level positions in the ministry of Exterior and state 
diplomacy, in order to influence policy and decision making, as the only ones that would be 
capable of "saving Israel from its isolation in the region"viii.  
                                                             
i Letter from David Siton to Eliahu Eliachar, 7.7.65, CZA 430A/68/1. Roby (2015) tells about some of these revolts, 
and the IB also reported some strikes since 1965.  
iiLetter from Felix Matalon to Eliahu Eliachar, 19.7.66, and from Y. M. Immanuel, 18.8.66, CZA 430A/210/4; "The 
'Ashkenazi' Zionist Congress" (ha-kenes ha-'ashkenazi' ha-tsiyoni), Kol Sinai, January 1965 (shvat tashkah). 
iii David Siton in interview to Mati Ronen, part 1, Augost 1983, CSCJA container 6330 file 1451. 
iv These were a sort of grassroots response within the institutional Zionist left to the growing involvement of 
Ashkenazi radical left in the struggles of the Palestinian Israeli Arabs. First, there was The Israeli Council for Jewish-
Arab Rapprochement (ha-mo'atsa ha-yisraelit le-hitkarvut yehudit-'aravit), then it became The Israeli Association 
for Jewish-Arab Cooperation (ha-aguda ha-israelit le-shituf pe'ula yehudi-'aravi); and then it became The Israeli 
Association for Jewish-Arab Understanding and Friendship (ha-aguda ha-israelit le-havana ve-yedidut yehudit 
'aravit). See Letters to Eliachar from these organizations, 13.1.63, CZA 430A/42/4; 5.4.65, CZA 430A/109/1. Apart 
from that, both he and Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon were involved in the club of Bnei Brith, a kind of a Jewish (mainly 
Ashkenazi) version of the Freemasonry, a world-wide membership-based organization with a focus on education.  
v For instance, the list of The Israeli Council for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement entailed many of the intellectual 
Sephardic elites. CZA 430A/42/4. Also see for example F. Falls' and N. Bentwich's response to Y. A. Abadi's article, 
on IB, 29.10.62, pp. 8-9.  
vi E.g."Tiferet Hall hosted the second issue of 'spoken In the Battle'" (ne'erakh be-ulam tiferet gilayon sheni shel 
'ba-ma'arkha be-'al pe'), IB, 10.3.63, p. 9. 
vii Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to David Ben Gurion, 15.3.62, BGA 110567; E. Eliachar, "Should we act against 
Lebanon?" (ha-nifa'al neged levanon?), Letters to the Editorial, Haaretz, 5.2.65. 
viiiSh. Cohen-Tzidon,"The Sephardim and Mizrahim and Changing the Regime of the State" (ha-sfaradim ve-yotsei 
ha-mizrah ve-shinuy ha-mishtar ba-medina), IB, 11.10.61. Also see e.g. Y. A. Abadi, "The Problem of Problems in 
227
However, despite claiming these power positions for the immigrants and natives, these 
intellectuals did not see their role in formulating political maps and conclusive solutions, as 
Zionist groups under Ashkenazi hegemony didi. For them, the negotiations for peace were not 
"merely a question of political gain or loss"ii. Rather, they suggested state policies to create a 
public climate that would reduce the Arab states' objection to the existence of the state, 
"creating tools and means to break the wall in various paths and roads"iii. As in the pre-state 
period, their proposals focused on strengthening studies of Arabic and Arab literature, aolong 
with a comprehensive change of attitude in the cultural psychology of diplomacyiv:     
"Declarations about peace and arrogant [declarations] about military victories cancel each other…a 
positive psychological change for us and for them… education and journalism that emphasize the 
common past and not to be ashamed of these chapters of history."v 
This discourse of the Sephardic and Mizrahi elites did not usually influence Israeli Ashkenazi 
discourse, accept for the only Sephardic demand that was indeed in the same discursive level: 
presenting the Palestinian refugee problem as a "population exchange" with the Mizrahi 
immigrants, which occurred by mutual hostility, and therefore compensation and rights should 
be equally granted to both types of refugees. The practical suggestions made by Zionist leftists 
to achieve peace were not incorporated into the Sephardic discourses either. As mentioned, 
some peace initiatives of Ashkenazim invited Mizrahi intellectuals to join platforms for 
rapprochement and peace, but it seems they did not usually consult nor share decision or 
discourse making with themvi.   
Some of the Ashkenazi left in Israel was getting more involved in struggles against the military 
regime, imposed on Palestinian citizens until 1966. As part of this struggle, the role of political-
cultural bridging between Israel and the rest of the Middle East was attributed also to the Israeli 
Palestinian Arabs. This line of discourse did infiltrate somewhat the Sephardic and Mizrahi 
intellectual discourse, both in the IB and in Young Israel. However, no group in this research 
clear-cuttingly demanded to abolish the military regime, but mostly rather expressed mistrust 
                                                             
our Exterior Policy" (be'ayat ha-be'ayot be-mediniyutenu ha-hitsonit), IB, 1.10.62, p. 3; E. Eliachar "Israel-Arab 
Relations. Before the UN General Assembly Session (yahasei Israel 'arav. likrat moshav 'atseret ha-um), IB, 1.12.64, 
p. 3. 
i For instance, the Semitic Action, which called to establish a Semitic federation in the Middle East.  
ii Y.A. Abadi, "Our Way to the Arab World" (darkenu la-'olam ha-'aravi), IB, 26.9.65, p. 4.  
iiiDavid Siton, "Strengthening Eastern Consciousness Among Us" (le-hizuk ha-toda'ah ha-mizrahit be-kirbenu), 
Shevet Va'am, November 1958. 
iv E.g. A. Meir, "Us and Our Neighbors" (anu ve-shkhenenu ba-merhav), IB, 29.1.65, p. 4; Y.A. Abadi, (Is There a Plan 
to Israeli Exterior Policy?" (ha-yesh tokhnit le-mediniyut ha-huts le-israel?), IB, 11.4.65, pp. 4-5; Shlomo Cohen-
Tzidon, Jewish-Arab Rapprochement in the Cultural Field" (hitkarvut yehudit 'aravt be-shetah ha-tarbut), IB 
29.10.62, p. 12. The Great Mativta also intended to teach Arabic as well as Latin languages and English. See 
"Curriculum" (tokhnit ha-limudim), CSCJA container 6261 file 564.   
v E. Eliachar "Israel-Arab Relations. Before the UN General Assembly Session (yahasei Israel 'arav. likrat moshav 
'atseret ha-um), IB, 1.12.64, p. 3. 
vi Letter from Yaakov Cohen to Eliahu Eliachar, 13.1.63, CZA A430/53/2. 
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towards the Israeli Palestinian Arabsi. I suspect this was an outcome of closer knowledge of the 
anti-Israeli tendencies in the Arab states at large, and less of Israeli Palestinian Arab society 
itself. In general, the Israeli Palestinian Arabs were not a concern to the circles of Sephardim 
and Mizrahim we are treating. If anything, just like in the past decade, they had the opposite 
concern. For the autonomous Sephardic and Mizrahi groups, the way the Ashkenazi left was 
implicated with the Israeli Palestinian Arabs' political struggles, rather than the Sephardic and 
Mizrahi ones, was straightforwardly outraging. They often pointed out that Labor parties and 
the ICP gave representation for Palestinian Arabs in the parliament, but not to Mizrahimii. Some 
in this elite might have conceived of the Mizrahi and Israeli Palestinian Arab struggles as related 
on some theoretical level, but practically the struggles were clearly and completely separate, 
and their own responsibilities and priorities were cleariii. Nonetheless, the discourse about 
Israeli Palestinian Arabs was spread in a way that made even less convinced groups and activists 
incorporated positive clauses about Israeli-Arab relations and the Palestinian minority in Israel 
as part of their electoral programsiv.  
                                                             
i E.g. "Manifesto of the Sephardic and Mizrahi Public in Jerusalem" (gilui da'at mi-ta'am ha-tsibur ha-sfaradi ve-
'edot ha-mizrah be-yerushalaim). Kol Sinai, November 1963 (heshvan tashkad). "Word of the Battle" (dvar ha-
ma'arakha), IB, 10.3.63, p. 1. Cohen-Tzidon was one of the only ones to sustain the Ashkenazi request to eradicate 
the military regime, but he was part of Gahal, which as all parliamentary forces, wanted to release the captive 
Palestinian-Arab voters from Mapai's control.  
ii E.g. "The Torah Loyalists" (neemanei ha-torah), Kol Sinai, December 1961 (tevet-kislev tashkab); Yehezquel 
Sofer,"Ashkenazi Hegemony in the Israeli Parliament" (hegmonya ashkenazit be-kneset Israel), IB, 1.11.64, p. 2. 
Young Israel activists felt this gave Arabs more power in Israeli society than Mizrahim, and therefore the Israeli 
Palestinian Arabs had the responsibility to reach out to them. See "Editorial Notes" (dvar ha-ma'arekhet), Young 
Israel, 23.12.62, p. 1.  
iii "The Israel Museum”, IOP, May 1965; "Principles" ('ekronot), Young Israel, 1.2.62, p. 2. 
iv Avner Shaki, "The Sephardic and Mizrahi Public in Israel as a Cultural Bridge between Israel and the Arab 
Countries" (ha-tsibur ha-sfaradi ve-ha-mizrahi be-israel ke-rosh gesher tarbuti ben israel ve-'arav), IB, 11.1.63, p. 
13. In Fraternity, see: Yeshaayahu Aviam, "A New Political Party: The Movement for Fraternity" (miflaga hadasha: 
ha-tnu'ah le-ahva), Maariv, 8.8.63, p. 14; "The Candidates of the New Lists" (ha-ratsim ba-reshimot ha-hadashot), 
Maariv, 15.9.65. In Young Israel, see: Y. M. Immanuel, "Before the Leap" (likrat zinuk), Young Israel, 18.11.64, p. 1; 
this position was probably induced by the joining of an older immigrant, George Harar, to their lines towards 
elections, versus Shalom Moial's habitual views.    
229
PART III: DISCUSSION 
 
In the period at hand, achieving representation became the ultimate goal of autonomous 
Sephardic and Mizrahi political groups. The greater purposes that representation was meant to 
achieve became less relevant, and almost any means was justified in order to achieve this goal. 
In other words, Mizrahi and Sephardic autonomous political discourse focused more on 
symbolic resource redistribution of representation and less on its purpose of socio-economic 
redistribution and spiritual-cultural recognition. Other kinds of political discourses were 
produced in Mizrahi and Sephardic journals that avoided getting involved in representational 
politics. These journals allowed different authors to re-examine some aspects of the colonial 
premises of the state, criticizing the privileges it awarded to European modernity over its eastern 
habitat. However, these discourses remained theoretical, and did not inspire or influence any 
form of political action.  
 
The discussion presented below is divided in three sections. The first section will address the 
possibility of a Mizrahi collective identity in the historical period at hand. First, the 
terminologies different groups used to address the Mizrahi and Sephardic public will be 
examined, as well as some practical projects that attempted to contribute to the construction of 
such a collective identity. We will see how the term "ethnic" ['adati] was inserted in the public 
political discourse of this period in order to capture the homogenization and subjugation of 
Mizrahim. The second part of the first section will examine some Mizrahi and Sephardic 
struggles in the spiritual field, related to rabbinical representation and synagogues. This part 
will address the ways the discursive level and the practical level of struggle co-constructed each 
other, in a way that resulted in a weakened and fragmented, yet collective, Mizrahi identity. 
This section corresponds with the fourth research question, observing the external factors that 
weakened Mizrahi political activism in this period, within local and regional power relations, 
as designed by the Zionist coloniality of power. 
The second section will commence with an exploration of the discourse developed on the pages 
of the IB in this period, suggesting that the intellectuals contributing to it were constructing a 
theory of an alternative, regional-autochthonous Zionism, which asked to challenge the colonial 
foundations of the Zionist state. This section corresponds with the first research question, 
specifying the conditions under which Sephardic and Mizrahi intellectuals that opposed certain 
forms of coloniality could come into being within a settler-colonial society. Consequently, 
corresponding with the second research question, we will discuss the extent to which these 
intellectual writings in fact undermined Zionist coloniality, and specifically the coloniality of 
knowledge. This section is aimed at making visible the Sephardic and Mizrahi intellectual 
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construction of oppositional theory and rebellious knowledge, comparing it to De Sousa Santos' 
conceptualizations about the meaning and forms of decolonial knowledge production. The 
concept of "ecology of knowledges" will be put into dialogue with the native intellectuals' 
perceptions about the Zionist project of Merger of the Diasporas.  
In the third section, we will mind the gap between the theoretical critical discourse developed 
in this period and praxis, by entering dialogue with Franz Fanon's writing about national 
consciousness in anti-colonial struggles.  The role of essentialist perceptions of identity in such 
struggles will be revised, and it will be suggested that the coloniality of being prevented the 
development of such essentialist concepts among the intellectuals that framed autochthonous 
Zionism, forming an obstacle to the development of praxis from this theory. This corresponds 
with the third research question, examining the particular substructure that prevented 
autonomous Mizrahi theories from developing into a practical, viable political alternative to 
colonial Zionism. On the other hand, we will show how the climate of global anti-colonial 
struggles of the 1960s enabled this oppositional theory to develop at all. This corresponds again 
with the fourth research question, inquiring after circumstances that strengthened Mizrahi 




COLLECTIVE IDENTITY                                                        and the Coloniality of Power 
 
What's in a name? 
 
The Sephardic and Mizrahi independent activists of this period faced a public that was more 
clearly stratified socio-economically and divided by different places of origin: in the end of the 
transit camps era, these divisions were not considered temporary anymore. These social and 
cultural fissures got channeled into the Zionist political system and became a tool in it. Stressing 
ethnic identities in politics as an empty vessel was proved an effective tool for struggling over 
resources and positions within Zionist parties. The attempt of individuals and group to regain 
dignity, by getting equally included in Jewish national ethnicity and citizenship, was 
transformed into an inter-ethnic competition and a narrow race for representation. Within this 
public atmosphere, there were different circles that invested their efforts in developing contents 
to a Mizrahi and Sephardic collective identity, which could construct this public as a public 
with its own political project. This was a way of building inner-strength and inner-coherency, 
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which was accompanied for some by an effort to cultivate the next generation of leadersi. Each 
circle and group took different steps and applied different discursive categories in order to 
capture the collective identity they attempted to construct. While the most commonplace term 
to address this public persisted, as in the previous decade, to be the hegemonic term, 
"Sephardim and Eastern Ethnicities" [sfaradim u-bnei 'edot ha-mizrah], some groups inserted 
other discursive categories, through what Benford & Snow (2000) called discursive processes, 
which produce different terms and titles for a collective identity.   
UNAI's strategy of addressing North African immigrants helped spread the practice of targeting 
separately publics from different countries of origin inside Zionist parties in this decade. Just 
few years after UNAI, its "successor" Fraternity already did its best to shake off its Iraqi stigma, 
and emphasized the inclusion of other ethnicities (including Ashkenazim)ii. The Torah 
Loyalists Circle had it easiest, since it aimed at formulating a conservative-religious collective 
identity, and could rely on what was known and accepted as Sephardic rabbinical traditions and 
Halachic view versus the Ashkenazi onesiii.  Still though, they usually emphasized addressing 
both Mizrahim [bnei 'edot ha-mizrah] and Sephardim. The Student Cell for the Merger of 
Diasporas used the term easterners [mizrahiim] versus westerners, or eastern ethnicities ['edot 
ha-mizrah] versus western ethnicities ['edot ha-ma'arav]iv. This was their way to signal 
Ashkenazi identity on par with Mizrahi one: as the hegemonic identity, Ashkenazi identity was 
transparent, considered as simply the general Israeli identity. The term "Sephardic" was hardly 
ever used by this circle to address the general Mizrahi public, except by its prominent Sephardic 
member, Shlomo Abayov.  
 
The CSCJ's practical attempts to construct a collective identity had two tracks. In the long run,  
they planned the project of the Great Mativta, and on a medium term, they published the journal 
In the Battle: these two projects conformed the institution's "spiritual and public work"vi. The 
CSCJ aspired for the IB to gather around it all Mizrahi and Sephardic intellectuals, but it 
remained a stage that was somewhat limited to certain circles of the elite. Activists who aspired 
to reach wider circles produced other stages and publications when they couldvii.  The IB did 
                                                             
i David Siton, "Strengthening Eastern Consciousness Among Us" (le-hizuk ha-toda'ah ha-mizrahit be-kirbenu), 
Shevet Va'am, November 1958. David Siton in interview to Mati Ronen, part 6, 30.10.83, CSCJA container 6330 file 
1451.  
ii "Equal Rights- to all Ethnicities" (shivyon zkhuyot: le-bnei kol ha-'edot), Yedioth Ahronot, 1.11.65, p. 15.  
iii "Versus the Ashkenazi Revolution" (mul ha-mahapekha ha-ashkenazit), Kol Sinai, March 1963 (nisan tashkad).  
iv FYI, August (elul) 1963, TA.  
v E.g. Shlomo Abayo, "Required: New Leadership" (mevokeshet: manhigut hadasha), FYI, 1.9.63, TA.   
vi "Protocol of Executive Committee" (pireti kol ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 1.3.65, CSCJA container 6236 file 380.   
vii Such was the case of the SCMD youngsters publishing Afikim. Y.M Immanuel and Shalom Moial with Young Israel 
and Felix Matalon, who published Hed ha-me'orer. These last two journals started publishing after failed 
negotiations with the CSCJ. Both intended to make more popular publications, with accessible language and 
content. Michael Selzer, who also wanted to expand the circles to which the IB reaches, ended up publishing the 
IOP.  
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not succeed as a tool for popular leaders to "solidify this public"i, but it did solidify a certain 
Sephardic and Mizrahi ivory-club, a real, live alternative to the academic ivory-tower, albeit 
without the scientific seal. This figurative club was a safe space for theory to develop without 
getting its epistemic base underminedii. An autonomous intellectual Sephardic-Mizrahi 
collective identity was formulated on the IB pages, but it did not relate to or inspire any practical 
struggle, nor was it successful in reaching out to wider circles. Perhaps the main hindrance of 
the IB was that it never acted to fulfill its title in an organizational manner. Though the CSCJ 
withdrew from politics, the IB still acted as an organ serving this one institution, and did nothing 
to create inter-generational allies with other Mizrahi autonomous organizations. It could be 
claimed that this was due to caution: in this period of so much suspicion and mistrust in every 
autonomous organization, any mistake an organization could make would mark it and its allies 
for good. However, the main reason was probably related with the CSCJ's honor: they expected 
young organizations to turn to them as a relevant stage, and would not approach in the other 
direction, no matter how much respect young organizations might have attributed to the CSCJ, 
as for instance the native youngsters of the SCMD indeed didiii. 
"They never hugged us or anything, and they were the señores... are we in a competition? .... They were 
not in our temperament, not in our spirit of struggle, and not in our emphases... they wore ties, they were 
older...most of them, a whole different generation! ...an organization in this age that sees a new 
movement with a temperament that it doesn´t have, has to hug us, look for us, come to us and hand us a 
stage, a page just for us to write whatever we want and so on... I mean they treated it more at a ceremonial 
level, [as if] we are supposed to come to them. That’s nonsense, what do we care? … supposedly with 
the IB we did not have any differences, but they were looking for the respect…"iv  
 
While the ideologues of the National Union and then Young Israel also had the explicit and 
central goal to create a collective Sephardic-Mizrahi identity, for Young Israel this was a much 
more complicated task. By 1961, this collective identity had been crushed in such a way that as 
a political force, Mizrahim became  
"dust-of-man [avak adam] subjugated to manipulations...by the hegemonic forces and by the Sephardic-
Mizrahi intelligentsia that shakes off its roots [mena'eret 'atsma mi-tzur mahtsevata] and searches for 
ways [mahalakhim] to get assimilated within this hegemony."v  
                                                             
i Yehezquel Sofer, "Problems of the Hour" (be'ayot ha-sha'ah), IB, 30.6.64, p. 2.  
ii Y. Maas, "'Principals in Organizing our Public" ('ikarim be-hilkhot hitargenut tsiburenu), IB, 11.1.63, p. 10.  
iii E.g. Yehezquel Shemesh, "The reader to the editor" (ha-kore el ha-orekh), IB, 8.4.63, p. 23.     
iv Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18, emphasis in origin.  
v Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to Felix Matalon. 7.8.66, CZA S62/576.  
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Already in the preliminary stages of forming the National Union, this circle of activists coined 
the term Sephardim-Mizrahim [sfaradim-mizrahiim] or Sephardo-Mizrahimi [sfarado-
mizrahiim] in order to construe the collective identity of their public. Their perseverance using 
these terms allowed them to spread into wider circles as wellii, but they never really caught.  
Armed with this terminology, this circle could usually avoid referring to the existence of 
different ethnicities: it did not emphasize the origins of its members, nor did it usually urge 
fraternity or solidarity between different ethnicities iii. Just before elections, though, the 
countries of origin were evoked, along with ethnic pride about being or "Truth Jews"iv or "Pure 
Sephardic"v. This proud Sephardic term was very rarely referred to within the circles of the 
CSCJ; in fact, the spreading of this term in this period was much at Eliachar's dislikevi. Eliachar 
usually persisted to refer to the term "Sephardic" to include all Mizrahim. He also often resorted 
to Ben Gurion's terminology of "non-Ashkenazim", particularly when writing to Ashkenazimvii. 
Despite being defined by negation, at least this term was perfectly understandable and could 
not be disputed. As for Young Israel, despite coining the brilliant term of Sephardo-Mizrahim, 
they still had problems defining the common denominator of their public: its own potential will, 
its mentality and culture, language and prayer, or the institutional discrimination, which crossed 
all socio-economic stratumsviii. As many researchers noted, the institutional discrimination was 
indeed the only thing that actually made Mizrahim into a collective (Tsur 2010, Meir-
Glitzenstein 2009).  It was visible and tangible in ghettos like Wadi Salib, but felt real for the 
elites as well, in glass ceilings they encountered in most spheres of lifeix (Meir-Glitzanstein 
2009). However, somewhat similarly to the CSCJ in the 1950s, Young Israel's militant calls 
against discrimination were repetitive and empty, far from reflecting the emotional side of the 
estrangement and exclusion that could unite different social stratums over feelings of 
"resentment, growing social distinction, bitterness and emotional cleavage"x. The formulation 
of a collective identity on basis of discrimination was therefore also not successful, and did not 
materialize in political terms. The inherent difficulties in cooperating between different 
                                                             
i This term came into use in Young Israel's publications after Kelman Katzanelson coined it in his racist book, The 
Ashkenazi Revolution. 
ii "The Question of Ethnic Representation" (le-sheelat ha-yitsug ha-'adati), Davar, 2.9.62, p. 3; A. Meir, 
"Commentary from the Margins" (he'arot min ha-tsad), IB, 5.4.62, p. 9; Y. Nitsani, "Problems of Merger of 
Diasporas" (be'ayot  mizug galuyot), Shevet Va'am 1960.  
iii See one such rare moment in Ezra George's ad in the EM, 30.10.59, p. 3. 
iv Truth, AMT, standing for Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia. "Interview with Prof. George Harar" (reayon 'im prof. george 
harar), Young Israel, 24.9.65, p. 3.    
v E.g. Arieh Avnery, "the Sephardic Revolution" (ha-mahapekha ha-sfaradit), Yedioth Ahronot, 5.7.64, p. 5.   
vi Eliachar (1967): 28. For more about the development of the term Pure Sephrardic in Israel see Baharad (2011). 
vii E.g. Danger, Jewish racialism! Israel's Sephardim : Integration, or Disintegration? 1965. Jerusalem:  Committee 
of Sephhardic Community of Jeruslem, p.1. 
viii Shalom Moial, "The Other Side of the Coin" (ha-tsad ha-sheni shel ha-matbe'a), Young Israel, 28.9.62; Ben 
Yaakov, "The Principles of the Movement" ('ekronot ha-tnu'ah), Young Israel, 5.4.62, p. 1; Immanuel (1964).   
ix Moshe Nahmias, "Abolishing Discrimination" (le-bi'ur neged ha-aflaya), IB, 13.8.61, p. 7.   
x "Danger, Jewish racialism! Israel's Sephardim : integration, or disintegration?" 1965. Jerusalem: Council of the 
Sephardi Community of Jerusalem. 
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generations and inclinations joined an intensified political rivalry between different ethnicities. 
In the CSCJ's attempts to gain recognition for the Federation as a non-party umbrella 
organization for the Sephardic and Mizrahi publics, the only possible allies they could think of 
were the old dysfunctional CSCsi. Young Israel also aspired to perform as this mother 
organization, but they also wished to be liberated and distanced from the same circles from 
which their ideology grewii. A solution that was proposed by all extra-parliamentary activists, 
was that the Mizrahi and Sephardic MPs would construct this organization, since they were the 
only ones that had established enough public legitimacy on a democratic baseiii. In this claim 
the two sides of the colonial/modern coin are exemplified simultaneously.  The Sephardic and 
Mizrahi autonomous leaders recognized that the elected Mizrahim and Sephardim were 
appointed in ways that were quite far from democratic, getting nominated to positions without 
a valid popular base or social position, but simply because they were deemed cooperative or 
forced to cooperate with the Eurocentric elitesiv. Some compared them to collaborators with 
oppressive colonial regimesv (Roby 2015). The expectation from Mizrahi MPs to take 
responsibility over the desired mother organization for the Sephardic and Mizrahi publics, 
exemplifies the crisis created by the omnipresent quality of the coloniality of power of Zionist 
Ashkenazi hegemony in this decade, and its exclusive power in determining the conditions of 
the social and political common sense. This power structure was dominated by Mapai and its 
ability, as it were, to divide and conquer:   
"Our own arguments and our fights [merivotenu] within ourselves- are countlessly more numerous than 
our fights [rivenu] with the different racists in the people [ha-giz'aniim ba-'am le-minehem]… we are a 
dispersed and crushed public…[with] no unified language"vi.  
As mentioned, the hegemonic language to define this public was the language most commonly 
used, despite the alternative suggestions raised to challenge this hegemonic framing. In this 
decade the adjective "ethnic" ['adati] got widespread in the political sphere. Instead of 
Sephardic or Mizrahi, there were ethnic activists, or ethnic functionaries ['askanei/pe'ilei 
'edot]vii, ethnic politicians [sarei 'edot]viii, ethnic organizations [irgun/miflaga adati/t] and even 
                                                             
i "Protocol of Executive Committee Meeting" (pirtei kol yeshivat ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 10.11.63, CSCJA container 6236 
file 380.  
ii At the same time, Immanuel was greatly disappointed when these circles did not actively support the movement 
and his other initiatives. See Immanuel (1968a).   
iii E.g. Immanuel (1968): 36; M. Selzer "Culture Clash in Israel" (hitnagshut tarbuyot be-israel), IB, 4.4.66.  
iv Y. M Immanuel, "Sephardic and Ashkenazi Leadership" (manhigut sfaradit ve-ashkenazit), Young Israel, 15.9.63, 
p. 4. Eliahu Eliachar, "After the Elections in Ashdod and Beer Sheva" (be-'ikvot ha-bhirot be-ashdod u-be-beer 
sheva), Haaretz, 29.10.63; Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to The Jerusalem Post Editorial, 10.1.65, CZA 430A/68/1.  
v Sh. Yerushalmi, "Why Not Ethnic Lists?" (madu'a lo reshimot 'adatiyot?), IB, 25.12.64, p. 13.  
vi Oriental Jew, "The Sin of our Shortcoming" ('al het mehdalenu), IB, 8.2.67.  
vii E.g. Avraham Alters, "Our Non-Action was a Sin to the Ethnicities" (be-i ma'asenu hatanu klapei ha-'edot), EM, 
10.6.58, p. 1.  
viii E.g. Sh. Gamliel, "The alignment of Ethnicities and the alignment of Parties" (ma'arkh ha-'edot u-ma'arakh ha-
miflagot), IB, 24.4.67.  
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ethnic people [anshei ha-'edot]i. The adjective "ethnic" became widespread in this decade of 
competitive identity-politics between different ethnicities. A wide variety of local activists were 
now representing Iraqi, Tunisian, North African, or other communities inside Zionist parties. 
Yet there was a need to define all of them in one word. The long adjective common in the 1950s 
to describe in one term such activists, bnei 'edot ha-mizrah, literally: sons of eastern ethnicities, 
was shortened into one word for language efficiency, a process as old as language itself.  
Nowadays the shortened adjective is Mizrahi, but in the 1960s it was 'adati (ethnic). The 
arbitrary signifier of this elusive referent (De Saussure 1959) changed along different socio-
political moments in history. It is no coincidence that under Labor Zionism's apparatus of 
domination, "Mizrahi" was dropped, and the term used was the one vacant from actual reference 
to the identities of the communities themselves. Though the longer adjective can also be 
considered as generalizing and unflattering, at least it did not entail by itself the denial of 
Mizrahim's spatial heritage. Shenhav (2006a) claimed the term 'adati has a reductive meaning, 
because it creates a non-political discussion in ethnicity, bounding ethnicity to issues of local 
cultures and folklore. This apolitical term was used in the political context by Ashkenazim in a 
derogatory sense, marking separatist and essentialist tendencies. Our activists also understood 
it this way: no organization proudly defined itself as ethnicii. As some Mizrahi intellectuals 
noted, the term "ethnic" invisiblized the Ashkenazim as an ethnic group, leaving them as 
generic unmarked categoryiii (Segrest 2001).  The occasional critique of the term did not prevent 
it from getting widely adopted even by the same criticizers. This term finally gave a name to 
this public and granted it de-facto with a collective identity.  
The consolidation of this term marks the conclusion of a racialization and inferiorization 
process of this population. The particular Orientalist colonial processes of the Middle East, 
marked Mizrahim, Mizrahi Judaism and Mizrahiness as the opposite of the west, and 
established western modernity as entailing the correct and desirable ways to live, and on the 
right side of history. The Zionist matrix of domination, the coloniality of power, in its system 
of absolute domination of the Zionist parties of all fields of life, infiltrated in the fissures 
between the different collective identities of Jews from the Middle East and North Africa. It 
transformed these fissures into empty struggles of power between essentialist identities, and 
then pasted together all these absent fragments in a unified jumble, described by an insulting 
                                                             
i E.g. M. Selzer, "For Levantization" (be-zkhut ha-levantizatsia), IB, 11.4.65, p. 19.  
ii E.g. Avner Garin, "How do the Party Candidates See the Future of the City of the Future?" (ekh roim mu'amadei 
ha-miflagot et 'atida shel 'ir ha-'atid), Yedioth Ahronot, 26.7.63, p. 33. In the IB this adjective was sometimes used 
in a positive manner, though usually it was used to refer to auto-organization as pressuring Zionist parties meant 
to gain representation.  
iii E.g. Y. Oz Ari,"Two Cultures and One People" (shtei tarbuyot ve-'am ehad), IB, 18.9.63, p. 7; "Eastern Ethnicities-
A Boiling Pot. Etgar Talk with Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon" ('edot ha-mizrah: sir 'al ha-esh. sihat etgar 'im shlomo Cohen-
Tzidon", Etgar, 4.10.62; "A New Political Party: The Movement for Fraternity" (miflaga hadasha: ha-tnu'ah le-ahva), 
Maariv, 8.8.63, p. 14.   
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reduction with racist significance. This careless patchwork was the precise opposite of the 
Sephardic and Mizrahi understanding of Israel and its Merger of Diasporas project, depicted 
rather as a harmonic mosaic of cultures, woven together as a beautiful Persian rug (in: Meir-
Glitzenstein 2009: 336).  
 
 
The Spiritual Struggle  
 
The terms used to form collective identities are mostly visible when they allow framing of 
struggles, accompanying strategic processes that produce tactics. The terms, titles, strategies 
and tactics are all necessary for constructing collective action (Benford & Snow 2000). In this 
research it certainly stands out that in practice, the main struggles that united varied Sephardic 
and Mizrahi activists into collective action were the struggles for equal status in rabbinical 
authorities: the national Chief Rabbinical Authority and the local Religious Councils. Indeed, 
many nominations and improvements of status of Sephardic rabbis were a result of public 
struggles, and such struggles were also often necessary for the opening and equipping of 
synagoguesi (Deshen 1970). These struggles, on the different geographical scales, were a 
central mobilizing force of Mizrahim and Sephardim in the 1950s and 1960s. The groups that 
aimed for national representation focused on the struggle for representation on national and 
municipal institutions, and various local groups fought for local representation, for the Sabbath 
to get respected by the municipality (Shaul 2016) and for constructing synagogues for the 
communities (Bashkin 2017:171-2).  
On the local level, it is clear how the struggles over these issues were a factor that necessarily 
impeded the construction of a collective Mizrahi and Sephardic identity. The fact that each 
ethnic community had to struggle for getting funds for a proper synagogue might have been a 
principal factor leading to the aspiration of each community to get organized by itself and gain 
representation. Synagogues had a certain role in getting independent Sephardic and Mizrahi 
political activity organized, as places to spread propaganda and gather people (e.g. Bashkin 
2017: 169). Synagogues were perfect spaces for these activities because they were autonomous 
and self-organized spaces of communities and sub-communities of Mizrahim. As Leon 
explained, synagogues are safe spaces for live practice of entire symbolic universes and cultural 
world views. The purpose of "ethnic synagogues'" is conserving the culture of the country of 
origin (Leon 2009). The institution at large is all about continuity, sense of belonging and space 
for stabilizing identities (Leon 2006). By themselves, synagogues strengthened "cultural 
                                                             
i E.g. Sh. Recanati, "We Will Unite to Struggle" (nitahed le-maavak), Young Israel, 18.4.63, p. 1; Letter from David 
Siton to Rabbi Sh. HaCohen Vingerten, 7.11.63, CSCJA container 6261 file 564. 
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islands"i: a positive element for the same communities, but an inherent obstacle for any political 
project constituted upon a collective identity of Sephardim and Mizrahim. In the 1960s, Zionist 
parties also used synagogues in their political campaigns, many times in dishonoring and 
instrumental manners, which according to Deshen (1970), profaned and secularized religious 
language, ceremonies and entire systems of values and cultures.  
 
The CSCJ aspired to challenge these dynamics by the Great Mativta project, which aspired to 
unite Sephardic and Mizrahi synagogues under its authority, and raise "spiritual leaders with a 
common language to the young intelligentsia"ii. Since the CSCJ activists had no toranic 
authority, gathering different synagogues within an organizational framework would have been 
a way to impose this circle's imagination of a Sephardic collective identity, in a way that also 
gave political power to this institutioniii. Just by taking up the Great Mativta project, as well as 
by its desired contents, the CSCJ attempted to challenge western modernity/coloniality, which 
marked clear borders between the religious and the secular. Even though these borders had not 
been so well demarcated among non-western Jewries, in Israel in the 1960s Sephardic rabbis 
were developing such understanding of these borders with ever greater vigor. Among the 
groups examined here, however, there were many who had alternative views to the hegemonic 
one about the relations between religion, state and society:  
"…Only then [with proper representation] will Sephardic consciousness come before Jewish 
consciousness, since Jewish they have enough of.  A statist Jewish consciousness has to be inserted in 
our Ashkenazi brothers. The Sephardic consciousness will bring profound changes in the systems of 
education and in our cultural life at large. This is not just a matter of representation."iv 
"The Sephardic voter…is astonished in face of the pure secularity of Herut and Mapai. It is obvious to 
him the signature of religion must be in the state to make the existence of the Jewish people possible"v  
"the people of Israel is not like all peoples…it was always independent in all its years in the diaspora…it 
kept its spiritual independence…Do not distort the true exhibition of the people of Israel's independence 
by turning it to an exhibition of weapons and military power, because in this field we will never win… 
our enemies… were condemned [hitabrakhu] to live upon their swords [ve-'al harbekha tihiye]..."vi  
                                                             
i Y. M Immanuel, "Abolishing Ignorance in Israel" (hisul ha-ba'arut be-israel), Young Israel, 28.2.63, p. 3.  
ii Letter from Rabbi Ventura to Rabbi Toledano, 23.7.58, CSCJA container 6300 file 890.  
iii "The Organization of the Institutions of the Community Council" (irgun mosdot va'ad ha-'eda), 29.10.62, CSCJA 
container 6263 file 587; "Protocol of Executive Committee" (pireti-kol ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 9.2.64, CSCJA container 
6236 file 380.  
iv Moshe Nahmias, "The Sephardim and the Elections to the Parliament" (ha-sfaradim ve-ha-bhirot la-kneset), IB, 
14.7.61, p. 6.  
v A. Meir, "The Sephardim, the Elections and the Parties" (ha-sfaradim, habhirot ve-ha-miflagot), IB, 13.9.61, p. 6. 
vi "Independence or my strength and power"  )'atsmaut o kohi ve-'otsem yadi), Kol Sinai, May 1962 (eiyar tashkab). 
This view is similar to Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox views.  
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With the exception of the Torah Loyalists Circle, many of our activists emphasized the 
tolerance, flexibility and moderation of Sephardic Judaism as holding national spiritual valuei.  
This image of Sephardic Judaism, though, was getting infiltrated by toranic colonization. 
Progressive political activists only contested this form of colonization when there was suspicion 
of Mizrahi and Sephardic children getting taken forcibly to Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox schools. 
Otherwise, they usually adopted an approach similar though not identical to the extremists-
conservative Sephardim, viewing it as a positive way to save the immigrants' children from 
assimilating into secular Ashkenazi identity, and a way to make sure the proper upbringing of 
the next generation of Sephardic rabbisii. Though in its contents Ashkenazi ultra-orthodoxy is 
perhaps not moderniii, it is a product of reaction to western modernity, its reversal, and this is 
evident in its modern form, and the way it is based upon strict binary oppositions between 
secular and religious identities and lifestyles. The struggles of "secular" activists over 
representation in rabbinical authorities, by itself undermined the modern/colonial dichotomy 
between secular and religious, and was used as an opportunity to show respect to rabbis or to 
emphasize the particular characteristics of Sephardic Judaism: 
"... [the Sephardic] rabbi is of general authority that is impossible to undermine…In front of the 
Sephardim's rabbi everybody comes, conservatives and otherwise [shomrei mitsvot ke-mekelim be-
mitsvot]. The Sephardim are not interested in an extremist rabbi that would distance the multitudes.”iv 
Through the processes of toranic colonization, the binary secular/religious categories got 
inserted not only within extremists-conservatives within the Torah Loyalists Circle, but also 
into the high positioned Sephardic rabbis and their decision making. The fact that Sephardic 
rabbis had to go through certain ashkenization in order to attain stature in the state, emptied the 
struggles over representation in rabbinical authorities of any independent Sephardic Halachic 
or cultural contents. Therefore, these struggles did not do much to define a Sephardic and 
                                                             
i E.g. Y.Y.Rivlin, "From Hed Hamizrah to In the Battle" (me-hed ha-mizrah ve-'ad le-ha-ma'arakha), IB, 14.7.61, p. 3; 
Sh. Cohen-Tzidon, "The Makers of Politics from Religion" (ha-'osim politika me-ha-dat), IB, 2.10.64, p. 9. For more 
about Sephardic Judaism see: Y. Y. Rivlin, "The Workshop for Sephardic Sages' Spirit" (beit ha-yotser le-ruah 
hakhamei sfarad); Shevet Va'am, 1960. 
ii Still there was a difference between the progressive and conservative approach: the last saw the Ashkenazi 
intervention as a blessing and a source of pride (Leon 2009, Horowitz 2000), while progressive Sephardim saw it 
more as the force of reality, the better option between worse ones. It should be mentioned that Shlomo Cohen-
Tzidon became publicly known for a case he took as a lawyer, against the forceful kidnapping of Yosi Shumakher 
by ultra-orthodox Jews. For comparing the progressive and conservative responses see: "The Savior of Toranic and 
Charity Institutions in Israel" (moshi'am shel mosdot ha-tora ve-ha-hesed ba-arets), Kol Sinai, June 1962 (sivan 
tashkab); Letter from David Siton to Eliahu Eliachar 27.5.62, CSCJA container 6236 file 587. Also see for instance E. 
Eliachar, "The Sephardim after the Elections" (ha-sfaradim ahrei ha-bhirot), IB, 13.9.61, p. 4; M. Farush, "Mizrahi 
Representation in the Parliament" (netsigut 'edot ha-mizrah ba-kneset), IB, 1.12.64, p. 19.      
iii This is nothing I would have the knowledge to assert, since that would require broad knowledge of Ashkenazi 
ultra-orthodox canon as well as careful analysis of Jewish writings and historical canonical developments.    
iv Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon, "The Elections for Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv" (ha-bhirot la-rav ha-rashi be-tel aviv), IB, 8.12.61, 
p. 7.    
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Mizrahi collective identity, but rather, were restricted to official issues such as number of 
representative rabbis or their formal authorities.  
The CSCJ had their own struggle in these matters, with their claims to become involved in 
electing the Chief Sephardic Rabbii. Jerusalem's chief rabbi Eliahu Pardes "firmly objected" 
this move, which led them to propose systems of rabbinical election through popular-
democratic bases, for instance through synagogues or by direct electionsii. The modern/colonial 
dialectics is perfectly visible in this move. Rabbi Pardes opposed secular agents getting 
involved in religious politics, in accordance with the axioms of Israel's modern/colonial politics, 
which left monopoly over religious affairs to religious parties. The notables' entire motivation 
was aimed against these axioms of Israel's politics about religious matters. Their claim for 
involvement was a reactionary claim, exhibiting their concern about their loss of status, but at 
the same time it was a way to struggle against the Zionist matrix of power and the way it 
influenced the spiritual sphere. As recalled, the implication of the monopoly of Ashkenazi 
political parties on the rabbinical sphere had a significant role in creating the spiritual and 
leadership crisis of Mizrahi immigration, making hundreds of immigrant rabbis banished from 
their communities by the circumstances created by state authorities (Leon 1999).  This crisis of 
leadership (Bernstein 1976) "shattered previous ethnic order" and "caused an existential crisis 
to many and entire communities" (Deshen 1979). At the same time, Deshen (1979) explained 
how this process had certain emancipatory aspects, because it ended patriarchal patterns that 
caused dependence of communities and their rabbis in a few wealthy individuals and families, 
also since the status of these last changed after immigration. Here, as in the CSCJ's move, the 
dialectics of the modern/colonial coin are evident, exemplifying how colonial oppression and 
modern emancipation are co-constitutive. When the CSCJ's traditional status was undermined 
by their authority of reference, Rabbi Pardes, for his adaption to the modern/colonial mindset, 
the CSCJ activists developed their own modern-emancipatory proposals for democratic and 
egalitarian ways, detached from the Zionist parties, to elect the religious authorities in state 
institutions.   
 
The coloniality of power of the Zionist apparatus of domination -the omnipresence of 
Ashkenazi-dominated parties in regulating all fields of life- was discussed here on two levels 
that complement each other, in relation to the production of collective identity: a discursive 
level that dealt with the terminology used to refer to this public, and a practical level, referring 
to the central collective actions that had power to unite this public. I suggest that the limits 
                                                             
i "Protocol of Executive Committee" (pirtei-kol ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 24.11.63, CSCJA container 6236 file 380.   
ii "Protocol of Executive Committee" (pirtei-kol ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 19.1.64, CSCJA container 6236 file 380.  The 
suggestions of a Yemenite and Maghrebi community to establish a separate rabbinate, though, seemed to them 
extremist. "Protocol of Executive Committee" (pirtei-kol ha-va'ad ha-po'el), 24.11.63, CSCJA container 6236 file 
380.   
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Mizrahi immigrants put to the coloniality of power were where it entered the public 
spiritual/cultural/religious sphere. Unmet needs in this field were perhaps the most important 
mobilizing force in those years, expressed, among others, in struggles of communities for the 
right to get funding to construct and improve their synagogues. This was a factor aiding 
particular ethnic communities to get organized in the sphere of local politics, and this process 
led the way for Sephardim and Mizrahim to gain positions in local and national Zionist parties. 
The struggles of separate ethnic communities impeded the creation of a positive collective 
identity for different Mizrahi or Sephardic communities.  Since collective identity can only be 
constituted when it gains recognition by others (Melucci 1995), the result of the numerous 
struggles of ethnic communities was a reduced and degraded ethnic, 'adati, Mizrahi collective 
identity. The term 'adati was formed through the exchange between the hegemonic frames and 
their contention. According to Melucci (1995), the capacity for collective action is defined by 
the ability to produce collective identity. The emptied collective identity formed by this 
exchange, then, limited the scope and ability of a Mizrahi and Sephardic collective action. 
Along with the crisis of the Sephardic rabbinical world, this left the 
religious/traditional/cultural/spiritual struggle on the national level reduced to the same kind of 
empty struggle over representation as in other state institutions, a struggle over form and not 
over contents.  
 
 
AUTOCHTHONOUS ZIONISM                                     and the Coloniality of Knowledge   
 
In the 1960s the IB served as a stage for writers to make theoretical and practical suggestions 
for an alternative atmosphere to the animosity, hatred and condescending attitudes within Israeli 
society towards the Arab world. This was intertwined with denouncing the public spirit and 
policies that required the Mizrahi immigrants to shed any Arab cultural baggage. This critical 
discourse at times reflected the anti-colonial discourse of the time, for instance in renouncing 
"cultural and educational feudalism"i and "Culturecide"ii. It unfolded more commonly among 
intellectual immigrants or older-native activists, and less within the younger generations of 
natives, that had been raised in the Zionist colonial society:  
                                                             
i Mizrahi Jew, "In the Depth of Mizrahi Statistics" (be-nivhey ha-statistica ha-mizrahiit), IB, 10.6.66.  
ii Shimon Yaakovi, "Zalman Aran's Communal Problem" (ha-be'aya ha-'adatit shel zalman aran), IB, 28.5.67; also 
see "Danger, Jewish racialism! Israel's Sephardim : integration, or disintegration?" 1965. Jerusalem : Council of the 
Sephardi Community of Jerusalem. 
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 "The youth that grows up in Israel does not better absorb neither understanding nor knowledge of what 
is happening around us, and in the day that the desired peace will come, we will lack this priceless 
baggage [mit'an yakar] for good neighboring relations with the peoples fate had assigned us to live by."i 
Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon, as MP for Gahal, raised in the parliament various issues reflecting his 
concern about this gap in knowledge created between the young generations in Israel and the 
Arab worldii. The "priceless baggage" of knowledge, and therefore appreciation, of Arabic and 
Arab cultural productions had political value for the older native and immigrant intellectuals. 
It served them to confront matter-of-factly the establishment's tactics to undermine the political 
value of Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewries. For instance, a common Ashkenazi discourse to justify 
Ashkenazi domination conjured anxiety from the "levantization" of Israel:  the danger that if 
Mizrahim and Sephardim had real power, the state would be assimilated with the Arab world 
and "would not have value for the Jewish people"iii. Young Israel attacked this argument in 
inconsistent ways that never undermined the attribution of inferiority to the Levant iv. In 
contrast, some of the older natives and immigrant intellectuals could use their cultural baggage 
to make comprehensive arguments against this Ashkenazi claimv. An intrinsic relation was 
presented between the project of empowerment of the Mizrahi and Sephardic publics, the need 
for the Ashkenazi-dominated state to have a more flexible character towards the east, and 
Israeli-Arab rapprochement: 
"The Jews of the east have adapted a special way of life through which they could accomplish co-
existence with the Arabs for many generations. When they felt estranged in this country [zarutam ba-
aretz] they tried to adapt the same way of life with the Ashkenazim, of course with less success. The 
disrespect [zilzul] did not persecute them in Muslim countries, but in the land of the Jews it persecuted 
them into their intimacy ['ad le-hadrei hadarim]…Now people begin to study their past, learn about what 
happened to them in Israel [ba-arets], and to express their feelings [rahashei libam] and respond on press 
to the said and written about them and against them…the burden of prejudice within, indicates [noten 
ototav] the exterior policy"vi  
Cohen-Tzidon and Eliachar believed the IB itself should be dedicated, among other issues, to 
Israeli-Arab rapprochementvii, and contributed to developing it as such. Unlike the Marxist 
                                                             
iLetter from Eliahu Eliachar to David Siton, 7.6.65, CZA 430A/42/1.   
ii Knesset Protocols, 29.3.67, 31.5.67.    
iii Letter from David Ben Gurion to Moshe Shlush, 25.10.62, BGA: subject files, container 42 file 245.   
iv E.g. "Editorial Notes" (dvar ha-ma'arekhet), Young Israel, 4.11.62, p. 1; Aharon Shmuel Moial, "The Riots and 
Conflicts in Beer Sheva's Municipality" (ha-mehumot ve-ha-tkhakhim be-'iriyat beer sheva), Young Israel, 1.2.62, p. 
2. The same kind of arguments were also published in the IB.  
v E.g. David Siton, "Strengthening Eastern Consciousness Among Us" (le-hizuk ha-toda'ah ha-mizrahit be-kirbenu), 
Shevet Va'am, November 1958.; Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon, Jewish-Arab Rapprochement in the Cultural Field" 
(hitkarvut yehudit 'aravt be-shetah ha-tarbut), IB 29.10.62, p. 12; "The Millennium", IOP, April 1965; Eliachar 
(1967).  
vi Oriental Jew, "The Failing and Faltering" ('al nehashalim ve-koshlim), IB, 28.5.67. 
vii Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon, "Singular View: The Military Regime is not Justified" (da'at yahid. kiyum ha-memshal ha-
tsvai be-yisrael eino mutsdak), IB, 5.4.62, p. 5. See permit to publishing Hed Hamizrah, 12.1.64. in this permit it is 
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approach to Jewish-Arab rapprochement, the IB contributors wrote about an Inner-Jewish 
process, not based on practical cooperation with Palestinians or any other Arabs. More than a 
process, in fact it was an ethos, which they developed in order to impose it on the state's nature 
and imagei. This ethos, a vision perhaps, was based on conceptions of Jewish Redemption 
[geula] and proposed a profoundly different state.  It had to do with the purpose of the Jewish 
people in their land and the role the Jewish state should play in the Middle East. That is, it was 
an alternative Zionist theory, that asked to design Israel as a Jewish "Oriental country".  
This alternative Zionism was developed through comprehensive critical thinking that tied 
several epistemological, ontological and political questions together. As mentioned, many 
wrote in the IB about Mizrahi and Sephardic culture and heritage. Some preached to the political 
project of knowing its positive valuesii, and others complimented this demand by writing up its 
contents: folklore, customs, rabbinical productions and history. As "natives of the region"iii, the 
project of producing knowledge about Mizrahi and Sephardic Jewries was the same identity-
related spiritual-cultural political project as spreading knowledge about the Middle East. It had 
to do with the definitions of the external and internal nature of the state: the nature of the Jewish 
people, its mission there and then, and its relation to its geographical region. It was an 
autochthonous nationalism that relied on Biblical times and on the glory of the Sephardic 
Golden Ageiv. This view can be seen in the writing of several authors, but its most eloquent 
formulator was Yitzhak A. Abadiv, whom different activists in this research recommended, in 
different stages, for candidature for presidency of the statevi:  
"[There is] a deep psychological abyss between us and them…understanding the abyss… would require 
us for a deeper and wider change, not only in our attitude to the Arab world, to the Arabs as humans, to 
the Arabs as our closest neighbors… but also to our very mission in this part of the world. This is the 
                                                             
elicited that the journal was to be edited by Eliachar and treat various issues, including Israel-Arab relations. CZA 
430A/42/2; compare to IB's permit from 9.7.61 and 8.7.65, CSCJA container 9419.  
i Efron (2005) wrote about Egyptian and Iraqi intellectuals in Israel, such as Jacqueline Kahanoff, Sami Michael and 
Nissim Rejwan. These intellectuals wrote in literary publications, daily newspapers and parties' organs, about 
similar themes as the ones that would be reviewed below, and from similar positions and prisms. These 
intellectuals as well as the ones that contributed to the IB all wrote in order to achieve public legitimacy to their 
interpretation of the desired character of the state. The IB, by its very existence, attempted to influence Sephardic 
and Mizrahi intellectuals and politicians, and also Ashkenazi decision makers. The mentioned intellectuals tried to 
gain influence mainly by themselves, and not through collective Mizrahi action. Nissim Rejwan and Aharon Zamir 
are the only one from Efron's research that consistently contributed to the IB, though during determined periods. 
ii E.g. Mizrahi Jew, "Levantism, Ashkenazism and the Weather" ('al levantiniut, ashkenaziut, ve-mezeg avir), IB, 
14.9.66.  
iii E.g. Karl Alpert, "Israel's Peace Offers" (hatsa'ot ha-shalom shel Israel), IB, 10.6.66.   
iv See also for instance N. Rejwan, "The Masterpieces of Jewish-Arab Culture" (yetsirot mofet me-ha-tarbut 
hayehudit 'aravit), IB, 25.12.66; Y. Y. Rivlin,"Jews and Arabs" (yehudim ve-'aravim),Gesher, December 1962.   
v Yitzhak A. Abadi was born in Jerusalem, and was a teacher, a journalist and the main translator between English 
and Hebrew for the British Mandate government. There is very little written about his public work, however 
through his writings reviewed here it seems that he had been consistently promoting Jewish-Arab rapprochement, 
and the spiritual and cultural return of Jews to the east, in light of the Sephardic Golden Age. See also Jacobson & 
Naor (2016): 50.  
vi In Israel the president is a symbolic-diplomatic role, while the Prime Minister holds the primary executive power. 
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kind of change that in itself requires a spiritual rebooting of systems [shidud maarkhot ruhani]…what 
does the Israeli child know about the Arab world, its language, lifestyle, ambitions, culture…this is 
required in order to design citizens that are loyal to their people and land with a Jewish 
consciousness…"i   
"In such a [historical] view, spiritual and cultural Jewish-Arab cooperation will not seem as utopia and 
false dreams, but the force of history… We seek [hotrim] to create an original culture of our own, and 
such culture will not be real [lo yehe ba mamash] if it does not nurture [tinak ve-tizon] from its natural 
ground [adama]. Such natural ground is in the Middle East, that is all Arab, and is also seeking [hoter] 
to design itself new tools of culture and spirit instead of yesterday's tools that go and sink in forgetfulness 
[holkhim ve-metuba'im be-yam ha-shikheha]. What then is more understandable and logical than 
cultural and spiritual cooperation between us and them…we do not have any passion to copy and imitate 
to our country values of others that do not fit our national character. But obviously, we do not have any 
passion, or ability, to stand for long as an isolated island distinct from its entire environment 
and…pretend it simply does not exist…In our press the president of Egypt will never be mentioned in his 
title, President of Egypt…but [just] in order to emphasize his supposed tyranny. Who are we trying to 
fool?"ii  
As we see in the last quote, the hegemonic Zionist discourse was criticized for misrepresenting 
and underrepresenting the Arab world in its totality. The discourse of politicians and the media, 
as well as the academic study of the Arab world, were disputed as unprofessional and equivocal 
in aimsiii. 
 
The Merger of Diasporas as Ecology of Knowledge  
The very same claim made about the academic study of the Arab world was made about the 
hegemonic Zionist discourse about Mizrahim, as it was getting reformulated by Ashkenazi 
"educators, ministers, politicians, writers, sociologists and journalists"iv. This decade was 
marked by growing "academization" of "the ethnic problem", in spheres where Ashkenazi 
social scientists took prominence. In some cases, these professionals might have informed some 
of the Sephardic elites about their doings, but they never attempted to get informed by the native 
intellectuals of this public.  By the IB and other means the CSCJ attempted to instigate the 
opposite direction of distribution of knowledgev. The academic conferences and publications 
                                                             
i Y. A. Abadi, "The Problem of Problems in our Exterior Policy" (be'ayat ha-be'ayot be-mediniyutenu ha-hitsonit), 
IB, 1.10.62, p. 3.  
ii Y. A. Abadi "Our Way to the Arab World" (darkenu la-'olam ha-'aravi), IB, 26.9.65, p. 5.   
iii David Siton, "Strengthening Eastern Consciousness Among Us" (le-hizuk ha-toda'ah ha-mizrahit be-kirbenu), 
Shevet Va'am, November 1958. 
iv Letter from E. Eliachar to H. Hahelgi, 28.11.65, CZA 430A/210/4.  
v See the booklet that was sent to the chairmen of all the universities' student organizations: Eliachar (1967), CSCJA, 
container 6256 file 537.  
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about "the ethnic gap" were source of continuous dispute in the IB over their scientific validity, 
underlining motivation and their general value for society:    
"The failure of these scientists to keep abreast of modern sociological thought, and to pass these findings 
to political and administrative circles in the country, is a major cause of the present gloomy ethnic 
situation in Israel. Their attempts to understand the ethnic confrontation are equivocal, superficial and 
evasive…and construct a circular argument"i 
 "…They sailed off to ideological spheres… from which the [ethnic] problem of the communities was 
pushed aside [nidheka le-keren zavit] … An investigative approach ...[using] categories of the majority, 
instead of practical categories…[it] only sets a diagnosis in a superficial, ornate [melitzi] and 
declarative manner and does not speak about treatment" ii 
The critics wrote about how the academic discourse was impractical, damaging, emanating 
from Ashkenazi bias, setting racial categoriesiii and returning to questions the Sephardic and 
Mizrahi elites had already exhausted, over "clarifying the terms and defining goals"iv. This 
scientific production of knowledge had absolutely nothing to do with what Ashkenazim were 
required to do: "turn down their arrogant tones [ton ha-yohara]"vand uproot their "pretentious 
dispositions [hilchei ruah]"vi; taking instead a tolerant, egalitarian and flexible attitude, in order 
to become one people in the landvii. The Inner-Jewish process, which is what autochthonous 
Zionism was all about, the path for becoming a people and building a nation, required a process 
of Merger of Diasporas, but Sephardim and Mizrahim had a different definition of this process 
than the hegemonic Ashkenazi one. Popular and intellectual, progressive and conservative 
Sephardic and Mizrahi perspectives all appropriated the Zionist ethos of Merger of Diasporas 
(Lissak 1972), to conceive it as a process of "mutual and fair conceding" of customs and 
traditionsviii, where both Ashkenazim and Mizrahim "learn from one another, merge into each 
other and not cancel one in favor of the other"ix. This shared understanding of the meaning of 
the Merger of Diasporas is what united Mizrahi and Sephardic activists of all spheres of activity, 
except for those who were more fully assimilated into Zionist parties and internalized the 
Ashkenazi view toward the east. Some researchers saw the Mizrahi discourse about Merger of 
                                                             
i "Israeli Sociology", IOP, June 1965.   
ii A. Yishai,"The Ethnic Problem in Mapai´s Convention" (be'ayat ha-'edot be-veidat mapai), IB, 8.11.63, p. 4.  
iii E.g. Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to Maariv's editor, 20.6.65, CZA 430A/42/1; H. Eitan, "The Soft Spots of the Ethnic 
Problem" (nekudot ha-torpa shel ha-be'aya ha-'adatit), IB, 5.8.63, p. 6; Eliachar (1967): 3, 9-18; A. Oron, "The 
danger of Wadi Salib had not passed" (sakanat vadi salib terem halfa), IB, 25.11.66. "Versus the Ashkenazi 
Revolution" (mul ha-mahapekha ha-ashkenazit), Kol Sinai, March 1964 (nisan tashkad). 




vii Eliahu Eliachar, "Is it Really Whites Versus Blacks?" (ha-omnam shhorim mul levanim?), IB, 10.2.63, pp. 3-4.  
viii Yosef Tubi's journal, entry of 5.3.63, TA.  
ix H. Shimoni, "In Front of Locked Gates" (bi-fnei sha'arim ne'ulim), IB, 10.12.63, p. 4. About the popular counter-
hegemonic framing of the Merger of Diasporas see Peres (1976): 100; and in political activity: Lissak (1972). 
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Diasporas as expressing dependence in Ashkenazim (e.g. Meir-Glitzenstein 2009).  However, 
there were Mizrahi groups and public figures who in fact expressed an autonomous voice, by 
contextualizing this vision of Merger of Diasporas within a broader geo-political view. This 
autonomous voice developed as a result of the socio-economic background and past lived 
experiences of its carriersi. This background constructed an autochthonous theory of Zionism, 
which presented the Merger of Diasporas as a project that can be seen as parallel to what 
Bonaventura De Sousa Santos called "the ecology of knowledges". Superficially, it seems that 
the ecology of knowledges could be interpreted as the popular Sephardic-Mizrahi claim for a 
"cultural merger that crystalizes into one system all the good and beautiful in the traditions of 
all different ethnicities.."ii However, as De Sousa Santos pointed out, mere recognition of 
cultural diversity is not the same as recognition in epistemological diversity, which is what this 
ecology stands for (Santos 2007). The ecology of knowledges is based on a principal that sees 
all systems of knowledge as incomplete, science as well as other symbolic universes and 
wisdoms. Ecology stands for the possibility of non-destructible relations between systems of 
knowledge (Santos 2006): not as abstract theories but as knowledge practices. Ecology of 
knowledges is reflected in the possibility to develop strategies according to the knowledges 
most suited to pursue a certain goal (as the Merger of Diasporas), rather than through 
privileging scientific knowledge simply because of its position in the power structure (Santos 
2007). Unlike the search for harmonious relations between communities, this is about entering 
dialogue to which each form of knowledge contributes in relation with its own lacunas, if we 
will (Santos 2006)iii. As shown, the "monoculture" (Santos 2006) of Ashkenazi scientific 
knowledge production about Mizrahim and about Arabs was contested in the IB for the same 
subjective and practical reasons De Sousa Santos pointed out.  
De Sousa Santos (2006) emphasized the dangers of reproducing colonial power relations when 
different movements from different cultures enter epistemological dialogue and attempt to 
create practical cooperation. When indigenous and western knowledges enter dialogue there is 
continuous danger that the latter will annex and dominate the first (Foucault 2003, Keating 
2009, Bhabha 1994). Therefore, different authors, including our activists, noted the importance 
for the subaltern culture to first get empowered, regain cultural bearing and self-esteem and 
recover its autonomous dignity. This can be done by making forms of knowledge had been 
made absent visible, and creating an "inventory" of the traces that historical processes left on 
                                                             
i Established socio-economic background and higher education allowed such a view because these intellectuals 
could claim for themselves or for their circles to take power positions in diplomacy. Impoverished social stratums 
of immigrants could not develop this claim because they could not claim positions in diplomacy, that is, it would 
not be their autonomous voice.  
ii Undated untitled document in handwriting, seemingly a draft for the SCMD platform, TA.  
iii See Santos (2006, 2007) for more about ignorance in the ecology of knowledges, other types of related ecologies 
and inter-cultural translation.   
246
the selfi (Memmi 1965, 1998). This inventory is necessary in order to create a dialogue that 
nurtures such ecology. For this reason, autonomous production of knowledge was an obvious 
starting point for all kinds of autonomous Sephardic and Mizrahi organizations of the time in 
their quest for Merger of Diasporas, not merely of the political organizations. The construction 
of inner-strength of this imagined community was essential in order to allow its very 
participation in the ecology of knowledges. The empowerment of Mizrahi identity was required 
in order to construct a better bargaining position, so to speak, in the process of national 
unification. Contextualizing the project of empowerment of Mizrahim within ecology of 
knowledges that included explicit references for learning from the Arab world, though, was not 
a trivial move, and had to be formulated with caution and precision. Many of those most 
consistently writing about it in the IB used pseudonyms, like "Oriental Jew". Groups as the 
SCMD lacked inner-coherency to allow addressing such sensitive topics, and "would not enter 
things that are none of [their] business and are controversial"ii. On the IB pages in this period, 
conditions had ripened again to formulate a vision of an intercultural state, nurtured by ecology 
of Ashkenazi, Sephardic, Mizrahi and Arab knowledges. No type of knowledge was discarded 
or adopted in its totality. The Ashkenazim brought technological developments of late 
modernity, the Sephardim held the heritage of grand Jewish thought of early modernity, and 
the Arabs knew how to combine the two knowledges, getting modernized without losing their 
identityiii.  
This discourse remained mainly as a theoretical debate, and had no practical implications. It 
expressed an aspiration for such an ecology of knowledge, but did not entail in any sense its 
realization. Educational projects that were meant to instigate a mutual and egalitarian Merger 
of Diasporas process generally did not succeed in fulfilling this mission in this period. This was 
the case of the Great Mativta. It seems the Great Mativta did not start functioning in a 
continuous manner until 1964iv, and even then it did not materialize its essence. Despite its 
purpose of performing as space for empowering and conserving Sephardic Judaism, the 
colonial power balance penetrated its very essence. Since the toranic Sephardic world has been 
going through its own processes of colonization by Ashkenazi Judaism, the institution did not 
transmit Sephardic liturgy and heritage but Ashkenazi ones. That was despite having Rabbi 
Ovadia Yoef as its headmaster. That is, there were no Sephardic rabbis of stature able to 
perform such rabbinical-Sephardic pedagogical workv.  This failure is probably what inspired 
                                                             
i Antonio Gramci in Said (1978). 
ii Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18.  
iii Mizrahi Jew, "In the Depth of Mizrahi Statistics" (be-nivhey ha-statistica ha-mizrahiit), IB, 10.6.66; Eliahu Eliachar 
(pseud. Mashkif), "Inaccuracies of the Minister Aran" (i-diyukim be-fi ha-sar aran), IB, 9.7.65, p. 10.  
iv Sh. Ben-Shimon, "The School Year in the Toranic Academy-High School was Opened" (nifteha shant ha-limudim 
ba-yeshiva tikhon), IB, 26.9.65, p. 31.  
vLetter from Eliahu Eliachar to Michael Selzer, 24.1.65, CZA 430A/43/3; "General Committee Meeting" (yeshivat 
va'ad klali), 8.12.65, CSCJA container 6236 file 380.  
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Eliachar to concentrate his efforts, by the end of this period, on the construction of an 
"institution for communal relations". This institution  was meant to serve also as the archives 
of the CSCJ, and to function as an autonomous academic sphere for knowledge production 
about and by Sephardim and Mizrahimi. This was a response to the general growth in 
knowledge production about these issues, and specifically to the Ashkenazi way of framing the 
socio-economic problems of the Mizrahim within the academy, always within the narrow prism 
of modernization theory.  
 
 
III. NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS                                          and the Coloniality of Being 
The anti-colonial struggles of the 1960s often relied on an essentialist perceptions of identity 
of the colonized subjects, glorifying the inferiorized subaltern culture as superior. This tendency 
has often been regarded as preserving the colonial discourse that imagines colonizers and 
colonized as essentialist dichotomies, and for merely reversing colonial Eurocentric logics, 
rather than challenging or dismantling them. Fanon (1965) criticized this tendency of the 
Negritude movement, and Grosfougel (2010), in what he called Third World fundamentalism. 
Ahmad (1992) named these tendencies third wordlist cultural nationalism and Valldejuli (2007) 
referred to these tendencies as "nativism". As reviewed in chapter 2, the concept "strategic 
essentialism" (Spivak 1988) suggests that this way of formulating the identity of the oppressed 
in a positive way, as essentially superior to their oppressor, is a necessary phase in order to 
construct a political power that can oppose colonialism (Shohat & Stam 1994). Essentialist 
views of identity are sometimes leveraged into identity-politics (Bernstein 2005), that demand 
acknowledgement of the singularity of a groups' identity, and define rights that subsequently 
derive from it. In certain senses the CSCJ tried to make this form of politics central in their 
parliamentary politics in early 1950s, only they could not quite define clearly enough or in a 
positive manner the collective identity which they aimed to represent. Not participating in 
parliamentary politics generally exempted this intellectual circle from the need to define and 
struggle for such an identity. The pages of the IB were not entirely devoid of identity-politics 
or essentialist conceptualizations of Sephardic and Mizrahi identities as superior, but as 
ideologies, these did not develop to the extent that other ideas did. Frantz Fanon expanded on 
the essentialist phase in the development of the anti-colonial discourse, as part of the native 
intellectuals' process of formulating national consciousness. As recalled, "native intellectuals" 
are often carriers of border-thinking or Mestiza consciousness, not belonging to the colonizing 
                                                             
i Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to the Hebrew University, undated, CSCJA container 6230 file 291; Letter from E. 
Eliachar to Mr. Nurock, 18.4.66, CZA 430A/43/3; "Action Plan of the New Council, 1963" (tokhnit ha-pe'ula shel ha-
va'ad ha-hadash, 1963), CZA 430A/33/2.  
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layer but also not entirely to the colonized society. The first phase in their construction of 
national consciousness, according to Fanon, consists of the native intellectuals' efforts to prove 
their ability to assimilate within the colonial culture. Zureik (1979) referred to this phase as 
entailing "the adoption of language of politics that is detrimental to their struggle: 
individualism, compromise, competition, political parties". Slabosdky (2014) wrote of the 
imposition in this stage of a "European veil", entailing self-rejection and attempts to ignore the 
racial constructions of the system to which the intellectual attempts to assimilate to. The next 
phase is self-acceptance (Slabosky 2014), an essentialist and romantic return to the roots, 
abandoning individualism (Zureik 1979), becoming immersed in the native people and 
abandoning all western knowledge. This phase allows border-thinking to flourish, as the 
intellectuals re-appropriate their knowledge and culture to construct a counter-narrative of their 
heritage (Slabodsky 2014). It is in this phase that, according to Fanon, nativist politics and 
discourse can get generated.  
"...What is clear is that even when [Mizrahim] got themselves education, let go of all their traditional 
and ethnic values, they could not get absorbed within Ashkenazi society, which is in fact the recognized 
Israeli society. And so, these youngsters lost from all side [yatzu kerhim mikan umikan], they burnt on 
purpose their bridge to the ethnic society, willingly or unwillingly, but the transition to the Ashkenazim 
these last are not willing to hand. And so there is a danger of drowning...Now every person is pushed by 
their will to exist. Largely, they try to rebuild the burnt bridge and then in certain cases they become not 
only Ethnic-Mizrahi patriots, but also ethnic chauvinists... they return to speak in their Mizrahi language, 
in the presence of Ashkenazim and foreigners at large, and they are more interested in the history and 
culture of their ethnic group and in their demand for unification of the people of Israel and cancelling 
'second Israel'"i 
The third phase, according to Fanon, is expressed in literary productions, and aims at "arousing 
the public" by way of emphasizing their people's cultural achievements. However, Fanon 
reminds us, since the intellectual is not truly a part of the people he reproduces mainly 
"exoticism". In our context, these are mainly theoretical and intellectual texts about customs 
and folklore, writings that do not reflect the real needs of the people (Fanon 1965).  This famous 
theory of Fanon has been criticized for the inaccuracy entailed in the strict division into 
consecutive stages (Williams & Chrisman 1994). Said (1993) suggested that these are not 
necessarily consecutive phases but rather congruent. In fact, these stages can even exist 
simultaneously in one individuals' discourse. The Jewish Tunisian writer Memmi (1965), 
described two phases in the construction of anti-colonial liberation struggles, very similar to 
Fanon's first and second phases. He claimed that the realization of the second phase of returning 
                                                             
i"The Goal of the Cell of Mizrahi Students" (matrato shel ha-hug le-studentim bnei 'edot ha-mizrah), Yosef Tubi's 
journal, entry on 5.3.62, TA.  
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to the roots, for Jews was likely to be expressed through Zionist ideology, as the principal form 
of Jewish national liberation (Memmi 1975). Kassab (2009) and Hall (2006) also noted two 
phases in decolonial cultural critique and in the construction of ethnicity-based politics, 
respectively. In their analysis, the first phase is an elevation of an essentialist identity, whereas 
later on, wider humanistic critiques develop that include demands for rights for other groups as 
well.  
The first phase of assimilation that Fanon mentions can certainly be claimed to fit with the 
processes reviewed over the native intellectuals of the CSCJ in the 1950s, which included 
certain abandonment of their border-thinking in favor of the colonizer's side of the border. The 
development of autochthonous, eastern Zionism of the 1960s entailed a re-appreciation to the 
advantages of this circle's border-thinking, developing a critical theory from the unique position 
of both colonizers and colonized. Eastern Zionism bears more similarities to the third phase of 
Fanon, of intellectual text productions, also expressing wide humanistic critique, than to a stage 
of promoting essentialist-nativist identities, although considering Memmi's suggestions, it 
could be seen as encompassing both. However, it seems more correct to suggest that the phase 
of strategic essentialism was mostly eluded by this elite.   
The avoidance of the essentialist phase in the Mizrahi struggle has been implicitly noted by 
other researchers who explored Sephardic and Mizrahi mobilizations and organizations. 
Research tends to dismiss the transformative value of Sephardic and Mizrahi political activity 
because their aim was to get included in the national collective as designed by Ashkenazi 
Zionists. Here, I suggest that the fact that this was the goal of autonomous Mizrahi and 
Sephardic political activity does not necessarily cancel the potential transformative value of 
their discourse. Furthermore, I would suggest that the inability of the political discourse of the 
time to construct identity-politics separately, developing an essentialist-nativist perspective, 
had more to do with the 1948 Rupture than with the desire to participate equally in the colonial 
national collective. If Mizrahim in the state of Israel are both colonizers and colonized, it was 
not necessarily taking the side of the colonizers that prevented them from developing anti-
colonial identity-politics based on essentialist nativist identity, although that certainly was the 
case for many organizations. In other cases, explored here, it was the ontological and physical 
fracture that occurred to these immigrants and natives in 1948 that prevented their anti-colonial 
discourse from developing into strategic essentialism. Leon (2010) pointed out the physical and 
mental barriers with the Arab world and their influence over the development of Mizrahi ultra-
orthodoxy. The same barriers also prevented the Sephardic and Mizrahi intellectuals-activists 
from constructing their own form of nativism, and use images within their own roots in Islamic 
civilization. Articulating an essentialist superiority of Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewries as a whole 
would necessarily rely on praising the tolerance and grandeur of Islamic civilization. The 
activists in question were not afraid of pointing out the advantageous characteristics and beauty 
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of Islamic civilizations, and neither of identifying it as related to themselves. However, due to 
the anti-Zionist exterminatory rhetoric of Arab nationalisms, they certainly could not build an 
essentialist image of themselves on this civilizational base, not once Muslims and Jews have 
declared each other mortal enemies. Specifying the contents of an essentialist Mizrahi and 
Sephardic collective identity would inevitably result either in superficialityi, or in praise of 
those who declared a desire to destroy the Jewish nation.  
 
Instead of developing an essentialist Judeo-Islamic collective identity that would help design 
an anti-colonial struggle, the native intellectuals' writing in the IB toiled at developing an 
alternative national theory embedded in broader humanist critique, that was meant to design an 
alternative Jewish collective identity based on spiritual eastern Jewish pillars, rather than the 
national European pillars imported by the Zionist movement. These eastern pillars, somewhat 
ironically, were rooted in the very western end of the Mediterranean Sea, in Sefarad/Al-
Andalus: the Jewish return to the east was understood as translating that time and place to 
present reality and region. This space-time translation was an act of inter-cultural translation 
(Santos 2006): the writers chose the most relevant knowledge base in their own culture to 
establish decolonial alternatives within a dialogue with the colonial culture. By translating the 
heritage of Sefarad, they avoided emphasizing components of the east that would be too 
dangerous to present in the contact with the colonial culture, but chose the most inclusive 
version of historical Judaism, the one that can be considered as a common base for Ashkenazi 
and Sephardic Judaism as well as Islamic civilization.  
Fanon (1965) pointed out that native intellectuals tended to conceptualize entire civilizations 
as the basis for their anti-colonial nationalisms, such as Negro-African and Muslim-Arab 
civilizations. In a similar manner, Sephardic and Mizrahi intellectuals conceptualized The East. 
By treating the east as one civilizational unit, the activists-intellectuals could construct certain 
continuities between their culture and Islamic civilization, and to demand respect for both. The 
conceptualization of the Jewish state's place within eastern civilization was the basis for an 
alternative national theory to modern/colonial Zionist theory. This last had long been 
materialized into a matrix of colonial power over the eastern lands and populations. By contrast, 
autochthonous-regional, eastern Zionism was a theoretical debate. It did not develop into 
praxis; it did not directly inspire or relate to any political group or practical struggle, nor did it 
designate a route to trickle out to society. Despite their political aspirations and active 
involvement in the political field, the activists who developed these intellectual writings did not 
exceed from the line of the critical intellectuals of the time, who were dedicated to the cause of 
                                                             
i E.g. Avner Shaki,"The Sephardic and Mizrahi Public in Israel as a Cultural Bridge between Israel and the Arab 
Countries" (ha-tsibur ha-sfaradi ve-ha-mizrahi be-israel ke-rosh gesher tarbuti ben israel ve-'arav), IB, 11.1.63, p. 
13.  
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anchoring Israel in its geo-political cultural surroundings, but from an intellectual-cultural 
niche, inspiring thought and not action (Efron 2005). The intellectual activists' avoidance of the 
essentialist phase can be considered then as a proof of its importance for the development of 
decolonial political action.  
Moreover, the lack of this essentialist attitude was another factor distancing the intellectual 
activists from wider spheres of the politicized public they presumed to write to and about. 
According to Fanon (1965), and to our intellectuals' own observations about the impoverished 
social stratums of immigrants, the people who bore the burden of the liberation struggles in 
practice -those initiating protests and those practicing numerous acts of everyday resistance- 
tended towards demagogy based on essentialist nativist perspective of particular ethnicities: 
"the emotional if not the logical antithesis of that insult which the white man flung at humanity" 
(Fanon 1965: 211). The previous part reviewed the wide span of the phenomena of elevating 
essentialist Mizrahi ethnic identities in the political field in this decade. However, the degree to 
which such an approach was directed against Ashkenazim is hard to tell for lack of primary 
material: it seems it was more prevalent among the lower stratums of society, and was usually 
verbal or physical and therefore left little textual evidencei.   
"After the disturbances started we didn't leave the house for one week, we were afraid. Any Ashkenazi 
that would be seen would not finish well."ii  
"[there is] acute bitterness and sometimes even real hatred in the relation of the eastern ethnicities to 
the western ethnicities. This becomes more acute [mahrif] as much as you descend to the poor and 
uneducated stratums of the people"iii 
Yosef Tubi referred to these tendencies of the time as "ethnic patriotism" or  "ethnic 
chauvinism"iv, carried out by "professional Yemenite nationalists"v. Tubi explained the danger 
of feelings of inferiority, which can cause aggressiveness and the need to revenge, to "become 
over" the othersvi.   As mentioned, from the perspective of our intellectual activists, the violent 
tendencies that accompanied the essentialist-nativist discourse only granted them more 
responsibility over the lower social stratums of immigrants:  
                                                             
i For some reports or references of such attitude see also: "Editorial Notes" (dvar Ha-ma'arekhet), EM, 11.8.59, p. 
1; B. Arditi, "Who Nourished Ethnic Hatred?" (mi metapeah sinaah 'adatit?), IB, 10.12.63, p. 5; Yehezkel Zamir, 
"Merger of Diasporas and Security. One Versus the Other" (mizug galuyot ve-bitahon. ze neged ze), IB, 2.12.62, p. 
9.   
ii Emil Mimel in Meyuhas et.al. (14.7.16). 
iii Letter to the journal "The Young Generation" (ha-dor ha-tsa'ir), Mapai Publishing, Jerusalem. Undated and 
unsigned, TA.  
iv E.g. Yosef Tubi's journal, entry of 6.3.62, TA.  
v Interview with Yosef Tubi, 12.11.17.   
vi Ibid.    
252
"Who will take care of the problem? Not hot-headed, unrestraint people without any responsibility 
towards the nation and the state, but responsible people. The Sephardic intelligence has to join around 
the movement"i  
"If a danger is spotted to dress [the Mizrahi struggle for equality] as a national struggle, those who take 
care of the issue attempt to divert away [le-hitrahek] from any such theme" ii    
The last quote of Cohen-Tzidon reflects the spirits of the time and region, where essentialist 
conceptions of identity were promoted along with the group's superiority over others, in order 
to gain national liberation. As colonized subjects, Mizrahim might have developed "national" 
sentiments of an essentialist, particular ethnic identity, superior to other ethnic groups and 
especially to Ashkenazim. However, from Mizrahim's position as colonizers, part of the Zionist 
national collective, such sentiments might have been directed towards Arabs as well, as some 
secondary sources reflect (Peres 1976: 93-97). The intellectuals that conceptualized 
autochthonous-regional Zionism, based on their Mizrahi and Sephardic backgrounds, did not 
treat the seeming paradox such a tendency could imply. Some perhaps dismissed this popular 
hatred to Arabs as an ephemeral or marginal phenomenon. In essence, even if there was growing 
hostility towards the Arabs within the impoverished social stratums of Mizrahim, this was not 
a paradox for the inclusive political project of regional-autochthonous Zionism, exactly because 
it did not perceive Sephardic and Mizrahi identity in an essentialist manner. Therefore, for 
instance, the Andalusian Golden Age was more often perceived as the foundation of Judaism 
at large, to serve as the basis of the Jewish state, and not merely as a tool for empowering a 
distinct Sephardic identityiii.  
The ontological dimension of Zionist coloniality, the coloniality of being, constructed spiritual 
and mental barriers of hostility between Jews and Muslims in the Middle East, raising fortified 
walls equipped with the best tools of European modernity, from its arrogant mental 
constructions to its latest technological advancements. Jews whose heritage was part of Islamic 
civilization got uprooted by Zionist and Arab national movements, and in the 1960s we saw 
their attempts to get re-rooted in the new reality formed. Mizrahi Judaism was gradually 
adapting to the modern/colonial environment, as particular rituals and customs that were 
enrooted in the countries of origin got popularly abandoned (Deshen 1972a). Sephardic 
rabbinical guidance changed its patterns, and rabbis were developing conservative responses to 
the changes by adapting to Ashkenazi patterns of Judaism and accepting its superiority. In Kol 
Sinai the roots of the Israeli people and of Sephardic Judaism were imagined in the Torah and 
                                                             
i Y. M. Immanuel, "Before the Leap" (likrat zinuk), Young Israel, 18.11.64.  
ii"Eastern Ethnicities-A Boiling Pot. Etgar Talk with Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon" ('edot ha-mizrah: sir 'al ha-esh. sihat 
etgar 'im shlomo Cohen-Tzidon", Etgar, 4.10.62.   
iii E.g. Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon, "Singular View: The Military Regime is not Justified" (da'at yahid. kiyum ha-memshal 
ha-tsvai be-yisrael eino mutsdak), IB, 5.4.62, p. 5; N. Rejwan, "Masterpieces of Jewish-Arab Culture" (yetsirot mofet 
me-ha-tarbut  hayehudit 'aravit), IB, 25.12.66.   
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the Halacha in a strict sense, which until then had never been popular or central in Sephardic 
Judaism (Zohar 2001). The native intellectuals of the time, from their place of enunciation as 
natives to the region, intended to challenge the coloniality of being by developing a competing 
Zionist theory, drawing a Zionist project inspired by their own image, which embodied an 
organic continuity between their past in the Arab Middle East and the Israeli present (Efron 
2005). The two intellectual endeavors in the IB and in Kol Sinai to construct an autonomous 
modern Mizrahi voice remained theoretical in this decade, they had no chance -and therefore 
no ambition either- to develop strategy for action. In fact, they had to be careful not to seem 
politically opportunistic: forming any kind of political organization could only undermine their 
claimsi. As the project of organizing Sephardic ultra-orthodoxy in a movement will advance, it 
will bear more similarities to nativist anti-colonialism, directed against Ashkenazi ultra-
orthodoxy (Zohar 2001). In the period studied, however, the essentialist strategy in the political 
field was exactly what guided the local groups who got organized on basis of specific 
ethnicities. The coloniality of power limited the essentialist strategy to a context that did not 
threaten its domination, but rather served it. The local ethnic identities did not need to rely on 
their spiritual roots in Muslim environment, because they were so very specific, they were 
organic collective identities formed by the process of immigration: 
"Now it happens here like in the Diaspora, when Jews were looking for Jews, [so here] Yemenites are 
looking for Yemenites. You want to be with people with the same orientation, the same courtesy, the same 
problems, the same ways to think and you don't have a doubt whether it's in friendly terms or not."ii  
These organic collective identities were manipulated in the political sphere in this decade, in a 
way that inhibited the development of praxis to the projects of autochthonous-regional eastern 
Zionism and of the eastern Judaism of Sephardic ultra-orthodoxy.  
 
In late 1966, as tensions were soaring between Israel, the surrounding countries, and the 
emerging Palestinian Fatah organization, the IB's contributors maintained almost complete 
silence regarding these issues. Again it became clear that the fact that Ashkenazi Zionists had 
succeeded in establishing the nation state, weakened the Sephardic claim regarding the benefits 
that could have been achieved had they played a more central role in Arab-Israeli politicsiii. 
From another perspective, it can be claimed that having established a Jewish state on such rocky 
pillars exempted those that did not participate in its establishment from coming up with creative 
solutions when these pillars were under threat of falling apart. In the 1960s, the unexplored role 
                                                             
i "Danger, Jewish racialism! Israel's Sephardim : integration, or disintegration?" 1965. Jerusalem : Council of the 
Sephardi Community of Jerusalem. See Fanon (1965): 223.   
ii Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18.  
iii E. Eliachar "Israel-Arab Relations. Before the UN General Assembly Session (yahasei Israel 'arav. likrat moshav 
'atseret ha-um), IB, 1.12.64, p. 3. 
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of Sephardim as cultural-political intermediaries was not reclaimed as loudly as before 1948, 
rather there was more emphasis on recollecting diplomatic paths not taken before the 
establishment of Israeli. When military combat and exchanges of violence with Palestinians and 
with Arab countries resurged, autochthonous-regional Zionism had no practical suggestions to 
offer. The intellectuals had no public critique towards the government's military policies,  such 
critique was expressed only in private spheresii. If coloniality and modernity are two sides of 
the same coin, then by June of 1967, the positive side of the colonial/modern coin, the side lit 
by a democratic nation state that has modern military power, shined brighter than ever. It 
allowed the Israeli public at large, including the Mizrahi and Sephardi activists and intellectuals 
at hand, relief and protection in face of the Arab rhetoric and goal to extinguish the stateiii. 
Autochthonous Zionism was meant to prevent arriving to the state of war, it was not constructed 




CONCLUSION                                             Mizrahi Autonomous Organizations 1958-1967  
 
In the period at hand, the subjugation of Mizrahi population got consolidated, as many of them 
found a stable place in the lower stratums of a new socio-ethnic class structure. For large 
sections of this population, the establishment of towns of Mizrahi majority in the periphery 
stabilized patterns of geographical, economic, religious, spiritual, social, cultural and political 
marginalization. This stability allowed developing organizational capacities from the same 
discontent that in the 1950s was expressed in sporadic upheavals and protests. This generation 
of Mizrahi political activists was struggling inside a colonial system that oppressed acts of 
contention by sophisticated as well as violent means, and rewarded collaborators with partial 
inclusion and certain opportunities for upwards social mobility. The Zionist colonial system 
was socially, politically and economically oriented westward, in a way that allowed devaluing, 
exploiting and expropriating the eastern subjects involved in the system. Palestinian Arabs 
suffered from these dynamics in a very direct manner, whereas for Mizrahim these power 
relations were concealed behind Jewish national discourse, which maintained an appearance of 
offering routes for partial inclusion in the colonial system. Since those Mizrahim opposing the 
system did not want to lose altogether the possibility to get included in it, they could not get 
                                                             
i E.g. Eliahu Sasson, "Syria Suggested Direct Negotiations between Jews and Arabs", IB, 14.9.66. 
ii See letter of Eliahu Eliachar to Michael Selzer, undated (Apr. November-December 1966), CZA 430A/42/3/2; 
Letter from Eliahu Eliachar to D. Khazzoum, 16.3.67, CSCJA container 6263 file 583. 
iii See Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon´s intervention in Knesset Protocols, 30.5.67.  
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organized against its colonial aspects. The stability of this period allowed the phenomenon of 
ashkenization to deepen and expand:  
"Many find relief to the nerves of the material and spiritual siege held upon us by dismissing the cultural, 
artistic, moral and historical values of the eastern man, they dismiss his language, past and worldview. 
This way estrangement [zarut] and distance grow, and on top of that are added inferiority complexes. 
people who wish to appear as Europeans and westerners and even to dress us forcefully with European 
cloths, even though it does not fit most of us and endangers our future and our very existence"i 
The last sentence is a reference to the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox outfit, and so this is a critique 
of toranic colonization, and of the profound consequences of the coloniality of knowledge and 
of being. In this quote Mizrahim form part of the colonial matrix of power, both as its victims 
and its exercisers, showing their own agency in choosing to assimilate to Ashkenazim.  
The revolt in Wadi Salib in 1959 opened a period of shameless bartering and trading in the 
power of organized ethnic communities. Representation of Mizrahim and Sephardim in state 
institutions was in continuous growth, and the way to maintain it growing seemed to have been 
found: politically strengthening specific ethnic communities, while qualitatively vacating them 
from any political content, creating an empty competition between different groups. The 
adjective "ethnic" became widespread to signify the homogeneity of these political 
propositions. This new political game became focused on expanding and materializing the paths 
for inclusion, and any struggle against the dominant colonial aspects of the Zionist system lost 
political relevance.  
"Most of these fractions, one of their problems is that they were immediately suspected -rightfully of not- 
as coming to promote a political or personal agenda. And the Mizrahi public was completely allergic to 
this. They would always be suspected…the public was completely burnt on these matters."ii  
Empty struggles over power positions between different ethnic groups became so popular that 
any autonomous collective ethnic struggle or leader were automatically suspected of promoting 
a hidden interest, either of their own ethnic group or directly of the leader himself, to gain 
personal privileges or to get better positioned in an existing party. The press of the period 
reflects a dire conflict of Mizrahi groups and leaders who gained power positions, between the 
expectation that they serve the interests of their communities, circles and families, and their 
commitment to democratic principles or to their partyiii. Notwithstanding, after 1961 the 
autonomous groups generally abandoned the discussion about these contradicting expectation. 
                                                             
i Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon, "Ways to Relief the Animosity Between Israel and Arab Countries" (drakhim le-hafagat ha-
eiva ben israel le-artsot 'arav), IB, 8.4.63, p. 9.  
ii Interview with Tuvia Sulami, 24.1.18 
iii E.g. "The Question of Ethnic Representation" (le-sheelat ha-yitsug ha-'adati), Davar, 2.9.62, p. 3; Uri Porat, "You 
can't tell me to go home" (atem lo tagidu li lalekhet ha-baitah), Yedioth Ahronot, 2.7.63, p. 4; M. Levi, "Good Luck 
in the Elections to the Ethnic Lists"(derekh tsleha ba-bhirot la-reshimot ha-'adatiot), IB, 26.9.65, p. 16. 
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Questions that beforehand were significant, of who was fit to represent this public and how 
should this representation be expressed, were left hanging without proper debate.  
This political atmosphere then presented major obstacles for groups who attempted to formulate 
an autonomous Mizrahi and Sephardic voice. These groups also had to prove the legitimacy of 
their existence despite the growing phenomenon of acculturation toward the dominant 
Ashkenazi-Israeli pole, and despite the commonplace public discourse conceiving of the 
"ethnic problem" as a mere class issue with no specific cultural groundingi. The autonomous 
Mizrahi and Sephardic groups dedicated much efforts just to explain to themselves and to argue 
in front of the dominant elites that there were racist aspects -cultural, epistemological and 
social- to the discrimination that was enacted by the state.  
The different groups found few bases for cooperation, despite some common grounds, and 
usually in struggles that were not about systematic and profound changes. The main struggle 
that easily united several groups was the one over the inferiorized status of Sephardic rabbis in 
state institutions. However, the coloniality of power infiltrated into Mizrahi spirituality, 
enforcing and unfolding the coloniality of being, directing the struggle over representation in 
the rabbinical sphere, as in other political spheres, to quantitative rather than qualitative 
questions. 
 
In this period, Mizrahi political activists who had ambitions to uproot the colonial base of the 
structure of power had to keep out of politics. Decolonial thinking in this period could only 
arise from organizations that loudly declared themselves as non-party and non-political. In this 
period, the publication, In the Battle, along with other publications of the CSCJ, gathered 
intellectuals who were "natives of the region", who developed writing and theory that 
constructed a vision for a regional-autochthonous, eastern Zionism. This theory tied the popular 
Sephardic meaning of the Merger of Diasporas project with a wider geo-political ambition for 
integration in the region. The intellectuals and activists who contributed to this line of thought 
were responding to the coherency and strength of the Ashkenazi Zionist ideologues in the 
beginning of the 19th century, who shaped the ethos and image of the Israeli state. The 
alternative, regional-autochthonous Zionism tied together the critiques of the subjugation of 
Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewries and of Arabs under one civilizational unit of 'The East', in order 
to portray the image of the Jewish nation, re-define the meaning and the goals of the Jewish 
state in the Middle East, as well as its very justification to exist there:  
"What gives the Jews the right to establish a state in a land that belonged to the Arabs until not long ago 
(except for few thousands of Jews)? The Balfour declaration? That's nonsense. Who gave the British the 
                                                             
i This was declared by Ben Gurion, see letter from David Ben Gurion to Eliahu Sasson and Bechor Chetrit, 
11.10.62, BGA: subject files, container 42 file 245; Uri Avnery, "The Subject: The Equator" (ha-nidon: kav ha-
mashve), Ha'olam Haze, 19.12.62, p. 4. 
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authority to decide that? The UN? The value of this statement is dubious in principal. There was no 
continuous settlement of Jew in Eretz-Israel. What then? Only one thing. The promise given to the people 
of Israel on the land and the fact they did not give it up in its years of exile after getting expelled from 
the land."i  
This thinking had been developed by the native elites as well as by immigrants who had had 
the chance to get educated in a mixed Arab, Jewish and western environments. Their 
perspective derived from this diversity in knowledge sources, which allowed them to build a 
non-Eurocentric logic of the Zionist Merger of Diasporas project that was nurtured from their 
border-thinking and aspired towards an ecology of knowledges. They got inspiration and 
tailwind from Asian and African national anti-colonial struggles, especially through their 
influence over western-progressive circles in Europe and the United Statesii. The legitimacy for 
Mizrahi and Sephardic political activists to structure an inclusive discourse towards the Arab 
world relied on this international atmosphere, its influence on Israeli public spirit, and on their 
autochthonous identity in the region, which allowed them to claim a stance of intermediaries 
between Arab and Israeli cultures and knowledges. This discourse did not construct any base 
for political action. It could be claimed that the closed structure of opportunities for political 
action is in fact what allowed the development of such decolonial political discourses: the 
intellectual freedom to write about Israel-Arab rapprochement was allowed by the lack of 
intention to take political action with regards.  
 
 
                                                             
i Letter from Yosef Tubi to MP Yisrael Yesha'ayahu, undated, TA.  
ii This is evident in different articles quoted in the IB, and also for instance in the increasing usage in the adjective 
oriental (orientali) rather than eastern (mizrahi), which might reflect the influence of western theoreticians on the 
development of such theory among the intellectual activists in this research. Direct references to Arab anti-colonial 
discourse were usually used as an excuse for reclaiming positions of power in circles of Israeli diplomats, as a 
perceived antidote to Arab anti-colonial discourse, a way to eradicate Israel´s stereotype as an imperialist and 
colonial force in the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER 7 






This chapter reviews the role of Mizrahi communist in elaborating decolonial perspectives and 
struggles in Israel during almost in the entire period of study of this research. The reason for 
dedicating a separate chapter for them is mainly due to the limitations of this review, which is 
based only on Hebrew, English and Spanish materials, while the principal bulk of existing 
documents of interest for this research is written in Arabic. Since this research is dedicated to 
the study of autonomous Mizrahi political organizations, a more comprehensive investigation 
of the present subject would probably tell the story of the development of the Iraqi Forum, a 
contemporary socio-political association created by ICP activists. In the past decades, the 
Forum has formed part of Hadash, the conglomeration of bodies which the ICP has been leading 
since 1977.  
The Israeli Communist Party (ICP) was formed in October of 1948, from the unison of the 
Jewish "Palestinian Communist Party" and the Arab-Palestinian "National Liberation League". 
This chapter ends in 1965, with the split that occurred in the ICP, which discomposed the party 
back into these two national components. Notwithstanding, some Jews, including Mizrahim, 
joined the Arab-majority splinter. Efron (2005) claimed the split marked an end to an era of a 
joint Arab-Jewish struggle, after which the ICP became and remained until nowadays a party 
of Arab majority, addressing primarily Israeli Palestinian Arabs. This is only partially true, as 
the Jewish minority has significant weight in the party, which is expressed, among others, in 
safeguarded seats in the parliament. The review presented in this chapter is based on documents 
that to the best of my knowledge have yet to been investigated, which demonstrate the particular 
position of Iraqi ICP members in the process that led to the spliti.  
 
The communist party, as a revolutionary force for uncompromising equality, and by its 
internationalist class ideology, is naturally positioned against any kind of ethnic discrimination 
that is expressed in economical oppression and exploitation. The ICP indeed had an important 
role in accompanying and leading lower-stratum Mizrahim's struggles for equality throughout 
                                                             
i Here I refer mainly to the meeting protocols of the Bnei-Brak branch, which was of Iraqi majority and was one of 
the two Jewish branches of the party to join the Arab-majority party in the split (Nahas 1976). These protocols 
were found in troves of documents that were made public in 2015: NLIA V1272-3 & 4. These troves also include a 
testimony of a meeting of the heads of the Israeli Communist Party and the Jordanian Communist party; a meeting 
which has apparently been significant in igniting the occurrences that eventually caused the split in 1965.  
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the period of study (Roby 2015, Gozansky 2018, Bashkin 2017). However, the Mizrahi 
component of these struggles is generally indiscernible, concealed under the class terminology 
that dominates the ICP's historical documents. Both ICP members and its press almost 
exclusively only referred to class and social nominators such as immigrants, unemployed 
[muvtalim, mehusarei 'avoda], residents of transit camps, slum dwellers [dayarei skhunot ha-
'oni], or the catch-all term, neighborhood dwellers [bnei ha-shkhunot]. Shohat (1988: 26) 
criticized this Marxist allusion to generic "Jewish workers", as "a simplification roughly 
parallel to speaking of the exploitation of 'American' workers in southern cotton plantations".  
The ICP expressed explicit protest against ethnic discrimination only when the oppression was 
explicitly so, and in some other rare occasions, as around the Wadi Salib events. Bashkin (2017: 
128) claimed that in such key moments, the party neglected the struggles against Inner-Jewish 
racism and reaffirmed the exclusivity of class oppression.   
 
The ICP is the continuation of the PCP, which since its establishment in 1923 has been anti-
Zionist, viewing Zionism as a form of western imperialism.  This position has limited greatly 
the constitutions under which the party was operating. Under Mapai's reign, the ICP and its 
members were treated as a national pariah (Bashkin 2017), and belonging to the ICP had far 
reaching consequences for the personal life of its members. Jews belonging to the party were 
considered national traitors and were denied employment and housing opportunities that were 
controlled by the state. Just like independent Mizrahi activists, every communist was put to a 
personal test of fidelity to their political cause, challenged by a series of pressures, temptations 
and threats transmitted by Mapai messengers (Gozansky 2018). Arab members were 
susceptible to worse forms of oppression, as internal exile to other cities, administrative arrests, 
house arrests and simple imprisonmenti (Cohen 2006). In fact, one of the declared purposes of 
the military regime was to prevent communism from spreading within the Israeli Palestinian 
Arab population. This task was fulfilled also by contracting people to do counter advocacy, and 
violently break communist rallies and demonstrationsii (Cohen 2006). These last practices were 
also commonplace in Mizrahi communist protests and rallies during the 1950s, which often got 
violently disturbed by thugs hired by Mapai or by the policeiii (Gozansky 2018: 37). There was 
a race/class difference, then, in the forms of governmental oppression towards ICP members. 
The lower-stratums of Arabs and Mizrahi immigrants suffered physical violence in the streets, 
while the higher-stratum Ashkenazim and Arabs fought in the courts and the parliament, mainly 
                                                             
i For instance, in 1955, 102 Arab Maki members had already spent time in prison. See Tawfiq Toubi, "Report" (doh), 
YTA Districts: 35-14/8.  
ii E.g. "Ramle Arabs protest the anti-Arab terror" ('araviyei ramle mohim neged gal ha-teror ha-anti 'aravi), KH 
14.3.52, p. 1; "The anti-Arab terror continues" (ha'teror ha'anti áravi nimshakh), KH 19.8.54, p. 2.  
iii E.g. "The police disturbed an immigrants' protest next to the Agency's building in Tel Aviv" (ha-mishtara par'ah 
be-hafganat 'olim leyad binyanei ha-sokhnut be-tel aviv), KH 23.6.52, p. 1.  
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against different governmental attempts to limit the freedom of speechi. Not only did class 
differences infiltrate the party that had absolute equality as its organizing principal, but so did 
the ethno-class division of Israeli society: while the highest ranks of the party included Arabs 
and Jews, the Jewish leadership was exclusively Ashkenazi.  
This chapter examines the role of Mizrahi and mainly Iraqi Jews within the Israeli Communist 
Party. Just like Mizrahim in the state of Israel held the potential of serving as a political and 
cultural bridge between Ashkenazim and Palestinian Arabs, within the ICP Mizrahim also held 
such a potential role, and here too colonial power relations prevented them from realizing such 
a position. In order to explore the circumstances that constructed the role of Mizrahim in the 
ICP, first the relations between Jews and Arabs in the party will be illustrated. This will be 
followed by a non-encompassing description of the trajectory of Iraqi Jews in in the party. 
Subsequently, the role of Iraqi communists in the 1965 split in the party will be discussed, after 
which the empirical material will be met with theorizations that are relevant for this research. 
This review will show how the ICP reflected the structure of power of the Zionist state, despite 
its consistent opposition to it. It will show how the ICP reproduced colonial power relations 
within its lines, by forming part of the imperial power that the Soviet involvement in the Middle 
East implied in this period. The position of Mizrahim in the 1965 split, and in the party at large, 
unveil the Eurocentric nature that Ben Zaken (2006) illustrated of communist ideology and 
practices. Their position exemplifies the hindrances and contradictions communism faced when 
operating in the multi-ethnic Middle East.  
 
 
Jews and Arabs in the ICP 
The Soviet support in the partition of Palestine in 1947 was crucial in designing the trajectories 
of the communist parties in this land. The Palestinian Arab "National Liberation League", 
formed in 1944, supported the Soviet stance, quite against the grand majority of Arab national 
stances. When the Arab defeat in the 1948 war became evident, the NLL appealed to the Jewish 
communist party (ECP) to join its ranks, in a process that included not little humiliation in 
certain casesii. As for the Jews, communist not only fought the war, but also had a crucial role 
in getting Czech weapons that helped win it (Magil 1951). Some Palestinian Arab communists 
who were expelled during the 1948 events were allowed to return to Israel, even if it took years 
                                                             
i E.g. "Strom in the parliament in the debate over the law of treason and espionage" (se'ara ba-knesset be-diyun 
'al hok bgida ve-rigul), KH 14.11.56, p. 1, 4. These struggles of the ICP in the Supreme Court, made the precedence 
for the definition of Freedom of Speech, making the state formulate the legal definition of Israel as a democratic 
country.  
ii See Emile Touma's 1949 scripture of self-criticism (including Meir Vilner's corrections of the text) in NLIA V1272-
3-245.   
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of legal and public strugglei. Beinin (1990) claimed that by joining the ICP, the Israeli 
Palestinian Arabs were the only Arab communists to de facto recognize the 1948 war results as 
final. The leader of the Jordanian Communist parties expressed the general incongruences 
between the Arab communists' position and the ICP's:  
"It is true that there are declarations to annihilate Israel by the Arab rulers. We oppose these 
declarations. They should not be exaggerated, and should be seen on the background of the Arab 
tragedy…the basis for peace should be the [1947 borders], including the return of refugees…We more 
or less agreed on that in the Prague Conference of the communist Arab parties…We ask for clarification: 
you support the return of refugees to where? And also the subject of the right of self-determination of the 
Arab people is not clear, from [your] materials…"ii   
As their Arab comrades, Palestinian Arab communists largely held different conceptions than 
the Jews in the party about various pivotal matters, such as the 1949 borders, the right of return 
of Palestinian Arab refugees and the right of self-determination of the Israeli Palestinian Arabs. 
This incongruity in positions kept the party's official position quite obscure about these issues. 
The differences in positions could at times be discerned by comparing the Arabic party 
newspaper, Al-Ittihadiii, with the Hebrew daily, Kol Ha'amiv: both Jews and Arabs in the party 
were simply concerned about transmitting the Soviet positions about Israel and Palestine in a 
way that would be most attractive to their respective societies, who took opposite parts in a 
violent national conflict: 
"Arabs in the village used to call my father a traitor for agreeing on the 1947 borders"v 
                                                             
i For example, see the case of the Al-Ashhab family. Ouda Al-Ashhab was of the leadership of the Arab Workers’ 
Congress, and ICP fought successfully for his and family’s return and citizenship right. See, "The minister of interior 
authorizes the denial of the Al-Ashhab family’s right to return to Israel” (sar ha-pnim measher et shlilat zkhuta shel 
mishpahat al-ashhab lahzor le-irsael), KH 17.1.51, p. 4; "ICP’s representative demanded to protest against the 
threat of expulsion of Miriam Al-Ashhab" (netsigat maki darsha limhot neged ha-iyum be-gerush Miriam al-
ashhab), KH 27.7.54, p. 4. Also see the central committee's request for Jewish members to attend court discussions 
of Arab members for "entering and exiting without permit." "Central committee decisions" (hahlatot ha-va'ad ha-
merkazi), 22.11.53, YTA Membership 35-1/2.  
ii "Protocol of all the conversations between ICP's delegation and the delegatio of the Jordanian Communist party, 
Moscow. First Meeting" (pirtei kol ha-sihot ben mishlahat maki u-mishlahat ha-miflaga ha-komonistit ha-yardenit. 
moskva. ha-yeshiva ha-rishona), 25.7.64, NLIA V1272-4-33. 
iii The Union.  
iv Voice of the People. For example, the Arabic party newspaper reclaimed the 1947 UN resolution borders and 
spoke clearly about the right of return for Palestinian Arab refugees, whereas the Hebrew newspaper maintained 
a more ambiguous position. Other matters of dispute were also the automatic right of citizenships for all Jews in 
Israel and also the mere recognition in the state. See Cohen (2006), Greenstein (2014), central committee 
discussions, YTA Congresses: 35-4/2; Shmuel Mikunis, "The Political Report of the Central Committee" (ha-doh ha-
politi shel ha-va'ad ha-merkazi), 12th Party Congress, Amal Publishers; Samir Marid, "The Myth and Reality of 'The 
Second Round'" (ha-agada ve-ha-metsiut shel 'ha-sivuv ha-sheni'), KH 10.1.50, p. 2; "Members Speaking" (haverim 
medabrim), 13th Party Congress, Amal publishers.  
vFormer MP Saleh Salim in Migners (18.5.15).  
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"I understand that the problem of the refugees is crucial but there are people that came from Poland or 
from Czechoslovakia that do not understand this problem because there they expelled the Germans and 
there are no problems."i  
The acuteness of the differences between Jews and Arabs in the party depended throughout the 
years on developments in middle-eastern politics. In 1965 the differences became crucial, and 
the party split into its two national components. This split was a reflection of the rising tensions 
between Israel and the socialist-oriented Arab republics, especially Egypt and Algiers.  
 
In the period of study, despite being of Jewish majority, the ICP was the main political body in 
Israel to lead the struggles of Israeli Palestinian Arabs: against the military regime, the 
discriminatory pro-Jewish laws, the practice of administrative arrests, post-1948 expulsions and 
the highly problematic legal situation of internally displaced peopleii. Unlike its propaganda to 
the Jewish public, the party addressed the Israeli Palestinian Arab population on a national-
ethnic base rather than class base (Kaufman 1997, Beinin 1990). This increasingly raised 
support to ICP within this population, as the communist way was the only legal way to express 
national demands (Nassar 2011, Rekhess 1988, Cohen 2006). In accordance with Marxist-
Leninist pillars, the ICP demanded for Israeli Palestinian Arabs the rights of a national minority 
by equal civil and national rights. The meaning of "national rights" was one point not usually 
fully clarified, whether referring to the right of self-determination or merely for the right to use 
Arabic in state institutions and the right for separate development of education and cultureiii. 
The internationalist structure of the party was very central, and a source of great pride to the 
party:  
"The heart of the soul [tzipor ha-nefesh] of the party is Jewish-Arab unity"iv.  
The ICP bore the slogan of "Jewish-Arab fraternity" and had two Palestinian Arabs representing 
it in the parliament, about half its representation. Notwithstanding, and despite the fact that Kol 
Ha'am published daily news regarding specific Israeli Palestinian Arab struggles and troubles, 
there was hardly sufficient information provided about them or about occurrences in the Arab 
world in generalv.  
"The racist persecution against the Arab minority got to vandalism…Sheikh Jamal Adin Asaad from 
Jaffa who has been running a struggle for the last five years…A month ago he proved that he was not an 
                                                             
i "Branch meeting" (asefat snif), 7.4.65, NLIA V1272-3-59.  
ii Cohen (2006) mentions that one of the declared purposes of the military regime was to prevent communism from 
spreading among Israeli Palestinian Arabs. 
iii E.g. "The report of the political committee for the XI congress of the Israeli Communist Party" (ha-din ve-heshbon 
ha-politi shel ha-va'ad ha-merkazi la-ve'ida ha-XI shel ha-miflaga ha-komunistit be-israel), KH 24.10.49, p. 3-7.  
iv "Haifa branch meeting" (yeshivat snif heifa), 23.12.64. NLIA 218-2-1272. 
v "Meeting with Haifa District for establishing work program, May-August 1956" (pgisha 'im mahoz heifa kedei 
lehagdir tohnit 'avoda, mai- ogust 1956), YTA Districts: 35-14/5. 
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absentee and got his property back. Two weeks ago tractors from neighboring kibbutzim got on his 
orchard… They also took the water motor…This is an offense to the honor of the state, which puts civil 
rights in grave danger".i  
Kol Ha'am rarely gave a comprehensive picture of the situation of Arab countries or of 
Palestinian Arabs in Israel, leaving Jews to feel little informedii and Arabs to feel 
misrepresentediii. 
All the difficulties the ICP faced in its attempts to construct unison beyond the Jewish-Arab 
national breach were understood by its members and leaders as challenges to overcome by 
international solidarity. The party reclaimed Israeli Palestinian Arabs rights eventually in order 
to be able to include them in the Israeli collective, along with respect to their difference. By 
contrast, diverse Jewish ethnicities and particular culture-related problems were rarely 
acknowledged and certainly not fought for. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, such ethic 
identities within a nation were mere manipulations meant to separate the workersiv:  
"The [Mizrahi] way to get organized has its final and declared goal in attaining small and temporary 
achievements by reducing the exploitation and deprivation of Mizrahim ['edot ha-mizrah] as compared 
with the general cruel exploitation and deprivation…as long as it does not advance the general interest 
this way to get organized is of no danger to the existing regime.."v  
"In Mapai there existed such a thing as an Iraqi sector…we didn't have any such thing, everybody [were] 
together."vi  
Nonetheless, when many Iraqi immigrants joined the party, their particular experiences 
did shape other needs and perspectives, leading them to construct circles of their own 
inside the party.    
 
Iraqi Communists   
With the end of World War I, the Middle East got divided into national units and national 
movements rose in the new countries. In Iraq, more than in any other Arab country, many Jews 
felt identified with the Arab Iraqi national movement and were part of the developing national 
                                                             
i "Thousands of fruit trees were uprooted from an orchard around Akka that belongs to an Arab resident". In: "A 
few facts about the government policy toward the Arab population in Israel" (kama 'uvdot 'al mediniyut ha-
memshala klapei ha-ukhlusiya ha-'aravit be-israel), March 1954, Amal publishers.  MALI IV104-85-130.  
ii "Haifa district committee meeting" (yeshivat va'ad mahoz heifa), "Meeting with Haifa district to establish work 
program, May-August 1956” (pgisha 'im mahoz heifa kedei lehagdir tohnit 'avoda, mai- ogust 1956), YTA Districts: 
35-14/5. 
iii "Members speaking" (haverim medabrim), 13th Party Congress, Amal Publishers. Also see Emile Touma's 
intervention there.  
iv E.g. Esther Vilenska, "Sounds of Alert” (otot az'akah), KH 5.5.50, p. 2; Esther Vilenska, "The Struggle of Oppressed 
Ethnicities" (le-ma'avak ha-'edot ha-mekupahot), KH 7.8.59, p. 2.  
v Yaakov Kujman, "There is no hope for the inciters" (ve-la-mesitim lo tihiye tikva), KH 14.8.64, p. 2.   
vi Menashe Khalifa in interview, 21.3.18.  
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culture. With the rise of Iraqi nationalism, communism also became a prominent source of 
political identification for many young Iraqi Jews. Zionism was another political identity many 
Jews adopted (Snir & Einbinder 1991). After World War II, communist Jews established an 
anti-Zionist League in Iraq, denouncing the aspiration for a Jewish state as causing more 
problems than solutionsi (Meir-Glitzenstein 2005). Iraq participated in the 1948 war over 
Palestine, and before and after it the government developed increasing mistrust towards its 
Jewry. It applied different restrictive measures and institutional discrimination towards them, 
and anti-Jewish sentiments rose among the nationalist right wing (Bashkin 2012). Eventually, 
the two enemy states of Israel and Iraq found a common ground for agreement, and forged a 
process which practically forced the emigration of Iraqi Jews. It is a common belief that the 
Iraqi-Zionist underground cell, commanded by secret agents sent from Israel, even planted 
bombs in Jewish centers in order to create hysteria and catalyze immigration (Shohat 1988). 
This led to the mass exodus of Jews from Iraq in 1951, including quite a few anti-Zionist 
communist Iraqi Jews who found themselves channeled to immigrate to Israel. Many of those 
joined the Israeli Communist Party. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the ICP used to make 
contact with uprooted Jewish communists in Eastern European countries before their 
immigration to Israel, in order to absorb them in the party's mechanism upon arrival: not very 
much unlike Zionist parties. However, the ICP did not have the same information and contact 
with the Iraqi communist party, and the Iraqi communists had to take their own initiative to 
find and join the party upon arrival (Gozansky 2018). For many of those, the ICP was a natural 
base from which they could continue their contact with Arab people and especially with the 
language:  
"In 1950 when we arrived to Israel, it was simply that we were looking for something to read in Arabic, 
and then we found one that they said has an Arabic newspaper Al-Ittihad [the Arabic ICP newspaper]. 
So I went to ask in Haifa...I took the paper, and took a few other papers as well and started to distribute 
them in Sha'ar Ha'aliyah among Iraqis. And since then I've been involved."ii  
Many researchers mentioned how the main attraction for Iraqi communists to join and remain 
in the ICP was its bi-lingual essence, which created the conditions for these immigrants to 
preserve their Arab cultural roots (Bashkin 2017: 86): 
"I remember I used to distribute Al-Ittihad already in the army… [they] would see a paper in Arabic, 
everybody wanted to read…the officer would ask, what is this, where did these papers come from? And 
I said everybody came from Baghdad with their own newspaper"iii  
                                                             
i Sami Michael in Samir (2006).  
iiMenashe Khalifa in interview, 21.3.18. 
iiiMenashe Khalifa in interview, 21.3.18. 
265
In Iraq, many Jewish communists contributed to the literary and journalistic scene. Upon 
immigration, they sought continuance to this within the Arabic communist daily Al-Ittihad and 
in the literary communist journal Al-Jadid. The involvement of Iraqis in the Arabic communist 
press was also an outcome of the vacuum left in Palestinian society after the expulsion and 
escape of such a large percent of the Palestinian Arab educated elite in 1948 (Snir & Einbinder 
1991). In the period of study, the mentioned journals were crucial sites of creativity and protest 
against the military regime and the restringing political conditions of Palestinians (Baskin 
2017:206). Bashkin (2017: 17) wrote: "being a prominent cultural hub, which counted many 
Palestinian writers and poets among its members, it [ICP] attracted educated Iraqi Jews and 
former Iraqi-Jewish communists. [ICP's] Iraqi intellectuals addressed Palestinian issues in their 
writings and discussed themes common to all Arab writers, such as the Arab struggle against 
colonialism, while also deliberating their problems as poor Jewish newcomers from Arab 
states."   
In the communist press, Iraqi Jews wrote about what happened in Iraq, and compared it to 
Israeli reality. They wrote about and against the dismissal and oppression of Arab culture in 
Israel and for the undisturbed development of Arab culture and peoples. They also wrote in 
Arabic about the problems of Mizrahim in Israel, the hardships in the transit camps and the 
economic and cultural oppression they endured. The resemblance in racist oppression and the 
shared suffering of Mizrahi and Palestinian Arabs was also raised at times (Bashkin 2017, 
Kabha 2006). This sentiment of shared oppression was raised in Kol Ha'am quite rarelyi. In 
1958, there existed a short lived "Circle of Arabic literary adherents in Tel Aviv". This circle 
was composed of writers in Arabic language, Jews and Arabs, which were mainly communist 
Iraqi and Palestinian Arabsii. 
Other than the Arabic communist literary scene, the Iraqi communist immigrants also gained 
prominence in leading struggles in the transit camps. As Gozansky (2018) explained, 
communist immigrants that joined the party were very valuable activists: they knew the 
language and customs of people of their own country of origin, had a common language with 
other immigrants as well, also for sharing some of the same vital experiences, and they had 
experience in public struggles, and some even in leading them. Bashkin (2017: 178) claimed 
the Iraqis brought with them the spirit of the Wathba-  the wave of protests in Iraq before 1948 
against the state's pro-British policies. In the 1950s, Iraqi communists gave continuance to that 
energy by organizing, leading and participating in the many struggles and protests for 
improving the basic conditions in transit camps (Meir-Glitzenstein 2005, Roby 2015). The ICP 
                                                             
iE.g. "The Eastern Ethnicities and the Elections" ('edot ha-mizrah ve-ha-bhirot la-asefa ha-mekhonenet), KH, 
10.1.49, p. 2. 
ii hug shoharei ha-safrut ha-'aravit be-tel aviv. The circle published some of their activity in the journal al-jadid, and 
was active for about two years in mid 1950s. See Ballas (2009): 44-46; Somekh (2008):  45-53.  
266
considered these struggles as a valuable tactic (Bashkin 2017) and backed them by publishing 
materials, hiring activists as party employees, and organizing weekly protests in Tel Aviv for 
housing and employment for the immigrants (Gozansky 2018: 55). The party platform 
incorporated the immigrants' issues, but usually did not place them as central in its agendai. 
Along with other parties, the ICP initiated a Parliamentary Committee for Transit Camps 
Issuesii. The Iraqi immigrants made various efforts to weave the isolated struggles of each 
transit camp into a broader network. Representatives from 18 transit camps met in a conference 
that was held in 1952. More conferences followed, as well as some struggles of solidarity 
between transit camps, and a publication in Arabic was distributed throughout 1954-1955 in 
transit camps, covering their different struggles (Gozansky 2018, Kabha 2006, Meir-
Glitzenstein 2005, Bashkin 2017). This publication had changing titles and was scarce and 
disperse: some claimed that the party's central mechanisms discouraged it (in: Meir-
Glitzenstein 2005); others claim that it was the government that limited their distribution 
(Gozansky 2018).   
The Iraqi communists were prominent in creating the energy of struggle among the immigrants 
in the transit camps, but the struggles did not highlight the ethnic characteristics of the 
protestors, and were held "without any difference of party"iii either (Roby 2015, Gozansky 
2018): 
"In the head of the struggle there were communists, not as messengers of their party coming from the 
outside, but as an integral party of the public."iv 
The Wadi Salib events exemplify well the ICP's relation to the issue of Mizarhim's struggles at 
large. Even before the Wadi Salib events, as the general discontent was rising and more ethnic 
organizations were getting formulated, the Iraqi communists asked the central institutions of 
the ICP to recognize the special problems of Iraqis and their need to form a separate framework, 
but the leadership refused to this "ethnic sectarianism" (Bashkin 2017: 129). The Wadi Salib 
events were covered closely and fondly by Kol Ha'am, in a way that was nearly unique in Israeli 
press. However, it was framed as a class struggle whose ethnic causes are secondary (Gozansky 
2018). Bashkin (2017:109) claimed that this was the party's way to appease the anti-Ashkenazi 
spirits of the events, which thereby dismissed its radical potential. Nonetheless, the protests of 
the summer of 1959 made the ethnic character of the class structure so evident, that even the 
ICP started to address the issues of Mizrahim separately and started speaking more of ethnic 
                                                             
i "Party platform" (mats'a ha-miflaga), 1955.  MALI IV 104-85-15: in this draft of the platform all demands regarding 
the immigrants’ issues was omitted. In the official platforms it was usually mentioned among the last subjects, as 
well as the stance against ethnic discrimination.  
ii "Urgent need to dismantle the transit camps" (hisul ha-ma'abarot- tsorekh dahuf), KH, 28.8.54, p. 4.  
iii "Branch Meeting" (asefat snif), 29.4.65, NLIA V1272-3-60. 
iv Ballas (2009): 86.  
267
discriminationi. Towards the 1959 elections, MP Esther Vilenska proposed holding a meeting 
of all Iraqi ICP members in the country (Bashkin 2017: 126). The proximity of the Wadi Salib 
events to the anniversary of the 1958 revolt in Iraq is perhaps what allowed the communist 
Iraqis to celebrate the anniversary in a huge conference, despite not getting permits to do so 
from the police,  and receiving wide coverage in Kol Ha'am, as well as the presence of its 
leader, Shmuel Mikunisii.   
 
The end of the transit camp period marked also an end to a period of Iraqi involvement in the 
ICP. In the second half of the 1950s many of the prominent Iraqi members left the party (Meir-
Glitzenstein 2009, Snir & Einbinder 1991). Even though some prominent Iraqi communists 
"took positions in the [permanent] housing projects"iii where the state settled Mizrahi 
immigrants, in some branches, the dismantling of transit camps left "nothing to struggle for"iv, 
and made some very active branches dismantle and disperse across the countryv: according to 
Gozansky (2018), this was not accidental.  The 1956 Sinai campaign influenced in general Jews 
in the party, since the ICP took a stance in favor of Egypt. This stance raised its popularity 
among Palestinian Arab population, and made it more isolated than ever among Jewish Israeli 
public. This strengthened Jewish-nationalist sentiment among some members and led them to 
leave the party. Some branches, including some of the Iraqi dominated ones, started to 
disintegrate following this positioning of the ICPvi. Some of the Iraqi anti-Zionists activists, 
who were forced to immigrate to Israel, left the country whenever they could and emigrated 
elsewhere (Meir-Glitzenstein 2005): 
 "Albert-... the responsible members in the party say he's right. He was thrown from Iraq to Israel, asked 
to exit Israel…why do they tie his problems with all the problems…"vii 
According to some testimonies of members that left in that periodviii, the main problem for 
Iraqis in the ICP was that despite the Marxist ideology, the party leaders held the same racial-
                                                             
i For instance, a search in Kol ha-'am after the term 'edot ha-mizrah (eastern ethnicities) has 82 results in 1959; in 
comparison to around 10 in the entire decade of the 1950s and around 30 in the 1960s.  
ii "Rally for the Iraqi Revolution"(le-ma'alah me-alpaim ish be-'atseret 'amamit bi-mlot shana la-mahapekha ha-
'irakit), KH 19.7.59, p. 1, 4; "Grand Response to the Celebration of the Iraqi Revolution in Or Yehuda" (hed rav le-
hagigat mahapekhat irak be-or yehuda), KH, 20.7.59, p. 2.    
iii Menashe Khalifa in interview, 21.3.18.  
iv "Lowland District Meeting" (yeshivat mahoz shfela), 25.3.57, YTA Districts: 35-15/5.  
v "Lowland District Meeting" (yeshivat mahoz shfela), undated, YTA Districts: 35-15/3; "Decisions of South District 
Committee" (hahlatot ve'idat mahoz darom), 27.7.57, YTA Regions: 35-16/9/1. It is plausible that the Iraqi 
leadership in the struggles in the transit camps is part of what allowed most Iraqis, including the communists, to 
attain permanent housing in the center of the country, rather than in its geographical periphery. This was a 
significant factor allowing for increased socio-economic mobility for these immigrants, which in turn would weaken 
the communist trends among them.    
vi "Lowland District Meeting" (yeshivat mahoz shfela), 25.3.57, YTA Districts: 35-15/5. 
vii "Order of the day of Petah Tikwa secretary meeting" (seder ha-yom, yeshivat mazkirut petah tikva), undated, 
YTA Protocols: 35-6/3.  
viii E.g. in Meir-Glitzenstein (2005); Ina Shapiro, "Rosa Luxemburg from Baghdad" (rosa Luxemburg mi-bagdad), 
Haaretz, 8.6.00. 
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ethnic prejudice as Mapai leaders. This was reflected in the Ashkenazi composition of the 
central party institutions, and the fact that none of the Iraqi leaders was incorporated in them: 
since 1953 there were many Iraqis holding district and municipal leadership positionsi. The lack 
of advancement opportunities in the party's central mechanisms reflected to Iraqi activists 
certain condescendence of the leadership towards them (Meir-Glitzenstein 2000). This 
discrimination against Iraqis in the ICP is explicated in many investigations about Iraqi 
communists in Israel in this period (Efron 2005, Bashkin 2017, Meir-Glitzenstein 2005). 
Following, this recurring argument in research will get developed and explored.  
 
Mizrahim and Ashkenazim in the ICP 
Throughout the period of study, the central institutions of the ICP were composed by a large 
majority of Eastern European and Russian Jews with some representation of Palestinian Arabsii. 
The central party institutions had a very low turnover, but in 1954 they incorporated Moshe 
Sneh, the leader of "The Left" fraction which had split from Mapam the previous year. This 
was cause for much bitterness and insult for local Iraqi communist leaders, and led to a feeling 
that the lack of advancement opportunities within the ICP was accompanied by ethnic 
discrimination:  
"Then came Sneh. Suddenly a member of the political bureau. Why not one of the Iraqis…we asked why 
none of the Iraqi leader got nominated…. but only put in the end of the list…and there were leaders!... 
When there were elections to the local councils we got in in many councils…our friends were leading 
the struggle but they didn't want to give them positions, that was the problem."iii  
Prominent Iraqi activists that left the party later blamed the leadership for exhibiting 
condescending attitudes and treating them as backwardsiv (Meir-Glitzenstein 2005). However, 
at the time, this issue was hardly ever spoken about, and denied fiercely by the Iraqi members 
when the rumor of discrimination inside the party got publishedv:  
"we didn't want to assassinate the party, that was anyway small and unloved, and for us to come and…we 
felt it [discrimination], and this feeling chased away many members"vi  
                                                             
i See letters of the Central Committee, YTA, Protocols: 10-16/5/1.  
ii Until 1965 the majority of party members were also Ashkenazi: 54.6% born in Europe and 25.7% Palestinian Arabs. 
14th Party Congress, Amal Publishers: 117.   
iii Menashe Khalifa in interview, 21.3.18.    
iv "Hertzelia Branch Meeting" (yeshivat snif hertseliya), YTA Districts: 35-15/3. Also see Sami Michael´s testimony 
in: "Immigrant in his own land" (mehager be-tokh artso), 28.6.12. Retrieved from:  shorturl.at/dhru0 (last 
accessed on 12.5.20); Ina Shapiro, "Rosa Luxemburg from Baghdad" (rosa luxemburg mi-bagdad), Haaretz, 8.6.00.  
vDavid Cohen, "There will be no hope for the inciters from Maariv" (la-mesitim mi-ma'ariv lo tehe tikva), KH, 
11.8.64, p. 3.  
vi Yosef Algazi, "Soda pop, 'Kol ha-'am' and a bridge to Baghdad" (kos gazoz, 'kol ha-'am' ve-gesher le-bahgdad). 
Retrieved from: http://www.defeatist-diary.com/index.asp?p=articles_new10086&period=10/10/2011-
12/12/2011 (last accessed on 20.3.18) (published in Haaretz on 12.2.99). 
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Further than leadership positions, the privilege of Ashkenazim in the party was also structured 
in the principal tactic the ICP implemented in order to reach new immigrants: establishing 
Friendship Leagues with different Eastern European countries. The Friendship Leagues held 
newspapers, clubs, social events and parties for people that emigrated from specific countries. 
These in fact performed as a kind of ethnic-cultural organizations within the party, but without 
carrying such a title, and in a way that was legitimate within the Marxist internationalist 
political perspective.  The Friendship Leagues provided cultural and social needs of absorption 
in the new country. However, they were not enough for assuring long term affiliation to the 
party. Faced with political isolation, employment difficulties and social and economic bans, 
many ICP members who joined the party shortly after their immigration, also left it after a short 
periodi. This process also occurred within Iraqi communist immigrants, who joined the party 
as a natural base for getting absorbed in the country, and left it after finding better trajectories 
for absorption that did not go through such high degrees of social and political isolation (Meir-
Glitzenstein 2005). Notwithstanding, The Friendship Leagues created a certain privilege within 
the party for Eastern European immigrants, since getting organized on an ethnic or national 
basis was disallowed or badly seen for any other groupii. Special rallies and propaganda were 
used to attract any wave of Eastern European immigrants well into the 1960siii.  The Friendship 
Leagues were considered a very valuable tactic to attract members, voters and affiliates, and 
the cultural events they held indeed reached very wide publics. These events spread Soviet 
culture, obviously more attractive to descendants from Eastern Europeiv. The multi-lingual 
communist press was an indispensable tool for the ICP to attract members, since the ICP's 
language of communications was often very high and dry, transmitted in extremely long 
speeches and heavy articles. Kol Ha'am was a dense newspaper that required some theoretical 
communist knowledge in order to decipher: 
"The subscribers claim- the paper is not interesting, it does not fit me, it has to be written in an easier 
manner, not to write such good Hebrew not to search words in Aramaic."v  
In areas of North African concentration of population, there was inconsistent distribution of a 
French publication. The inconsistency of the French newspaper was a main and constant cause 
                                                             
i See Shafran (1983), p. 25-26; "Summery of Action Plan of Lowland District" (sikum tokhnit ha-pe'ula shel mahoz 
ha-shfela), NLIA V1272-3-137.  
ii "Haifa Committee Meeting" (pgishat va'ad heifa), undated; "South District Committee Meeting" (yeshivat 
va'admahoz darom), undated; YTA Protocols: 35-4/1. Israeli Palestinian MP Tawfiq Toubi criticized the "ethnic-
patriotism" of the Leagues as well, claiming it makes each country-based sector to believe its communism was the 
only true one. In: "The Organizational Report of the Central Committee" (ha-doh ha-irguni shel ha-va'ad ha-
merkazi), 11th Party Congress, Amal Publishers.  
iii E.g. letter from Central Secretary to South District Commission, 29.7.57; "Meeting with Secretary of South 
District" (pgisha 'im mazkirut mahoz darom), 26.2.57, YTA Regions: 35-16/9/1; "Branch Meeting" (asefat snif), 
18.6.63, YTA Regions: 36-4/2; "Tel Aviv Yafo District Report" (doh mahoz tel aviv- yafo), 1962. YTA 35-9/5.  
iv E.g. "Members’ meeting about cultural actions" (pgishat haverim le-gabei pe'ulot tarbutiyot), undated, YTA 
Regions: 35-3/3.  
v "District Secretaries Meeting" (pgishat mazkirei mehozot), 21.5.64, NLIA V1272-3-119.  
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for ICP members to feel they were not doing enough to attract this populationi, despite the deep 
oppression they endured and their disposition to struggle for their rights ii: 
"we must repeat again what different members said that lacking French language press limits the 
dimension of our distribution and disconnects us from the public of French speakers with which we meet 
everywhere we go."iii 
Despite the party already publishing Arabic press and propaganda within Palestinian Arab 
population, these were discouraged in the concentrations of Mizrahi population, especially after 
most transit camps had been dismantled: 
"A worker that works with me always reads Al-Ittihad. We let him read twice KH and now he’s a 
subscriber."iv 
It is somewhat peculiar that Al-Ittihad was not distributed in areas of Mizrahi populationv. 
While many North Africans perhaps did not read literary Arabic, in towns like Ramat Gan and 
Bnei Brak, which had a big Iraqi cadre, it seems that it was not so easy to get Al-Ittihad 
distributed in a regular mannervi. This could raise the suspicion that it was the disparity between 
the Jewish and Arab interpretation of the communist ideology that the ICP was attempting to 
protect the immigrants from. Either way, it is another evidence that proves Bashkin's (2017) 
claim, that the Ashkenazi communists did not understand the cultural dilemmas of the Iraqis, 
which Palestinians in the party openly contained. Some Iraqis' involvement in literary Arabic 
circles was even frowned upon (Bashkin 2017: 207).  
Notwithstanding, in the 1960s in these areas of Iraqi concentrations, Iraqi cultural and political 
events took place regularly. An Iraqi ball was held all through the night almost on a monthly 
basis, with typical music, clothing and food. The Arab MPs would sometimes honor these 
gatherings with their presence. Important events of revolutionary Iraqi were celebratedvii:  
"we always mentioned here the rebellion that was there…I remember, we were in big halls, Emil Habibi 
and Tawfiq Tubi [ICP Arab MPs] would come…we would bring an Iraqi orchestra, meet and sing, we 
used to sit together until morning and then go home"viii  
                                                             
i "Negev District Report" (doh mahoz ha-negev), 8.12.64, NLIA V-1272-3-135 
ii "Meeting with Lowland District Secretary Committee" (pgisha 'im va'ad mazkirut mahoz ha-shfela), undated. YTA 
Regions: 35-15/5; "Decisions of South District Committee" (hahlatot va'ad mahoz darom), 27.7.57, YTA Regions: 
35-16/9/1; "Meeting with South District" (pgisha 'im mahoz darom), 18.5.56, YTA Regions: 35-16/3.  
iii Moshe Zaks, "Report of ICP Activity of Negev District" (doh pe'ulot maki mahoz ha-negev), 7.2.64, NLIA V1272-3-
227. 
iv "South District Active" (aktiv mahoz darom), 14.10.62, YTA Regions: 35-16/2.  
v "Newspapers' Distribution" (tfutsat 'itonim), NLIA V1272-3-119. In this document of early 1960s it seems the 
Arabic newspapers were only distributed in areas of Palestinian Arab population.  
vi Menashe Khalifa testifies that they did used to receive the paper regularly, but meeting protocols seem to suggest 
otherwise; see for instance Bnei Braki branch meetings protocols of 17.8.62 and 6.7.64, NLIA V 1272-3-58.  
vii E.g, Bnei Brak branch meeting protocols, 8.5.61, NLIA V 1272-3-58; or various Bnei brak branch meetings 
protocols in NLIA V1272-3-59. 
viii Menashe Khalifa in interview, 21.3.18.  
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These cultural events were parallel to the kind of cultural activity that the Friendship Leagues 
held as well. The main difference is that the Iraqis in the ICP had to initiate and build themselves 
these kind of spaces after having settled in permanent residence, whereas the Friendship 
Leagues were encouraged, funded and invested in by the ICP since early 1950s. That is, the 
Friendship Leagues were prompted by the central leadership, while the Iraqi circles were a 
grassroots initiative without a formal framework within the central party mechanisms. It seems 
that beyond the cultural activity, these circles could have also served for political debates and 
questionings.  
The case of the Iraqis within the ICP shows how the party's rigid loyalty to the Soviet ideology 
made it reproduce within its ranks the inequalities of the colonial Zionist state and privilege 
Ashkenazim. The party privileged Ashkenazim by allowing them for cultural safe-spaces that 
were not provided for the Iraqi cadre, and in the way it did not include any of the Iraqi leaders 
in the party's central institutions. This last point hid a much more substantial problem. Just like 
Palestinian Arabs, Iraqi communists had particular views and perceptions about middle-eastern 
politics, which had been shaped by their lifetime experience in the region as well as their 
contemporaneous ability to get informed by Arabic pressi. Despite having more fully informed 
views, though, these did not get expressed in the party's official line, that was consistently and 
firmly loyal to official Soviet positions. For example: 
"We evaluated positively…Algiers and Egypt that can eventually bring a socialist regime…did this 
evaluation get expressed in Kol Ha'am? It has been many months since Kol Ha'am published any article 
with positive things getting done in the Arab world. And if it appeared- it wasn't as it should be told…. 
How can you say that…Nasser is a dictator…He contributed greatly against…imperialism and 
Fascism….The danger is the pro-imperial policy of the Israeli government"ii 
"In the party they did not know Jamal a-din el-Afgani that for middle-eastern communists was like Jean 
Jack Rousseau"iii 
Iraqi Shimon Ballas, for instance, was in charge for a while of the Hebrew column about 
middle-eastern politics in Kol Ha'am. He gave advice about these matters to his districts' 
members and even gave the party head Mikunis some Arabic lessons. However, he still felt 
frustrated for getting his articles cut and his analysis discarded if the official Soviet Pravda had 
different views. Towards the end of the period of study, in 1964-1965, the dispute in views 
became much more acute, as the Soviet Union supported the Iraqi regime, that persecuted 
communists in Iraq. This emphasized the unique position and views of Iraqis in the party:  
                                                             
i Ballas (2009): 54-66. See for instance "Jerusalem Branch Meeting" (asefat snif yerushalaim), 20.10.56, YTA 
Districts: 35-1/2, for examining the disparity in knowledge between Russian and Arabic reading members.   
ii Bnei Brak branch meeting protocols, 26.5.65, NLIA V1272-3-234.  
iii Shimon Ballas in Samir (2006). 
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"The title and article in Al-Ittihad about Aref was a mistake. He doesn't deserve such an article in our 
newspaper. His hands are dirty with the blood of our friends in Iraq."i 
The Iraqi ICP members became so disgruntled that they let the leadership know their dismay 
about the party's blind pro-Soviet positions, and demanded the incorporation of one of them to 
the Political Bureauii.  
 
The Split 
The argument that led to the split of the ICP is of interest to this research, because it revolved 
around definitions of colonialism and imperialism in the Middle East, in a way which 
eventually evoked national feelings in both Arabs and Jews and broke the internationalist 
composition of the party.  
In the summer of 1964 the party's general secretary Shmuel Mikunis met in Moscow with 
comrade Fuad, who I assume to be Fuad el-Nasri, the combatant Palestinian Arab refugee who 
was general secretary of the Jordanian Communist Partyiii. This was the first time such an 
official meeting took place since 1947, and it was invoked following a summit of all the Arab 
communist parties and before their next summit. The ICP was not invited to any of those 
meetings. Though maintaining the conversation in friendly terms, there were tensions revolving 
the correct definition of the regimes against which each party was confronting. 
"you spoke about the Arab liberation movements and about the Palestinian [original: Eretz-Israeli] 
problem...you said we should not dismiss [their] difficulties. Why do you think we dismiss the difficulties? 
Secondly I wish to emphasize the difference between the Arab messengers of imperialism and the Israeli 
rulers- the second are much more dangerous in terms of their cruel aggressiveness and racism...- more 
similar to the rulers of South Rhodesia, South Africa or the French in Algiers. Their responsibility for 
the Palestinian [original: Eretz-Israeli] problem is much harder than the Arab rulers...Mikunis sounds 
like he is trying to justify occupation of territory and expulsion."iv 
"you cannot compare the people settled in Israel to the French settlers in Algiers etc. This is a people 
with a right for self-determination, most of them only came recently and are not responsible for the 
situation of Arab-Israeli relations. It is hard to blame the population in Israel for agreeing to the current 
                                                             
i David Shlomo in "The first session of the countrywide congress" (moshav alef shel ha-kinus ha-artsi), NLIA V1272-
3-121. 
ii M. Hanania. "Iraqi Descendants in the ICP Complain of Discrimination" (yotzei Iraq be-maki kovlim 'al kipuham), 
Maariv, 5.8.64.  
iii While the protocols only name Comrade Fuad, it is highly likely that the participant in these conversation is Fuad 
el-Nasri, as it is logical that it was the general secretary of the Jordanian Communist Party that was to meet with 
the general secretary of the ICP. Kol Ha'am reported his presence in Moscow on the month beforehand. "The 
Delegation of the Jordanian Communist Party Held Talks with the CC of the CPSU (mishlahat ha-miflaga ha-
komonistit ha-yardenit nihala sihot 'im ha-v'ahm shel ha-mkbm), KH 12.6.64, p. 1.  
iv Comrade Fuad in: "Third Meeting" (pgisha shlishit), 25.7.64, NLIA V1272-4-33. 
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regime."i 
The basic content of this meeting could represent any conversation many Jewish Israelis would 
hold with many Arabs in the world. At some moments, Mikunis expressed blunt 
condescendence, but in essence he was simply asking El-Nasri to recognize the right of Israel 
to exist. Mikunis was expressing eventually a popular Jewish Israeli sentiment: fear that 
recognizing that the state of Israel was established in sin, and continues to perform as a colonial 
project, will undermine Jews' very legitimacy to live in Palestine/Israel.  Few people, after all, 
wish to participate in an ongoing crime. For Palestinian Arabs, not recognizing the coloniality 
of the Zionist state undermines the very legitimacy of their claims for the land. The recognition 
in this perspective for many Palestinians has to be the common denominator of any basic 
political understanding between Jews and Arabs. For many Israeli Jews, the basic common 
denominator is recognizing the legitimacy of the existence of the state, which reflects to them 
their very right to live where they do. In the 1960s, a decade of decolonization when colonizers 
were made to leave settler-colonies in different locations, this debate was ever more acute. The 
fear of the colonizer from evacuation and the struggle of the colonized to liberation has led the 
Palestinian/Israeli political national-colonial rivalry into a dead end. Mikunis and Fuad also 
reach a certain dead end, but under the centralist direction of the USSR it was resolvable. The 
Jordanian Communist Party ended up yielding to the cry of help from the ICP. Fuad promised 
to pass the message to the other Arab communist parties, and in later platforms of the JCP it 
did not refer to Israel as an imperial bridgeheadii. It seems that this was the seal of approval 
Mikunis was waiting for, because a month after this meeting, while still in Moscow, he wrote 
an article that was so controversial inside the ICP that the discussions over it brought the split 
in the party within a year. In this article Mikunis condemned the revolutionary Algerian 
president Ahmed Ben Bella for undermining Israel's right to exist,  as an artificial  imperialist 
entity that is a constant threat for world peace iii. The argument this article aroused in the ICP 
revolved around the question of whether or not the party should tolerate declarations of anti-
colonial Arab leaders, namely Nasser and Ben Bella, that define Israel as an imperialist 
spearhead in the Middle East, directly or indirectly implying the need to vanquish the state of 
Israel. This led to questioning the nature of the Arab regimes:  
"this movement [in Egypt and Algiers] cannot be revolutionary and advanced because it comes from 
Feudalism. Different forces were its partners, they work with the bourgeois, the national bourgeois… 
they brought…a spiritual baggage. There is also nationalism there which became stronger along the 
struggle for liberation...this we must see… but it also has the faltering part, this is how I can explain the 
                                                             
i Shmuel Mikunis in: "Third Meeting" (pgisha shlishit), 25.7.64, NLIA V1272-4-33. 
ii "Pieces from the program of the Jordanian Communist party to the upcoming period" (kta'im mi-tohnit ha-miflaga 
ha-komonistit ha-yardenit la-tkufa ha-nokhehit), undated, after 1967. NLIA V1272-4-33. 
iii Shmuel Mikunis, "To Amhad Ben-Bella's Ears" (be-oznei ahmad ben bella), KH 20.9.64, p. 2.  
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things to people. I'm afraid of the influence that these declarations have on my people and on the Arab 
peoples"i  
As the quote above can reflect, the question of the definition of the Arab regimes was related 
to the question of the role of the ICP in Israeli society. In essence, the last debate continues to 
accompany the ICP until today: as an anti-Zionist party enrooted in Israeli Palestinian Arab 
society, some of its Jewish cadre question their role in the party, and aspire to do more to appeal 
to Jewish-Israeli society. This aspiration has a pragmatic aspect: the need to gain influence in a 
Jewish majority state. However, it requires from the party to de facto defend the interests of the 
colonial settlers. Within this ever-going argument, the split in stances in 1965 had a clear-cut 
ethnic nature, in at least one of the Jewish ICP branches that had Iraqi dominanceii: 
"There was an argument and we said ok, please vote, and there was a division like this, as if ethnic. 
Ashkenazim apart and Iraqis apart"iii 
"the comrades of the east appear along a certain line and other comrades appear with others. Because 
the comrades they read Arabic and listen to Arabic radio stations"iv 
The question was one of principals and ideology, but these were shaped by the activists' lived 
experiences and knowledge. The Jewish communist that ended up after the split in a Jewish 
communist party, could not assimilate the simultaneous position of being anti-colonial 
colonizers. For Iraqi communists it might have been somewhat easier, since they were placed 
in the simultaneous role of colonized and colonizers upon their very arrival to Israel. Moreover, 
their cultural proximity to the colonized Arabs released them of any kind of a superiority 
complex. The difficulty of Ashkenazim to assume the colonizer's role can be reflected in this 
appeasing declaration Mikunis made to Fuad:  
"It is a constant pain for me and my comrades to be acting and struggling in the shadow of the tragedy 
of the Palestinian [original: Eretz-Israeli] Arab people. We do not doubt that this historical injustice will 
be repaired and instead of it will rise a solid base for Jewish-Arab fraternity, which will enrich both 
peoples in cultural and scientific ways on the basis of fructiferous cooperation."v 
The meeting protocols of the Bnei Brak branch show clearly how the different stances were 
informed by Arab versus Israeli press, and by the lived experience of Ashkenazim versus Iraqis. 
Ashkenazim, closer to holocaust survivors, tended not to exhibit any tolerance towards the 
statements of Arab leaders for the extermination of Israel, as an ideological stance, but also and 
as a tactic aimed to appeal to the broad Jewish-Israeli public:  
                                                             
i Bnei Brak branch meeting protocols, 7.6.65, NLIA V1272-3-234.  
ii Also see Tzadok Tzadok's testimony, in: http://maki.org.il/2012-10-03-18-06-03/ (last accessed 29.10.19).  
iii Menashe Khalifa in interview, 21.3.18.  
iv Bnei Brak branch meeting protocols, 14.2.65, NLIA V1272-3-59.  
v Shmuel Mikunis in: "Third Meeting" (pgisha shlishit), 25.7.64. NLIA V1272-4-33. 
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"We cannot say to the people that statements don't kill, the people here are sick from the fear of 
extermination. If I want [people] to believe me I must give expression to their anxiety from these things"i 
 Iraqi members, on the other hand, like Israeli Palestinian Arabs, thought the actual threat 
implied in these declarations is marginal, and that anyway the state of Israel deserved to be 
threatened this way:  
"I learned from the party that it's not us that follow the public's slogans but the public follow our 
slogan…are we lacking imperialism here? Why would I search for imperialism in Arab countries?... And 
the problem of a million refugees that will grow. Standing in line for milk and seeing their land in front 
of them. Also me I say from declarations you don't die. What do you want them, to not even make 
declarations?"ii 
The degree to which this stance of Iraqi members was accorded upon in meetings that they held 
of the Iraqi cadre remains unclear in the span of this researchiii. However, as Bashkin (2017) 
insinuated, the lived experience of the Israeli Iraqi communists had made them particularly 
allergic to expressions of nationalist sentiments, having the imposition Arab and Jewish 
nationalisms played in setting their fates, in contrast to their own beliefs and struggles:  
"we had a serious argument… We always since Baghdad had a Jewish-Arab slogan, so we came here so 
now we have to be above them?"iv 
The only Jewish branches to join by majority to the ICP splinter of Arab majority were Bnei 
Brak and Petah Tikwa (Nahas 1976), but according to testimonies, Iraqis from all branches 
joined as wellv. However, other branches with large Iraqi presence, like Ramat Gan, joined the 








                                                             
i Bnei Brak branch meeting protocols, 24.3.65, NLIA V1272-3-5.   
ii Bnei Brak branch meeting protocols, 24.3.65, NLIA V1272-3-5.  
iii In the Bnei Brak branch meeting protocols there is recurrent reference to The Forum, as a space where politics 
were debated apart from the branch meetings. However, I was not able to gain any further information regarding 
these meetings.  
iv Menashe Khalifa in interview, 21.3.18. 
v Tzadok Tzadok claimed most Iraqis joined the Arab splinter. In: http://maki.org.il/2012-10-03-18-06-03/ (last 
accessed 29.10.19).     
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PART II: DISCUSSION 
 
In the period of study of this research, there was no organ that struggled against Zionism in a 
more direct, explicit and persistent manner than the ICP, at great personal cost for all its 
members. The members were blocked from receiving housing and employment opportunities 
by Mapai's apparatus of domination, and the ICP itself channeled members' housing and 
employment at the party's interest, and dominated most of their free time. Active members 
indeed sacrificed their entire lives for a dire struggle for peace and equality, at the service of 
the party.  Taking this into account makes the case of Mizrahim within the party particularly 
interesting for observing the ways in which mechanisms that reproduce colonial inequalities 
function by themselves, without intention nor remedy. This section will firstly demonstrate the 
reproduction of Zionist-colonial dynamics within the ICP, by examining the conditions that 
both allowed and limited Mizrahi autonomous collective actions within the ICP. In this way, 
the research questions will be revised, but instead of relating to the dynamics of Mizrahi 
autonomous organizations within the Zionist state, they will relate to their dynamics within the 
ICP.  
Notwithstanding, the dynamics within the ICP in this period reflect not only the omnipresence 
of Zionist coloniality, but also of the imperiality of the Soviet Union, the political and 
ideological hegemony of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the international 
communist movement (Ben Zaken 2006). Ben Zaken wrote about the development of 
communism in the Middle East as a form of cultural imperialism, referring to the rhetoric fields 
of language and ideology, Marxist values and education, as well as to science and technology. 
Marxist-Leninist ideology privileged European cultural symbols, such as European languages, 
science and progress, and contempt to cultural traditions and to religion. It reflected European 
political economy in the primacy it gave to the party and to the industrial working-class.  The 
liberation struggles in the Middle East headed by Eastern European immigrants and by local 
leaders that assimilated Marxist ideology, were designed to rebel against "eastern tradition" as 
well as against the western-liberal model of progress, while serving the USSR's interests. 
However, Marxist discourse was not presented as the product of European culture and history 
that it was, but as scientific, objective and universal truth (Ben Zaken 2006). This was its way 
to formulate the aspiration to liberation in a way that could transcend the diversity of the worlds' 
cultures.  
The ICP faced the need to put the universalist ideology of Marxist internationalism to trial by 
fire. This was the basis over which it asked to reconcile under one ideological umbrella two 
sides of a dire and violent national conflict, but also the base over which Jews from all countries 
and cultures intended to create a solid common ground: 
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"We were a very diverse bunch: new immigrants from Poland listened with pleasure to Hebrew songs of 
the multitude of children…oriental music of Iraqi immigrants got exchanged with Russian and Polish 
songs."i 
However, just as Ben Zaken (2006) showed, when examining the ICP's Marxist ideology in 
cultural parameters of knowledge, representation and history, it becomes evident that it was 
based on Eurocentric assumptions. This was expressed for instance in the shared supposition 
of the Jewish-Israeli leaders about the meaning of the Hebrew National Culture, conceiving of 
its source and strength as belonging to Jewish Eastern European developments: 
"we must pay special attention to the great cultural values in Yiddish language…the fact that the most 
and the best of the popular cultural values of the Jewish people in the last century were created in  
Yiddish, and the fact that most its speakers…were destroyed by the Hitleric Fascism… makes it all the 
more necessary to absorb in the national Israeli culture.." ii 
These suppositions, however, were a source of estrangement from the party for non-European 
Jews: 
"I am not attracted to the literary page of Kol Ha'am. The Jewish people are not united neither in 
language and nor in culture".iii  
This understanding of the national culture helped perpetuate Orientalist views among party 
members and leaders: "a paternalistic attitude, diluted with a certain measure of humanism and 
identification with the suffering of the people of the east" (Ben Zaken 2006):  
"In Israel the situation is that about half the people is in a low cultural and technical level… there are 
now in Israel about 400 thousand illiterate people... most of the Jewish people do not know what is 
Zionism…"iv 
The Eurocentric understanding of Jewish national culture was a channel through which the 
party reproduced within its lines the same colonial Zionist power structure against which it was 
committed to struggle. For instance, the party was concerned about spreading knowledge about 
Hebrew national culture in poor immints' areav, as part of its endeavors to nurture Israeli 
patriotismvi. Patriotism was another top value of Marxism-Leninism, which like 
                                                             
i Yehuda Lahav, "City of Tents in the Forest" ('ir ohalim ba-ya'ar), KH 16.5.58, p. 2.  
ii "The Israeli Communist Party in the Struggle for Peace, Independence and Socialistic Advancement. Chapters for 
the 13th Congress" (ha-miflaga ha-komunistit ha-israelit ba-maavak le-shalom, le-bitsur 'atsmaut Israel ve-le-kidma 
sotsialit. rashei prakim la-ve'ida ha-shlosh 'esre), KH 19.9.56, p. 7. The defense of Yiddish language and culture was 
part of the decade long anti-Zionist struggle of communist Jews against the imposition of Hebrew as the exclusive 
national language.  
iii Tzadok in "Branch Meeting" (asefat snif), 24.2.65, V1272-3-59. 
iv Shmuel Mikunis in: "Third Meeting" (pgisha shlishit), 25.7.64. NLIA V1272-4-33. For other orientalist expressions 
see e.g. Albert Benny, "Transit Camp to Poverty" (ma'abara le-dalut), KH 17.8.50, p. 2; "Health administration gives 
medical aid to 650 thousand people, its budget 7 million LI" (Kupah megisha 'ezra refuit le-650 elef nefesh- taktsiva 
7 milion li), KH 21.12.50, p. 4. 
v "South District Committee Meeting" (pgishat va'ad mahoz darom), undated, YTA Districts: 35-16/3. 
vi Bnei Brak branch meeting protocols, 14.2.65, NLIA V1272-3-59. 
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internationalism, created for the ICP contradictions and difficulties most European communist 
parties did not have to face. The interpretation of ICP's Jewish members and leaders of the value 
of patriotism put in contingent risk their ability to fully identify with the ICP's anti-Zionist and 
internationalist values:  
"It is but a mistake that it says the 1948 war. There is no problem in calling it the War of Independence."i  
Communist Israeli Palestinian Arabs, on the other hand, suffered from a different kind of 
contradiction. Though they had certain space within the party to propagate for their own 
national culture and self-determination, this space was limited by the comradeship with Jewish 
Israelis. The Palestinian Arabs' basic positions did not influence the official party line as deeply 
as the Arab leaders aspired (Greenstein 2014), and as ICP members they were in many senses 
isolated from other Arab communist parties.  
 "we are blamed for identifying with the national Arab movement.... We responded about Abdul el-
Nasser…when he spoke against communism… everybody that was in festivals remembers how [we] 
stood... Arabs arguing with [other] Arab delegations"ii 
These factors made the ICP yield to the positions of the CPSU and keep blind loyalty to it, in 
order to maintain the internationalist structure of the party. Nonetheless by the end of the period 
this structure lost validity, even before the need to take stance about the 1967 occupation of 
Palestineiii. Yosef Algazi summarized his point of view about the 1965 split as such:  
"After leaving the party 21 years ago, I got to the conclusion that the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict 
poisoned not only the relations between the two peoples, but it also created complicated situations, in 
the crucial way in which it created (and creates) nationalist tendencies among communists that have 
declared and still declare their ambition to solve the conflict without bias and without preferring one 
nation over another in this tragic conflict."iv 
If the ICP ever had the aspiration to constitute "a bridge to Arabs"v for Jewish Israeli society, 
by force of its internationalist ideology, under the auspices of the Soviet Union's stronghold it 
evidently did not succeed in that. The role of the Iraqi communists within the party sheds further 
light over the colonial and imperial conditions that prevented the Marxist ideology from 
performing as such a bridge. Certainly, the potential role of the Iraqi cadre as a cultural, 
linguistic, epistemological and ontological bridge between the Jews and Arabs in the party did 
                                                             
i Bnei Brak meeting protocols, 12.5.65, NLIA V1272-3-234 
ii Bnei Brak meeting protocols, 26.6.65, NLIA V1272-3-234.  
iii In 1967 there were still two communist parties in Israel as formed by the split. After the Six Day War the Jewish 
splinter defended the occupation as a defensive act of Israel, whereas the Arab splinter condemned it. This brought 
the Soviet Union to withdraw its support from the Jewish splinter.  
iv Yosef Algazi, "Soda pop, 'Kol ha-'am' and a bridge to Baghdad" (kos gazoz, 'kol ha-'am' ve-gesher le-bahgdad). 
Retrieved from: http://www.defeatist-diary.com/index.asp?p=articles_new10086&period=10/10/2011-
12/12/2011 (last accessed on 20.3.18) (published in Haaretz on 12.2.99). 
v Yafo branch meeting protocols, 7.10.64, NLIA V1272-3-10.   
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not escape neither the Iraqi cadre nor the Ashkenazi leadershipi. In his autobiography, Shimon 
Ballas described his first meeting with MP Vilner:  
"He surprised me when he asked some banal question about Syria…it truly embarrassed me coming from 
a leader like him. Syria was… all over the headlines but was still foreign to Israelis…and even to a leader 
of a Jewish-Arab party… I realized the role I and people like me would have to play in order to reduce 
the estrangement between Israel and the Arab world."ii 
However, the particular Iraqi identity, skills and special needs were largely denied by the party 
leadership, despite the recurring pleas Iraqi activists made for such consideration throughout 
the period. The party refused to open a space for them to articulate their vision. Within the strict 
interpretation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, there was no room for them to develop or formulate 
their unique position in a way that could tie their identity to class issues, as the party did for 
Palestinian Arabsiii (Bashkin 2017). The role of cultural-political intermediaries was never 
comprehensively suggested to them, their cultural particularity was largely ignored, and their 
knowledge was not regarded as of any particular value for the correct functioning of the ICP 
within middle-eastern politics. This stands in bleak contrast to the way the party did take under 
consideration the special needs of Eastern European immigrants and of the Palestinian Arab 
population. Both by the state's apparatus and by the party's mechanism, Mizrahi immigrants 
were expected to shed any particular identity. This was a theoretical request for all communist 
affiliates, but it was implemented in practice only for these immigrants. Other affiliation groups 
found stable spaces for reinforcing their cultural particularity, and had theoretical justification 
for it within Marxist doctrine or within USSR loyalty. The Mizrahi communists, however, were 
limited to the molds of ideology, discourse, culture and mental frameworks designed by the 
Ashkenazi elites of the party. The main problem with this discrimination is the repercussions it 
had on the party's political line, which missed the opportunity to embody the added value that 
the Arabic speaking, educated activists, well informed in middle-eastern politics, could have 
supplied for the ICP's frameworks.  
These reflections can be seen as corresponding with the first research questions, inquiring after 
the conditions that allowed Mizrahi activists to develop comprehensive opposition to the strong 
coloniality trends within the ICP. It was their roots and base of knowledge that designed their 
opposition both to the ICP's eurocentrism as well as its political dependency in Moscow. These 
allowed the ICP eventually to participate, albeit from the margins, in the Zionist state's 
colonization process. These factors point out to the third research question, which inquired after 
the conditions that inhibited Mizrahim's ability to construct an autonomous framework within 
                                                             
i Shmuel Mikunis quoted in, "Grand Response to the Celebration of the Iraqi Revolution in Or Yehuda" (hed rav le-
hagigat mahapekhat irak be-or yehuda), KH 20.7.59, p. 2.   
iiBallas (2009): 40.   
iii See Ella Shohat in Samir (2006).  
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the party. The second and fourth research questions direct to examine the degree to which the 
Iraqi activists succeeded in creating alternatives to colonial frameworks within the ICP, and the 
external circumstances that supported or weakened their anti-colonial opposition. With regards 
to these questions it should be noted that the dire conditions of the transit camps in the first half 
of the 1950s presented auspice conditions for the development of Mizrahi decolonial alternative 
frameworks. The struggles led by the communist Iraqis in this period crossed ethnic, party and 
national affiliations. The discourse developed around these struggles at times formulated 
continuity between Mizrahi and Palestinian Arab colonial-racist oppressions, and served as a 
base for a de-facto autonomous Mizrahi framework within the ICP. In the context of these 
protests it is important to emphasize the mutual influences of the Iraqi communist cadre with 
the general Mizrahi political sphere, despite its apparent detachment from it (Chetrit 2004: 117). 
This is also exemplified in their petition for an autonomous framework in 1959, when other 
Mizrahi groups were also constructing their autonomy. I suspect that another principal 
condition that shaped the Iraqi cadre's trajectory within the ICP were international 
developments within Arab communist and socialist regimes, as shown before the 1965 split. 
However, this supposition diverges from the span of this research.  
The case of Iraqis within the ICP, and especially the role some of them played throughout the 
1965 split, is a good example of the repercussions of the Eurocentrism of the left that 
Grosfoguel (2009a) criticized. Grosfoguel wrote about the westernized left -referring to all the 
streams that follow western paradigms- which by privileging western political philosophies 
reproduce epistemological racism/sexism, and eventually discard nonwestern epistemologies 
as inferior. The universalist imperatives that directed Marxist-Leninist ideology reproduced 
ethno-racial colonial logic, because of the monolithic Eurocentric conception of liberation they 
reflected (Grosfoguel 2009a). The course of events in the Bnei Brak branch during the 1965 
split shows the epistemic basis of the split in the ICP, and the degree to which it was related to 
the lived experience and the access to knowledge of natives of the Middle East. The split was 
not merely a result of a "stammered cultural dialogue" (Ben Zaken 2006) between the world of 
knowledge of Eastern European Jews and Arabs, or of Marxist ideology and subjects 
indigenous to the region. The place of Iraqis within the ICP in the period of study reveals the 
way the ICP was imprinted by colonial racist hierarchies, which for decades have been 
preventing leftist parties from performing as real projects of liberation (Grosfoguel 2009a). 
Colonial power relations infiltrated the party, right through the discourse of total equality for 
all, because this very demand made the ICP blind to the epistemological diversity necessary for 





In this concluding chapter the questions that guided the research will be revisited in light of the 
historical materials reviewed and by using the theoretical conceptualizations that have led this 
inquiry. The conditions that allowed glimpses of a decolonial attitudes to emerge within 
Mizrahi and Sephardic political discourse in the period studied will be reviewed, and the main 
characteristics will be highlighted. In the end, some thoughts regarding the relevance of this 
research to current social research and to potentially decolonial Israeli struggles will be 
suggested. 
 
The Mizrahi Political Sphere, 1948-1967 
This research examined different formulas of Mizrahi autonomous organizations that 
participated in the Israeli political field in the 1950s and 1960s, the years in which 
discrimination against Mizrahim in Israel was at its peak. Colonial-racist perceptions directly 
designed state policies, in a way that shaped socio-economic inequalities that prevail in Israel 
to this day. In these two decades, the research has outlined a Mizrahi and Sephardic sub-political 
sphere within the Israeli one. This sub-sphere included all those who attempted, to varying 
degrees, to combat the systematic discrimination and humiliating discourse against Mizrahim. 
This sub-sphere included Mizrahi and Sephardic activists affiliated to Zionist parties of 
Ashkenazi hegemony, and also many more bodies and organizations not included in this 
research. This review certainly did not exhaust all the possible organizations belonging to this 
sphere, not even all the ones that can be considered autonomous Mizrahi and Sephardic political 
organizations. A separate research can be dedicated to local groups and leaders, and observe 
the kind of politics they promoted in municipalities and local councils of Mizrahi 
concentrations of population, where many were successful in gaining power positions in the 
1960s. The autonomous Mizrahi and Sephardic organizations reviewed in this research were 
born as direct and indirect responses to developments within the Mizrahi-Sephardic political 
sphere. The dynamics of this sphere were conditioned by international, regional, national and 
local politics, the combination of which eventually shaped its own particular dynamic. In some 
years, as in 1958, this sphere reacted to the arrival of Eastern European immigrants, the decimal 
anniversary of the state's independence and developments in the internal regimes of the 
surrounding countries in different ways than the mainstream Israeli-Ashkenazi political sphere. 
The 1948 Rupture and the 1959 Wadi Salib events also had their particular, long lasting 
influences over this sphere.  
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All Mizrahi and Sephardic activists and intellectuals in this period aspired and called for 
equality within the colonial state. Their main motivation was a simple one, that within Jewish-
Israeli society, "the least happy camp will not have ethnic characteristics"i. Many of them quit 
the political struggle when they found personal solutions that allowed them, as individuals, to 
live according to their values, and attain a level of life that fulfilled at least economic equality 
with Ashkenazi middle-class. Others gained small power positions, that allowed them to 
influence some limited, mainly local parts of the Israeli public sphere. Many were incorporated 
to the service of the settler-colonial mechanisms of domination, either by co-producing the 
Zones of Non-Being of Palestinian Arab population, or in order to strengthen the walls of the 
colonial villa in the middle-eastern jungle, by contributing to the security and intelligence 
mechanisms. Not few within the Mizrahi elite got incorporated into diplomatic institutions of 
the state as ambassadors: to my understanding, this was a way for the Ashkenazi elites to 
exclude talented activists from gaining influence over the state's internal affairs or having an 
actual say over its diplomatic policies: rather, they were incorporated to its rhetoric defense. 
The groups reviewed in this research established autonomous Mizrahi-Sephardic organizations 
due to their unwillingness or inability, sometimes temporary, to attempt to gain equal status in 
the settler-colonial state in any of the ways mentioned above. Many of the SCMD activists, for 
example, after graduating their BA, were incorporated into the state's institutions through one 
of these paths. The Mizrahi political sphere was constructed by Sephardic and Mizrahi activists 
of different political and cultural tendencies and associations, but all searched for the conditions 
that would allow them to become equal contributors to the debate about defining the face of the 
nation. All of them wanted to annihilate the "the gap and the abyssality"ii between Jews in the 
Jewish state, and aspired to conserve the national identity border. The natives searched for ways 
to fulfill the prospect of belonging to the ethnic majority of their homeland; the immigrants 
searched for a new national belonging in a world that became of nation states, where Israel was 
the only place where they had the possibility to become equal members of a modern national 
collective. Some of the observed groups did not form an official autonomous organization, as 
the Iraqi cadre in the ICP, others did not nurture strictly political aspirations, as the Torah 
Loyalist Circle. The thread weaving the groups and texts together was their aspiration to 
formulate an alternative national project to the hegemonic Zionist one, which would respect 
their culture and include them in an equal manner, without losing their identity or having to 
recognize their inherent inferiority. These aspirations were considered within this research as 
the basis from which decolonial thinking could emerge. Previous research of Mizrahi 
autonomous political organizations claimed that they only reproduced Zionist hegemonic 
                                                          
i "Organization of Sephardic and Middle Eastern Descendants" (irgun yotsei sfarad ve-hamizrah ha-tikhon), 7.4.58, 
CZA 430A/210/3.  
ii Y. M. Immanuel, "Before the Leap" (likrat zinuk), Young Israel, 18.11.64, p. 1 
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discourse and did not suggest alternatives to it (e.g. Herzog 1986). In this research, I 
demonstrated how the coloniality of power, of being and of knowledge designed the activity of 
these organizations and created their limitations. Notwithstanding, I attempted to excavate here, 
from the practices and discourses of Mizrahi activists and formulators of independent Mizrahi 
political agenda, traces of decolonial alternatives that could be viable in the settler-colonial 
Zionist state today.   
 
 
Summarizing the Research  
Right after the 1948 Rupture of middle-eastern Jewries from their native environments, a 
rupture that occurred both with or without immediate geographic displacement, organized 
Mizrahi politics were limited to organizations that had already been established before 1948: 
the CSCs and the Communist Party. For many Iraqi communists, the 1948 Rupture entailed a 
dramatic shift in their lives and political trajectories, forcing them into a new geo-political 
reality in which they had to carve new paths to equality and justice. In the first period of 
research, Iraqi immigrants belonging to the ICP uplifted a spirit of revolt within Mizrahi 
immigrants in the transit camps, leading the struggle for dignified absorption into the colonial 
state. Through the party's mechanisms, they contributed to the cultural resistance of Arabic 
language and press in Israel: this was a way for them to pursue their anti-colonial aspirations 
while satisfying their cultural and intellectual needs.  
By contrast, for the Sephardic notable elites, the Rupture was not as acute, since it entailed for 
them an emancipatory promise, inaugurating a new era where they could share the sovereignty 
over their own geographical space for the first time. The disillusionment from this promise in 
the first years of statehood, along with the consequences of the Rupture, directed the CSCJ's 
discourse into a non-compromising, untrusting and hostile political line towards issues 
regarding the colonial state's relations to Palestinian and other Arabs during 1949, the year of 
the armistice negotiations. After that year, under the continuous status of low warfare of the 
early 1950s, their political activity and discourse largely evaded exterior or interior Arab-
related politics: after all, those who did not participate in establishing the state could hardly 
resolve the violence its very establishment had aroused. Notwithstanding, evading Arab-related 
politics obstructed the CSCJ's ability to play a significant role in the Israeli political sphere. In 
the first period of research, the CSCJ was subdued by the colonial mechanisms of the Zionist 
state: at first abruptly, and later in subtler manners. The shreds of its political influence 
gradually dissipated. Under the deep colonial mechanisms of the modern Zionist state - 
bureaucratic, military, economic, political, epistemic and ontological- they became identified 
in new ways with the Ashkenazi elites, which undermined the institution's very base of 
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legitimacy to get involved in the political sphere. The CSCJ circle was epistemically subjugated 
by the ruling elites, and eventually yielded to the Zionist leaders the primogeniture right to set 
the tones and actions of the settler-colonial state.  
 
In the second period of research, a decade after the 1948 Rupture, most Mizrahi immigrants 
had already settled in permanent housing. In some senses, this marked a stabilization in the 
socio-economic ladder of opportunities, and allowed for some of the more accommodated 
social stratums ways to become incorporated into Ashkenazi society under conditions of 
inferiority. This stabilization and the recession in warfare, allowed for new leaders, as of 1958, 
to attempt to organize Mizrahi political forces, creating an immensely more varied and diverse 
organized Mizrahi-Sephardic political sphere in the second period of study than the first. The 
Iraqi cadre in the ICP also became more direct in its petitions for representation within the 
party's directive institutions. In the summer of 1959 one Mizrahi organization, UNAI, captured 
the attention of politicians and the media, leading to a summer of public turmoil around the 
Mizrahi struggle. This turmoil showed many Mizrahi activists involved in Zionist parties, the 
way to leverage organized political action within Mapai's apparatus of domination. This 
apparatus efficiently co-opted to its benefit this bloom of organized autonomous Mizrahi 
activity, formulating Israeli "political ethnicity" (Deshen 1974, Herzog 1986), which vacated 
the Mizrahi struggle for equality from contents that were not related to representation itself. 
The case of the National Union is emblematic of this transition from the 1950s to the 1960s. 
While in its inception the National Union transmitted some decolonial values, its 1960s avatar, 
Young Israel, was dedicated to maintaining Mizrahi autonomy in parliamentary politics 
practically merely for the sake of doing so. This way, it helped the entire network of Mizrahi 
political activists to maintain a better bargaining position within Zionist political parties. The 
political network of Fraternity had a similar function in the sphere of local politics, allowing 
local activists to gain some power positions in municipalities and local councils. The SCMD 
grew between the walls of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, bringing together the few 
Mizrahi and Sephardic university students who were interested in their own heritage and 
culture, and functioning as a social laboratory for the educated young generation to formulate 
a collective position about their degraded place in Israeli colonial society. The communist Iraqi 
cadre started in this decade to gather for celebrating together their cultural roots. These 
gatherings could have contributed to the formulation of a particular Iraqi stance among some 
of the cadre, when the ideological differences between Jews and Arabs in the party became 
more acute. The bodies that had long term, deep ambitions to change the colonial nature of the 
state, largely avoided in this decade participating in direct forms of political action, but rather 
were occupied with constructing internal coherency. This was the case of the Torah Loyalist 
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Circle, who published a periodical that formulated Sephardic ultra-orthodox stances, which 
very carefully avoided forming any kind of rivalry with the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox elites.  
The CSCJ remained the main focus of research in this period, mainly thanks to its leader's 
renewed determination to tie the question of integration of the Jewish state in the Middle East 
with the struggle against Sephardim's discrimination, "Sephardim" here carrying the widest 
most inclusive significance. In the second period of study, the CSCJ also focused on 
constructing internal coherency as an oppositional lobby group. It maintained a pseudo-
academic "ivory-club" for many of the native and immigrant intellectual elite around its 
publication "In the Battle". This safe epistemic space allowed the native intellectuals to 
formulate decolonial stances that tied together critique of the racist dynamics against Mizrahim 
within the settler-colonial state, with its hostile positioning towards its surrounding, Arab 
environment. Communist ideology also allowed to tie these two questions together, within the 
paradoxical dialectic of communism in the Middle East, within which it served both as 
instigator of anti-western colonialism and as an active agent of Eurocentric culture, promoting 
unintended cultural imperialism (Ben Zaken 2006: 24-29). In fact, in the 1960s, tying the two 
questions together became a rhetoric tool many groups included as a clause in their platform, 
without granting it much further significance. This was a reflection of the international 
atmosphere of this period of decolonization of Arab states, and formed part of a general 
tendency of Mizrahi political discourse of the period to use discursive formulas without filling 
them with much further content.  
 
 
Recurring to the Questions of Research  
Regarding  the first research question, about the conditions that allowed Sephardic and Mizrahi 
groups and individuals opposing coloniality to develop within a settler-colonial society, this 
research, as others before it, showed the relation of this particular Mizrahi and Sephardic 
discourse with the indigenous identity of its speakers: Sephardic and Mizrahi intellectuals from 
the Middle East, who  had  been educated by diverse educational institutions, and were exposed 
to and appreciated diverse intellectual sources. The activists reviewed here were rooted in the 
region, felt part and parcel of it in a wide sense. Their motivation to get organized, as well as 
their very sense of entitlement to approach the political field, was anchored in their dismay at 
being discriminated against and enclaved within the fortified walls of the Zionist state.  
 
The second research question opens the discussion as to the degree in which these activists 
succeed in challenging and opposing Zionist-colonial frameworks or creating alternatives to 
them. In this respect, it should be noted that tying together Israel's internal mechanisms of 
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exclusion with its exterior politics is the first thing that allowed Mizrahi and Sephardic 
discourse to view Israeli reality as similar to other colonial contexts, and therefore it was the 
basis from which decolonial perspectives could emerge. Without viewing the two questions as 
related to each other and to a wide geo-political context, the Mizrahi struggle for equality was 
plainly seeking only to gain as many privileges as Ashkenazim in the settler-colonial system. 
In the period of study, Israel was a place where people who were Jewish gathered together, but 
there was not a people, nor a nation, not just yet. The debate about the Merger of the Diasporas 
was the main discursive tool through which different activists tried to fulfill the invitation of 
the Jewish state to participate equally in building the nation and shaping its features. For some, 
this quest might have been simply about assuring a fairer divide of the privileges of the settler-
colonial state, and they used this hegemonic Zionist terminology while reproducing Eurocentric 
Zionist logics. However, this term also lent itself easily for appropriation by innovative 
autonomous ideologies, and by those who had deeper aspirations to intercede the hegemonic 
debate, and contribute their own view of what character should the Zionist state have. This kind 
of activists propagated for a comprehensive change of attitude of Israeli politicians and society: 
remove the pride of functioning as a modern European enclave in the Middle East. At the very 
least, that would entail expressing an aspiration to become part of the region. In certain 
moments, conditions ripened for these activists to develop discourse that demonstrated 
decolonial glimpses, daring to imagine beyond the colonial reality. Over the IB pages we can 
see a claim for the Merger of the Diasporas that aspired towards an ecology of knowledges: 
aspiring that the practices of the state be informed by more diverse sources of knowledge, 
privileging knowledge that can bring peace and equality over modern European knowledge 
which perpetuated violence and war. This discourse drew inspiration from the trope of Sefarad, 
in order to advocate for the immense civilizational value that is potentially entailed in a 
dignifying convivencia of the Jews in the Middle East. Sefarad served as a metaphor for fusion 
between Jews, Christians and Muslims as well as between east and west. By constructing the 
east as one civilizational unit, the intellectual activists could construct certain continuities 
between their culture and Islamic civilization, and to demand respect for both. Embracing the 
heritage of Sefarad and reviving it in Israel of the 1960s was understood to have the power to 
promote different kind dynamics between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, and a different kind of 
diplomacy between Jews and Arabs, based on respect to the east, and allowing for plurality of 
faiths and ethnicities to co-exist in a non-destructive way. This vision of an ecology of 
knowledges was characterized by social and political inclusivity and plurality of knowledges, 
cultures, faith and communities. The fulfillment of this claim did not require actual contact with 
Palestinians or other Arab people, but only the equal participation of Sephardim and Mizrahim 
in the debate that defined the face of the nation. The supposition of some among of the educated 
immigrant and native elites was that their very incorporation to the debate over the face of the 
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nation -not as its subjugated executers or informers, but as equal contributors to debates over 
policy and decision making- would in itself allow for Israel to integrate better in the Middle 
East. The aspiration to re-construct Israel as part of its geographical environment was evoked 
as an Inner-Jewish process. As such, it required just exactly what any other egalitarian Inner-
Jewish process required in Israel in this period: the emancipation of lower-stratum Mizrahi 
immigrants and the shattering of the glass-ceiling the elites encountered in diplomatic, political 
and academic institutions, by gaining public appreciation to their particular knowledge and 
skills. This was not merely a demand for power positions, nor merely a protest against being 
treated in a degenerating way. It was based on a presumption that Mizrahi and Sephardic elites 
had particular ways of behaving, of believing and of being, of knowing, getting organized, of 
producing and of communicating, that have a grand potential to contribute to the wellbeing of 
the state of Israel. 
 
As for the third research question, I find that the first factor inhibiting the construction of an 
independent political camp was the corollaries of the Wadi Salib events within the Zionist 
coloniality of power, which turned the Mizrahi political sphere into a battlefield that spurred 
competition rather than solidarity between ethnicities. This Mizrahi struggle focused on 
increasing representation of Mizrahim inside the Zionist political parties, and the quest after 
representation became detached from the larger goals of inclusion that increased representation 
was aimed to achieve. The inter-ethnic competition was encouraged by the parties, which 
expanded the practice of nominating different representatives for each place of origin. The press 
also contributed to form the dynamics of rivalry in the Mizrahi political sphere by classifying 
the autonomous Mizrahi and Sephardic organizations according to their followers' and leaders' 
origins.  
Efron studied Mizrahi and Sephardic intellectuals who acted in the literary sphere and with its 
tools. She explained how in "the lyrical arena", the intellectuals felt confident that their 
experience and their cultural capital made them appropriate for the task of cultural and 
knowledge intermediaries with the Arab world. They based their legitimacy to act in the public 
sphere on their intimate knowledge with Arab people and their natural belonging to the Middle 
East, on their roots and epistemic basis, on their very identity as natives to the region (Efron 
2005). They were not very different from the intellectual activists studied here, As Eliahu 
Eliachar, Yitzhak Abadi and Shlomo Cohen-Tzidon. However, these roots and identity did not 
establish any base of legitimacy at all for acting in the political arena of modern/colonial Israel.  
Furthermore, it formed rather an elusive base over which to structure the political argument for 
equal participation, and it had little tools to express itself in the direct language of real-politik, 
it did not easily lend itself for making actual political demands. This is because it required an 
organization or at least a person to embody it as the appropriate participant in the debate, the 
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legitimate representative of this particular Mizrahi-Sephardic perspective and skills. That was 
the stature that Eliahu Eliachar and the CSCJ failed to attain in the 1950s. After the failure of 
the "old guardia", and in the aftermath of the Wadi Salib events, the way to increase 
representation of Mizrahim and Sephardim in state institutions had been found, and this way 
did not require adding any ideological significance to the representation. It did not require 
pointing out the added cultural, social or spiritual value Mizrahi participation could have in 
decision making. Each activist and group in this research had to prove their own base for 
legitimacy for reclaiming political influence. Even the institution that was perhaps the most 
confident one, the CSCJ, also depended on Ashkenazim's commentaries for legitimizing 
radicalization of their discourse.  In this sense, the ICP mirrored Israeli society: the Iraqi cadre 
within it wanted representation in order to intercede in the decision-making of the party, well 
aware of the unique value their contribution could have for integrating the party in middle-
eastern politics.  However, communist ideology did not equip them with the base for legitimacy 
to express this claim directly.   
 
As to the fourth research question, regarding the circumstances that allowed decolonial 
opposition to strengthen at certain moments and weaken at others, I find that international and 
regional politics were the most crucial factor allowing hints of decolonial discourse to emerge 
in the political discourse of Mizrahi and Sephardic organizations and leaders. The 1960s was a 
period of decolonization in the Arab world. The Algerian struggle succeeded in portraying itself 
as progressive to western eyes (Garavini 2012), and the UN had expressed official support in 
national decolonialization at large (Strang 1991). When the internal regimes within Arab 
countries seemed to promise emancipatory possibilities for their peoples, it was more likely for 
Sephardic and Mizrahi political discourse to advocate for integration in the Middle East. The 
revolutionary spirits of the 1960s in the Middle East penetrated this way the Mizrahi-Sephardic 
political sphere. This discourse on intellectual platforms was often mediated by western liberals' 
endorsement of Arab leaders' emancipatory promise. This demonstrates the encompassing 
influence of western public discourse on Israeli society, and it also demonstrates the deep roots 
of Sephardic and Mizrahi elites within European cultures, as developed since the 19th century's 
processes of European cultural colonization in the Middle East. The internal Zionist political 
sphere also had its share in designing the structure of political opportunities that allowed 
decolonial discourses to emerge. The fact the Mizrahi political struggle became vacated from 
content made some Mizrahi and Sephardic intellectual activists retire from the political sphere, 
and that allowed them to develop the traceable buds of decolonial discourse we saw in this 
period. The nativist-regional claims described here as autochthonous Zionism was based on 
emotional foundations that are not easily incorporated into political action per say, and are more 
easily reduced into cultural initiatives. These claims were developed in another discursive level, 
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and within other epistemic spheres, than the ones of Zionist politicians and policy and decision-
making elites, and therefore it could hardly intercede at that stage with Israeli politics.  
 
To summarize, this research has demonstrated how some Sephardic and Mizrahi groups and 
individuals weaved into their political discourse threads of opposition to Zionist coloniality, 
which were manufactured from their material roots, their identity as natives of the region of the 
Middle East. This kind of opposition could manifest itself when the cannons of war were silent, 
and when Arab internal regimes could be perceived as making the Middle East a potentially 
emancipatory space to integrate into. The discourse developed in the IB in the 1960s imagined 
a viable alternative to the Zionist regime on an intellectual level, but these remained on a 
different discursive level, based upon other epistemic foundations than the ones leading the 
modern European Zionist political discourse and logics. These spirits could not amount to 
creating a political action, nor a political camp, that would express these aspirations in the 
colonial Zionist political sphere. Mapai's apparatus of domination was highly effective in 
disintegrating its opposition in the period studied, by playing different cards of exclusive 
inclusion in the modern/colonial regime it constructed. Threads of decolonial political discourse 
emerged in this period only in spheres that did not aim to participate directly in the political 
sphere, and purely intellectual activity remained limited as a way to instigate political action.  
 
 
Lessons from the Angel of History  
In the researched period, as well as nowadays, the most dominant Mizrahi claims in the modern 
Zionist political sphere have been claims against socio-economic oppression and for the rights 
of the poor. In fact, it could be claimed that whatever universal social rights exist in Israel today 
are due to the continuous Mizrahi protest movement. The sphere of the cultural struggle remains 
limited to the sphere of intellectual writing and educational projects. Mizrahi organized political 
action against cultural oppression prevails today in some senses mainly within ultra-orthodox 
politics. Ultra-orthodox politics, which in basis aim against the modern Zionist state, redeemed 
Mizrahim and Sephardim in the period of study in some senses from the hegemonic Ashkenazi 
standards, which set them as primitive and not modern enough. Toranic colonialism has not 
demanded Sephardim to modernize and change the essence of who they were in order to fit in. 
They have accepted Sephardim as they were, even if it was in order to subjugate them into the 
doctrines of Ashkenazi ultra-orthodoxy and incorporate them in a subjugated manner into this 
social sphere. Chetrit (2004) marked the beginning of Mizrahi opposition to modern European 
Zionism in the 1980s and 1990s, by two trends: the religious Sephardic-Jewish trend, marked 
by the rise of the ultra-orthodox party Shas in 1984, and the secular-intellectual trend, that has 
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achieved the peak of its political organization with the establishment of the Mizrahi Democratic 
Rainbow in 1996i. This research delineates the origins of both trends in the Israeli political 
sphere to the 1960s, to a time when the two had a bit more relationshipii. I would like to 
emphasize here that the main issues observed in this research that allowed for collective Mizrahi 
action were themes related to Sephardic Judaism: from struggles over furniture for synagogues 
to the struggle over the status of the Sephardic rabbis. As Chetrit (2004) noted, the spiritual life 
is the most protected Mizrahi space. It gives positive content to a distinct Sephardic identity, 
that otherwise is best recognized mainly through the "Mizrahization melting-pot" (Tsur 2010): 
the injustice and discrimination of the modern/colonial homogenization processes, led by the 
Zionist regime, caused by its ignorance and violence. 
 
There are quite a few lines of research that directly stem from this investigation: first and 
foremostly, its completion by the inquiry of materials of autonomous Mizrahi groups written in 
Arabic and French, research of the Yemenite organizations, and of the variety of local Mizrahi 
groups and leaders, in light of the decolonial perspective and frameworks. I suspect that some 
contemporary Mizrahi leftist intellectuals could have benefited more from a historical research 
focused on leftist -socialist and Marxist- Mizrahi activists, like Felix Matalon or Shalom Cohen. 
This kind of intellectual political activists, most active during the 1970s, were immersed in 
European, Israeli and Arab cultures, from which they developed a universal system of values 
that was based on anti-religious, revolutionary, and anti-colonial ideologies, where their eastern 
background was interlaced in a cosmopolitan identity. Questions of cultural heritage of tradition 
and religion did not form part of their thinking and practiceiii.  However, in the activity around 
the CSCJ circle, which this research focused on, one can observe a kind of political activism 
that sprang from an identity that combined Jewish heritage with certain identification with Arab 
culture. This identity was shared by many Jews under Muslim rule. In Muslim countries 
Mizrahi Judaism often combined modernity and tradition in non-exclusive ways, in a 
combination the liberal intellectuals reviewed in this research very much aspired to. However, 
the memory of diaspora of Judeo-Islamic civilization (Snir 2006) was stained by more recent 
modern experiences, marked by a growing rivalry with Muslim-Arab national identities. This 
                                                          
i This organization combined practical struggles for distributive justice with emancipatory demands for recognition 
in Mizrahi heritage. It had partial practical successes in changing laws regarding distribution of lands and housing, 
and it advanced different struggles in the educational field as well. The Mizrahi Rainbow presented quite a coherent 
and broad approach to the changes required in order to transform the cultural character of the state and the ethnic 
structure of inequality that prevails in it.    
ii In recent years, Mizrahi members of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel entered organized dialogue with 
members of Shas, following Mizrachi's (2011) critique about human rights discourse in Israel, and regarding 
Mizrahim's place in it in particular. This initiative demonstrates the need for the dialogue between these two social 
groups. However, as far as my knowledge goes, the initiative has currently ceased its activities.   
iii I thank Amos Noy for helping me clarify this point and characterize these activists.   
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can project onto the collective memory of these Jewries of earlier experiences, emphasizing for 
instance the degraded status of Jews under Muslim rule as an ethnic minority. This is the reason 
the trope of Sefarad was such a powerful tool for the intellectual activists in this research: it 
captured the potential of mutuality of influences and exchanges between Judaism and Islam, 
and between east and west, which got interwoven into both cultural heritages. Sefarad/Al-
Andalus sets a precedence to the kind of transformation Jewish culture is required again to 
perform in order to become part of the Middle East and resolve the imminent war in 
Israel/Palestine. This transformation is about the selective election of culture and identity 
components from various sources, which unlike European leftist ideologies, does not convert 
the loyalty to Jewish identity into a new loyalty to a universal secular identity. The experience 
of Jews in Muslim countries, from Sefarad to modern times, from their ways of organizing to 
the contents and tones of their writing, are the kind of diasporic memories that if re-produced 
in contemporary reality, can support the decolonization of Jewish-Israeli consciousness. Raz-
Krakotzkin (1994) wrote of how "a collective Jewish identity that is anchored in the 
consciousness of Diaspora, allows disconnecting sovereignty from the national definitions, 
without renouncing collective needs, certainly not collective memory". The conclusions of this 
research suggest a dire need for a deep inter cultural dialogue within Jewish Israeli society.   In 
such a dialogue, the heritage of the Diaspora of Sefarad/Al-Andalus can serve as the significant 
common heritage of both Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jewries. The cultural transformations and 
dialogues that were made possible in this Diaspora signal the way to some emancipatory 
horizons in the Middle East, pouring contents into what an ecology of knowledges can mean in 
this region, what kind of inter-religious inter-civilizational dialogue is required. The trope of 
Sefarad is key for a decolonial Inner-Jewish dialogue, and can influence Israel's exterior 
policies as well.  
Recently, the Sephardic World Unioni started a series of lectures called, "East and West: A 
tradition of a thousand years". The first conference was titled "The Value of Peace in Sephardic 
Judaism and Peace in Hebrew Law". In this conference, different speakers emphasized the 
peaceful principals of Sephardic Judaism, and suggested Sephardic Judaism should be leading 
the dynamics of Israel with its neighbors and with its Palestinian Arab minority. The 
philosopher and activist Meir Buzaglo spoke of this Judaism's enrooted self-confidence in its 
heritage, whose basis in Sefarad has allowed it to be opened to humanist ideas and science, 
without its faithful roots being jeopardized or threatened. He also spoke of the inherent short-
                                                          
i Unión Sefardí Mundial is a separate organization than the World Sephardi Federation which this research has 
slightly followed, and which still exists today. They both serve, among others, as a platform for different Sephardic 
communities worldwide.  
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handedness of western secular liberal principals of democracy to accomplish reconciliation or 
a sense of shared life of Jews and Arabs in the Middle East: 
"As if… now we need to find a way, through civil rights and this sort of things. [But] this is a connection 
related to the roots:… Jewish-Arab heritage. There is no liturgical poetry [piyut], no Jewish art, without 
deep affinity to the Jewish-Arab heritage."  
According to Buzaglo, because Sephardic Judaism does not have the conception of sectarianism 
[mahanaut], it holds the keys for leading the Inner-Jewish process Israeli society so desperately 
requires: its role should be to instill the value of "togetherness" in Israeli society. Buzaglo 
claimed Mizrahi protest movements held humanist values because these were enrooted in them, 
that they have been "polite" and "so very nice", and that Mizrahim in Israel have contained and 
'swallowed' a lot: as is required from the responsible adulti.  
The study and distribution of knowledge about the heritage of Sefarad in light of decolonial 
conceptions can help highlight the factors and facets in this heritage which can construct a 
political discourse that relies on non-colonial understanding between Jews and Arabs: 
emphasizing their common heritage and mutual influences, highlighting the ways the two 
religions contributed to each other's development, and analyze the variety of ecologies of 
knowledges that have existed between them throughout their common history, as old as Islam 
itself. This emphasis, if spread outside intellectual circles, might replace the strengthening 
emphasis in Israeli Zionist discourse on factors of rivalry and animosity between the two 
nations and religions. For instance, in the same conference, Rabbi Naftali Rotenberg suggested 
emphasizing Muslim influences in the canonical texts of Sephardic rabbis, which are being 
studied in toranic academies and in the formal education system everywhere in Israelii. A more 
daring and sensitive line of research might focus on 1948, and attempt to draw a common line, 
along decolonial concepts, to the Palestinian Catastrophe and the Mizrahi Rupture, which in 
this research emerged as a central experience of the Jewish Zionist nation. Shohat noted that 
the only legitimate Sephardic and Mizrahi claim regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has 
ever been "to parrot the standard rhetoric of population exchange" between the Palestinian 
refugees and Mizrahi Jews, an exchange which de-facto occurred within this regional crisis. As 
a political claim, it is highly problematic, because it erases the abyssal difference between these 
experiences and can be easily manipulated into negating the urgent claims of Palestinian 
refugees. However, it is possible and necessary to view the connection between the 
establishment of the state of Israel, the dispossession of Palestinians and the dislocation of 
                                                          
i Dr. Meir Buzaglo, lecture on 31.12.19, in the conference "The Value of Peace in Sephardic Jewry's Heritage and 
Peace in Hebrew Law" ('erekh ha-shalom be-yahadut sefarad le-doroteha ve-ha-shalom ba-mishpat ha-'ivri), Unión 
Sefardí Mundial, The Jerusalem Institute, Jerusalem (Hebrew).  
ii Rabbi Naftali Rotenberg, lecture on 31.12.19, in the conference "The Value of Peace in Sephardic Jewry's Heritage 
and Peace in Hebrew Law" ('erekh ha-shalom be-yahadut sefarad le-doroteha ve-ha-shalom ba-mishpat ha-'ivri), 
Unión Sefardí Mundial, The Jerusalem Institute, Jerusalem (Hebrew). 
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Mizrahi Jews in a non-reductive way (Shohat 1988). That means giving the memory of 1948 
as a regional Rupture a more central place in Israeli collective memory.  It had been practically 
taboo to express this perception in public at the time of this research, but I believe today Israeli 
national collective consciousness might be consolidated enough to handle these dark sides of 
1948.  
In recent decades, the foundations of Israeli coloniality has become rooted more profoundly in 
the mentality of its society, as they have been receiving a more heavily armored expression in 
middle-eastern politics. Since the post 9/11 security regime of a western low-intensity war on 
terrorism (Grinberg 2008, Offir & Azoulay 2009, Hajjar 2005), culminating with the recent 
combats with Daesh, the exterior political conditions have been the least favorable for 
establishing respect in Israeli society towards the environment surrounding it. This research 
demonstrated that historically, regional and international politics have had a significant 
influence over the Israeli political sphere, and the Mizrahi political sphere in particular. 
Therefore, the conclusions that arise from this research might suggest a potential role for Israeli 
intellectuals and activists: producing and distributing knowledge about revolts and protests that 
carry emancipatory horizons in the surrounding countriesi. Middle-eastern initiatives that 
promote respectful co-existence within heterogeneous communities and states might entail 
valuable lessons for the Israeli/Palestinian context, and contribute to a culture of peace that is 












                                                          
i See for instance Amir (2019).  It is with some delay that Hebrew press have started in the past couple of years to 
report and get informed about the Kurdish decolonial feminist regime constructed in Rojava. If this regime will not 
get annihilated by the warfare that threatens it, I hope information about and solidarity with Rojava can expand in 
Israel, to inspire political activists to imagine a reality for Israel/Palestine beyond European modern coloniality. 
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Palestine after World War I 
MAP II: 1947 
The United Nation Partition Plan 
 
 
MAP III: 1949 
The Armistice Agreements 
 
MAP IV: 1967 








 1895 1918 1936 1947 
Sephardim 40 19.4 9.2 9.5 
Mizrahim
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i Sources: Asaf (1970), Tractober (1958): 50, Aliav (1991): 17-39, Ben Arieh (1988): 7-8. UNSCOP Report (3.9.47), 
retrieved from: https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3 (last 
accessed on 20.6.16).  
ii The main groups here are: Maghrebim, Yemenites, Babylonians, Persians, Bukharians, Georgians, Caucasians, 
Kurds, Orphals and Aleppians (Bezalel 2007: 39). 
iii Source: Horowitz & Lissak (1979): 66, 117.  
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Table IV: The Sephardic faction in the parliamentii 
 
 
 1949 1951 1955 
Name of list National Union of 
Sephardim and the 
oriental sectors 
(headed by Bechor 
Chetrit) 
Sephardim and the 
oriental sectors old 
timers and immigrants 
(independent  list 
within General 
Zionists) 
Sephardim and the 
oriental sectors old 
timers, immigrants and 
non-party affiliates. 
(independent  list 
within General 
Zionists) 
Parliamentary seats 4 2 0 







                                                             
i Sources: Smooha (1978): 281; Tractober (1958): 30.  Yearly statistics of Israel (Shnaton statisti le-israel), 1963, 
1965. Central Bureau of Statistics. The population data regarding 1963 is based on approximations of the Central 
Bureau of Statistics from the 1961 census.   
ii Source: The Israeli Institute for Democracy: Election Data. Retrieved from: 
http://www.idi.org.il/%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%93%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%9B%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%91%
D7%97%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%92%D7%95%D7%AA/ (last 
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